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This exploratory study examines the concept of Honesty (H) in Managerial 
Performance Reporting (MPR) developing the concept of Honest Managerial 
Performance Reporting (HPR).  It identifies the level of honesty in manager’s 
performance reporting behaviour and how HPR influences aspects of Firm 
Performance (FP).  The work of Yang (2009) and Evans et al. (2001) provide academic 
consideration of this area, including insights into how this area may be studied.  
Practical, real-world examples of such issues are numerous, but the ‘Enron case’ is 
probably the most well-known (Ndofor et al. 2015). The study utilises datasets of 
managers, managerial performance reports and companies (Ghana Club 100) in its 
work and applies a mixed method approach using a variety of research instruments.  
 
Several theoretical approaches provide the bedrock for this study and a lens for 
examining different dimensions of the concept of honesty in MPR. These are Classical 
agency theory (Jenson & Meckling, 1976), a multi-actor stakeholders model that 
emanates from Stakeholder theory (Freeman 1984, Yang, 2009), Impression 
Management (Goffman, 1959), Legitimacy (Deegan, 2002) and Institutional (DiMaggio 
& Powell, 1983) theories. 
 
The thesis explores the level of and factors that influence honesty in managerial 
performance reporting (HPR). It also determines if HPR has any implication on Firm 
Performance (FP). From this, four areas of endeavour are formulated, and hypotheses 
developed to address the issues in each area, and the quest for answers and 
conclusions to these specifications are pursued. Specifically, the study uses 
1) Four experimental constructs to test manager’s voluntary preference for HPR.   
2) 265 structured questionnaires to explore the variables affecting HPR. 
3) Statistical analysis to examine the relationships between HPR and FP. 
4) Vignettes to document HPR practices among Ghana Club 100 companies.  
 
The results are the outcomes of the hypotheses and in turn, address the research 
issues that answer the primary research question leading to conclusions such as: - 
a) Regarding levels of honesty, managers are partially honest in MPR. 
b) HPR is affected by a range of factors that include environmental, organisational, 
economic and individual variables.  
c) The nature and level of relationship of HPR on FP is that HPR has a significant 
positive relationship with FP. 
 
The clear contribution of this study is that: -    
a) It uses managers rather than students in HPR studies confirming that managers 
voluntarily prefer HPR. 
b) It confirms that HPR is mainly influenced by factors within the control of 
‘decision-active’ stakeholders. 
c) It demonstrates that HPR can be improved if the pay-off for performance related 
bonuses is deferred rather than paid immediately. 
d) It provides evidence that HPR has a significant and positive effect on FP. 
 
These contributions provide new insight into Managerial Performance, MPR, HPR and 
the relationship with firm performance, while recognising some limitations. It also 
makes worthy contributions to our understanding of new contexts. 
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AN INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY  
 
This chapter provides an introduction and overview of the study which is an exploratory 
study of the concept of Honesty (H) in Managerial Performance Reporting (MPR) among 
Ghana Club 100 companies (GC100). The objectives/aims of this study are to examine 
the nature of honesty of managers in relation to Managerial Performance Reporting 
(MPR), it considers the factors that influence Honest Managerial Performance Reporting 
(HPR) and the nature of HPR’s relationship with Firm Performance (FP). This chapter 
identifies areas for academic and conceptual development, by identifying gaps in the 
literature which allows potential improvement of our understanding by formulating 
research questions, operationalised by the formulation of relevant hypotheses. Key 
concepts and terms used in this thesis are Honesty (H), Managerial Performance (MP), 
Managerial Performance Reporting (MPR), Honest Managerial Performance Reporting 
(HPR) and Firm Performance (FP). The concept of Honest Managerial Performance 
Reporting (HPR) is a conceptual development of Honesty in MPR seeking to 
operationalise a concept which may be considered in the broader context of Managerial 
Performance (MP) and Firm Performance (FP). A fuller exposition of such concepts and 
their frameworks is considered in chapter two.  
 
1.0. OPERATIONALISING KEY TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS.  
Honesty (H) is defined as the degree to which a report accurately reflects the underlying 
private information. Honesty, in this study, is categorised as accuracy rather than an 
ethical perspective (the intention to be “good”) and is perceived as a continuum construct 
with the possibility of differentiating more honest reports from less honest reports rather 
than a mere dichotomy between true or false (Hannan, Rankin & Towry, 2006).  
 
The term Managerial Performance Reporting (MPR) comprises the process leading to 
supply and disclosure of all information (financial and non-financial), as well as appraisal 
systems generated within the organisation for effective decision making and resource 
allocation as well as assess the performance of managers against set targets by those 
with authority to do so. It is premise on the assumption that in situations where ownership 
is divorced from management, managers self-report their performance vis-a-vis set 
targets and processes. Therefore, discussions of Managerial Performance Reporting 
(MPR) in this study are based on scenarios where managers self-report their 
performance. 
 
Performance is a broad word term and will be explored and explained in chapter two. 
Managerial Performance (MP) is a subset of this broad concept and is defined to include 
all measurable outputs of managers over a specified period and the extent to which such 
outputs support the achievement of set goals and encompasses the metrics of Firm 
Performance (FP). 
 
Honest Managerial Performance Reporting (HPR) for purposes of this study occurs when 
managers of an organisation purposefully report performance results to stakeholders 
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truthfully, responsibly and promptly vis-à-vis the underlying private information in their 
possession. Misreporting of managerial performance is considered as opposite to Honest 
Managerial Performance Reporting (HPR). Yang (2009), as well as Evans et al. (2001), 
apply similar conceptualisations. In this sense, misreporting of managerial performance 
covers all purposeful actions, whether legal or illegal, that are undertaken by managers 
of firms with ‘low values’ to mimic the performance of firms with ‘high value’ (Bar-Gill & 
Bebchuk, 2003 a & b). 
 
Yang (2009) explores the factors that affect HPR among public institutions using a dataset 
from Taipei. Yang (2009) applies SEM to eleven hypotheses and confirms a set of factors 
that interact to influence HPR. Data was collected using a questionnaire instrument with 
165 respondents. Evan et al. (2001) apply an experimental approach to retest the 
empirical evidence of managers preference for honesty and find confirmation that 
managers usually prefer to be partially honest than totally dishonest in MPR. Based on 
their findings, Evan et al. (2001) provide a theoretical hypothesis of the likely effect of 
HPR on FP (but do not test the hypothesis) and suggest an empirical test of this 
hypothesis by future researchers. However, even though Evans et al. (2001) focus on 
managerial behaviour, their dataset is from 28 university students rather than managers. 
Yang (2009) on the other hand measures perception about MPR and HPR using data set 
from employees rather than managers. Yang (2009) justifies this action because 
employee perception about managerial action is close to actual (Chun, 2004). Other 
scholars have used a similar approach and justified it because using employees avoids 
SDB as employees’ job security are not as closing tied to MPR as it is for managers (see 
for example Chun, 2004).    
 
The definition of Firm Performance (FP) in this study is grounded in Stakeholder Theory 
(Freeman, 1984) and based on multidimensional indicators (Glick, Washburn, & Miller, 
2005). Firm performance (FP) is also considered as a subset of organisational 
effectiveness and covers operational and financial outcomes of managerial action on a 
business entity (Venkatraman & Ramanujan, 1986). Organisational effectiveness is 
broader in that it covers other aspects of performance that relate to the functioning of the 
organisation as engagement in legitimate activities, resources acquisition, and 
accomplishment of stated goals (Cameron, 1986). The link between Managerial 
Performance (MP) and Firm Performance (FP) is hypothesised as being a significant 
contributor to the aim of achieving organisational effectiveness. 
 
The term GC100 will imply companies within the Ghana Club 100 for the year 2014. 
GC100 ranks organisations in Ghana based on a set of criteria (this will be explained in 
chapter two) and usually connotes the top companies within Ghana. 
 
In this exploratory study, the honesty of managers is assessed using experimental 
constructs with the propensity of managers to be Honest in Managerial Performance 
Reporting (HPR) being considered in Research Question One and operationalised and 
measured by hypotheses H1-H4. The assessment analysis uses an HPR score 
constructed based on data from experimental constructs. For each respondent, HPRIND 
= 1 - (actual pay-off claimed/ maximum possible pay-off) such that when a respondent 
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misreports to gain the maximum pay-off possible the answer is zero and when a manager 
reports the answer truthfully HPR will be one. For each experimental construct, HPR = 
∑HPRIND. This formula is mainly a weighted average of individual HPR scores (using 
maximum pay-off as weights) and allows for a perspective consideration of the magnitude 
of any specific misreporting (Evans et al., 2001). 
 
The factors that affect Honest Managerial Performance Reporting (HPR) are explored in 
two steps. First, hypotheses are used to confirm associational relationship (correlation) 
with HPR  (H5 -H15). This is acheived through parametric and non-parametric correlation 
test. Specifically, results from Pearson, Kendall and Spearman correlation tests are 
analysed. The use of parametric (Pearson Correlation) and non-parametric tests (Kendall 
and Spearman’s correlation tests) address the two school of thoughts about whether 
Likert Scale responses meet the requirement for an assumption of continum. The two 
tailed P values are used to confirm the extent of the significance of the hypothesised 
association between Honest Managerial Performance Reporting (HPR) and another 
variable. Following that structural equation modelling (SEM) is used to test how the 
hypothesised variables confluence to affect Honest Managerial Performance Reporting 
(HPR). Structural equation modelling (SEM) is therefore used to propose a model of a 
directional relationship between variables and HPR. In substance, HPR becomes the 
dependent variable in a multiple regression. Values for HPR and the proposed influencing 
variables are computed using principal component analysis (PCA). In performing the 
PCA, the extraction technique with varimax rotation is used and the latent root criterion 
that required that the eigenvalues are greater than one applied to select the appropriate 
number of factors. 
 
HPR’s relationship with Firm Performance (FP) is tested using various regression types 
(that control for halo effect) to confirm several proposed hypotheses (H16-H19). The 
theoretical basis for these hypotheses is explained in chapter three. In this relationship, 
HPR becomes the independent variable, and the measure of FP becomes the dependent 
variable. The choice of regression method is based on the nature of the dependent 
variable. Based on the nature of the dependent variable, Ordered Probity (i.e., marginal 
effects) or Logistic Binary (HPR coded as 0 or 1) regression methods are applied to 
measure the effect of HPR on employee satisfaction and employee perception of firm 
performance (FP).  
 
These two dimensions (employee satisfaction and employee perception of firm 
performance) are considered as measures of Firm Performance (FP).  This is because 
empirical evidence abounds of their direct and positive correlation with ‘objective’ 
measures of FP. Regarding ‘objective measures’ of Firm Performance (FP), Linear 
Regression with HPR coded in a Binary Form 0 or 1, and Robust Stepwise OLS at the 
respondent and organisational level are used to regress HPR on Return on Assets (ROA) 
and Return on Capital Employed (ROCE). P values at a 5% significance level are used 
to analyse the strength of the tested relationships. HPR aside Principal Component 
Analysis (PCA) was also computed based on the sum of scores on the Likert scale (for 
each respondent) and regressed to reveal the nature of the relationship.  
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1.1. BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION 
 
The Guardian Newspaper (23.10.14), reported that the Tesco CEO (Dave Lewis), barely 
three months into his new role, discovered a significant overstatement in accounting 
profits (for multiple prior years), more than £263 million. In the same edition, a retail 
analyst from Shore Capital (Darren Shirley) expressed concern about Delloite & Touche’s 
admission that the accounting misreporting goes beyond one financial year raising ‘all 
sorts of questions to our minds as to what has gone wrong in prior years’ (Guardian,23rd 
October 2014, p.7).  
 
The trend of purposeful misreporting of performance by managers has gained significant 
notoriety in recent periods with Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) of renowned companies 
such as WorldCom (Farzad, 2005), Tyco International (Eichenwald, 2005) and Adelphia 
Communications (Bishop, 2015; Fabrikant, 2005) convicted of accounting fraud. Other 
CEOs such as Calisto Tanzi of Italy’s Parmalat (Ndofor, Wesley & Priem, 2015) and 
Ramalinga Raju of India’s Satyam Computer services (Bhasin, 2015; Niazi, & Ali, 2015; 
Timmons & Wassener, 2009) have admitted to fraudulent misreporting of performance 
information during their tenure of organizational oversight. 
 
These recent spectacular corporate scandals have drawn stakeholders' attention to the 
managerial performance reporting (MPR hereafter) behaviour and decisions of business 
leaders (Mittendorf 2006; Birnberg 2011) in part because of the actual and perceived 
impacts of such business failures on national economies and individual lifes. The resulting 
curiosity about managerial behaviour choices in performance reporting dilemmas has 
resulted in an increased interest in research on honest managerial performance reporting 
(HPR hereafter) by business managers. Ndofor, Wesley & Priem (2015) and Rankin, 
Schwartz & Yong (2008) provide examples of studies that explore managerial choices in 
MPR. 
 
Agency theory predicts managerial action when there is a conflict between the interest of 
managers and shareholders (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) and for many, it provides a 
fundamental framework for studying and interpreting managerial ethical behaviour. In 
recent times agency theory has evolved into many streams (see Fig. 2.2 in chapter two) 
but is still predominantly defined by the classical approach which is often referred to as 
the Classical Agency Theory (CAT).  CAT suggests that managerial action is 
predominantly self-serving.  
 
Positive Accounting Theory (PAT) as expounded by Watts & Zimmerman (1978) is 
concerned with explaining and predicting actual accounting practices in contrast to a 
normative approach that seeks to prescribe what such accounting practices should be. 
Based on PAT, managerial action reflects in accounting and financial outcomes within 
financial statements.  
 
HPR is a relevant phenomenon that requires more attention due to the empirical 
confirmation of bonded rationality in decision making by most stakeholders (Simon, 
1989). Yang (2009), Gneezy (2002, 2004, and 2012), Gino & Pierce (2012) and Evan et 
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al. (2001) have been leading authors on HPR albeit from different perspectives. Evan et 
al. (2001) have focused on understanding managers preferred orientation about HPR 
hypothesising that managers voluntarily prefer HPR. Yang (2009) develops on Evan et 
al. (2001) and argues that even where managers prefer HPR, conducive conditions must 
exist for HPR to occur. Yang (2009) proceeds to develop and test a model about how 
selected variables confluence to affect HPR in public organisations. Gneezy (2002) 
focuses his studies on individual lying behaviour and predicts conditions that cause 
individuals to lie arguing that since organisations are made up of individuals, then 
understanding individual lying behaviour helps to understand HPR. Both Yang (2009) and 
Evan et al. (2001) request for replication studies within different geographical and cultural 
context. 
 
Gino & Pierce (2012) focus on theoretical dispositions for observed HPR behaviour 
applying economic, social and psychological theories to explain empirical findings of 
HPR, especially partial HPR. They evaluate concept such as ‘positive self-maintenance’, 
‘lying aversion’ etc. as possible explanations for observed behaviour. Recently, Gino & 
Pierce (2014) have argued that unfettered managerial discretion could lead to 
misreporting MPR and propose that in situations where there are strong possibilities and 
opportunities for managerial discretion to be used arbitrarily, such discretion should be 
constrained or a requirement imposed for multiple redundancies or diverse assessment 
from other managers. 
 
As stated earlier, Evans et al. (2001) develop a hypothesis about the likely effect of HPR 
on FP based on their experimental study. However, they did not proceed to test it and 
request further study of this phenomenon empirically. Even though the literature abounds 
with empirical studies of the influence of ethics (See Cameron et al., 2002 and Chun, 
2004) on ‘objective’ and ‘perceived’ measures of FP, there is no direct study of the effect 
of HPR on FP. Merkl-Davies (2011) summarises various studies that explore the effect of 
accounting fraud on FP. In most of these studies, the definition of accounting fraud is not 
clear.  In this study, I provide a theoretical basis to test the relationship between HPR and 
FP (in chapter three). Evans et al. (2001) argue that if empirical evidence can establish a 
relationship between HPR and FP, then MPR may receive more attention. 
 
In an MPR process, managers may have the opportunity to formulate their own reports 
on their performance.  Positive accounting research relies on agency theory (Ndofor, 
Wesley & Priem, 2015) to explain and predict managerial choices (Peltier-Rivest & 
Swisky, 2000).  Hence the Classical Agency Theory (CAT hereafter) underpins most 
empirical studies on HPR. CAT holds that agents (business managers) in possession of 
privileged private information (due to information asymmetry) are likely to use such 
information to their advantage even if it disadvantages the principal (Bowen, Rajgobal & 
Venkatathalan, 2008; Birnberg 2011). This study also adopts a positive approach but 
explores other theoretical depositions other than CAT.   
 
MPR is an organisational communication tool that is critical for accountability, reward and 
quality decision making about efficient resources allocation (Waterman, Rouse & Wright, 
2004; Bohte & Meier, 2000). However recent corporate failures and organisational 
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scandals have raised questions concerning the value of such performance reports on 
both theoretical and empirical grounds (Yang, 2009). If CAT is held to be true, for 
instance, then managers’ opportunistic behaviour may limit the value of MPR (Evans, 
Hannan, Krishnan & Moser, 2001) requiring a reconsideration of efforts to encourage 
HPR. 
 
Research has categorised the challenge with MPR into two areas or dimensions. The first 
concern is with the extent of honesty, quality, credibility, and truthfulness of such 
performance information, and the second matter relates to the insufficient use, misuse, 
gaming and creaming of managerial performance reports by crucial decision actors 
(Kettle, 2005). Yang (2009), attempts to link the two schools of argument by suggesting 
that, a likely cause for the misuse and non-use of managerial performance information 
may be the inability of stakeholders to trust the credibility of the performance information 
reported by agents (and hence one factor causes the other). In other words, the critical 
issue to deal with is to improve the relevance, credibility and ‘honesty’ of managerial 
performance information. Arguments like this, underscore the relevance of studies on 
HPR. 
 
Literature abounds with various strategies used by managers to obfuscate, hide, temper 
with and falsely communicate managerial performance information in a self-reporting 
scenario. See for example Merkl-Davies & Brennan (2011). The strategies used can be 
gouped into five broad categories that include:- 
  
1) Assigning wrong reasons for performance gaps or sterling performance 
2) Purposeful hiding or delaying of information 
3) Falsifying information 
4) Conscious use of technical jargons and complexity to hide performance gaps 
5) Tempering with conventional performance reporting policies and accounting 
standards.  
 
Based on this synthesis that emanates from literature, the concept of HPR, as developed 
in this study, captures a scenario of honest managerial performance reporting where 
managers consciously avoid the strategies enumerated above. In this regard, HPR 
captures a scenario of honest managerial performance reporting where (from the 
perspective of stakeholders) managers are truthful, ‘responsible’ and prompt in reporting 
managerial performance (explained further in chapter two). My approach has empirical 
backing. Yang (2009) and Hanson & White, (2003) used a similar approach.   
 
Studies about the factors influencing HPR must consider the individual attributes of 
agents as well as the organisational constructs that influence group dynamics in the 
workplace (Seeger & Ulmer, 2003). That is, while admitting that honesty as a concept 
emanates at the individual level, it is imperative to appreciate that information asymmetry 
entrenches the trend of managerial self-reporting of performance and honesty as a 
concept extends to the organisational level in managerial performance reporting. Indeed, 
critical learning from the various spectacular corporate failures has been the need to shift 
focus in management studies from individual morality and ethics to how organisational 
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environment and practices influence organisational communication (Seeger & Ulmer, 
2003). From an organisational theory perspective, it is necessary to consider HPR as a 
general organisational tendency or behaviour rather than just the sum of individual moral 
and ethical thresholds and preferences. A study of HPR as an organisational concept 
highlights the reality that HPR is often a decision made by a collection of organisational 
actors in senior management positions (Yang, 2009). The focus on organisational 
variables does not in any way suggest a diminished role for individual moral and ethical 
practices in scholarly discussions around HPR. Instead, it indicates that, at the very 
minimum, discussions around organisational communication should include 
considerations of organisational attributes, environmental variables and agent’s 
characteristics, rather than a mere extension of the summation of individual morality 
thresholds. This study (will be explained later) combines organisational and 
environmental variables (Flannery & May 2000; Schweitzer & Croson, 1999; Weaver et 
al., 1999) with individual characteristics of agents (Ford & Richardson, 1994; Leo et al., 
2000) in predicting HPR. Specifically, following on from Yang (2009), I test a model that 
postulates that HPR is dependent on an organisations environment (internal and 
external), organisational practices (stakeholder participation and organisational culture) 
as well as an individual’s level of moral development. My approach is supported by Devine 
(1966 p. 26) who claims that "The common core of scientific methods is the interworking 
of observation and deduction, and it should be clear that one can construct a predictive 
social theory only in conjunction with empirical and behavioural assumptions." 
 
1.2. LITERATURE GAP(S)  
 
Study of the key areas (honesty, managerial performance reporting (MPR) and honest 
managerial performance reporting-(HPR) has identified some gaps in understanding of 
the theory and practice.  Such ‘gaps’ of theory and practice were first identified by 
Scapens (1983) and has been a motivator of research to develop our understanding of 
the area. Literature gaps with HPR studies are summarised below and explained in detail 
in the remainder of this section. These gaps include: -  
 
1. Limited understanding from existing literature of the nature of honesty in MPR and 
its subsequent development into the area of HPR. 
2. Conflicting scholarly findings and mixed results which affects the ability to improve 
predictive value about HPR. 
3. Limited, minimal and inconclusive studies on the relationship between HPR and 
Firm Performance which affects stakeholder interest in HPR. 
4. Incomplete identification and assessment of the confluence of factors that affect 
HPR.  
5. Significant methodological difficulties with existing studies including the over-
reliance on CAT, the focus on individual rather than organisational constructs of 
HPR and the extrapolation of student ethical behaviour to explain organisational 
HPR. 
6. Limited studies on HPR in Africa, especially how agent’s ethical behaviour varies 
according to cultural background.   
 
       
8 
 
1.2.1. Methodological Difficulties 
 
Various methodological challenges have affected the predictive value of studies on MPR 
and HPR. In this sub section, I discuss three such challenges which are by no means 
exhaustive. 
 
The first issue is the conflation of individual morality thresholds with organisational HPR. 
As can be deduced from the earlier section, studies have focused on agents’ attributes, 
by assuming that, the individual preferences of managers or agents with regards to ethics, 
morality, and honesty provide an appropriate guide for the propensity for HPR. The 
current focus of studies on individual ethical thresholds to predict HPR may be 
problematic. In my opinion, what is relevant from an organisational growth perspective is 
HPR within an organisational setting rather than the mere honest orientation of 
individuals. Most studies have, in their construct of experiments focused on individual 
propensities and sought to generalise any findings onto organisational settings. While 
some studies have looked at this subject area from a cognitive view (Kohlberg 1969, 
1981), other studies have focused on behaviours.  For instance, Kohlberg (1969), 
proposes three stages of moral development to explain the propensity of individuals to 
exhibit high moral or ethical considerations in their actions. Xian, Roy & Chen (2006) 
follow other researchers to conceptualise cognitive orientation as the interplay between 
individualism (own or personal benefit) and collectivism (group benefit) by combining 
cognitive orientation (attitudes) with behavioural preferences. They suggest that 
incentives and control systems designed to encourage HPR can only be effective if they 
consider the unique cognitive orientation of agents.  Drach-Zahavy, (2004); Ramamoorthy 
& Flood (2004); Clugston, Howell & Darfman (2000); Triandis (1995); Hofstede (1991); 
Earley (1994) also conflate individual and organisational honesty and confirm Xian et al. 
(2006) assertion. Without any prior research, it may be difficult to disagree with this 
methodology. However, it may be more appropriate to design a research method that 
focuses on HPR as an organisational rather than an individual issue. 
 
Luft & Sheild (2010) agree with this approach and attribute the inconsistency in research 
findings to this anomaly. HPR, as conceptualised in this study, is an organisational 
phenomenon. This distinction is important because evidence exists to support the 
assertion that the dynamics of organisational action can mediate and temper various 
behavioural and cognitive orientation of agents (Yang, 2009). Luft & Shields (2010) call 
for additional research to identify these organisational relevant factors and to understand 
how people “trade-off.”  
 
Recent empirical studies, even though scanty, have attempted to introduce elements of 
organisational constructs into HPR studies (see for example Yang, 2009; Weaver et al., 
1991). However, these studies are limited in the generality of their conclusions due to an 
arbitrary selection of organisational constructs as study variables, or entirely focusing on 
organisational constructs without the inclusion of other relevant variables such as 
individual attributes (Flannery & May 2000).  
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Secondly and related to the above, the research approach establishing agents’ 
preference for HPR or otherwise has often been through laboratory experiments (Gibson, 
Tanner & Wagner, 2013) that uses students (Charness & Rabin, 2002) as respondents. 
The validity of such subject to population homogeneity assumptions has been questioned 
and supported in equal measure with no consensus. Increasingly, however, it is becoming 
apparent that students may react differently in scenarios of ethical dilemma compared to 
employees (Alpert, 1967; Van Loo, 1993; Brownell 1995).  Considering the significant 
implications of such subject surrogation assumptions, Birberg & Nath (1963) advice that, 
at the very least a control sample (of the appropriate group from the ‘real world’) be used 
in a pilot study or the real experiment. Most studies that use students as surrogates do 
not test on a control group and this affects the generalisation of their findings. There is a 
detailed discussion of the population to subject homogeneity in chapter three.  
 
Thirdly, the debate on the efficacy of the CAT, or any other theory for that matter, to issues 
of HPR, is by no means conclusive. For instance, whereas CAT confirms that 
misreporting of managerial performance by agents is deliberate and has adverse side 
effects, other theories, such as the stakeholder theory suggest that such distortion of 
performance reports is mostly not intentional and is mainly driven by the desire of agents 
to satisfy various stakeholders who have varied interest and focus. Stakeholder theory 
also suggests that multiple stakeholders inevitably result in information leakage that 
reduces any potential side effects of misreporting especially in an efficient market. The 
empirical evidence to support any of these theories is thin but evolving. As an indication, 
the failure of organisations such as Enron, and the reaction of stock markets do not 
suggest that multiple principals and stakeholders adequately ‘discount’ for misreporting 
in managerial self-reported performance information (Barefoot, 2002) nor do they confirm 
that agents get an adequate rewarded for HPR. Indeed, the costly attempt to align the 
interest of agents has not been successful in guaranteeing HPR as evidenced in the 
recent scandals in financial institutions (Berlau, 2015).  
 
The CAT is based on standard economic models of self-interested utility maximisation 
and emphasises the role of consequences in determining agent’s actions (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976; Simons 1995). The theory assumes that principals and agents all act in 
a manner to maximise their wealth or gain, often at the expense of the value and interest 
of other agents or the principal (Christensen & Feltham, 2005, 2012; Salterio & Webb, 
2006). Therefore agents will purposefully misreport performance for cogent reasons 
especially under conditions of complete anonymity, with no reputation effects and no 
interpersonal accountability (James Jr. 2002; Fumham & Taylor, 2004; Daley, Gigler, & 
Kanodia, 1990). Following from this, most models of HPR assume that managers’ report 
performance in a manner to maximise their utility for wealth because agents experience 
little or no disutility from lying. Therefore, managers with privileged information will lie to 
any extent possible to gain the maximum payoff possible from performance reporting.  
 
If the CAT is assumed to hold, then principals, aside from constant monitoring, must also 
seek to design contracts that rewards agents for HPR and reduces the reward for 
dishonesty, which can be costly (McColgan, 2001; Ndofor, Wesley & Priem, 2015). 
Ndofor, Wesley & Priem (2015) for instance suggest that: - 




‘Thus incentive-aligning stock option compensation intended to reduce agency monitoring 
costs and improve firm performance may when taken to the extremes, instead promote 
financial reporting fraud.’  
 
The scholarly contentions with Ndofor et al. (2015) assertion confirm the need for further 
studies on HPR. As an example, Hogan & Wilkins (2006) have previously expressed 
similar sentiments, but Jagolinzer & Larcker (2010) disagree with this assertion.  
 
Jagolinzer & Larcker (2010) disagreements notwithstanding, in recent times, the CAT 
model has faced criticisms due to its inability to adequately explain HPR (Miller & Whitford 
2006; Waterman & Meier 1998; Waterman, Rouse & Wright 2004). Indeed, the CAT that 
has guided most research in this area has been challenged and supported in equal 
measure (Peltier-Rivest & Swisky, 2000; DeAngelo et al., 1994). The controversy 
constitutes a broad debate in academia, with no consensus. The consequences of these 
counter positions are apparent in empirical studies that analyse HPR. For instance, there 
is a growing stream of studies that show that firms can benefit from considering a broader 
range of preferences than assumed by CAT (Church, Lynn & Kuang 2014). Waterman et 
al. (2004) for instance suggest that the CAT is dyadic and static resulting in a limited value 
for explaining and (or) predicting HPR. They suggest that new studies should explore 
creating a scenario of multiple principals and multiple agents in a continually evolving 
relationship where principals or agents may have superior information or seek to be 
opportunistic. If this view is accepted, then it significantly changes initial theoretical 
predictions about agent behaviour. Bohte & Meier (2000), also demonstrate that the 
existence of multiple principals is critical to the study of HPR because many principals 
compete for the attention of the agent and this, coupled with the scarcity of resources 
could results in goal displacement and hence misreporting.  
 
No study has attempted the use of a multi-actor principal-agent model in HPR studies in 
profit-oriented businesses. Yang (2009) applied a multi-actor principal-agent model in 
evaluating the factors that affect HPR in public organisations. It will seem from the 
developing literature that HPR decisions are guided instead by an equilibrium model that 
at all occasions weighs the perceived utility of any gains from HPR with the disutility of 
lying. Considering that the study of HPR is in part a study of human behaviour, it is logical 
to argue that agent’s utility functions will be a function of different variables that will evolve. 
If this is the case, then a close to the real situation in determining the factors that affect 
HPR is, in fact, a study of complex variables that interplay between agent’s preferences, 
the external environment, and the organisation. This approach to the study of the causes 
and effects of HPR has received scant attention in the literature. Instead, complex models 
and experiments designed to measure student morality have been generalised to explain 
HPR with little predictive and empirical value to organisations. Whereas most principals 
and regulatory bodies have not spared effort in ensuring HPR (Abrahamson & Park, 1994) 
they have not been helped by the inconclusiveness, and sometimes, contradiction, of 
studies on HPR.  
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1.2.2. The Inconclusiveness Of Findings & Scholarly Contestation 
 
Whatever the approach adopted for HPR studies, what is remarkable is the general non-
conclusiveness of various studies in the academic literature concerning HPR. Current 
studies on HPR are scattered, incomprehensible and inconclusive. These disagreements 
affect the quest to build a theoretical foundation on HPR to guide future research and 
drive an agenda towards resolving critical and pertinent issues that are relevant to social 
development (Lindsay, 1995).  
 
Multiple studies have disagreed on methodology (discussed above), interpretation of 
results, as well as conclusiveness of findings. There is even disagreement on the effects, 
if any, of HPR. This non-conclusiveness that has characterised HPR studies is probably 
because often the theoretical construct used in these studies are incomplete and do not 
appropriately measure the reality imposed by multi-person and multi-period equilibriums. 
The theoretical constructs also exclude considerations of game theory solutions as well 
as strategic factors that are relevant in the formulation of a formal theory (Lev & Ohlson, 
1982; Flannery & May 2000). The inconsistencies that impose limitations with existing 
studies are discussed in chapter two.  
 
As an example, experimental constructs have resulted in contestations about the validity 
of findings and conclusions. For instance, Battigalli, Charness, & Dufwenberg, (2013) 
disagree with Gneezy (2005) conclusions and argue that: -  
 
“the sender is similarly forced to move the receiver’s beliefs, and through anticipation, this 
shapes the sender’s behaviour in line with the observed treatment effects.”  
 
 Evans et al., (2001), also disagree with Baiman & Lewis (1989) methodology and are of 
the view that the attempt to guide subjects to use the expected monetary value 
maximisation approach may have saliently influenced subjects in their choice of options. 
Also, Evans et al. (2001) question whether Baiman and Lewis (1989) empirical findings 
are consistent with their assertion that there is no significant benefit from exploiting an 
agent’s reluctance to lie. Baiman & Lewis (1989) identify methodological difficulties with 
Hegarty and Sims (1978) experiment that examined a cost-benefit approach to ethical 
behaviour. According to Baiman & Lewis (1989), the experiment did not control or 
measure relevant variables in a cost-benefit model such as risk preference, penalties, 
and rewards (further discussions of the various contestations is in Chapter Two).  
 
Aside from the contestations and despite the increasing number of studies on HPR, the 
critical questions remain unanswered. These include the following. 
 
1.2.3. Limited Evidence About Factors That Affect HPR 
 
The empirical evidence on agents’ preference for HPR and the underlying reason(s) is 
still inconclusive. Evidence of agents predisposition or otherwise to HPR is at the heart of 
the CAT that has provided the bedrock for most studies in HPR as well as the construct 
of employment contracts, albeit with inconclusive findings. While there is a distinct appeal 
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to explain managerial choice with the agency theory and contractual relationships, the 
empirical validity to back this approach is complicated to substantiate (Glinkowska & 
Kaczmarek 2015; Lev and Ohlson 1982). That is, is HPR guided by the moral 
development theory of Kohlberg; the threshold model of Baiman and Lewis (1989); the 
types model of Koford and Pennon (1992); the trade-off model of Brickley et al (1997); 
the threshold hurdle model of Evans et al (2001); the heterogeneous preference for 
truthfulness model of Gibson et al (2013); or a varied combination of the various models 
enumerated above? Resolving issues around the theoretical framework for HPR is critical 
in the advancement of social development and the prescription of solutions. As an 
example, if empirical evidence suggests a general preference for HPR, thereby 
challenging the CAT, then most employment contracts that reward HPR reporting from 
managers are costly but ineffective.  
 
Secondly, empirical research still disagrees on the general factors that can influence 
HPR. Various factors, including but not limited to, cultural differences, level of 
sophistication of information systems, management maturity, contracts constructs, owner 
knowledge and involvement, the extent of national development, extent of market 
efficiency etc., have been suggested to influence HPR (Church, Lynn, & Kuang 2014; 
Mass & van Rinsum 2011). Empirical evidence on the causes of HPR is critical to 
mitigating any potential adverse effects from deliberate obfuscation by managers in self-
reporting underlying private information on performance. 
 
1.2.4. Limited Exploration Of The Relationship Between HPR & FP 
 
Studies on the relationship between HPR and firm performance are still inconclusive and 
have received little attention. Waterman, Rouse & Wright (2004), suggest that where 
markets are efficient, stakeholders can effectively discount for information asymmetry in 
performance reports. Also, in the long run, in a multi-actor principal-agent relationship, 
information leakage will reduce information asymmetry. If deliberate obfuscation by 
managers in self-reporting underlying private information on performance indeed has no 
bearing on capital allocation decisions and hence firm performance, then it may be 
unwarranted to dedicate significant resources to mitigate it. Cameron et al. (2004) argue 
that studies on virtues and ethics will receive more scholarships and organisational 
support if a positive relationship with firm performance is empirically confirmed. Clifton 
(2003) explains that perhaps the limited attention paid by practising managers to HPR 
could be because managers assume very little association between HPR and economic 
outcomes for which they are responsible (Walsh, 2002; Baumeister, Bratslavsky, 
Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001). 
 
1.2.5. Limited Studies In Africa 
 
Due to globalisation, developing countries have attracted significant participation in their 
private sector mainly due to the success of market reforms and the publicised success of 
global companies that have dared to invest in developing countries (Agtmael, 2007). 
Developing countries are no more as a “small and yet risky niche” that is only relevant as 
a spice of investment but rather have assumed a more central and mainstream role in 
       
13 
 
investment decisions. This view is because of the suggestions of over-saturation of 
investments opportunities in major industrial countries. Developing countries in recent 
times have experienced reducing risk (both market and political), lower market volatility, 
and sound economic policies. Additionally, corporate enterprises are becoming globally 
competitive (an example is the recent acquisition of Range Rover by the Tata Group with 
phenomenal success) and more transparent with comparably sound financial quality. The 
increase in transparency has allowed for improvement in business valuations (an 
example is the recent inclusion of business enterprises in Africa in the Forbes various 
valuation matrixes). 
 
Developing countries are also exhibiting signs of impressive economic growth and 
recovery due to improved macroeconomic discipline, increasing foreign reserves and 
improving the financial health of corporate enterprises (Agtmael, 2007). These 
improvements have made developing countries less prone and perhaps more resilient to 
economic crisis and economic shocks as evident in the recent global downturn. Indeed, 
many developing countries now have relatively small state participation in the economy 
than some major industrial countries (Agtmael, 2007). Corporate governance, 
transparency, and disclosures while still inferior to the developed world are also rapidly 
improving with more companies adopting international benchmarks and practices such 
as internationally recognised accounting practices.  
 
The ‘corporate sector is increasingly becoming the main conduit of development finance, 
with the risks of rapid reversals of financial flows when corporate performance does not 
meet market expectations’ (Litan et al., 2003; page 449). Therefore, it is becoming ever 
more important for key stakeholders, including policymakers, to be aware of the scope of 
credibility of performance reports and hence HPR  (the next chapter provides a detailed 
discussion of the likely implications of HPR studies on strengthening capital markets). 
That this is difficult to achieve has been duly underscored by the recent corporate 
scandals in major industrial countries and calls for further empirical studies on the 
phenomenon of HPR within developing countries.  
 
Despite this glaring need, however, studies on HPR, where they have occurred, have 
mostly been in developed Western Countries. In contrast, the phenomenon of HPR in 
developing countries remains largely unexplored. Even when research has occurred, the 
focus has been on HPR of Multinational Companies (MNCs’) to the neglect of local 
companies. No clear empirical findings exist to explain why and how local firms in 
developing countries engage in HPR.  There is a growing body of research evidence that 
highlights the distinctive nature of ethical issues in developing countries and the fact that 
moral behaviour varies cross-culturally, as well as, based on national characteristics (Wiig 
& Kolstad, 2010, Huang & Wu, 1994; Thorne & Saunders; 2002). Hence there is a need 
for careful consideration in decisions that attempt to extrapolate HPR constructs 
(including practices) developed in the literature so far to in emerging economies. 
 
Given the above arguments, the current study seeks to answer the following question:
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1.3. RESEARCH QUESTION 
 
“Should stakeholders be concerned about managers’ honesty in managerial 
performance reporting (MPR) and if so what are the factors that influence this 
behaviour?”   
 
Answering the research question will require answers to the following sub-questions. 
  
RSQ11 In a self-reporting MPR environment do managers have a preference for 
being honest? 
RSQ2 Are there implications for HPR? 
RSQ3 Can we identify the factors that influence HPR? 
RSQ4 Is there a relationship between HPR and FP? 
RSQ5 Can we identify the main features of managerial behaviour in HPR? 
 
1.4. RESEARCH AIM AND OBJECTIVES  
 
The research aims, and objectives are to identify the level of honesty in MPR 
conceptualised in the concept of HPR, the factors that influence HPR, the relationship 
with FP and HPR practice and behaviour amongst managerial groups. Specifically, the 
thesis seeks to achieve the following aims and objectives by answering the research 
questions RQ1, 2, 3, 4 and 5. 
 
OBJ12 To reassess the empirical evidence of managers’ preferences for being 
honest in reporting their performance. 
OBJ2 To identify and evaluate, from a stakeholder perspective, the implications of 
HPR. 
OBJ3 To identify factors that influence HPR.  
OBJ4 To provide evidence of the relationship between HPR and FP. 
OBJ5 To identify the main features of managerial behaviour in HPR among 
managerial groups within the Ghana Club 100. 
 
 
                                                          
1 RSQ means Research Sub Question 
2 OBJ means Objective 
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Also, suggestions and recommendations will be made to guide research, policy and 
practice on HPR.  
 
1.5. SIGNIFICANCE AND IMPORTANCE OF THE RESEARCH 
 
The broad contributions of this thesis are outlined below and discussed in the subsequent 
paragraphs of this section. Points One to Four enumerate on how this study adds to the 
existing literature while Points Five and Six discuss other relevance of this study. 
 
This study will contribute to improving the existing literature about MPR and HPR through 
confirming existing findings and adding new findings. Specifically, this study adds to 
existing literature because 
1) The study provides an operational definition of honesty of managers (within an 
organisational context) in their MPR and HPR practice which is helpful for 
standardised comparison and synthesis of various researches as well as 
meaningful interpretations of findings. 
2) This study identifies and provides clarity on the relevant organisation factors/ 
variables that influence HPR. In this regard, the study helps to address the 
challenge of scanty literature about variables that affect HPR. 
3) The study also explores the relationship between HPR and FP. Findings from this 
study are therefore relevant in decision making about organisational effectiveness. 
4) Also, considering that existing studies have had mixed results and been fraught 
with methodological difficulties, this study makes an additional contribution to 
literature because it studies HPR from a new and different perspective. 
Specifically, the study utilises new methods and explores new areas within a 
different cultural context and hence the findings from this study are essential for 
the critical mass required to support theorisation of HPR and answers the call for 
new studies about MPR and HPR to focus on different cultural context. 
5) Findings from this study will also contribute to policy and practice on whether 
performance related bonus schemes align the interest of agents (i.e., managers) 
with principals (i.e. Shareholders). 
6) The findings from this research can also be useful to guide multinational 
organisations (MNCs) with insights on inculcating ‘standardised’ core ethical 
values throughout the organisation (Desai & Rittenburg, 1997). This contribution is 
because invariably this study explores, by replication, an ‘ethical phenomenon (i.e., 
HPR)’ within a different cultural contest (Ghana in Africa) and the results may 
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1.5.1. Adding To Existing Literature 
 
Considering the mixed results regarding studies on HPR, further research is required to 
establish relevant theories on HPR that can guide policy and business decisions, 
particularly for efficient resource allocation. Granted that HPR is critical to managerial 
learning, business decisions and performance-based accountability very little exist in the 
literature on the determinants of HPR, and no research exists on the effect of HPR on 
firm performance. This study adds to existing literature on HPR by performing extensive 
studies on various variables of HPR, while improving on identified methodological 
difficulties in existing studies (See chapter three). Therefore, aside from providing new 
perspectives and evidence on existing empirical findings, I explore previously unexplored 
areas to enrich the academic literature on HPR. 
 
Regarding new perspectives, using data from a developing country called Ghana, this 
study tests the efficacy of CAT in predicting the propensity of managers for HPR by 
investigating if employees are willing to manipulate private information in their possession 
to gain a performance-based monetary reward. Ghana offers the opportunity to test HPR 
within a different culture as well as a national boundary.  This study will be the first to 
reassess the empirical evidence of agents’ preference for HPR in Africa using 
experiments.  In doing so, the research will attempt to mitigate the methodological 
challenges identified with previous research. Admittedly, nations and national boundaries 
are not equivalent to culture (Hofstede, 1991) but they offer an appropriate unit for 
comparison even if on a general level and have been ‘implicitly accepted as operational 
definitions of culturally distinct units (Adler, 1997, page 40). Compared to Western Europe 
and the USA, Ghana is a relatively conservative society (Hofstede, 1991) with ‘high 
taboos’ about anti-social behaviour. I expect that individuals within Ghanaian culture will 
exhibit relatively higher thresholds of honesty compared to Western Europe. 
 
This new perspective is essential because a new approach to research methodology 
argues that the cultural context of Africa requires a new approach to developing a 
methodology to guide research enquiry (Asante 1987; 1990; Reviere 2001). Following on 
from Asante’s (1990) principles of Ma’am and Nommo, Reviere (2001) proposes five 
cannons of ukweli, utuliva, uhaki, ujamaa and Kujitoa as a new criterion for research 
studies into human behaviour. While most of these cannons may be considered 
ambiguous and arbitrary, there lies within this assertion of Afro-centrism the fact that 
Africa as a place of inquiry presents an intriguing set of challenges and opportunities. 
Africa offers an opportunity for new knowledge that, perhaps, may have a more significant 
positive correlation with social development than in advanced countries.  
 
In line with Afro-centrism, if the purpose of research is to promote social development 
and human progress, then a compelling case arises for continuous empirical studies in 
Africa.  Hopper, Tsamenyi, Uddin, & Wickramasinghe (2009) argue that even though 
many contextual factors and issues are not unique to developing countries, developing 
countries are still relatively distinctive and it will be wrong to categorise research on 
developing countries as ‘exotic and irrelevant’ to mainstream accounting studies (p. 514) 
 
       
17 
 
Various researchers agree on the need for replication and new studies in Africa. For 
instance, Hopper et al. (2009) suggest that research in accounting in developing countries 
must be encouraged and such research should aim at fostering the understanding that 
promotes local solutions to local challenges rather than the wholesale adoption of western 
proposed solutions influenced by ‘alien values.’ Needles (1976) argues that scholarships 
in accounting must take into consideration the social, political and economic environment, 
particularly in developing countries.  Mirghani (1982) argues for wider studies in 
accounting that incorporate indigenous models to mitigate uncertainty in planning. Yang 
(2009) suggests caution in the application of ‘foreign theories’ to developing countries 
that have different political and social systems. Considering the relevance of scholarships 
in accounting on developmental issues such as governance, planning, employment and 
quality of life (Hopper et al., 2009); studies in accounting could contribute to the general 
debate about how governance and control can better serve the humanitarian 
development. Without more studies in accounting in developing countries, Hopper et al. 
(2009) argue that ‘local politics and culture’ can transform accounting systems into 
mechanistic ‘tools of cohesion or external legitimacy rather than rational control’ and 
accountability.   
 
Also, in investigating the factors that affect and the effects of HPR, I propose and apply a 
new perspective of a multi-actor principal-agent model to test various hypotheses on HPR 
developed from theoretical models derived from social sciences. The findings from this 
approach vis-à-vis the traditional principal-agent model enrich the literature.  
 
Additionally, and regarding previously unexplored areas, studies on the extent and 
strength of any relationship between firm performance and HPR is still in its early stages 
of development requiring more studies that apply different methods and uses different 
variables.  This study contributes to the literature by providing further evidence of the 
extent of the relationship between HPR and various indices of firm performance. 
Methodologically, unlike prior studies this study controls for the halo effect, and other 
variables that have been established to affect actual or perceived firm performance. This 
is the first study that attempts to determine the extent of the relationship between firm 
performance and HPR. 
 
The current level of our understanding on critical variables about HPR is not clear, and 
my study seeks to provide a better understanding, identify relationships and develop the 
area using improved and relatively larger datasets and better subjects, i.e., managers. 
Particularly, the operational definitions of managerial honesty, MPR and HPR provided in 
this study are helpful for comparison of various studies and their results. This provides a 
useful contextual view. 
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1.5.2. Guide On Inculcating Global Ethical Policies Across Nations (and Cultures). 
 
While variation in ethical behaviour based on culture and national characteristics has 
received scholarly attention; scant attention has been given to ‘understanding how culture 
affects the ethical reasoning process that predicates individual’ ethical actions (Thorne 
and Saunders). The understanding of how agent’s ethical behaviour varies according to 
the cultural background is important to guide MNCs in their continuous challenge to 
balance the desires for standardised global policies with appropriate considerations of 
specific norms of various cultural context (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1998). It is also helpful in 
MNCs drive to inculcate core values throughout the organisation (Desai & Rittenburg, 
1997).  Since different cultures lead to different ways of perceiving the world (MacDonald, 
2002), it is logical to expect that culturally differences will affect ethical reasoning and 
hence ethical behaviour. Indeed, research has confirmed that individuals from different 
cultures differ in their sensitivity to ethical situations (Cohen, Pant, & Sharp, 1992), 
perception (Dubinsky, Jolson, Kotabe, & Lim, 1991), ethical values (Izraeli, 1998) and 
ethical behaviour (Lysonski & Gaidis, 1991). Most experimental studies on HPR have 
however been within European countries and the USA. Even in Europe, various cultures 
have provided different findings. As an example, Hurkens & Kartik (2006) attempted to 
replicate, in Spain, Gneezy’s (2005) experiment (conducted in Israel) and discovered 
substantial differences in behaviour between their subjects and Gneezy’s subjects 
regarding the interpretation and use of privileged private information. Also, Hobson et al. 
(2011) contend that individual personal beliefs and ethical values influence HPR. Since 
personal values and ethical values are influenced by many variables including culture 
(Gibson et al., 2013; Gino & Pierce, 2010), then, an empirical study of HPR within a 
different cultural context such as Ghana enriches the literature. Hopper et al. (2009) argue 
that behaviour is governed not just by economics but as well, by a combination of 
knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, and custom known as culture. 
 
1.5.3. Contribution To Accounting Policy And Practice 
 
This thesis also contributes to policy and practice by studying the efficacy of the CAT vis-
à-vis managers’ disposition for HPR. By doing so, it addresses critical issues regarding 
the effectiveness of expensive but widely used employment contracts that seeks to align 
the interests of agents with principals as well as the efficacy of various performance-
related bonuses. The findings (discussed in chapter four) will contribute immensely to 
business practice and policy. Ndofor et al., (2015) argue that misreporting of managerial 
performance information is a qualitatively different and potentially more egregious form 
of opportunism compared to simple shirking or manipulation of strategic actions because 
HPR is ‘fundamental to robust and efficient equity markets’ (page 1789).  
 
Considering that this study explores the relationship between HPR and FP, confirms the 
factors that influence HPR and identifies managerial behaviour in HPR, it provides 
empirical evidence to improve managerial performance and hence overall organisational 
effectiveness. 
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In exploring the above-mentioned objectives, this study applies a variety of methods 
including replication studies. Chenhall (2003) argues that variations in findings limit the 
coherent accumulation of conclusions and proposes that new studies, as well as 
replication studies (perhaps in other cultures), are required to develop sufficient ‘critical 
mass’ to confirm existing findings, acquire new knowledge and to enhance confidence. 
Lindsay (1995) agrees with Chenhall’s (2003) assertion that replication studies are 
relevant to improve “the validity and reliability of findings and thereby provide a strong 
base to move forward by way of model development”, Chenhall (2003, page 166). 
 
1.6. STRUCTURE OF THE RESEARCH 
 
The structure of the study is outlined below and depicted by the diagram beneath (Figure 
1.1). There are five chapters in this research: - 
 
Chapter one introduces the background to the study, identifying the research question(s), 
research objectives, the significance of the research and overview of the study.   
 
Chapter two considers existing literature of the key concepts in this study and provides a 
theoretical framework for the study discussing CAT, Stakeholder theory, Legitimacy 
theory, Impression management theory and Institutional theory and how they are utilised 
in this study.   
 
Chapter three provides a rationale for the research approach, design and methodology 
as well as highlights the individuality of Ghana as a research location. In this research, I 
adopt different methods for each of the objectives (mixed method), as such, I discussed 
the relative benefits and limitations of each method in detail. I attempt to improve on the 
methods used by various researchers in this area of study and show how and why I do 
so.   
 
Chapter four reports the analysis and the results/findings of the study in relation to the 
objectives of the study. It addresses RSO1 & OBJ1 by analysing the findings of 
experimental constructs to understand manager’s preference for being honest in reporting 
their performance. It assesses the implications of HPR from a stakeholder perspective 
(RSO2 & OBJ2) and discusses the results of the factors that influence HPR to address 
RSO3 & OBJ3. It confirms the relationship between HPR and FP (RSO4 & OBJ4) and 
identifies the main features of managerial behaviour in HPR among managerial groups in 
GC100 (RSO5 & OBJ5). Specifically, the chapter discusses the results of: - 
 
5) A group of managers, who are tested under four experimental constructs on their 
honesty in MPR and resulting in their propensity to practice HPR.  By implication, 
the results of these experiments provide a partial test of the efficacy of the CAT in 
predicting managerial self-reporting performance behaviour. 
6) A dataset of 265 managers through closed ended structured questionnaires used 
to explore variables affecting HPR. 
7) The relationships between HPR and FP examined using statistical regression.  
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8) Five vignettes used to document HPR practices among managerial groups in 
GC100 companies.  
Chapter five presents the conclusions of the research providing answers to the research 
questions posed, meeting the stated aims and objectives of the study.  It highlights the 
research’s contributions, its limitations, where further research may be directed and 
where my research endeavours will be focussed.   
 
Table 1.1 depicts the linkages between research question, research objectives, methods, 
matrices and hypotheses while Figure 1.1 illustrates the overall structure of this study. 
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Table 1.1: Linkages Between Research Questions, Research Objectives, Methods, And Hypothesis 
Research Question Research Objective Method/Approach Metrics & 
Hypothesis 
RSQ1 In a self-reporting MPR 
environment do managers have a 
preference for being honest? 
OBJ1 To reassess the empirical 
evidence of managers’ 
preferences for being honest in 
reporting their performance. 
Experiments (Four 
constructs) 
Compute an HPR 
Score to test  
H1 – H4 
RSQ2 Are there implications for HPR? OBJ2 To identify and evaluate, from a 
stakeholder perspective, the 




Scale scores for 
analysis. No 
Hypothesis  
RSQ3 Can we identify the factors that 
influence HPR? 




Use 5% two tailed 
P Values to test  H5 
- H15 
RSQ4 Is there a relationship between 
HPR and FP? 
OBJ4 To provide evidence of the 
relationship between HPR and FP. 
Questionnaire + 
Statistical Analysis 
Use 5% two tailed 
P Values to test  
H16 - H19 
RSQ5 Can we identify the main features 
of managerial behaviour in HPR? 
OBJ5 To identify the main features of 
managerial behaviour in HPR 
among managerial groups within 
the Ghana Club 100. 
Questionnaire & 
Limited Interviews 
Data analysis and 
aggregation using 
Vignettes with Four 
Scenarios 
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Figure 1.1: Diagrammatic Depiction Of The Structure Of The Thesis 
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1.7. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter provides an introduction to the nature of the study, the operational 
definitions of key terms and the managerial content. The background provided in this 
section emphasises challenges with studies on HPR.  This has relevance to 
developing countries and those in Africa. This chapter idenitifies theory –practice gaps 
where this study seeks to provide a better understanding of the key concepts. The 
research questions identify the objectives of the research. I proceed to highlight the 
significance of this study and presents the chapter layout of the thesis (depicted 
graphically) briefly outlining the contents of each chapter. The study considers the 
current level of the concepts of honesty, MPR and HPR reflected in the academic 
debate, characterised by contestations among scholars about methodology, 
contradicting views and the range of findings, which provides my motivation to develop 
a clearer understanding of this area.
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          CHAPTER TWO 
HONESTY IN MANAGERIAL PERFORMANCE REPORTING: – 




This chapter discusses the operational definitions for Performance, Honesty (H), MPR, 
and HPR. It also reviews existing empirical studies on MPR and HPR, revealing the 
contradictions, methodological difficulties and gaps. A theoretical framework and 
contextual literature about Ghana is also discussed to provide context for the ensuing 
study.  
 
2.1. DEFINITION OF KEY TERMS AND CONCEPTS 
 
2.1.1. Defining Honesty (H). 
 
The empirical literature on managerial performance disclosure use the words 
truthfulness, truth-telling, honesty, and ethical interchangeably, and as opposite 
concepts to the words lying, deception, misreporting, dishonesty and unethical 
behaviour.  
 
Mitchell (1986) defines deception, as “a false communication that tends to benefit the 
communicator.”  Therefore humans, plants and animals practice deception. Cozzolino 
& Widmer (2005) suggest deception by orchids and Szamado (1999) studies 
deception in animals. Mitchell (1986) definition implies that lies increase the liars’ pay-
off. Gneezy (2005) disagrees with this definition due to its limited scope, particularly 
because by Mitchell (1986) definition ‘innocent lies’ such as unconsciously and 
mistakenly misleading others will be classified as deception. 
 
Krauss (1981) defines deception as “an act that is intended to foster in another person 
a belief or understanding which the deceiver considers to be false.” However, Ekman 
(1992) disagrees with this definition and argues that an appropriate definition of 
deception should exclude the provision of prior notice of the intention to lie. Ekman 
(1992) offers an alternative definition suggesting that deception is “a deliberate choice 
to mislead a target without giving any notification of the intent to do so.” Vrij (2001) 
argues that liars are not always successful at misleading others, and hence a proper 
definition of deception will be “a successful or unsuccessful deliberate attempt, without 
forewarning, to create in another a belief, which the communicator considers to be 
untrue.” 
 
Sutter (2009) argues that truth telling should be considered as deception if the sender 
chooses the true message with the expectation that the receiver would not follow the 
sender’s true message. 
 
Mazar et al. (2008) interpret honesty as the compliance with a given rule where there 
is an opportunity to cheat. Therefore, honest behaviour must have a costly effect, and 
this is referred to as the ‘Handicap Principle’ (Szamado; 2011; Zahavi 1975; Zahavi 
1977; Grafen 1990).  
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The empirical definition of honesty includes “a tendency not to lie, cheat or steal.” 
(Grover 2005, page 148) and “the refusal to fake reality or pretend that facts are other 
than they are, whether to himself or others.” (Smith 2003, page 518). In this study, I 
follow Hannan, Rankin & Towry (2006) and define honesty as accuracy rather than an 
ethical perspective (the intention to be “good”). Honesty is the degree to which a report 
accurately reflects the underlying private information.  Honesty is perceived as a 
continuum with the possibility of differentiating more honest reports from less 
honest reports rather than a mere dichotomy between true or false. 
 
2.1.2. Honest Managerial Performance Reporting (HPR). 
 
Hannan et al., (2006) suggest that in decentralised organisations, managers often 
possess private information (such as local business environment, competitor 
positioning and resource cost) that could be valuable to their principals. Following on 
from the CAT, if goals are misaligned, managers may withhold or misrepresent such 
information to maximise their self-interest. HPR studies are relevant in accounting 
because in an accountability setting where managers’ report private information 
upwards, managers often trade off the benefits of appearing honest with the benefits 
of misrepresentation. 
 
From the perspective of organisational theory, HPR exists when an organisation or its 
leaders purposefully report performance results to stakeholders truthfully, responsibly 
and promptly (Yang, 2009). Yang (2009), offers a comprehensive definition for HPR. 
I adopt Yang (2009) view as a conceptualisation of honest managerial performance 
reporting (HPR) and suggest that 
 
HPR occurs when managers of an organisation purposefully report 
performance results to stakeholders truthfully, responsibly and in a timely 
manner vis-à-vis the underlying private information in their possession. 
Purposefulness involves avoiding the intentional or deliberate, misstatement or 
omission of material facts, or performance data (when there is an opportunity to lie, 
i.e. the handicap principle), which is misleading and when considered with all the other 
information made available would cause the user to change or alter his or her 
judgment or decision.  Usually, the objective is to mislead stakeholders about the 
underlying economic performance of the company or to influence contractual 
outcomes that depend on disclosed managerial performance.  
Truthfulness measures the extent of accuracy in the disclosure of unobservable 
managerial behaviour as well as underlying private information.  It involves avoiding 
deliberate obfuscation, lying or wrongly attributing performance results.  
 
Responsible reporting involves the extent of understandability of performance reports 
and covers situations where performance reports are presented clearly and concisely 
and complies with relevant organisational and regulatory policies, rules, laws and 
practices.  
 
Timeliness relates to decision usefulness and refers to the time it takes to provide 
performance information. Timely MPR occurs when managers make information 
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available to decision makers before it loses its capacity to influence decisions (IASB, 
2008).  
 
According to Yang (2009), although truthfulness is central to the definition of HPR, 
being timely and responsible is equally relevant, because what matters is not 
“objective” or “absolute honesty” but stakeholder’s perception of the agent’s honesty. 
He recognises that stakeholder perspectives and judgments are always subjective.   
 
While the term “honesty” may be considered strong, the conceptualisation and 
measurement in this research work focus on the operational definition re “honest 
managerial performance reporting” and only attempts to capture the potential serious 
consequence of the possibility that top management may deliberately not 
appropriately report performance problems.  Bohte & Meier (2000) used “cheating” to 
capture managerial practices that political principals do not desire. In the opinion of 
this researcher, the word “cheating” seems inappropriate for this study mainly because 
it encompasses activities outside managerial performance reporting (Yang; 2009) and 
hence may lead to conflation and confounding. Hosmer (1995) confirms that it is not 
uncommon for organisational theory scholars to treat “honesty” and “integrity” as 
synonymous and opposite to dishonesty, lying or misreporting. However, Murphy 
(1993) argues that encouraging HPR and deterring misreporting of managerial 
performance in an organisation represent two different managerial challenges that 
must not be approached in the same way. 
 
Hannan, Rankin & Towry (2006) follow the literature in categorising HPR as accuracy 
rather than an ethical perspective (the intention to be “good”) and define HPR as the 
degree to which MPR accurately reflects the underlying private information.  
Additionally, they perceive HPR as continuum construct with the possibility of 
differentiating more honest reports from the less honest report rather than a mere 
dichotomy between true or false. 
 
Taking cognisance of the above definition, misreporting underlying private information 
in performance reports (misreported MPR) goes beyond direct lying and often 
encompasses other techniques to hide information purposefully. This may include 
knowingly attributing managerial failures and other corporate failures to the wrong 
reasons such as “unforeseen or uncontrollable events”, deliberately delaying the 
submission of reports with the intention to shift stakeholder interest, as well as, the 
conscious use of technical jargons, sophisticated numbers etc., to confuse 
stakeholders. Bohte & Meier (2000), confirm that agents consider direct lying as 
extremely risky and therefore expectations around dishonest MPR will often involve 
very little direct lying and more of other deliberate strategies to mislead, withhold 
information to, or confuse the stakeholders.  I use honest reporting, honest 
performance reporting and honest managerial performance reporting interchangeably. 
I considered HPR and misreported MPR as opposite concepts in this study. In this 
sense, misreporting covers all purposeful actions, whether legal or illegal, that 
are undertaken by managers of firms with ‘low values’ to mimic the performance 
of firms with ‘high value’ (Bar-Gill & Bebchuk, 2003 a). 
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2.1.3. Managerial Performance (MP) And Managerial Performance Reporting 
(MPR). 
 
Stakeholder effort at measuring performance is perhaps as old as the origins of 
commerce (Raisinghani & Nugent, 2001). In the late 1800s Fredrick Taylor, propose 
metrics to determine “a better way of doing things” and a basis for relating pay to 
performance. The 1960s saw the advent of “Short Interval” that resulted in 
improvement of on-time performance in process oriented, repetitive type tasks. While 
these early metrics measured the efficiency of non-managerial workers, it provides 
useful insight into original thoughts about performance measurement in general.  
Recently, executive tools such as the “digital dashboard“, cockpit chart” and "balanced 
scorecard" have evolved (Raisinghani & Nugent, 2001), and used not only to improve 
and measure the efficiency of the organisation for strategic purposes, but to objectively 
measure the performance of highly compensated managers as well as non-
managerial employees (Hammer & Champy, 1993; Kaplan & Norton, 1996).  In current 
performance measurement various evaluation metrics (often called “Key Performance 
Indicator - KPI) are assigned to an event, result, or activity which management 
believes provides insight into how “well” the business is performing. KPIs are usually 
measured and reported on at the “end of the period,” whether that “end of period” is a 
month, quarter, annual or another period. Traditional managerial performance 
reporting systems usually involve a process of “filtering,” “shaping” or “conditioning” 
performance information before it is reported to assessors.  
Stakeholders require a sound analytical basis derived from accurate, valid, and timely 
information for short- and long-term planning and for allocating scarce resources. 
Managerial performance is different from organisational performance and is difficult to 
measure due to various dimensions. Raggad, (1988) defines managerial performance 
based on managerial potential and ability. Chenguang, Yanli & Yingjun (2011) define 
managerial performance in terms of managerial efficiency and propose that the 
evaluation of managerial performance should be based on equitable and objective 
measuring methods that can avoid penalising good managers who manage within an 
unfavourable ‘existing condition’ as well as avoid rewarding poor managers who 
manage in a favourable ‘existing condition’. They operationalise managerial 
performance as behaviour attributes that reflect the efficiency produced purely by 
management activities with the influence of the ‘objectively basic condition element’. 
They operationalise ‘objectively basic conditions’ to include the external environment 
and strength of an organisation and acknowledge that such objective variables affect 
managerial performance. 
 
In this study, managerial performance is operationalised to measure managerial 
ability, know-how and potential for achievement vis-à-vis a set organisational 
goal. 
Performance reporting at its best should enable an organisation to link its operational 
activity and decision making with the attainment of strategy (KPMG, 2015). If done 
correctly, it should give the essential information for effective decision-making.  
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Atkinson, Banker, Kaplan & Young (2000) suggest that providing information on 
financial performance and other (non-financial) indicators is a function of accounting. 
Even though Managerial Performance Reporting (MPR hereafter) is an integral and 
expansive part of an organisations performance measurement system, Kreps (1997) 
argues that it is often incomplete, hard to contract and ineffective because there is 
general difficulty in measuring all relevant dimensions of managerial performance with 
equal precision since specific tasks or aspects thereof are difficult to measure, monitor 
or verify. Merchant (1998) argues that performance reporting of any form serves both 
an informational and motivational role. Gellatly, Paunonen, Meyer, Jackson & Goffin 
(1991) note that ‘predicting managerial performance remains a tricky and complex 
problem facing employers’. This is especially true given the diversity of role 
requirements and behaviours across different levels of management and highlights 
the need to consider performance from a ‘multi-variable perspective’. 
 
This study conceptualises managerial performance reporting (MPR hereafter) 
as the process leading to the supply and disclosure of all information, financial 
and non-financial, as well as appraisal systems generated within an 
organisation for effective decision making and resource allocation and to 
assess the performance of business leaders against set targets by those with 
the authority and/or interest to do so.  
 
It is premised on the assumption that in situations where ownership is divorced from 
management, managers self-report their performance vis-à-vis set targets and 
processes. Therefore, MPR is part of a performance management process, and the 
resulting reports (i.e. managerial performance reports) include information for 
evaluating managers against set targets. Often these targets are pre-communicated 
to managers (i.e. business leaders) even though this is not a rule of thumb. MPR must 
be differentiated from overall organisational performance assessment. To be able to 
do this, it is essential to understand that the managerial performance system is not 
just restricted to top level business leaders or top management.  Often it is a top down 
approach that acknowledges every employees’ contribution to the achievement of 
overall business targets. In that regard, every employee within an organisation plays 
some role in the compilation of a managerial performance report. Considering the top 
down approach to managerial performance management, it is possible for an 
organisation to be performing well, according to a given set of targets, whereas 
specific managers or personnel may be performing poorly. Therefore, it is not 
farfetched for the CEO of an organisation to be ‘fired’ for poor performance even when 
the organisation achieves impressive financial results. MPR, performance reporting, 
performance management, and managerial reporting are used interchangeably in this 
study. Even though almost all organisational employees have set targets and 
contribute to overall performance reporting, the focus of this empirical work is on 
managers (i.e. business leaders) rather than lower level employees and how they 
report their performance. The reason is that the relative influence of senior 
management including business leaders on the MPR process is significant. In other 
words, evidently, managers (i.e. business leaders) than mere employees can 
significantly influence the inputs into, and outcome of the performance reports. This is 
perhaps because the fortunes of managers (i.e. business leaders) are more directly 
correlated with MPR than ordinary employees (Yang, 2009). Therefore, managers (i.e. 
business leaders) have more interest in the MPR process. Managers (i.e. business 
leaders) are defined to include CEOs, CFO and other senior executives who report 
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directly to the CEO or the BOD as well as departmental and divisional heads and 
managers directly responsible for supervising more than ten employees. 
 
The Royal Society of Arts, Manufacturers and Commerce (RSA, 1994) suggest that 
managerial performance measurement is critical to achieving business success in a 
demanding world market place. Neely (1999) argues that MPR is not a new concept 
because most of the basic principles applied in recent times, even by large 
corporations, have existed since 1909. Even then, Chandler (1977) hypothesises that 
most organisations are likely to have a developed and functioning MPR systems in 
place for years by now. Ashton (2010), Parida et al. (2015), and Neely et al. (1995) 
confirm that MPR systems in most organisations are still in the development stages 
and are not entirely credible or reliable. MPR systems may still be characterised by 
and criticised to include deliberate false information (Ashton, 2010); heavy reliance on 
historical data (Dixon et al, 1990), ‘short termism’ (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1989; 
Banks & Wheel Wright 1979, Hayes & Abernathy 1980), and redundant information 
resulting in information overload (Lynch and Cross 1991). Church (1908) had earlier 
argued that the lack of proper definitions for performance measures introduce 
ambiguity into measurements and the interpretation of results. 
 
Neely (1999) proposes that the surge in research on MPR is due to seven factors 
which are (1) the changing nature of work (2) increasing competition (3) specific 
improvement initiatives (4) increased national and international quality awards (5) the 
changing organisational roles (6) changing external demands as well as (7) the power 
of information technology. The recent spectacular corporate scandals may have also 
contributed to the increased interest in MPR and managerial behaviour.  
 
The hierarchical diagram (figure 2.1 below) shows no directional arrows because there 
is an upward and downward relationship for each connected relationship. 
Performance target setting is typically top down (re from BOD to CEO through to low 
level employees), and MPR (encircled with the red line) is typically down –up (re from 
employees, through managers to CEO to BOD). The conceptualisation of managers 
(i.e. business leaders), as well as employees, is depicted graphically as well as the 
distinction between organisational performance and managerial performance (this has 
been explained earlier). Whereas managerial performance typically includes all 
performance reporting relationships from the CEO downwards, organisational 
performance includes the performance of the BOD and most critically is based on an 
assessment of total organisational performance vis-à-vis the organisational mission, 
vision and values. Therefore, often the assessment of overall organisational 
performance is with a long-term perspective and may not be subjected to an annual 
performance review as will be for managerial performance. Admittedly, however, 
managerial performance has some direct correlation with overall organisational 
performance, in most cases over the medium to long term. It is also worth noting, the 
dual responsibility of the CEO to the BOD and stakeholders as well as the dual 
responsibilities between direct functional managers to the BOD and the CEO. This 
relationship is typical in most privately-owned organisations where ownership is 
divorced from management. The distinction between principals and agents in a multi 
actor principal agent relationship has also been graphically depicted (the essence of 
this distinction will be explained in a later chapter). 
 
   


















































































































leaders in this 
study 
CEO 
FUNCTIONAL DIRECT REPORTS 
TO THE CEO 
SHAREHOLDERS REGULATORS MEDIA 
PRINCIPALS 
MANAGERS WITH SPAN OF 
CONTROL OF > 10 EMPLOYEES 
MANAGERS WITH SPAN OF 
CONTROL OF < 10 EMPLOYEES 
Figure 2.1: Hierarchical Relationship Of Managerial Performance Reporting Process 
OTHER 
STAKEHOLDERS 
Functional direct reports (FDR) to the CEO are classified as business leaders irrespective of the size of their span of 
control. Managers reporting to FDRs are only classified as business leaders if the span of control (direct and indirect) 
exceeds ten personnel. 
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Raggad (1988) proposes an analytical tool for testing managerial performance by 
hypothesising a relationship that links managerial ability to the firm's capacity to grow and 
the external environment. Moran (2005) contends that the structural and relational 
constituents of social capital have unique effects on managerial performance. More 
specifically, relational embeddedness influences managerial performance even while 
holding constant any possible benefits from network structure and hence it is not just 
whom one knows but also the quality of those relationships that matter to managerial 
performance. During uncertain and potentially risky contexts being able to draw on well-
established and faithful relationships is valuable in improving managerial performance.  
Staw & Barsade (1993) use a comparative test of two psychological theories to 
hypothesise that managers' affect may influence both the decision-making and 
interpersonal aspects of managerial performance. Simulations are used to test whether 
people who are positive in disposition perform better or worse on both decisional and 
interpersonal tasks of managerial performance and find results consistent in supporting 
the happier-and-smarter as opposed to the sadder-but-wiser hypothesis. Their findings 
show positive relationships between dispositional affect and performance.  
Lawler III & Porter (1967) develop a theoretical model that specifies the kinds of attitudes 
that are assumed to lead to effective managerial performance. The basic components of 
the model are attitudes toward the values of rewards, attitudes toward the perceived 
probability that rewards depend upon effort, role perceptions, abilities, and job behaviour. 
Testing the theoretical model, they find that (a) managers' role perceptions were related 
to their rated job performance effectiveness (b) there is a definite relationship between 
the degree to which effective job behaviour is seen as leading to rewards, and measures 
of job performance. (c) the relationship was increased by considering the relative 
importance of monetary rewards.  
 
Shipper & Davy (2002) develop a model of effective managerial performance based on 
criticism of prior two-factor models to identify six specific skills and explore their 
theoretical contributions. Their model incorporated both self and others' evaluations of 
skills and tested using both employees' attitudes and performance as measures of 
managerial effectiveness. They find that others' evaluations of skills are better indicators 
of employees' attitudes than self-evaluations. Also, they find support for the preposition 
that a complex set of relationships exists among self- and others' evaluations, employee 
attitudes, and managerial performance.  
 
Abraham, Karns, Shaw, & Mena, (2001) use a survey approach to investigate (a) 
managerial competencies used by organisations to describe successful managers (b) 
and whether organisations are appraising these same competencies as part of their 
managerial performance appraisal processes. They find that even though 
organisations accurately identified competencies relevant to managerial 
performance, many of these same organisations fail to appraise these competencies 
properly  
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Rodan & Galunic (2004) investigate the relationship between knowledge heterogeneity 
and network structure in social networks on both overall managerial and innovation 
performance. They achieve this by exploring several micro-social processes that account 
for differences in managerial performance. Their work finds evidence that, while network 
structure matters, access to heterogeneous knowledge is of equal importance for overall 
managerial performance and greater importance for innovation performance. Their study 
provides more unequivocal evidence of the mechanisms of a relationship between 
network structure and managerial performance in general. They find evidence of two 
distinct micro-social processes: one arising from the exploitation of network structure, the 
other based on exposure to diverse knowledge and its recombination as a well- spring of 
innovation.  
Brownell & McInnes (1986) find a strong positive relationship between managerial 
participation in the setting of performance measures and managerial performance.  
 
2.1.4. Defining Performance (P). 
 
Studies that incorporate performance grabble with two main issues. These are, 
a) The selection of a conceptual framework from which to define performance and 
b) The identification of accurate and available measures to operationalise 
performance. 
 
Performance is neither a unitary concept nor is it unambiguous (Siegel & Summermatter, 
2008) and can be subject to multiple definitions (De Bruijn, 2002). Even though definitions 
are essential (Gaster, 1995) operationalising the concept of performance is inherently 
difficult (Dess & Robinson Jr. 1984). Indeed ‘few people agree on what performance really 
means: it can mean anything from efficiency to robustness or resistance or return on 
investment, or plenty of other definitions never fully specified” (Lebas, 1995). Therefore, 
to be able to proceed with a conceptual framework, I attempt a conceptualisation of 
performance based on a synthesis of the literature.  
 
Performance has been defined ‘as the ability of an entity, such as a person, group or 
organisation, to make results in relation to specific and determined objectives’ (Laitinen, 
2002; Lebas & Euske, 2004).  Harbour (1997) also defines performance as an actual work 
or output produced by a specific unit or entity whereas Phillips, Davies & Moutinho, (1999) 
suggest that performance is the measurable achievements produced. Hatry (1999, p. 3) 
defined performance as ‘the results (outcomes) and efficiency of services or programs’. 
The OECD (1994) have suggested performance measures economy, efficiency, 
effectiveness, service quality and financial performance. 
Performance for purposes of this study focuses on managerial performance and is 
defined as the measurable outputs of managers over a specified period and the extent to 
which such output supports the achievement of set goals. This output can involve a 
process, activity, system or result. 
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2.1.5. Performance Measurement (PM). 
 
MPR and HPR are critical elements within the performance measurement (PM) system 
of organisations. Therefore, section 2.1.5 discusses relevant aspects of the Performance 
Measurement (PM) literature that are relevant to the MPR process. Measurement 
‘indicates the ability and processes used to quantify and control specific activities and 
events (Morgan, 2004) whereas measures are the metrics used to quantify and compute 
an action’s efficiency and effectiveness (Bourne, Neely, Mills & Platts, 2003). 
 
The field of Performance Measurement (PM hereafter) lacks a cohesive body of 
knowledge (Marr & Schiuma, 2003) which, limits conceptualisation and the potential for 
generalisability and comparability of research in this area. Ford & Schellenberg (1982) 
previously categorised three frameworks for conceptualising PM.  
a) The Goal Approach (Etzion, 1964) operationalises PM based on an explicit set of 
goals. As a traditional approach, it relies on the organisational vision in the setting 
of standards against which performance can be measured (Goodman et al. 1977). 
This traditional view of PM derives from the cybernetic model of control and views 
PM as a tool to facilitate choice between alternative actions. Based on the goal 
approach, PM is associated with control or accomplishment of organisational 
objectives and strategy implementation and is, therefore, a diagnostic control 
system that provides formal feedback, monitors outcomes to correct for deviations 
from set standards. 
b) The system approach (Yuchtman & Seashore, 1967) defines PM based on the 
internal and external factors that facilitate organisational survival. It is grounded in 
the open system approach where inputs, processes and outputs are considered 
as part of the whole. The systems approach focuses on the means needed for the 
achievement of specific ends and suggests a relevant role for performance 
measurement in signalling managerial cues, strategy formulation, as well as 
organisational learning. In so doing it brings to the fore the interactive relevance of 
PM in focusing managerial attention on critical issues. 
c) The Constituency approach defines PM based on the needs and views of the 
numerous ‘constituents’ both internal and external to an organisation. It broadens 
the scope of the two previous approaches by suggesting a relevance of the 
expectations of various interest groups that affect and are affected by the 
organisation (Connolly et al. 1980).  In such a circumstance, the organisation is 
perceived to have a set of internal and external stakeholders that bring bearing on 
the organisational goals and activities (Goodman et al., 1977). This study bedrocks 
on the constituency approach of PM. 
 
In recent times, however, and due to the complex and multi-disciplinary research on PM 
(Dess & Robinson Jr. 1984), definitions of PM have mainly been from three perspectives; 
operational, strategic control and accounting (Franco Santos et al. 2007). From an 
operational perspective, the most quoted performance measurement definition is Neely 
et al.’s. (2002, p. 80) “the process of quantifying the efficiency and effectiveness of past 
actions”; whiles Bititci et al., (1997) suggest that it is the reporting process that gives 
feedback to employees on the outcome of actions.  




From a strategic control perspective, Gates (1999) argues that performance 
measurement (PM) reflects the procedures used to cascade down performance metrics 
during strategy implementation within the organisation. Ittner et al., (2003) also argue that 
PM is the system that provides an organisation with the information necessary to 
challenge the content and validity of strategy.  
 
From an accounting perspective, a PM system is synonymous with management planning 
and budgeting (Otley, 1999). I acknowledge, Hofer (1983) assertion that "...it seems clear 
that different fields of study will and should use different measures of organisational 
performance because of the differences in their research questions" and I offer a 
conceptualisation of PM from the strategic and accounting perspective.  I follow Moullin 
(2002) who defines Performance Measurement as “evaluating how well organisations are 
managed and the value they deliver for customers and other stakeholders” (p. 188). This 
definition encourages managers to consider the extent to which organisations measure 
the value they deliver to other stakeholders (beyond shareholders and investors) and 
covers the main aspects of how performance is managed. Moullin, (2005) argues that an 
organisation needs to know how critical stakeholders perceive it and being explicit about 
this in the definition will encourage organisations to measure stakeholder perceptions. 
 
Moullin (2007) argues that Neely et al. (2002) definition emphasises effectiveness as well 
as efficiency but does not help managers stop and challenge their performance 
measurement systems and gives little indication as to what they should quantify or why. 
The idea here is that ‘performance is always a performance for someone" (Bouckaert & 
Peters, 2002, p. 361). In that sense, performance depends on stakeholder perceptions 
(Berg, 2007). Bouckaert & Peters (2002, p. 361) for instance, suggest that ‘performance 
needs to be related to satisfaction, and satisfaction needs to be related to trust of actors 
and stakeholders’. Zigan, Macfarlane, & Desombre (2007) use the satisfaction of patients 
as an indicator of high performance, and for Paalberg (2007) organisational performance 
can be improved ‘by creating greater value for customers". It is worthy of note that a 
critical condition for stakeholder satisfaction is responsiveness (Boyne et al., 2005; Crook, 
1994; Yang & Hsieh, 2007) to their needs and expectations.  
  
In a critique of Moullin (2007) definition of PM, Bocci (2004) indicates a preference for 
Neely’s definition, and in particular, prefers “quantifying” to “evaluating” because the latter 
referred to more than measuring. Pratt (2005) and Moulin (2005) however argue that an 
extreme focus on quantification (i.e. financial numbers) may be limiting and instead 
evaluating was much better than quantifying as it encompasses qualitative as well as 
quantitative measures.  
 
Neely himself commented that “in essence I find myself agreeing with Moullin and Pratt 
[because] delivering value to stakeholders is clearly essential to an organisation’s 
success” (Neely, 2005, p. 14). However, later in the article, he stresses that “the concept 
of stakeholder adds no clarity to the definition because the question of which stakeholder 
matters is, so context dependent.” 
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In my opinion, Moullin’s definition highlights the critical role of Performance Measurement 
in providing the information needed to assess the extent to which an organisation delivers 
value and achieves excellence. This definition highlights the perceptual nature of 
performance measurement and consequently evaluation as well as the usefulness of both 
quantitative and qualitative measures in the PM process. Additionally, the definition 
covers all the dimensions of the balanced scorecard. The financial aspects are included 
in “delivering value”, customers and stakeholders are vital to the definition, while internal 
processes, innovation and learning are central to the way organisations are managed.  
 
Admittedly, performance is difficult to define and measure because, stakeholders often 
disagree about which elements of performance are most important, and some elements 
are difficult to measure. Moreover, tinkering with agency performance also has strong 
political implications (Brewer & Selden, 2000). Nevertheless, numerous scholars have 
focused on developing the best way to define and measure organisational performance 
with mixed results. Because of this difficulty, several and different methods, perspectives, 
and models have been developed to enable organisations to measure and manage their 
performance effectively. 
 
2.1.5.1. Performance Measures. 
 
Pun & White (2005) define performance measures as the numerical or quantitative 
indicators that show how well organisational objectives are being met. Neely et al. (2005) 
define a performance measure as: “a metric used to quantify the efficiency and/or 
effectiveness of an action”.  The discussion of quantification is not inclusive of softer, 
qualitative measures and the term ‘metric’ alludes to quantitative scales. 
Neely et al. (2005) definition, even though widely used has been criticised to be 
mechanistic and overly operational. Besides, it seems to exclude ‘softer’ and more 
qualitative measures of performance (Skevington 1999, Teece 1992). Moreover, Neely 
et al. (2005) view that performance measures are objective criteria for assessment, 
evaluation or comparison has been contested due to the involvement of judgment in the 
choice of measures (Johnson & Kaplan 1987).  
Quite recently various studies have confirmed the value of applying qualitative measures 
of performance as well as the financial measures.  This balanced or integrated approach 
(Burgess, Ong & Shaw, 2007) attempts to offer a broader perspective of performance 
from various stakeholder viewpoints. 
In this study, performance measures are defined as the indicators, values and metrics 
that help in the evaluation of performance vis-à-vis a previously set benchmark. The 
‘metrics’ from which performance measures usually emanate are briefly discussed below. 
 (a) Inputs 
Input is often used as an element of performance (Radnor, 2008) and usually measures 
cost savings, keeping within budget (Amirkhanyan, Kim, & Lambright, 2007) and 
economic gains (Yang & Rho, 2007) by increasing revenue and decreasing expenditure 
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(Gurd & Gao, 2008). Regarding performance, the idea is to improve ‘economy’ and make 
better use of resources (Barrett, 1997). 
  
 (b) Process & Throughput 
According Siegel & Summermatter (2008), ‘throughput’ refers to organisational 
processes, (Boschken, 1992) and incudes elements such as activities (Berman, 2002), 
capacities (Hendrick, 2003), operations (Smith, 2007), volume of work (Daut Mohmud & 
Sackett, 2007), or workload (Smith, 2007). Workload indicators, for instance, are output 
orientated and measure the amount of work done, (such as the number of applications 
processed, or the number of letters delivered).  
There have been various contentions about the use of input and process measures. For 
instance, Propper & Wilson’s (2003) argue that “inputs and process measures provide no 
information on the effectiveness of programmes. That is, using costs as a performance 
measure also biases activity towards shorter and less intensive programmes”. 
(c) Output  
Melkers & Willoughby (2005, p. 183) define outputs as ‘the quantity of services that meets 
a certain quality requirement, such as, the number of lane miles repaired". Therefore, 
outputs are the results of the production process (Arellano-Gault & Gil-García, 2004) and 
measure quantity and quality of outputs. Output measures or indicators refer to ‘direct 
results’ produced from the transformation of inputs (Ristic & Balaban, 2006). 
 
(d) Outcome /Results 
Outcome variables are unique in their sensitivity to the strategic interests and success of 
the firm (Moran, 2005). Outcomes or results measure the effects, results, or impacts of 
an activity or process (Goerdel, 2006) including the consequences arising from outputs 
(Thompson, 1999). Outcomes also measure the usefulness and value of an action, and 
most performance measures differentiate between initial, intermediate, or long-term 
outcomes. Behn (2003) contends that outcomes are not necessarily the best measure for 
all purposes. Moreover, the choice of a measure depends on whether this measure 
possesses the characteristics required for the manager’s purpose. This is particularly so 
because organisations do not produce outcomes but rather produce outputs. 
Consequently, although managers want to use outcome data to evaluate their 
performance, they need output data to motivate better performance. 
 
(e) Efficiency  
Neely, Greggory & Platts (2005) argue that the level of performance a business attains is 
a function of the efficiency and effectiveness of its actions. Based on these, Neely et al. 
(2005) proceed to a definition based on a marketing perspective. They argue that, from a 
marketing perspective, organisations achieve their performance goals by satisfying their 
customers with greater efficiency and effectiveness relative to competitors (Kotler, 1984). 
Hence effectiveness measures the extent to which an organisation satisfies customer 
requirements, while efficiency is a measure of how economically the firm utilises its 
resources to provide a given level of customer satisfaction. Their definition highlights the 
fact that there can be internal as well as external reasons for pursuing specific courses of 
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action (Slack, 1991). This definition is not surprising. Neely (1994), for instance, had 
previously defined a performance measurement system (PMS) ‘as the set of metrics used 
to quantify both the efficiency and effectiveness of actions’. 
Efficiency measures how well an organisation uses its resources. (Dunsire, Hartley, & 
Parker, 1991), and is often operationalised as the relation of ‘efforts to outputs’ (Smith, 
2004, p. 23), or ‘the relationship between outputs and the resources used to produce 
them’ (Ammons, 1995).  
(f) Effectiveness  
Hall & Rimmer (1994) as well as Ammons (1995), relate effectiveness to the quality of 
services and meeting several objectives. Effectiveness is based on the notion of the 
appropriateness of the outputs of the process and focuses on a broader set of measures 
(Radnor & Barnes, 2007). It measures how well services or programs meet their 
objectives" (Wall & Martin, 2003) and hence is a measure of outcome that illustrates the 
result or impact of a service (Hall & Rimmer, 1994). Boschken (1992) offers a deeper 
understanding of effectiveness by distinguishing between organisational, social, or 
reciprocal effectiveness based on the dynamic interplay of different units (organisation or 
program) and levels (strategic or operational).  
 
(g) Non-Financial and Qualitative Measures 
Financial measures are more susceptible to ‘higher levels of data manipulation, distrust, 
rivalry, and dysfunctional decision making vis-à-vis cost, customer service and innovation’ 
(Vagneur & Peiperl, 2000). This can derail innovation and creativity, due to the rigidity it 
introduces (Balsam et al., 2011), and also lead to ‘short termism’ as well as adversely 
affect HPR. However, compared to non-financial measures, financial measures are 
usually objective with a standardised or uniformity in measurement that allows for 
effective comparability. Non-financial measures such as customer satisfaction and brand 
equity may be subject to varied interpretations and computations and may be perceptual 
rather than objective. Davila & Enkatachalam (2004) suggest that non-financial measures 
of performance are not comparable across industries. Ijiri (1975) considers hard 
measures as reducing the opportunity for disputes over a measure while ‘soft’ measures 
can be easily ‘pushed in one direction or another’. In the empirical literature, financial 
measures are usually considered as hard measures. The debate about the efficacy of 
financial versus non-financial measures seems to have settled on the relevance and 
complimentary relationship between both measures in the PMS. 
Compared to financial measures of performance, non-financial measures can capture 
broader aspects of performance (Abernethy et al., 2013, Lau & Moser, 2008) as well as 
focus on long-strategic implications of managerial actions and activities (Marginson, 
McAulay, Roush & van Zijl, 2014; O’ Connell & O’ Sullivan, 2014). Additionally, non-
financial measures of performance enhance organisational communication (Simons, 
1995) and are forward looking and related to long-term success rather than ‘short 
termism’ (Ittner & Larcker, 1998; Kaplan, 1984; Smith & Wright, 2004). The use of non-
financial measures of performance has been linked in recent literature to improvement in 
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managerial performance through the enhancement of desirable behaviours and attitudes 
(Atkinson et al., 1997; Ittner & Larcker, 2003).  
Amir & Lev (1996) highlights the complementarity between financial and nonfinancial data 
in performance management in a study that examines the value-relevance to investors of 
financial and nonfinancial information of independent cellular companies. Their study 
concludes that, on a stand-alone basis, financial information (earnings, book values, and 
cash flows) is mostly irrelevant for security valuation while nonfinancial indicators, such 
as POPS (a growth proxy) and Market Penetration (an operating performance measure), 
are highly value-relevant. However, combined with nonfinancial information, earnings 
contribute to the explanation of share value.  
Davila & Venkatachalam (2004) investigate the role of non-financial performance 
measures in executive compensation in the airline industry and find that non-financial 
performance measures are positively associated with CEO cash compensation. This 
association is significant after controlling for traditional accounting performance measures 
(return on assets) and financial performance measures (stock returns) and is consistent 
with the hypothesis that non-financial measures provide incremental information about 
CEO’s actions over financial measures and hence, receive a positive weight in 
compensation contracts. They further explore cross-sectional differences in the 
importance of non-financial performance measures and find weak evidence that CEO 
power and the noise of financial performance measures impact the relationship between 
non-financial performance measures and cash compensation. 
Ahmad & Zabri (2016) examine the application of non-financial performance 
measurement system among manufacturing companies in Malaysia and find that the use 
of non-financial performance measures is contingent on several variables including size 
of the firm, the involvement of owner/manager, and application of modern technology. 
They discover that non-financial performance measures related to internal processes and 
customers are more widely used compared to quality control.  
Huang, Liang, Lobo & Zhang (2016) examine the relation between innovation (a non-
financial performance measure), and CEO compensation for high-technology firms and 
find that CEO compensation is positively associated with corporate innovation 
performance, (i.e., innovation output as measured by patent count) and innovation output 
value (measured by patent citations). Their study also finds evidence that CEO equity 
compensation, particularly option compensation, is more sensitive to these measures of 
innovation performance than is cash compensation. They argue based on their findings 
that board of director’s view patent performance as an essential non-financial 
performance measure for innovation and incorporate this information when determining 
CEO compensation.  They also explore cross-sectional differences in the compensation 
relevance of patent performance and find the relevance varies according to firm 
characteristics (noise in financial performance and R&D intensity) and CEO 
characteristics (CEO tenure and CEO age). 
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Graham, Cannice, & Sayre (2001) assesses the extent to which non-financial measures 
of internet usage are incrementally value-relevant above basic financial information 
across four Internet industry sectors.  Specifically, they explore the extent to which net 
income, book value, unique users, page views, and hours per user can explain stock 
prices and find evidence that net income cannot explain market values. Concerning the 
non-financial variables, they find that for retailers and content/community firms, page 
views have the most significant explanatory power. Notably, for service companies, 
unique users have the highest ability to explain market values, and for infrastructure 
companies, non-financial variables are not significant. 
 
While admitting the general value relevance of both financial and non-financial measures, 
Wyatt (2008) evaluates the relevance and reliability of financial and non-financial 
information on intangible assets. Wyatt’s (2008) study finds supporting evidence that 
research and development (R&D), purchased goodwill and measures of brands and 
customer loyalty are not reliably measured and may be less relevant in some contexts 
(e.g. established versus growth firms). Wyatt (2008) suggests that giving management 
discretion, with regulatory guidance, to report intangibles might facilitate more value‐
relevant information on intangibles and hence HPR. 
 
The choice of a measure should be preceded by a clarity of purpose (Behn, 2003). 
Kravchuk & Schack (1996) note that no one measure or even one collection of measures 
is appropriate for all circumstances and therefore ‘the search for a single array of 
measures for all needs should be abandoned, especially where there are divergent needs 
and interests among key users of performance information’. They advocate “an explicit 
measurement strategy” that will “provide for the needs of all important users of 
performance information” (page 350). 
 
2.1.5.2. The Performance Management Process And System 
 
Radin (2006) argues that the performance vocabulary emphasises the rigor of following 
a logical process, focuses on the ultimate outcomes, and relies on the collection and 
interpretation of data.  This process is summarised below. A detailed discussion of the 
PM process or system can be found in Aguinis (2009), Amstrong & Baron (1998), and 
Bititci, Carrie, & McDevitt (1997). The process is iterative and includes  
 
2.1.5.2.1. Setting Measures, Targets And Indices And Matrices 
Pun & White (2004) argue that measuring performance involves a process to determine 
how successful organisations have been in attaining their objectives. This implies that 
performance relates to some requirement and whether or to what extent it is met (Radnor, 
2008). These are often referred to as measures, targets, benchmarks, goals or objectives 
(Arellano-Gault & Gil-García, 2004; Askim, 2004). Such targets can include benchmarks 
on service standards (Awortwi & Vondee, 2007), timeliness (Berman, 2002), or more 
generally, the overall mission accomplishment (Karkatsoulis, Michalopoulos, & 
Moustakatou, 2005). Targets, or benchmarks are parameters that provide the basis for a 
comparative analysis (Smith, 2007, p. 1624). According to Courty, Heinrich, & Marschke 
(2005), ‘the establishment of appropriate benchmark levels (or standards) is a key 
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element to guide the evaluation of outcomes’ and hence any performance measure will 
be useless if it appears as an isolated, disconnected or abstract number (Siegel & 
Summermatter, 2008). 
Richter (2004) argues for ambitious but realistically achievable targets and suggests that 
“to be truly effective, standards should be set at a level of performance well above 
average, but within the bounds of what has been achieved with current best practices and 
technologies’. This will require organisations to strive for excellence without setting a goal 
that cannot be achieved.  
Neely et al. (2005) ague that even though measurement is the “process of quantification” 
performance measures that are used to evaluate performance must be positioned in a 
strategic context, as they influence what people do and can stimulate action. Mintzberg 
(1978) proposes that it is only through consistency of action that strategies are realised. 
Leong et al. (1990) suggest the critical dimensions of manufacturing’s performance, as 
quality, delivery speed, delivery reliability, price (cost), and flexibility. However, the 
conceptualisation of these terms is fluid. For instance, Wheelwright (1984) uses flexibility 
in the context of varying production volumes, while Tunälv (1992) uses it to refer to a 
firm’s ability to introduce new products rapidly. Scholars such as Garvin (1987), 
Schonberger (1990), Stalk (1988), Gerwin (1987), and Slack (1987) have measured 
quality, time, cost and flexibility from different dimensions (Neely & Wilson, 1992). Neely 
et al (2005) argue that, in the manufacturing sector, the most important measures relate 
to quality, time, cost and flexibility.  
Behn (2003) suggests serious consideration of the number of performance measures 
used because, if managers have too many performance measures, they may be unable 
to learn anything. Neves et al (1999) agree and argue that “in many agencies, because 
of the proliferation of performance measures, there is more confusion or ‘noise’ than 
useful data and managers lack the time or simply find it too difficult to try to identify good 
signals from the mass of numbers”. Poister & Streib (1986) call this the “‘DRIP’ 
syndrome—Data Rich but Information Poor”.  
2.1.5.2.2. Measurement (Collecting Data And Analysing By ‘Agents’) 
Measurement is the process of quantification and can be used to (1) evaluate; (2) control; 
(3) budget; (4) motivate; (5) promote; (6) celebrate; (7) learn; and (8) improve (Hatry 1999; 
Behn, 2003). Theurer (1998) comments that performance measures are intended to 
provide reliable and valid information on performance.  
 
A central stakeholder dilemma is how to measure managerial performance (Reichelstein, 
1997).  Traditionally, activity-based measures such as Economic Value Added (EVA) 
have been used and proven to overcome the drawbacks of ROI.  However, minimal formal 
models have attempted to delineate the exact incentive properties of such residual 
income measures.  Reichelstein (1997) explores for a performance measure that creates 
goal congruence without considering moral hazard and concludes that EVA in several 
aspects creates goal congruence. 




Charnes, Cooper & Rhodes (1978) propose the DEA (Data Envelopment Analysis) to 
measure managerial performance. Golany & Roll (1993) develop a one-stage model 
based on DEA. Chenguang et al. (2011) contest because it excludes environmental 
factors. Bhattacharyya et al. (1997) propose a two-staged model, but their model does 
not entirely account for measurement errors. Fried et al. (2001) propose a three-staged 
and later a four-staged model which does not account for statistic noise.  
 
Chenguang et al. (2011) argue that a fair measurement of managerial performance 
should focus on the subjectively efficient efforts of managers that exclude ‘objective basic 
conditions’.  In furtherance of their argument, they propose a two-stage model of relative 
efficiency analysis to measure manager’s performance.  Chenguang et al. (2011) contend 
that organisational performance is different from and must be measured separately from 
the managerial performance. They admit however that an effective measurement of 
managerial performance must reference organisational performance. Specifically, they 
propose that organisational performance is measured with the Efficacy Coefficient 
Method (ECM) whereas the Data Envelopment Method is used to measure managerial 
performance. Two performance scores are needed to analyse their two-staged relative 
efficiency. The performance score in the previous year is used as a measure of intrinsic 
strength for the next year’s operations and is considered as a reference index (RI). The 
performance score in the current year is defined as the current index (CI). In the first 
stage, performance measurement techniques such as Analytical Hierarchical Process 
(AHP) or ECM are used to measure organisational performance. In the second stage, the 
RI is considered as an input and the CI as the output and applied in the DEA to measure 
managerial performance.  
 
2.1.5.2.3. Reporting Performance: Self-Reporting Of Performance By Agents. 
Performance reporting is a fundamental accountability and communication function that 
has generated significant research interest. Pintelon & Puyvelde (1997) suggests that 
performance reporting is the first step towards benchmarking and argue that sound 
performance reporting is indispensable for every management function. They contend 
that efficient performance reporting systems support continuous improvements and are 
the basic ‘stepping stone’ for quality control in each management function. Prior studies 
have focused on how the characteristics of reporting and reward systems jointly and 
separately impact agent’s propensity to misreport underlying private information. This 
focus is justified as the integrity of self-reported performance information is vital for 
decision making. Self-reporting of performance by agents occurs and is relevant for two 
main reasons; 
a) Agent’s efforts are mostly unobservable, and hence performance measures are 
only a noisy indicator of ‘objective performance’ (Holmstrom, 1979).  
b) Performance information may be unavailable in some instances. 
For these reasons, assessors mainly rely on self-reported performance from managers 
for monitoring, evaluation and decision-making. 
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Thornton (1980, p. 269) advocates for the use of self-reports in measuring performance 
due to the involvement of cognitive considerations in the process. He comments that 
"cognitions are an intervening variable between motivational force and objective 
performance and should be studied". The debate regarding the efficacy of self-reports 
has no consensus. Some authors have claimed that self-ratings of performance result in 
leniency bias compared with, say, superior ratings (Parker et al., 1959; Prien & Liske, 
1962; and Heneman, 1974); while others disagree (Nealey & Owen, 1970). 
Heneman (1974) compares self and superior ratings of performance on nine dimensions 
and found that self-ratings possessed less leniency, restriction of range, and halo error 
than did superior ratings.  
 
Gul & Chia (1994) use a questionnaire survey to investigate the interaction effects of 
perceived environmental uncertainty (PEU), decentralisation and design of Management 
Accounting Systems (MAS) on managerial performance in Singapore Companies. MAS 
design was defined in terms of perceived availability of two characteristics of information, 
(scope and level of aggregation). The results indicated that decentralisation and the 
availability of MAS information characteristics of broad scope and aggregation were 
associated with higher managerial performance under conditions of high PEU. Under 
conditions of low PEU, decentralisation and the availability of MAS broad scope and 
aggregated information were associated with lower managerial performance. 
Robertson & Sadri (1993) use a field study to explore the importance Bandura’s self-
efficacy concept to organisations and managerial performance. They achieve this by 
developing a parallel version of Bandura's scale to assess that is reliable and independent 
of social desirability. The second part of their study provided evidence of the relationships 
between scores on the managerial self-efficacy scale and supervisors’ ratings of 
managers’ performance and indicated that managerial self-efficacy correlates with 
managerial performance ratings. 
Empirical literature supports self-reported managerial performance (including delegation 
of the choice of measurement method) when such reported can be verified (Demski et 
al., 1984) or not (Verrecchia, 1986) especially under conditions where the manager is 
sufficiently risk averse (Ozbilgin & Penno, 2008). This is because allowing managerial 
performance reporting flexibility reduces the manager’s compensation risk. Demski 
(1998) considers a multi-period model where the manager has private information and 
can manipulate earnings information. He shows that the expected cost of compensation 
when the manager is motivated to manipulate earnings can be lower than in a situation 
where he has no private information so that earnings can only be reported truthfully. The 
underlying reason is that the manager can only manipulate the performance signal in 
case the desirable effort level is delivered, and allowing for manipulation reduces the 
manager’s risk. This view is however contestable if other wider social and organisational 
cost implications, aside contractual compensation cost are considered.  
Waegenaere & Wielhouwer (2011) explore the implications of managerial reporting 
flexibility (or discretion) by considering a principal-agent setting in which a manager’s 
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compensation depends on a noisy performance signal, and the manager is granted the 
right to choose an accounting method to determine the value of the performance signal. 
They measure managerial reporting flexibility as the number of acceptable methods, on 
the optimal contract, the expected cost of compensation, and the manager’s expected 
utility and find that a minimal degree of discretion may be necessary for successful 
contracting. Particularly while an increase in reporting discretion never harms the 
manager, the effect on the expected cost of compensation is subtle. When reporting 
discretion induces costly effort on the part of the manager, the optimal degree of discretion 
can be higher than when it is costless.  Therefore, it may be optimal to grant managerial 
self-reporting flexibility, even when his compensation depends on performance measures 
derived from such self-reported performance.  
Managerial reporting flexibility involves the application of different noisy performance 
signals, each resulting from equally acceptable measurement methods. Based on 
Waegenaere & Wielhouwer (2011) if a manager cannot be motivated to deliver high effort 
by increasing the level of the bonus, increasing the level of reporting discretion may be 
an alternative means to resolve incentive conflicts. This view is based on a ‘hard agency 
problem’ where (1) an unfavourable signal carries little information regarding the 
manager’s action choice and (2) the level of utility that the manager derives from 
compensation cannot be made arbitrarily high by increasing the level of the bonus in case 
of a favourable signal, and does not consider the view of other stakeholders. Inherently 
their study suggests that inherent in the self-reporting mechanism is a risk of substantial 
misreporting of underlying private information. 
Reporting managerial performance should have variable considerations of both 
effectiveness and efficiency but most importantly should evaluate the exercise of 
discretion (Jaques, 1961).  Indeed, because the managerial task involves the exercise of 
discretion and judgment, performance reporting and hence evaluation is a fundamentally 
judgmental activity (Vickers, 1965). Therefore, the evaluation of managerial performance 
is, in itself, a managerial task which cannot be precisely predetermined, and which 
different stakeholders will carry out in different ways.  
Sabac & Tian (2017) differentiate between positively biased and negatively bias 
information in examining the impact of biases in managerial judgment and performance 
reports on the voluntary disclosure of private managerial information. Their study 
considers the cost of voluntary performance disclosure as endogenous and does not 
disentangle intentional from unintentional biases. They show that negatively biased 
performance reporting, reduces timely voluntary disclosure by firms. Only positively 
biased reporting increases voluntary disclosure by firms. Negative biases, act to reduce 
voluntary disclosure and thus the supply of timely information to capital markets (Gigler 
& Hemmer, 2001). Similar to Watts (2003), they find that freedom from bias, both in 
managerial judgment and in accounting, is desirable in that it makes firms more likely to 
make timely voluntary disclosures. 
Negative bias may arise because auditors, incentivised by audit standards and legal 
liability, would allow low accounting earnings reports to pass but challenge high earnings. 
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This would shift the probability of low accounting earnings upwards. Positive bias may 
arise because managers, incentivised by their compensation contract, would leave high 
reported accounting earnings to pass but challenge low reported earnings.  This would 
shift the probability of high accounting earnings upwards.  
Bucur (2013) study the relationship between managerial competence and managerial 
performance using Campbell’s Model of Competence and find that competence is 
significantly linked with managerial performance. However, the hierarchy of these 
competencies was different across managerial levels. For instance, core competences 
were more critical to high managers and line managers in determining managerial 
performance. 
 
2.1.5.2.4. Evaluation And Analysis (By Principals) 
Evaluating performance helps to recognise achievements and guides future remedial 
action when required especially if evaluations are based on transparent and equitable 
analysis (Capko, 2003). Evaluation in this context is broader than mere assessment and 
implies a ‘systematic judging/determination of intrinsic (primary) and extrinsic (secondary) 
values’ (Ristic & Balaban, 2006) of managerial action reported through achieved 
performance matrices.’ In this sense, evaluation is a comparison of perceived attained 
managerial value against the pre-determined standard of performance and judgment 
becomes a quotient of the perceived and the standard (Stake, 1980). Weilenman (1980) 
confirms the contextual nature of evaluations and evaluation criteria and highlights that 
the exercise of judgement by evaluators has no consensual approach.   
 
2.1.5.2.5. Action And Feedback 
Hatry (1999) argues the fundamental purpose of performance information is to make 
improvements. Managers should receive feedback on the results of their activities 
because this is intuitively necessary for decisions about future activities (Halachmi & 
Bouckaert, 1996). As measurement alone does not bring about performance 
improvement, performance data should be part of a continuous feedback loop that is used 
to report on value and accomplishment and identify areas where performance is weak so 
that steps can be taken to promote improvements. 
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2.2.   THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR HPR. 
 
The quality of MPR has varied temporally, spatially and across sectors. These variations 
have attracted research into motivations behind managerial performance reporting 
decisions. Despite the growing empirical interest in MPR, there is still no comprehensive 
theoretical framework that will adequately identify the factors that affect MPR. Perhaps 
this is because studies on MPR have been approached based on different theoretical 
frameworks and consequently different methodological constructs thus hindering the 
development of coherent literature (Wangombe, 2013). 
 
A single theory cannot fully explain the motivations, determinants and effects of HPR 
(Linsley & Shrives, 2000; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013). Adrem (1999) and later Cormier et 
al. (2005) highlight that managerial disclosures (including MPR) are a complex 
phenomenon not explainable by a single theory. Theories are complementary and yet are 
not equal in their interpretation of a particular phenomenon (Van der Laan, 2009). 
Freedman & Stagliano (1992) admit that there is no single motivation for managerial 
performance disclosure practices. Deegan (2000) agrees and comments that since 
theories are an abstraction of reality, a particular theory cannot be expected to provide a 
full account or description of managerial behaviour. As a result, several researchers have 
advocated for a theoretical lens that encompasses various perspectives (Gray et al. 1995; 
Cormier et al. 2005; Islam & Deegan, 2008; Martin & Hadley, 2008). MPR is multi-faceted, 
and therefore more than one theory will be applied in explaining the findings of this study. 
Although the theoretical concepts discussed in this section have been presented as 
different and competing, they have many conceptual overlaps (Wangombe, 2013). 
 
While admitting that the dominant views of theory in accounting research are 
interpretative, normative and positive, there are several conceptions of theory, each of 
them, different regarding nature and scope. Stan (2010) defines theory as a ‘systematic 
representation’ of a valid problem expressed as far as possible, or logically in life and 
social sciences. Harlow (2009) argues that the word theory cannot be subject to a single 
definition because the discipline of study influences it. He argues that natural scientists 
see theory as a decisive law or a system of laws and for other disciplines theory is a 
construct or set of constructs for comprehending a phenomenon. While Gay & Weaver, 
(2011) agree, Wacker (1998, 2008) goes further and proposes that theory is ‘an explained 
set of conceptual relationships’ while Corley & Gioia (2011) define theory as a statement 
of concepts that shows interrelationships between concepts as well as offer explanations 
about how and why such relationships exist.  
 
Theories help to define a research problem, describe the peculiar features of a 
phenomenon and have predictive value. Theories are ultimately tested and become an 
uncontested fact (Gelso, 2006) but retain the characteristic of refutability (Wacker, 1998). 
Admittedly, most of the theories adopted in accounting are adopted from other disciplines 
(Malmi & Granlund, 2009). An, Davey & Eggleton (2011) argue for the adoption of a multi-
theory approach in the explanation of observed phenomena in accounting as well as the 
application of CAT, ST, LT and Signalling theory in the study of managerial performance 
disclosure decisions.  




Legitimacy theory (LT), Stakeholder theory (ST) Institutional theory (IT) and Impression 
Management (IM) derived from political economy theory and are often categorised as 
system-based theories.  These theories substantially propose that information and 
disclosure (such as MPR) play a relevant role in the relationship between organisations, 
employees (agents) and the broader society including external groups. Therefore, 
organisations and managers within the organisations are perceived to be influenced by 
and influence the society in which economic activity occurs. 
 
The political economy is the ‘social, political and economic framework within which human 
activity takes place (Gray, Owen & Adams, 1996, page 47) implying that economic activity 
cannot be fully understood without consideration of political, social, institutional and other 
relevant context that define such economic activity. Political economy recognises the 
power of conflicts and the struggles that occur between various groups within society 
(Marcuccio & Steccolini, 2009) and recognises the effect of MPR on the distribution of 
income, power and wealth (Cooper & Sherer, 1984). Guthrie & Parker (1990) argue that 
disclosures can transmit social, political and economic meanings for a pluralistic set of 
report recipients. It embraces the perspective that society, politics and economics are 
inseparable and hence managerial action cannot meaningfully be investigated in the 
absence of these considerations. Essentially, MPR is not a neutral and unbiased process 
and is influenced by the continuous and evolving interchange between organisations, 
employees and the environment. 
 
Political economy has two dimensions. The classical theory of political economy 
emanates from Marxism and views information disclosure (MPR) within the context of 
classical struggles, class interest, structural and society conflicts, inequity and the role of 
the state. Predominantly it argues that MPR are only a means to maintain the favoured 
position of influential persons in society who want to control scarce resources. 
 
The Bourgeois stream of Political Economy Theory does not consider class struggles and 
structural conflicts. Instead, it explains MPR based on the interaction between groups in 
a pluralistic society. LT and ST emanate from this stream of political economy theory.  
 
In this study, LT, ST, IT & IM provide a partial explanation for observed findings regarding 
HPR and suggest that MPR and the extent of the extent of honesty in disclosing 
underlying private information are used as a strategy by actors (i.e. managers) to 
manipulate the relationship between self, organisation and society. In the subsequent 
sections below, I explain these theories and their underpinning concept to provide a 
theoretical basis for my hypothesis, adopted methodology and explanation of findings. It 
is worthy of note that even though these theories are the fundamental theories 
underpinning this study, other theories are also used albeit spatially in this study.
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2.2.1. Classical Agency Theory (CAT) And The Propensity To Report Dishonestly.  
 
Classical Agency theory analyses the relationship within an economic exchange 
(Kostova, Nell, & Hoenen, 2016) where an individual (the principal) delegates authority to 
another person (the agent) to act on his/her behalf to maximise the principal’s wealth 
(Jenson & Meckling, 1976; Cuevas-Rodrigez, Gomez-Mejia & Wiseman, 2012).  
 
Evidence exists to suggest that occasionally people trade monetary gains for moral cost 
and engage in dishonest behaviour (Schindler & Pfattheicher, 2017). Even though many 
types of research refer to CAT, only in rare instances do they discuss the model and how 
its assumptions fit the problem to be studied. In this subsection, we review the model as 
well as its basic assumptions. The CAT is applied in various academic disciplines and is 
a theory about contractual relationships between buyers and sellers (Waterman & Meier, 
1998; Pratt & Zeckhauser 1985). Perrow (1986) for instance states that:  
 
“In its simplest form, agency theory assumes that social life is a series of contracts. 
Conventionally, one member, the `buyer' of goods or services is designated the 
`principal,' and the other, who provides the goods or service is the `agent'-hence the term 
`agency theory.' The principal-agent relationship is governed by a contract specifying 
what the agent should do and what the principal must do in return”. (page 14). 
 
Classical Agency theory is theoretically appropriate for studying relations where (a) 
decision making is delegated (b) principals are unable to observe whether the delegated 
power is properly exercised fully and (c) there is divergent motivation(s) between the 
principal and agent (Hoenen & Kostova, 2015). Due to this, CAT has become the 
dominant institutional logic of corporate governance and studies of human behaviour and 
ethics in social sciences (Zajac & Westphal 2004; Ross 1973; Jensen & Meckling 1976; 
Shapiro 2005) making it a ‘general social theory of relationships’. White (1985) and later 
Mitnick (1998) concede that the ultimate imperative by actors when confronted with an 
agency problem is gaining and maintaining control.  
 
Therefore, classical agency theory is “perhaps the dominant paradigm in management 
accounting research’ (Steinberg & Kunisch, 2016; Salterio & Webb 2006; Gomez-Mejia, 
Berrone & Franco-Santos, 2010). Cuevas-Rodriguez et al (2012, page 526) buttress this 
point further by suggesting that “Because the use of incentives to create alignment of 
interest between principals and agency is a primary mechanism proposed by the theory 
to reduce agency cost, the theory is, without doubt, one of the main (if not the main) 
theoretical frameworks in the area of compensation management (particularly at the top 
management level)”. 
 
The theoretical underpinning of CAT emerged from the theory of the firm (Coase, 1937) 
and had been used in financial economics literature since the 1960s (Hoenen & Kostova, 
2015). 
 
CAT defines a bilateral principal – agent relationship (Arrow, 1985) where, under 
conditions of information asymmetry (the situation where one party, often assumed to be 
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the agent, has more or better information than the other party in a relationship) and 
uncertainty, the principal attempts to design a contractual relationship with an agent that 
optimises the economics of information and incentive (Hoenen & Kostova, 2015). This 
principal agent relationship mimics the relationship between owners and professional 
managers, or employers and employees.  The principals’ effort at designing a ‘perfect 
contract’ is because, the separation of ownership from control results in agency costs that 
require costly mechanisms for control and monitoring (Cuevas-Rodriguez et al., 2012). 
 
Agency cost arises because both parties to the relationship have self-serving interest and 
the contractual mechanisms used to align the interests are imperfect and costly (Cuevas-
Rodriguez et al., 2012). This is because both parties are rational rent seekers with 
different utility functions (Jensen & Meckling, 1972) who will act opportunistically to 
maximise their self-interest or utility. This causes a conflict of interest resulting in market 
failure problems of adverse selection and moral hazard (Holmstrom, 1979; Moe, 1979). 
That is, whereas principals seek to maximise personal wealth subject to minimal risk 
constraints, agents seek to maximise personal wealth while minimising personal effort 
and risk. Arrow (1985) refers to the adverse selection problem as ‘hidden information’ and 
moral hazard as ‘hidden actions’. Due to this hidden information, classical agency theory 
assumes that principals are unable to know the true ‘type’ of the varied agents, making it 
easy for agents to take advantage of this imbalance in information and shirk (Shapiro, 
2005), skive (Cuevas-Rodriguez et al, 2012) and become ‘opportunistic’, pursing self-
interest with ‘guile’ (Williamson 1975; Kolev, Wiseman, & Gomez-Mejia, 2012). 
 
Adverse selection occurs because the principal misjudges abilities and willingness to 
perform satisfactorily. It could also arise because principals lack adequate information or 
cannot analyse such information about agents’ characteristics, skills competence, etc. 
(Akerlof, 1970).   Moral hazard occurs because of the ‘inherent incongruence’ between 
the motivations of the principal and the agent. This is heightened by the principals’ inability 
to observe the actions of the agents fully. This causes behaviours such as lack of effort, 
shirking, skiving etc. (Kolev et al., 2012). 
 
Perrow (1986) suggests the possibility of principals also behaving opportunistically with 
no consideration for the agents’ welfare. Therefore, under CAT the opportunistic 
behaviour can be by both the principal and the agent. Despite the wide literature on CAT 
that suggests that such opportunistic behaviour is driven mainly by self-interest, Hendry 
(2002) disagrees and proposes an alternative explanation for observed dysfunctional 
behaviour by agents. He argues that rather than pure self-interest and opportunism, the 
dysfunctional behaviour is inherent in the bilateral agency relationship. According to him, 
due to imperfect rationality, principals are unable to adequately specify their expectations 
and agents also lack the competence to interpret principal’s actions to take the 
appropriate steps. Shapiro (2005) argues that this variation of the bilateral agency model 
is overly simplistic and not adequately supported empirically.      
 
To mitigate against agency cost, attempts have been made to achieve congruence in the 
motivation of agents and principals to align their interest. This has mostly been through 
performance related compensation. That is to say, agency theory guides decisions about 
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the most efficient contract for aligning the interest of an agent with a principal (Fama & 
Jensen, 1983). However, such performance related contractual arrangements are often 
imperfect and incomplete (Cuevas-Rodriguez et al., 2012). 
 
The roots of agency theory are therefore linked to economic utilitarianism and has been 
applied in management studies to (1) examine incentive alignment, particularly 
compensation policies (Shapiro, 2005), evaluate the types and relationships between 
behaviour oriented and outcome oriented compensation (Eisenhardt 1989), (2) analyse 
corporate governance and control systems (3) estimate agency cost resulting from the 
challenges of adverse selection and (4) enhance the debate between classical agency 
theory versus scholars with ‘other-regarding’ behaviours of humans (Donaldson & Davis 
1991; Wright and Mukherji 1999). 
 
Most of the studies on HPR have been grounded in some context of the agency theory, 
especially the classical agency model (CAT). This is because CAT provides a 
parsimonious prediction of how rational individuals will behave in a bilateral relationship. 
 
CAT is built on an assumption of incompatible goals (Shapiro, 2005), suggesting that 
market failures introduced by information asymmetry can be mitigated by efforts at 
monitoring, communication and information systems, as well as incentives (outcome 
oriented contracts rather than behaviour oriented contracts) that encourage behaviours 
aligned to the interest of the principal. Often this theory assumes a single principal agent 
relationship with perverse behaviour always by the agent. Perrow (1986) argues that the 
agency theory even in its classical form will make more sense if the possibilities of the 
perverse behaviour of principals are considered as well. 
 
Principals are assumed to be risk neutral with an adequately diversified portfolio, whereas 
agents are risk adverse because they have not adequately diversified their risk. In the 
classical agency model, Jensen & Meckling (1976) suggesting a dyadic relationship 
between individuals, argue that most organisations are merely legal fictions serving as a 
nexus for a set of contractual relationships among individuals. Shapiro (2005) asserts that 
the assumption of methodological individualism makes this transformation process 
seamless. Therefore, in organisations, agency relationships are contracts, and the 
incentives and control systems are the elements of the contract. 
 
Applying the classical agency theory to the context of HPR will imply that agents will use 
superior information at their disposal to maximise their utility and therefore have no 
aversion to reporting dishonestly in the process. An agents’ choices are influenced by his 
utility function, which is entirely dependent on his consumption aspirations (Sen 1997). 
This is referred to as the pursuit of selfish self-interest that may or may not be congruent 
with organisational goals (Ouchi 1979). This behaviour by agents’ to be self-seeking is 
referred to as opportunistic (Chua 1986) and is consistent with Willamson et al. (1975) 
definition of opportunism as 'self-interest seeking with guile':'... an effort to realise 
individual gains through a lack of candour or honesty in transactions'. Research in 
accounting has mostly focused on situations where agent’s goals are at variance with 
organisational goals (Church et al., 2014). This implies that without interventions from the 
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principal, agents are likely to report dishonestly than honestly once they can maximise 
their wealth from such behaviour.  
 
Yang (2009) challenges the assumption that complex organisational structures or 
networks (Shapiro 2005) can be reduced to dyadic relationships between individuals and 
suggests that organisations are more practically a loose network of relationships. Kiser 
(1999) suggests that the dyadic relationship between individuals in the classical agency 
model makes the model ‘an organisational theory without an organisation’. 
 
Social scientists often find the simplification of principal - agency relationships as 
problematic (Shapiro, 2005; Cuevas-Rodriguez et al., 2012) and have attempted to relax 
the rigid dichotomies into more complex variables with a more practical understanding of 
what an organisation is or stands for. Shapiro (2005), for instance, argues that actors in 
any relationship are more than just principals or agents and often operate in a dual role 
of principals and agent. In other words, an actor may be an agent to one person but a 
principal to another agent in the same transaction and /or in a hierarchical structure. If 
that be the case, then it is inappropriate, from a value maximising perspective, to model 
contracts from the view-point that only one individual has a perverse behaviour. Perrow 
(1986) argues that agency problems on the side of the agent are mirrored on the principal 
side as well. He indicates that the problem of adverse selection can also cause agents to 
self-select themselves into contracts with principals who shirk, cheat, are opportunistic 
and lie about hazardous work environments etc. Donaldson & Davies (1994) also contend 
that the actions of principals can create self-fulfilling actions and behaviours by agents. 
Other critics have argued that CAT includes simplistic assumptions about individual risk 
preferences (Wiseman et al., 1998) and does not acknowledge the social context within 
which these relationships occur; primarily on how the context could influence the 
relationship between principals and agents (Wiseman, Cuevas-Rodriguez, & Gomez-
Mejia, 2012); the role of trust; the importance of other interest groups and; the possibility 
of enlightened self-interest on the part of the agent. 
 
Yang (2009) proposes that the assumption of solitary principal and agent must be 
extended in organisational studies to include multiple principals and agents because that 
is more practical. Adams (1996) refers to this as the ‘Hydra factor’ and contends that the 
possibility of a multiplicity of principals and agents in a single contract or organisation 
presents a scenario of a collation of teams (principal and agents) having conflicting 
interest and competing for attention over their unique goals and interest (Espeland & 
Stevens, 1998). In such a scenario, the challenge for agents could become choosing 
between incommensurable interests that ‘do not share a common metric along which 
competing demands can be ranked, costs and beneﬁts weighed, trade-offs evaluated, or 
rational choices modelled’ (Shapiro, 2005). Shapiro (2005) suggests that, in a multi-actor 
principal agent relationship, some agents may be more risk averse than others, or have 
more goal congruence with certain principals than others arguing that this can increase 
information asymmetry and introduce difficulty in monitoring. However, Waterman and 
Meier (1998) argue that in the long run, information leakage from competing agents will 
reduce information asymmetry and its attendant adverse effects. 
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Central to the classical agency model is the economic assumptions that all individuals are 
rational and seeking maximum utility (wealth) in an equilibrium position. Because 
principals are risk neutral in all situations, agents are singled out to be to self-seeking 
utility ‘maximisers’ (maximum wealth) prone to opportunism. Heimer & Staffen (1998), as 
well as Sharma (1997), also disagree with the assumption of a superior principal in the 
classical agency theory. In the classical agency theory, a superior principal that is risk 
neutral always, specifies preferences, defines goals and creates incentives for the agent 
to follow. Heimer & Staffen (1998) indicate that the asymmetry of power can shift to the 
agent in scenarios where the agent was recruited for his expert knowledge or in 
circumstances where the agent has prior experience, and the principal has no experience 
or knowledge of the relevant subject matter. The assumptions of superior principal are 
particularly stretched when principals seek out agents with specialised knowledge 
(referred to as professionals). Sharma (1997) suggests that in such a situation, 
information asymmetry (not knowing what the agent does) can be compounded by 
knowledge asymmetry (not knowing how the agent does his job). Therefore, adverse 
selection is even more pronounced because the principals are unable to evaluate the 
skills of professional agents, have difficulty in specifying a contract and difficulty 
evaluating the quality of work done as well as the appropriate limit to impose on agent 
discretion. Regarding this, Shapiro (2005) argues the opportunity for self-regulation 
makes professions a social device against agency cost. Larson (1997) however disagrees 
and suggests that professions increase agency cost by securing a monopoly.  
 
Perrow (1986) rejects the assumption that agents are risk averse, self-serving utility 
maximisers (Anthony et al., 1998) and argue that, in line with Simons (2000), in given 
situations, humans can be altruistic, other-regarding and hardworking. Perrow (1986) 
suggests that the classical agency theory is limited because it ignores cooperative 
aspects of social life and precludes considerations of trust and cooperation between 
principals and agents (Fehr & Falk, 2002). Critics of CAT suggest that viewing agents as 
“Stewards” motivated to act responsibly may result in desirable outcomes for both parties 
(Davis, Schoorman & Donaldson, 1997). Stewardship theory (Donaldson & Davis 1991) 
proposes that agents are often good stewards and team players rather than opportunistic 
and align with the interest of principals through a process of cooperation and coordination 
rather than a scenario of perverse conflict of interest. 
 
Mitnick (1992) suggests that the ‘a-contextual’, ‘a-historical’ and static principal agency 
relationship must be abandoned. Shapiro (2005) proposes that agency relationship must 
be viewed from a broader social context and buffeted by other variables (such as other 
agency relationships, competitors, regulators etc.) to reduce informational imbalances, 
offer or constrain incentives as appropriate, emphasize the risk of adverse selection or 
moral hazards, mitigate or enhance opportunism etc. 
 
Moe (1984, page 763) confronts the limitations in applying the classical agency model, 
which is grounded in profit seeking and sharing (the theory of the market), to non-profit 
organisations and observes that “the more general principal-agent model of hierarchical 
control have shown that, under a range of conditions, the principals optimal incentive 
structure for the agent is one in which the latter receives some share of the residual in 
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payment for his efforts; thus giving him a direct stake in the outcome….for public 
bureaucracy, however, there is no residual in the ordinary sense of the term”. 
 
Waterman and Meier (1998) suggest that the incentives at play for public organisations 
revolve around policy rather than profit. Evidently, if the market setting is removed, a 
range of diverse strategies is available to mitigate information asymmetry and can be 
applied in different quantum and extent (Worshan et al., 1997; Sharma 1997; Banfield 
1975). 
 
In summary, there seems to be a growing suggestion in the literature of the inadequacy 
of the classical agency theory for studies in social science and accountancy. Interestingly 
however, rather than refute the theory, empirical studies have instead requested for an 
adaptation of the theory to suit “realism” in social sciences, proposing the relaxation of 
some of the assumptions grounded in economics, replacing dichotomies with continuous 
variables, reducing abstract categorisations and placing all analysis of the agency theory 
within a relevant context. Tirole (2002) for instance calls for the widening of agency theory 
to include behavioural perspectives. Arrow (1994) asserts that ‘economic theories require 
social elements as well even under the strictest acceptance of standard economic 
assumptions. Rabin (1998) agrees and argues that ‘some important psychological 
findings seem tractable and parsimonious enough that we should begin the process of 
integrating them into economics’ (page 13).  Cuevas-Rodriguez et al. (2012) concur and 
suggest that we may be able to benefit from the evidence of human behaviour as well as 
organisational theory without necessarily losing out on the virtues of economic analysis. 
Cuevas-Rodriguez et al. (2012) also argue for the inclusion of other theoretical 
perspectives to extend and strengthen agency predictions. Shapiro (2005) confirms the 
invalidity of the assumption of a single agent to single principal assumption that underpins 
CAT and provides evidence that agents are increasingly buffeted by conflicting and 
legitimate interests for multiple principals. He further concedes that so called ‘perfect 
incentive to align the interest of corporate executives and shareholders’ only results in 
these executives contriving illicit schemes and preferably a more nuanced understanding 
of principals, agents and organisations when fashioning complex incentive.  
 
Attempts have been made, even though still at nascent stages, to progress agency theory 
beyond the classical perspective. These developments are still in their early stages and 
have not obtained the critical mass to support theorisation. This has led to the 
categorisation of several streams of agency theory (Hoenen & Kostova, 2015; Bolton & 
Dewatripont, 2005) into static bilateral, static multilateral, dynamic, social and contextual. 
These categorisations are guided by theoretical considerations about how each stream 
adds a specific aspect of complexity by relaxing some of the assumptions or changing 
some of the boundary conditions of CAT. 
 
Jensen & Meckling (1976) attempt to extend the boundary of CAT to a multilateral 
scenario that involves multiple principals and agents. They perceive an organisation as a 
‘nexus of contracts’ (Coase 1937) that results in complexities emanating from ‘multilateral 
asymmetric information’ (Milgrom & Weber, 1982). Bolton & Dewatripont (2005) 
differentiate between multilateral and bilateral agency relationship by suggesting that ‘in 
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the one sided private information case the contract designing problem reduces to a 
problem of controlling the informed party’s response, while in the multilateral situation the 
contracting problem becomes one of controlling the strategic behaviour of several parties 
interacting with each other’ (page 25). Therefore, the multilateral agency relationship 
highlights the importance of monitoring agents in addition to providing incentives to 
alleviate ‘moral hazard in teams’ (Holmstrom, 1982). Even though monitoring is relevant, 
it can be costly, and principals sometimes adopt team-based compensation or risk 
sharing to minimise the cost of monitoring. 
 
The static multilateral scenario does not negate CAT. Instead, it highlights additional 
agency problems (Hoenen & Kostova, 2015). This is because multiple principals and 
agents only complicate further the issues of loss of control (Williamson, 1967) primarily 
as multiple agents could result in collusion against the principal (Tirole, 1986; Holmstrom 
& Milgrom, 1990). 
 
Holmstrom & Milgrom (1987) have proposed a relaxation of the dyadic relationship 
espouse in CAT in favour of a dynamic relationship that evolves over the medium to long 
term.  By relaxing the CAT assumption of persistent and stable information asymmetry, 
they argue that, due to repeated interactions, mutual learning may change the nature of 
the agency relationship. This is because parties learn more about each other (Shapiro, 
2005) and could result in contract renegotiation and reputation building (Hart & Tirole, 
1988). Aside from the fact that agency relationships are usually not long term focused, 
the dynamic perspective of agency further highlights that agency problems are evolving 
based on new information that parties obtain from each other. It highlights the perspective 
of gaming that could be introduced into the agency relationship. 
 
In recent times, scholars have attempted to align agency theory with stakeholder theory 
(Shankman, 1999) by introducing a social view of agency. This recognises that agents 
and principals ‘have socially derived interests that may or may not coincide, nor must they 
automatically reflect wealth maximisation’ (Wiseman et al., 2012). It argues that principals 
or agents are not merely economic actors driven by self-interest but are influenced by the 
firms’ social context and hence consider social elements in their relationships with others 
(Cueva-Rodriguez et al. 2012; Hendry, 2002). Arrow (1985,) admits that professional 
responsibility can be enforced by considerations of other ‘rewards and penalties that take 
social rather than monetary forms’ such as ethics educations, formal punishments and 
considerations of reputation. Therefore, such considerations should be merged with the 
structure of economic analyses. 
 
Also, even though still at its nascent stage, recent studies have also attempted to place 
agency relationship within an institutional environment and cultural context. Fidrmuc & 
Jacob (2010) for instance argue that cultural values affect agency relationships because 
cultural values affect how actors use information, make decisions and explain actions. 
This stream of literature argues that the cultural embedding of agency relationships must 
be considered a relevant variable.     
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I assume a multi actor principal agency relationship in organisations that are a loose 
network of relationships. This construct of an organisation with multi-actor principal agent 
relationship allows relationships to endure over time (as parties develop histories, and 
personal relationships and become a complex social network) affording agents and 
principals an opportunity to understand each other better. Therefore, over time, agents 
understand the interest of varied principals, and principals appreciate how to reward 
agents if need be (Granovetter 1985) appropriately. More importantly, the locus of power 
continually shifts in this relationship. Overtime, agents, acquire constituencies and power 
bases, aside from that with the principals and this provides them with a cushion against 
contract and sanction threats from the principal. Also, perhaps as agents outlast the 
principals, the balance of power between agents and principals may shift (Shapiro, 2005). 
I use the terms managers, business executives, business leaders and agents 
interchangeably. Figure 2.2 is adapted from Bolton & Dewatripont (2005); Hoenen & 
Kostova (2015) and presents the evolution of research streams from the agency 
perspective. 
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FIG 2.2: Research Streams In Agency Theory 
Source: Adapted from Bolton & Dewatripont (2005); Hoenen & Kostova (2015). 
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2.2.2. Stakeholder Theory (ST). 
 
Since Freeman’s (1984) pioneering work, Stakeholder Theory (ST) has become a 
dominant theory to identify and examine the impact of managerial actions (Weiss, 
1995) and is approaching a paradigm status.  It has been used to inform discussions 
about corporate governance, business ethics, managerial behaviour, strategic 
management and organisational effectiveness. 
 
Freeman (1984) defended the empirical relevance of ST on the basis that ‘current 
approaches to understanding the business environment fail to take account of a wider 
range of groups who can affect or are affected by the corporations; its stakeholders’. 
Therefore, understanding organisational dynamics, including MPR requires an 
understanding of the influence of different groups that have legitimate stakes of 
varying degree in the organisation. Applying ST to MPR will imply that manager’s 
decisions on performance reporting are shaped by an awareness of a managerial 
responsibility to a broader constituency than shareholders and investors.  
 
ST has also been employed to hypothesise the consequence of HPR or otherwise 
albeit with mixed results. Waterman, Rouse & Wright (2004) argue that, in a multi-
actor setting, users of MPR (in the long run) can adequately discount for misreported 
managerial performance because of the inherent likelihood of information leakage 
attributable to competing interest. Yang (2009) as well as (Heclo, 1977), contest this 
based on bounded rationality in decision making and suggest that misreported 
managerial performance has real and perceived effects. 
 
The basic preposition of ST is that an organisation’s (and the managers who manage 
it) success is dependent on the successful management of all relationships with 
stakeholders and hence a manager’s primary job is to ensure a sustainable balance 
between the varying and sometimes conflicting interest of stakeholders. Stakeholder 
theory differs from CAT based on differences in the value perception of the firm. CAT 
assumes that that the ultimate purpose of a company should be serving the interests 
of its shareholders (Cragg, 2002). Stakeholder theory is driven by a desire for more 
equitable distribution of organisational benefits (Maitland, 2001) and hence makes 
serving the interests of all those identified as “stakeholders” in a company the ultimate 
purpose (Evan & Freeman, 1993, p. 255; Cragg, 2002, pp. 132–133). These include 
shareholders but also, and most significantly regarding contra distinctiveness from the 
CAT, non-shareholders such as employees, customers, suppliers, local communities, 
and so on.  It is worthy of note however that ST does not suggest a less than equal 
status for shareholder interests relative to any non-shareholder interest (Kaler, 2003, 
2006). Based on ST, MPR becomes a source of information that can be employed by 
managers to manage (or manipulate) stakeholders to gain their support and approval 
or distract their opposition or disapproval (Gray et al. 1996). 
 
With ST, organisations are influenced towards a more extensive serving of non-
shareholder interests relative to those of shareholders than under CAT (Orts & 
Strudler, 2002; Kaler, 2002). Kaler (2003, 2006), Evan & Freeman (1993), and 
Maitland (2001) contend that ST involves a reformist stance toward capitalism, 
seeking to move it in the direction of greater equity and a less single-minded 
concentration on owner’s interests rather than replacing it entirely.   
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The various definitions of stakeholder within the empirical literature can be categorised 
into two broad groups (Kaler, 2002). The first set covers definitions from a normative 
perspective in which being a stakeholder derives from being someone for whom a 
business is morally responsible. The second set of definitions are non-normative and 
depend on how capable a person can have or affect a causal interaction with a 
business. The normative core imposes a responsibility-based definition of 
stakeholders as “persons or groups with legitimate interests in procedural and/or 
substantive aspects of corporate activity” (Donaldson & Preston, 1995, p. 67). In 
contrast, in a non-normative sense, the legitimacy of the interest is irrelevant and all 
that matters are the causal interaction. In such a case, stakeholders are “any group or 
individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the firm’s objectives” 
(Freeman, 1984, p. 46). 
 
Kaler (2002) prefers the normative definition and is of the view that empirical studies 
on organisational ethics (like HPR) must adopt the normative definition. From a 
normative perspective, stakeholders are ‘groups without whose support the 
organisation would cease to exists’ (Freeman, 1983). In this context, organisations are 
perceived as a nexus of implicit and explicit relationships (Elijido-Ten et al., 2010, 
Mahadeo, 2011); a complex network of constituencies (Clarkson, 1995); and a 
coalition of individuals and organised sub coalitions (Cyert & March, 1963).  ST differs 
from Institutional Theory (IT) in that whereas IT assumes that firms impose norms, ST 
assumes that firms and their managers are at the centre of a web of relationships and 
can influence such relationships.  
 
The categorisation of stakeholders is often assumed to be homogenous within groups 
but heterogeneous across groups. Indeed, the stream of ST that an author ascribes 
heavily influences the classification of stakeholders.  For instance, the ethical branch 
of ST posits a model of an enterprise in which ‘all persons or groups with legitimate 
interest participating in an enterprise do so to obtain benefits, and there is no prima 
facie priority of one set of interests and benefits over another (Donaldson & Preston, 
1995). 
 
Even though there are different typologies of ST, these differences have not been 
clearly established in the empirical literature. A synthesis of the literature suggests two 
broad areas of differences (i.e. typologies) in ST (Kaler, 2003). These are  
1) Differences in identification and categorisation of stakeholder grouping. Kaler 
(2003) argues that how stakeholders are identified is ‘fundamental to 
stakeholder theory’ in all aspects. Clarkson (1995) acknowledges that the 
interests and impact of stakeholders are not equal and hence stakeholder 
management does not imply that managers must direct equal attention to all 
constituents (Dentchev & Heene, 2003 a & b). Rowley (1997) also contends 
that stakeholders vary in power and influence and the density of 
interconnections. Mitchell et. al, (1997, p.854) propose the concept of 
stakeholder salience and define 'salience' as 'the degree to which managers 
give priority to competing stakeholder claims'. Mitchel et al. (1997) see 
stakeholders as a matter of multiple perceptions while Neville et al. (2004, 
2011) see a constructed reality rather than an ‘objective one’. In relation to this 
typology, a categorisation often flaunted in the literature is the distinction 
between primary and secondary stakeholders. Clarkson (1995) describes 
primary stakeholders are those who control resources critical to the survival of 
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the firm whereas secondary stakeholders are those with the power to mobilise 
public opinion for or against a firm. This categorisation is predominantly driven 
by a view of stakeholder homogeneity (Fassin, 2010, 2012), which ‘focuses on 
heterogeneity across rather than within stakeholder groups’ (Wolfe & Putler, 
2002). Fassin (2009, 2010) contests the lack of focus on stakeholder 
heterogeneity and suggests stakeholders within each category or ‘constituency’ 
are not homogenous. Winn (2001), as well as Argenti (1997), take this 
argument further by indicating that stakeholder groups are not monolithic but 
differ in interest, the extent of involvement as well as influence capacity. 
Therefore, stakeholders are likely to have various appurtenances belonging to 
more than one constituency set at the same time (Jansson, 2005; Campbell, 
1997) occupying several roles. Based on this, Pesqueux & Damak-Ayadi 
(2005) suggest that analysis of stakeholders should be based on the role played 
at any given time. This confusion has been compounded by the recent 
introduction into the ST literature of ‘derivative shareholders’. This categorises 
stakeholders whose legitimacy is derived from the ability to affect the 
organisation based on obligations owed to others (Phillips, 2003; Phillips, 
Freeman, & Wicks, 2003). Pressure groups, for instance, represent ‘institutional 
structures that serve the function of monitoring and enforcing the terms of the 
implicit or tacit contracts’ and may fit into this categorisation (Hill & Jones, 
1992). However, it is difficult to appreciate a clear distinction between derivative 
shareholders and secondary stakeholders. Post et al. (2002) have proposed a 
categorisation of stakeholders into a resource based, industry structure and 
social-political arena with massive contestation from other authors (Kaler, 
2003). 
2) Differences in the extent to which stakeholders are morally required to have 
their interests served relative to the extent to which those of shareholders must 
be served. Kaler (2003) argues that this differences in identification 
fundamentally divides different versions of stakeholder theory because the 
most advantageous basis for constructing a typology of stakeholder theories is 
the extent to which different non-shareholder interests are morally required to 
be served relative to those of shareholder 
 
Donaldson & Preston, (1995) propose a tripartite division of stakeholder into ‘aspects’ 
based on different ‘uses’ of ST and proposes descriptive, instrumental and normative 
typologies of the theory even though they argue that ST is effectively normative. It has 
“become customary to distinguish three kinds of stakeholder theory” regarding 
Donaldson & Preston’s categorisation (Hendry, 2001a, p. 163, 2001b). Freeman adds 
‘metaphorical’ to these distinctions (Kaler, 2003).  
 
Even through stakeholder theory has been advanced and justified by its descriptive 
accuracy, instrumental power and normative validity, these three aspects of the theory 
although interrelated are quite distinct. This is because they involve different types of 
evidence and arguments and have different implications (Donaldson & Preston, 1995). 
The descriptive aspect to stakeholder theory discusses the use of ST to “describe, and 
sometimes to explain” the nature and operations of companies (p. 70) ‘as a 
constellation of cooperative and competitive interest possessing intrinsic value’ 
(Donaldson & Preston, 1995). Wangombe (2013) states that descriptive stakeholder 
research seeks to describe organisations within ‘their environment’ and hence 
descriptive ST attempts a description of reality (i.e. the reality of business thinking, 
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business practice or, even more fundamentally, the nature of business itself). The 
purpose is to describe how managers confronted by stakeholder conflicts manage and 
represent their interest. Therefore being “descriptive” is about making a factual claim 
about a theory (Kayler, 2003). The contention is that, in some form or other, 
‘stakeholding’ has been incorporated into business thinking or practice or is intrinsic 
to the nature of the business. Van der Laan (2009) contends that this descriptive 
aspect, when it is organisation centered is referred to as the managerial branch of 
stakeholder theory.  
 
The instrumental discusses the use of ST in arguing that the adoption of a stakeholder 
approach to running companies is an equally good or better way of achieving 
“conventional corporate objectives” “such as profitability as “rival approaches” (p. 71). 
In essence, it assesses the extent to which managing stakeholders is conducive to the 
achievement of commonly asserted organisational goals (Wangombe, 2013). With the 
instrumental approach, the factual claim relates to what will happen to businesses if 
they adhere to the theory (i.e. commercial success). The contention is that adopting 
some form or other of ‘stakeholding’ is conductive to, or at least compatible with, 
commercial success 
 
The normative aspects of ST suggest what the “function” of companies should be and 
the “moral or philosophical guidelines” they should follow about their “operation and 
management” (p. 71). However, the empirical tests of normative prepositions may be 
difficult (Deegan, 2014) because in normative uses, ‘the correspondence between the 
theory and the observed facts of corporate life is not a significant issue, nor is the 
association between stakeholder management and conventional performance 
measures a critical test. Instead, a normative theory attempts to interpret the function 
of, and offer guidance about, the investor-owned corporation on the basis of some 
underlying moral or philosophical principles’ (Donaldson & Preston, 1995, page 67). 
Wangombe (2013) ties the normative approach to the ethical branch of ST, which 
holds that all shareholders have intrinsic value and hence no shareholder has priority 
of interest over shareholders. Therefore, there is no reason to treat shareholders 
specially compared to others (Boatright, 1994). 
 
These categorisations have empirical backing. For instance, Brenner & Cochran 
(1991; page 452) use ST to ‘describe how organisations operate and to help predict 
organisational behaviour’, while Freeman (1994) used ST to develop an instrumental 
approach to managerial and strategic practice. Indeed, its established status is 
demonstrated by its interpretation into an encyclopedia account of stakeholder theory 
(Freeman, 1997). These three aspects are not entirely discrete (Kaler, 2003) but 
“nested within each other”, with descriptive uses being “supported” by instrumental 
ones and normative uses providing a “central core” to the other two uses (p. 74) as 
well as a “foundation” for stakeholder theory as a whole (p. 85).  
 
Hendry (2001) even though accepts this tripartite distinction of ST derives what he 
recognises as a distinct class of “normative” theories regarding the degree to which 
organisations accept responsibilities towards stakeholders. He proposes a 
categorisation into “modest”, “intermediate”, and “demanding” degrees of 
responsibility. Based on that he attempts a parallel division of stakeholder theories 
regarding how far differing degrees of responsibility towards stakeholders challenge 
the existing institutional, legal, and moral basis of society but includes a combination 
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of the implementation measures demanded with the moral justifications offered. Kaler 
(2003) considers Hendry (2001) groupings as a theoretical supplement that must be 
offered in support of earlier stakeholder theories distinguished without being intrinsic 
to that classificatory scheme. 
 
Kaler (2003) contests Donaldson & Preston’s (1995) categorisation and propose that 
stakeholder theories must be categorised based on the extent to which serving the 
interests of non-shareholders relative to those of shareholders is accepted as a 
responsibility of companies. Kaler (2003) prefers differentiation between theories to 
be based on its ‘content’ rather than its ‘use’ because ‘uses’ derive from ‘content’ 
(therefore uses have secondary relative status to content). He conceptualises content 
to mean the way a theory describes and explains the nature of a given phenomenon 
and ‘uses’ to mean what the theory says about the phenomenon it is a theory of. Kaler 
(2003) argues the supposed descriptive, and instrumental streams of ST refer to 
second order theories rather than divisions within stakeholder theory and therefore, 
cannot, except in a suitably indirect way, feature in a typology of stakeholder theories. 
Since the crucial distinction between stockholder and stakeholder theory is their 
respective rejection and acceptance of role-specific responsibilities toward non-
shareholders that are “ultimate objective fulfilling”, then any typology should be based 
on the division of stakeholder theories into those which (a) do and do not give priority 
to the interests of shareholders over those of non-shareholders, (b) do and do not posit 
perfect duties towards non-shareholders as well as shareholders, (c) do and do not 
accept accountability to non-shareholders as well as share- holders.  
 
Based on her assertion, Kaler (2003) derives two versions ST of qualified” and 
“unqualified”. Qualified versions of ST qualify the degree of opposition to CAT and 
accept that serving of non-shareholder interests should join the serving of shareholder 
interests as part of the defining purpose of corporate activity rather than, relegated to 
an incidental by-product of serving shareholder interests. Qualified versions of ST 
recognise role-specific responsibilities towards non-shareholders as well as 
shareholders as ultimate objective fulfilling. However qualified versions of ST are 
similar to CAT and accept some degree of priority for shareholder interests. 
Unqualified versions of ST reject this compromise as well as any sui generis status for 
shareholder interests relative to those of non-shareholders. Thus, there has to be at 
least one grouping of stakeholders whose interests are given equal priority with those 
of shareholders.  
 
Considering that role-specific responsibilities are either perfect or imperfect, Kaler 
(2003) identifies two versions of qualified ST theory; weak and strong versions. The 
strong version posits perfect duties towards stakeholders and corresponding rights. 
The strong version derives from a moral perspective and imposes an obligation for 
fulfilment. The weak version presumes that duties to stakeholders are imperfect based 
more on an act of benevolence towards stakeholders rather than, something which 
stakeholders can demand “as of right”.  What emerges from his work is a spectrum of 
stakeholder theories ranging from (a) a qualified and weak version contrasting the 
least with a CAT to (b) an unqualified and strong version with accountability to non-
shareholders as the one contrasting the most with CAT. 
 
The link between ST and managerial action can be explained by the Resource 
Dependence Theory where organisations and their managers are dependent on 
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stakeholders for critical resources. Based on Resource Dependence Theory, Frooman 
(1999) explains stakeholder’s direct and indirect use of withholding (discontinuing 
provision of the resource) or usage (providing the resource with conditions attached) 
strategies to force managerial action. Nue et al. (1998) show that organisations are 
responsive to powerful ‘relevant publics’. Therefore, variations in HPR are partly 
explained by managerial effort to satisfy influential stakeholders whose interest may 
vary over time (Tang & Luo, 2011). 
  
Additionally, ST implicitly assumes the existence of a social contract between 
businesses and society that provides a moral basis for the social control of business 
activities. Therefore, the actions of organisations (and the managers that lead them) 
can be legally and morally constrained by society. Moral and not merely legal 
obligations can be placed on productive organisations because business is a creature 
of society. 
 
2.2.2.1. Application Of Stakeholder Theory (ST) To MPR & Disclosure 
Studies. 
 
Considering that the expectation and power relativities of several stakeholders change 
over time managers must continually adapt operating and disclosure strategies in a 
delicate balancing act among stakeholders (Deegan, 2014). Information disclosure 
(into MPR) in an accountability process is a major tool used by managers in this 
balancing act to gain legitimacy, support or approval and to distract stakeholder’s 
opposition or a section of them (Gray et al., 1995). 
 
The accountability process obligates managers of organisations to disclose 
information regarding performance and compliance to intended and sometimes 
unintended parties. Two branches of ST drive a manager's approach to accountability. 
These are the ethical (moral) branch and the positivist (managerial) branch (Gray et 
al., 1995).  
 
The ethical branch does not differentiate between stakeholders (i.e. primary or 
secondary etc.). It accepts the view that all stakeholders have certain intrinsic rights 
and hence the disclosure of performance information must give equal consideration to 
all stakeholder interest even if a particular stakeholder is not interested in using such 
information. (Deegan & Samkin, 2009). The positivist (managerial) branch is of the 
view that it is the selective focus on influential stakeholders that benefits managers 
and organisations (Mitchell et al., 1997). Therefore, in disclosing MPR, managers 
need to focus on the expectations of ‘powerful stakeholders’ (Roberts, 1992; Watts & 
Zimmerman, 1986). Figure 2.3 below is adapted from Deegan (2014) and itemises the 
distinction between the ethical and managerial branches of ST during accountability 
and managerial information disclosure. 
 
The application of ST in accounting has mostly been to explore pertinent issues within 
social and environmental accounting (CSR) as well as voluntary performance 
disclosure. Roberts (1992) for instance, confirms that measures of stakeholder power 
and the related information needs provide some explanation of levels and types of 
corporate social disclosures. Neu, Warsame & Pedwell (1998) suggest that firms are 
more responsive (regarding corporate environmental disclosure) to the concerns of 
financial stakeholders and government regulators than to environmentalists. Islam & 
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Deegan (2008) study garment suppliers in Bangladesh and find a responsiveness to 
the expectations of multinational buying companies, with the multinational buying 
companies, in turn, being responsive to the expectations of Western consumers 
(whose expectations about working conditions, child labour, and so on - i.e. 
unobtrusive events - are influenced by the Western media). Owing to the mixed 
findings from the application of ST to CSR, Ullman (1985) developed a conceptual 
framework from the stakeholder theory of management. Ullman (1985) explained the 
linkage between disclosure, and firm performance through the variables of stakeholder 
power, firm’s strategic posture, and firm economic performance.  Stakeholder power 
is a function of the degree of control over resources required by the organisation, and 
this determines stakeholder influence. Ullman’s (1985) work can be interpreted to 
mean that performance disclosure is used by managers to manipulate relationships 
with stakeholders and the external environment. Dierkes & Antal (1985, 1986) argued 
that disclosures of performance information provide an opportunity for dialogue with 
various stakeholder constituencies. Strategic posture explains how stakeholders 
respond to the call for an organisations request for resources. Economic performance 
is based on the premise that given certain levels of stakeholder power and firm 
posture, sound economic performance can determine the extent of HPR. 
 
Frost (1999) and Craswell & Taylor (1992) confirm that broader stakeholder dispersion 
increases the likelihood of HPR. Elijido-Ten et al. (2010) applies Ullman’s (1985) three-
dimensional framework to analyse managerial disclosures and finds evidence that the 
level of ownership dispersions, the industry sensitivity (characterised by the increased 
regulatory sanctions), as well as managers conviction (a measure of strategic 
posture), are the main determinants affecting MPR.  Considerations of past and 
current economic performance had no direct effect on HPR. 
 
Phillips (2003) confirms that competitors and the media usually have a significant 
influence on managerial action. 
 
2.2.2.2. The Multi-Actor Principal-Agent Relationship.  
 
The multi-actor principal agent relationship is a crucial feature of stakeholder theory. 
In a multi-actor principal-agent setting, agents may be dishonest to a principal if the 
perceived utility of dishonesty exceeds the perceived utility of truthfulness relative to 
the reporting relationships with other principals or agents. Yang (2009) suggests that 
in such a setting, dishonest MPR is likely to occur when (1) there is a perceived benefit 
(material or otherwise) from the dishonesty (such as getting a reward or avoiding 
punishment) and (2) the dishonesty cannot be detected due to information asymmetry. 
The critical difference between a multi-actor principal-agent relationship and the 
classical agency model lies in the perception of utility. Under the multi-actor model, 
the principle of relativity (between principals and other agents) plays a critical role in 
the evaluation of utility. 
 
Even though Waterman, Rouse & Wright (2004) argue that in a multi-actor setting the 
opportunities for dishonest MPR based on reasons of information asymmetry are 
minimal due to the possibility of information leakage, Yang (2009) suggests that in 
public organisations, the long run is hardly considered. Since the constructs of 
contracts and performance measurements systems in business organisations 
currently reward short-term efforts over long run efforts (Heclo, 1977), business 
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managers (agents) hardly consider the long run in decision-making. Moreover, the 
principle of bounded rationality (Simon, 1991) may reduce the likelihood of information 
leakage as well as the probability that any such leakage will influence stakeholder 
action. Additionally, information asymmetry is still likely to exist regardless of 
information leakage as principals cannot always keep track of all activities within 
multiple relationships. As well, the definition of a long run can be ambiguous. Keynes 
(1923) argues that ‘in the long run we’re all dead’.  
 
Figure 2.3 below is adapted from Deegan (2014) and itemises the distinction between 
the ethical and managerial branches of ST during accountability and managerial 
information disclosure.










Key Issues  Ethical Branch Managerial Branch 
Positive or Normative 
in orientation? 





Concerned with stakeholders who can affect 
the organisation as well as with those who are 
affected by the organisation.  
 
Concerned with stakeholders who can affect 
the organisation. 
 
What is the role of the 
organisation? 
  
Manage the organisation for the benefit of all 
stakeholders. 
 
Manage the organisation for the benefit of the 
owners and powerful stakeholders. 
 
What is the relevance 
of stakeholder power? 
  
Stakeholder power is not relevant as all 
stakeholders deserve consideration in their 
own right. 
 
Stakeholder power is relevant, and 
stakeholders will be identified based on the 
extent to which their needs must be managed 
to further the interest of the organisation. 
 
What is the role of 





MPR is responsibility driven and linked to 
considerations such as ‘rights to know’. MPR 
will inform stakeholders about the extent to 
which the actions for which the organisation is 
deemed to be responsible have been fulfilled.  
 
MPR is used as a strategy to manage the 
interest and influence of powerful stakeholders 
to further the interest of the organisation.  
 
FIGURE 2.3: Differences Between Ethical And Managerial Branch Of Stakeholder Theory 
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Researchers still questioned the theoretical foundation and clarity of ST arguing that it 
merely states a strategic management technique than developing a viable alternative 
theory of the prevailing norms of profit maximisation. Apart from identifying internal and 
external parties to a firm, ST, it has been argued, fails to explain the dynamics existing 
within these relationships.  
 
Donaldson & Dunfee (1994) and Jones (1995) subsequently tried to link ST with contract 
theory and the theory of property rights arguing that managers engage with society to 
gain certain rights (i.e. right to own and use natural resources and to hire employees). 
Donaldson (1982) argues that these needs of ‘productive organisations’ require ‘special 
status’ and hence makes organisations morally obligated to serve the public interest. This 
effort at retrospective sense making and rationalisation does not convince Weiss (1995), 
especially since in capitalist society individuals already have such rights. Therefore, the 
argument of societal imposed constrains because faulty.  
 
Most of the criticisms of ST have centred on the underlying assumptions of the normative 
approach to ST, which in many respects does not lend itself to sound empirical testing. 
Key (1999) contends that ST suffers from a delimitation problem and inadequately 
addresses the environment surrounding the firm. Fassin (2007) goes further and argues 
that most advocates of ST conflate the immediate business environment of the firm with 
the broader external environment. While acknowledging the dynamism of the variables in 
the immediate business environment, most ST is either silent on the broader eternal 
environment or in some cases assumes synonymy between the two, or in extreme cases, 
assume that organisations fully control its wider environment. Quite obviously, the 
empirical evidence to back these approaches is thin. As a fact, a firm’s environment is not 
limited to its stakeholders as assumed by ST (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).  Tang & Luo 
(2011) see the changing pattern of the external environment as requiring agility from 
managers in the art of balancing short-term needs with long-term needs and contend 
environmental changes could affect power in stakeholder hierarchy necessitating 
adjustment of manager’s response to stakeholder demands. 
 
Weiss (1995) expresses massive scepticism about ST and suggests that ST is based on 
a limited study of the relationship of business activity to the institutional structure of 
modern capitalist society and fails to answer the principal question of in whose interest 
should an organisation be run and whom managers should serve. He suggests that ST 
inability to answer this principal, question results from a confusing and interchangeable 
use in ST empirical literature about the terms ‘enterprise’ and ‘corporation’. This obscures 
differences in the range of ways in which business activities can be governed and makes 
the control of enterprises seem more problematic than it actually is.  
 
Weiss (1995) also contests the ST view of an enterprise as ‘an entity through which 
numerous and diverse participants accomplish multiple and not always congruent 
purposes (Donaldson & Preston, 1995, page 70). He argues that an appropriate view of 
an enterprise is a ‘permanent commercial establishment that takes various inputs and 
transforms them into outputs’. The ST view of the enterprise, he argues, confuses the 
enterprise and the interest of the owners with those parties with whom it interacts directly 
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and indirectly. In other words, the assumption of an enterprise as a ‘web of private 
agreements’ (Brummer, 1991; page 16) obscures the fact that it is the owners of the 
enterprise and not the enterprise itself who are at the centre of the web. Managers, who 
represent shareholders, are the ones responsible for entering a contractual relationship 
with other stakeholders (Jansson, 2005) placing them at the ‘centre of the nexus of 
contracts’ (Hill & Jones, 1992). Due to agency problems, the manager becomes both the 
‘identifier and interpreter’ and hence the crucial mediator of stakeholder influence (Winn, 
2001). The manager becomes responsible for reconciling divergent interests (through 
strategic decisions and resources allocation) in a manner that is consistent with claims of 
all stakeholder groups. Few studies have explored the multiple relationships that exist 
between stakeholders forming an interconnected web of relationships (Radin, 2004). 
 
2.2.3. Legitimacy Theory (LT). 
 
Hurst (1970) suggests that one of the functions of accounting reports is to legitimise the 
existence of an organisation and its continuous stewardship by managers. Legitimacy is 
a resource on which an organisation is dependent for survival. Consistent with the notion 
of Legitimacy theory (LT) companies seek to gain, maintain or repair their legitimacy by 
using MPR (Mousa & Hassan, 2015). Evolving from resource dependence theory, 
(Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975) if managers consider that they need a resource to improve 
prospects of organisational survival they will pursue strategies to ensure continued supply 
of the resources. MPR and by extension HPR becomes part of the strategies to gain, 
maintain and repair legitimacy (Marcuccio & Steccolini, 2009). Deegan & Rankin (1996) 
as well as Deegan, Rankin, & Tobin (2002) report that managers of a company will 
provide information to stakeholders to justify or legitimise the organisations continued 
existence and by extension their stewardship. In essence, MPR represents a response 
to society expectations (Hogner, 1982). 
 
Legitimacy theory posits that organisations, through their managers, continually seek to 
ensure that they operate in a socially acceptable manner (by acting within the bounds 
and norms of society- see Deegan, 2002) to gain access to resources, gain approval of 
their goals and place in society, and guarantee continued existence (Wangombe, 2013). 
Parsons (1960, page 175) defines legitimacy as ‘the appraisal of action regarding shared 
or common values in the context of the involvement of the action in the social society’. 
Suchman (1995, page 574) and later Deephouse, & Suchman (2008) consider legitimacy 
as ‘a generalised perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, 
proper or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs 
and definitions. Maurer’s (1971, page 361) definition is wider and suggests that 
legitimation is the process of an organisation justifying to a peer or superordinate system 
its right to exist to enhance both resource supply assurance and credibility of 
organisational activities (see also Habermas, 2018).  
 
LT derives from the concept of organisational legitimacy which implies a ‘condition or 
status, which exists when an entity’s value system is congruent with the value system of 
the large societal system of which the entity is part (Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975, page 122). 
To this end, managers of an organisation, acting on behalf of the organisation, attempt to 
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establish congruence between ‘the social values associated with or implied by their 
activities and the norms of acceptable behaviour in the larger society social systems of 
which they are part (Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975; page 122). When there is a disparity, actual, 
perceived or potential, between the two vale systems, then there is a threat to the 
organisation's legitimacy. Companies achieve legitimacy by demonstrating to society that 
its activities are concordant to social values. Preston et al. (1995) attempts a 
differentiation between legitimacy and legitimisation and proposes that legitimacy 
measures the congruence between institutional actions and social values whereas 
legitimisation involves actions that an institution takes either to signal value congruence 
or to change social values. 
 
Richardson (1987; page 352) confirms that concerns about HPR have arisen because of 
recent accounting scandals as well as concerns about the ‘ethical’ impacts of economic 
activities of organisations. However, disclosure practices are still focused on the 
managerial dimension (Marcuccio & Steccolini, 2009). 
 
LT concentrates on the concept of social contracts and posits that the survival of 
organisations is dependent on the extent to which the organisation operates within the 
bounds and norms of society (Brown & Deegan, 1998). Shocker & Sethi (1974) suggest 
that any institution and business without exception, operates in society via a social 
contract, expressed or implied, whereby its survival and growth are based on ‘the delivery 
of some socially desirable ends to society in general and the distribution of economic, 
social or political benefits to groups from which it derives its power’. Mathews (1993) and 
Mousa & Hassan (2014) contend that society provides organisations with their legal 
standing, attributes the authority to own and use natural resources and to hire employees 
(Weiss, 2009 & 2014 contests this assertion) which organisations have no inherent rights 
to. Therefore, organisations must continually meet the tests of relevance and legitimacy 
by demonstrating that society requires its services and that the groups benefiting from its 
rewards have society’s approval. Without this, the society may revoke the organisation's 
contract to continue to operate. In essence, the existence of organisations depends on 
society’s willingness to allow them to operate (Reich, 1998). Therefore, managers engage 
in the process of legitimation to extend, maintain or defend the organisational legitimacy 
and hence survival (Milne & Patten, 2002). In this regard, disclosures, including MPR, are 
used by managers to justify their continued existence and to affect public perception of 
the company. Magness (2006) confirms that MPR is a means of ‘explaining what, why, 
when and how’ certain items are addressed by corporate management in their 
communication with outside audiences. Some parties in society such as employees, 
investors, customers etc. may refuse to deal with organisations that renege on their 
obligations within a social contract (Coopers & Lybrand, 1993). Herremans et al. (1993) 
have previously established a positive relationship between social reputation and firm 
profit.    
 
According to legitimacy theory (LT hereafter), HPR is affected by visibility, political and 
social issues as well as organisation performance (Edwards, 1998 & 2014; Roberts, 1992; 
Hackston & Milne, 1996). Marcuccio & Steccolini, (2009) demonstrate how managerial 
performance reporting practices are a response to both performance and legitimacy gaps 
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caused by the search for efficiency, effectiveness and accountability. LT predicts that 
during periods of ‘bad’ performance, MPR may be obfuscated (Roberts, 1992). However, 
Marcuccio & Steccolini, (2009) find no relationship between ‘bad’ performance and extent 
of HPR. Rather, their study confirms that, the higher the visibility of an organisation, the 
greater the attention to HPR. Therefore, the higher the number of ‘constituents’ the higher 
the degree of HPR. 
 
Marcuccio & Steccolini, (2009) contend that LT is irrelevant in influencing the extent of 
HPR but can be useful in understanding why and if an organisation adopts HPR. In this 
sense, HPR responds to the need for legitimising not by conforming to a ‘generic’ set of 
externally developed models of performance reporting but by interpreting it according to 
specific needs through making certain results and activities more visible to specific 
constituents. Therefore, legitimacy seeking behaviour rather than pushing for conformity 
in performance disclosure practices contributes to a ‘diffused differentiated’ approach to 
performance reporting. 
 
In a dynamic society, the bounds and norms are not fixed but change across time. Hence 
organisational legitimacy is variable temporally, spatially, and across stakeholder and 
cultural groups. Managers must, therefore, be responsive and adopt ‘legitimation 
strategies’ (Lindblom, 1993) to construct and enhance social acceptance and ‘public 
image’ especially in periods of legitimacy gaps.  A legitimacy gap occurs when 
organisational performance does not match the expectations of ‘relevant public’ or 
stakeholders (Van der Laan, 2009). Managers, acting on behalf of their respective 
organisations, seek legitimacy through either substantive disclosure (which involves real, 
material change in managerial practices) or symbolic disclosure. Symbolic disclosure 
involves a choice of ways that make the organisation appear consistent with social values 
and expectations (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990). The approach adopted depends on whether 
management seeks to extend, maintain or defend its legitimacy (Wangombe, 2013). For 
instance, symbolic management is frequently applied when organisations seek to defend 
its legitimacy. Extending or defending legitimacy is more problematic for organisations 
that are highly dependent on external others for resources (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990). 
Often in such a case, the level of legitimation depends on whether managers want a 
passive acquiescence or active support from relevant publics (DiMaggio, 1998). 
 
Lindblom (1993) and Dowling & Pfeffer (1975) suggest means by which a company facing 
legitimacy threats may legitimise its activities. These are 
 
1) Adapt its output, methods or goals to conform to prevailing conditions of legitimacy 
2) Demonstrate the appropriateness of its output, methods or goals through 
education and information. 
3) Try to alter the perception of relevant publics by associating itself with symbols, 
values and institutions that have a higher legitimate status 
4) Try to alter societal expectations by aligning them with the organisation's output, 
goals or methods. 
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The intensity applied with each of these strategies depends on factors such as the need 
for speed, the availability of resources, extent of managerial flexibility, level of 
organisational stigmatisation etc. (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990). Points two to four above 
involve symbolic management where socially acceptable goals are espoused and may 
involve ‘anti-social strategies’ such as denial and concealment and ceremonial 
conformity.  
 
Since communication is a strategy for legitimation (Buhr, 1998), Suchman, (1995) argues 
that managerial initiatives in MPR can make a substantial difference in the extent to which 
organisational activities are perceived as desirable, proper and appropriate within any 
given social and cultural context. Buhr (1998) states that ‘the annual report is the most 
commonly accepted and recognised corporate communication vehicle’. Abrahamson & 
Park (1994) see the annual report as a legitimating device that projects selective 
impressions about managerial activities. O’Donovan (1999, 2002), as well as Guthrie & 
Parker (1989), confirm that managers believe that MPR is a useful educational and 
informative tool for changing public perception. MPR has been confirmed as a corporate 
communication instrument (Hoogheimstra, 2000); a public relations vehicle (Elkington, 
1997) and used to reduce the effects of unfavourable events (Deegan et al. 2000); 
construct preferred imagery and relationships (Gray et al. 1995) and improve reputation 
(Adams et al. 1998). 
 
Suchman (1995) identifies three forms of legitimacy based on managerial action. These 
are Pragmatic legitimacy, Moral legitimacy and Cognitive Legitimacy.  
 
Pragmatic legitimacy occurs when managers overtly try to win societal support and may 
involve substantive action or mere symbolism. Moral legitimacy is conferred by ‘relevant 
publics’ without overt managerial action. It results from a positive assessment of an 
organisation’s activities by its stakeholders. Suchman (1995) concedes that moral 
legitimacy involves consequential legitimacy (where stakeholders confer legitimacy by 
evaluating outcomes of actual organisational activities) and procedural legitimacy (where 
legitimacy is conferred based on how organisation results are achieved). Based on this, 
Hrasky (2012) contends that MPR should disclose both outputs and processes.  In 
essence, managers derive pragmatic and moral legitimacy from a two-way discursive 
interaction with relevant publics. Managerial disclosures including MPR are effective in 
attaining pragmatic and moral legitimacy. Deegan et al. (2002) provide confirmation that 
when there is growing public concern and public pressure through media reports, MPR is 
used as means of demonstrating their legitimacy. Cognitive legitimacy, an extension of 
socio-political legitimacy (Suddaby, Bitektine, & Haack, 2017), occurs when there is such 
a high degree of congruence or acceptance between the normative expectations of the 
organisation and its environment that they are unquestioned or taken-for-granted (see 
also Hannan & Freeman, 1986). Therefore, the organisational characteristic or practice 
becomes so normatively acceptable within its environment that it is considered to be 
‘natural’. Implicit in this argument is the assumption that legitimacy is an elemental 
property (Zelner, Henisz, & Holburn, 2009) or quantity that ranges in strength along a 
continuum from being so legitimate, as to be taken-for-granted (Hannan & Freeman, 
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1984) to being so illegitimate that the organisation is stigmatised (Elsbach & Sutton,1992, 
Hudson, 2008). 
 
MPR practices used to gain legitimacy vary in type. Hrasky (2012) discusses that these 
variations reflect the nature of legitimation responses, which is contextual and is usually 
a mix of symbolism and substance. Soobaroyen & Ntim (2013) find that ‘corporations 
adopt a combination of substantive and symbolic disclosures in a bid to achieve specific 
types of organisational forms of legitimacy, and this mix of substantive and symbolic 
disclosures is altered as a result of changes in contextual events, stakeholder salience 
and the corporation’s current state of legitimacy’. Stanny (2013), as well as Cho & Patten, 
(2007) posit that managers in an MPR process only disclose the minimum required 
information to gain the appropriate type of legitimacy. Hopwood (2009) suggest that MPR 
is used by managers as a form of corporate veil simultaneously providing a new face to 
the outsiders while hiding the actual picture.  
 
As the number of researchers adopting LT as the theoretical basis for MPR has increased 
so too has the sophistication and understanding of its application been refined (Van der 
Laan, 2009). Many studies have positively linked MPR to legitimising motive. Recently, 
studies have attempted to ‘test for’ LT (e.g. Adams et al. 1998; O’Dwyer, 2002; Wilmshurts 
& Frost, 2000) as a motivation for disclosure with inconclusive results (Van der Laan, 
2009). Campell et al. (2003) contend that LT can be demonstrated or rebutted depending 
on the degree of association found between disclosure patterns and changes in societal 
opinions. Hearit (1995) however is of the view that a measure of legitimacy is only 
subjective and hence studies should instead infer legitimacy from the fact that being 
legitimate enables organisations to attract resources necessary for survival. Studies have 
confirmed that HPR is influenced by industrial sensitivity (Deegan et al. 1996), regulation 
and prosecution (Deegan & Rankin, 1996), media attention (Brown & Deegan, 1998) and 
contextual environmental issues (Deegan et al. 2000). 
 
Wangombe (2013) classifies LT into two broad approaches. These are strategic 
legitimacy and institutional legitimacy. Strategic legitimacy uses a managerial perspective 
and hence emphasise how managers instrumentally manipulate and deploy symbols to 
gain societal acceptance. Institutional legitimacy emphasises how structural dynamics 
generate cultural pressures that organisations are obligated to follow.   
 
ST and LT focus attention on the nexus between the organisation and its operating 
environment (Neu et al. 1998). When this environment is at the micro level, then ST is 
suggested as the appropriate theoretical framework (Van der Laan, 2009). This is 
because LT operates at the conceptual level and hence accommodates more 
appropriately notions of power relationships and discourses at the global level (Moerman 
& Van der Laan, 2005).  
 
Patten (1992) examined the change in the extent of environmental disclosures of US oil 
firms around the Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska. He posited that Legitimacy Theory 
suggested that they would increase disclosure in the annual report after the spill and 
found confirmation for his hypothesis. 




Deegan & Rankin (1996) used Legitimacy Theory to explain changes in the annual report, 
and environmental disclosure policies around proven environmental prosecutions. They 
found that prosecuted firms disclosed significantly more environmental information in the 
year of prosecution than any other year. They also found that prosecuted firms disclosed 
more ‘positive’ information than a matched sample of non-prosecuted firms. 
 
The media has been confirmed as a critical influencer of societal expectations, and hence 
HPR responds to media attention (Brown & Deegan, 1998; Carpenter & Feroz, 1992). 
 
Like any other social theory, there have been scholarly contestations of this theory. Archel 
et al. (2009) suggest that LT focuses predominantly on organisational level legitimacy 
and does not comprehensively consider actions that are aimed at legitimising the broader 
social system. They state that ... ‘researchers should also consider whether the 
disclosures might have a broader impact in terms of efforts to legitimise particular 
economic, social and political systems that potentially undermine the interests of 
particular stakeholders’. 
 
Owen (2008) and Luft Mobus, (2005) contend that LT is underdeveloped and lacks 
predictive value especially as it predominately relies on managerial perception. Moerman 
& Van der Laan (2005) also argue that legitimacy theory operates at the abstract level 
dealing with ‘perceptions and the processes involved in redefining or sustaining those 
perception’.  
 
Deegan (2002), as well as Owen (2008), take issue with the vagueness in explaining how 
managers become adequately aware of the community concerns and the terms of the so-
called ‘social contract’. Even though Gray et al. (1996) suggest that the explicit terms of 
the social contract can be specified by legal requirements, Deegan (2002) focus seems 
to be on the implicit aspects of the social contract, which are difficult to specify and may 
be a subject of managerial instinct. Even then, it is not clear how managers determine if 
they are receiving the required legitimacy.  
 
Even critical is the recent introduction of the term ‘relevant publics’ into the LT literature. 
This emphasis on ‘relevant publics’ seems to shift discussions of LT from entire societal 
perceptions to a focus on particular sections or constituency of society. This approach 
metamorphosis’s LT into ST with all the consequential criticisms. These include issues 
with the assumption of a ‘homogeneous society’. Nue et al. (1998) correctly point out that 
some stakeholders are useful in demanding HPR than others (Laine, 2009).  
 
With specific reference to HPR, LT has produced mixed and unclear findings on how 
social contracts promote HPR. Deegan & Rankin (1996) argue that LT provides 
confirmation for HPR and misreported MPR in equal measure. Additionally, empirical 
evidence on what disclosures are useful in a legitimating process is thin. 
 
Despite these criticisms, Deegan (2002) still considers LT a relevant theory for explaining 
managerial actions in performance reporting.   




2.2.4. Institutional Theory (IT). 
 
Institutional Theory (IT hereafter) explains the causes of changes in the features and 
practices of organisations and the processes by which organisations secure legitimacy 
endorsement through conformity with norms and expectations of the institutional 
environment (Scott 1987; Oliver 1991).  
 
Institutional theory is based on the foundational works of Zucker (1977, 1987) and is 
premised on the assumption that organisations respond to pressures from institutional 
environments by adopting structures/procedures that are deemed socially appropriate. 
Zucker (1977, 1987) explored how authority is institutionalised within organisations. 
Meyer & Rowan (1977) built on Zucker (1977) explaining that managerial behaviour 
choices are often not a reflection of efficiency but rather an attempt to act in the generally 
accepted manner to defend against the perception of irrationality.  
 
The nature of institutions, how they operate and are controlled has never been clear or 
consensual. Theories to explain institutional phenomenon range from economic through 
social to political.  The modern Institutional theory emphasises the dependence of modern 
organisations and the managers charged with stewardship on society and environment 
and highlights the influence of history, custom and force of habit within the organisation 
in establishing value congruence based on recurring routine. These re-enacted activities 
eventually attain a rule-like status that becomes resistant to change (Berger & Luckmann 
1967; Zucker 1983).  Various external and internal actors exert institutional influence for 
organisational conformity, to ensure observance of legitimated organisational routine 
(Scott 1987; Oliver 1992).  
Before the advent of contemporary IT (often referred to as neo institutionalism) earlier 
theories of the embeddedness of organisations in social, cultural context (old 
institutionalism) had received attention and still retain substantial measures of vigour 
(Meyer, 2008; Hirsch & Lounsbury, 1997; Stinchcombe, 1997). In many respects old 
institutionalism has been marginalised by a new schema that argues that actors within 
institutions are purposeful, bounded, reasonably rational and drive social, cultural and 
custom changes.  That is to say; society is made up of interested, purposeful and rational 
actors. 
Meyer & Rowan (1977) and DiMaggio & Powell (1983) have been key proponents of 
modern institutionalism.  Neo institutionalism is underpinned by the tested presumption 
that the formal structures of the organisation reflect the rationalised myths of institutional 
environments rather than the demands of work activities (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Neo 
institutionalism proposes three processes that generate rationalised myths of 
organisational structure. These three variables significantly influence organisations to 
develop and implement myth-based structures and routinised behaviour. As such, the 
impact of these elements on organisations and organising is significant. 
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First, the elaboration of complex relational networks (and not just norms) drives structure 
formation among organisations. In specific reference to MPR and HPR, network 
relationships among different organisations, managers and stakeholders, influence and 
shape the type of structures employed by these firms. Next, the degree of collective 
organisation of the operating environment would influence structural orientation. 
Therefore, the extent to which the operating environment required collaboration among 
competing organisations would directly impact the types of structures utilised. Finally, 
managers within organisations belong to the same social class hence will implement, 
similar ideas concerning the structural orientation, practices and processes of the firm 
(such as HPR).  
I adopt the sociological institutionalism strand of IT to explain why organisations take on 
similar characteristics, practices, forms, processes and reporting practices. It is premised 
on the argument that actors (i.e. managers) adopt reporting practices to bring legitimacy 
to their stewardship and the organisation.  Scott (1987) for instance contends that 
‘organisations conform because they are rewarded for doing so through increased 
legitimacy, resources and survival capabilities’ (p. 498). This view, in substance, provides 
complimentary perspective to both LT and ST. 
 
The underlying similarity in all institutional theory is that something identified at a higher 
level is used to explain processes and outcomes at a lower level of analysis (Amenta & 
Ramsey, 2010; Clemens & Cook, 1999). However various types of institutional theory 
focus on different types of higher order determinants and differ in how they matter. 
Zucker’s (1987) contends that the two defining institutional elements are:  
 
a. A rule-like, and organised pattern of action (exterior), and  
b. An embedding in formal structures, such as formal aspects of organisations 
that are not tied to specific actors or situations (non-personal/objective).  
Meyer & Rowen (1977, page 341) agree and state that ‘institutionalisation involves the 
processes by which social processes, obligations, or actualities come to take on a rule 
like status in social thought and action’. IFRS is an example of such institutionalisation, 
where normative approaches to financial reporting are solidified in a set of guidance rules 
about the reporting of financial performance.  
Amenta & Ramsy (2010) identify four streams of institutional theory. These are 
sociological, historical, political and rational choice streams. Historical institutionalism (HI 
hereafter) reject functionalist explanations for why institutions emerge and focus on 
determinants at the macro political or macro-economic level expecting causation to be 
multiple, conjunctional and involving a time order and path dependence (Pierson & 
Skocpol, 2002). HI is in part a response to rational choice theory and behaviourism and 
holds that institutions are not typically created for functional reasons. Therefore, historical 
research is required to trace the processes behind the creation and persistence of 
institutions and policies.  
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Political institutionalism (PI hereafter) focuses on macro political determinants. PI came 
in response to formerly dominant pluralist and Marxism that provided a one-dimensional 
view of organisations. Political institutionalism does not focus on convergence across 
organisations but rather long-standing institutional differences among companies and 
argues that organisational level political institutions mediate the influence of internal 
political actors (e.g. managers). PI & HI define institutions to include formal and informal 
procedures, routines, norms and conventions in the organisational structure of the 
political economy.  
 
Sociological institutionalism (such as Powell & DiMaggio, 1991, 2012; Meyer et al., 1997 
a & b) focuses on cultural and ideational causes that are posited to exert influence either 
at the supra-societal or supra state level for states or at the societal level for organisations. 
Sociological institutionalism (SI hereafter) perceives institutions as a complex and 
coherent mixture of cultural and organisational material. Stakeholders within this context 
are substantially empowered and controlled by institutional context, and these contexts 
go beyond norms and networks. Often the context has prior and exogenous historical 
origins. Granovetter (1985) argues that SI goes beyond norms and focus on networks 
and relations.  SI originated in part, in response to traditional views of organisations (such 
as resource dependence model) that neglect cultural structures and processes in 
explanations.  The focus of SI is on the quests for legitimisation in political organisations 
and tends to focus on the process of policy imitation and diffusion and especially on the 
surprising convergence in forms of institutions and policies. 
In this section, I justify the use of sociological perspective of institutional theory as an 
appropriate theoretical lens for examining HPR and proceed to establish a foundation for 
hypothesising how environmental and organisational factors can influence HPR through 
the process of institutionalisation. 
The notion that both macro and micro variables shape managerial choices and behaviour 
has gained intuitive appeal among scholars. Indeed, there is enormous literature on the 
application of organisation-focused theories, (with varying conceptions of what 
constitutes an organisation and how organisations interact with their competitive 
environments) to explain managerial behaviour choices when confronted with ethical 
dilemmas in periods of performance gaps. For instance, Structural Contingency Theory 
explores the effect of environmental variables and structural differentiation, on MPR 
(Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967) by assuming a single organisation as the unit of analysis. 
‘Transaction cost economists’ also claim that the boundaries and structure of a firm are 
influenced by considerations of transaction cost (Williamson, 1975, 2000). Resource 
dependency theorists examine organisation as a coalition of groups and interests joggling 
to benefit from their membership (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978, 2003). In all these studies, 
the organisation is examined as a single unit in the examination of interdependencies and 
power dynamics.  
Neo-institutional (modern institutional theory) theorists differentiate themselves from the 
aforementioned organisational theories in that they examine organisational fields rather 
than individual organisations as the primary unit of analysis. An organisational field is a 
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group of organisations that combine to form a recognised area of institutional life and can 
include suppliers, consumers and regulatory agencies (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). 
Therefore, even though all the theories above focus on macro phenomena, only IT is 
appropriate for analysing a group of similar organisations operating under the constraints 
of environmental and social constraints.  
Suddaby (2010) suggests that empirical studies should focus on the organisational level 
of analysis to understand how institutions are comprehended and interpreted by 
organisations themselves. Davis & Marquis (2005) insist that organisational research 
utilising an entire field of organisations is helpful for further developing the literature on 
institutional theory especially about the drivers of action in the constantly evolving 
environment that affects managers and the organisations they manage.  
Since this study examines components of a particular field as the unit of analysis (GC100 
companies), the application of institutional theory is appropriate. SI argues that common 
cultural institutions and cognitive or normative constructs that define the conceivable and 
appropriate forms of political organisations play a significant role in policy and structural 
isomorphism (Hall & Taylor, 1996). In that respect, the institutions of interest are not the 
organisations that mirror culture in themselves, rather the ‘codified cultural constructions’ 
(Strang & Chang, 1993). SI conceptualise the process of policy adoption as a matter of 
emulation and diffusing emphasising system-level and relational level causes that are 
exogenous to actors. This implies that managerial behaviour within organisations is 
explained based on the extent of conformity to new, emerging or existing cultural 
institutions. 
Across all conceptual approaches and despite differences between the various schools 
of thought, notions of recurrence, typification, solidified patterns and relative durability are 
at the core of what institutions are (Meyer & Hollerer, 2014). Hughes (1936) notes ‘the 
only idea common to all usages of the term ‘institution’ is that some sort of establishment 
of relative permanence of a distinctly social sort’ exists. 
I use IT (specifically the Sociological perspective of neo institutionalism) to explore 
managerial performance reporting behaviour and the extent to which managers are 
impacted by processes and practices, norms, beliefs from actors within their organisation 
to engage in HPR. To set the stage for my hypothesis, I highlight and summarise relevant 
literature on institutional theory to establish a foundation for my assertion that institutional 
logics of action serve to moderate managerial self-seeking behaviour in MPR. The 
definition of the institution is varied and depends on the stream of IT that authors align 
with. DiMaggio & Powell (1991) attribute this ambiguity to scholars’ casual definitions of 
institutionalism, institutionalist researchers’ diverse emphasis on micro and macro 
features, the level of cognitive and normative aspects of institutions, and the importance 
they place on relational networks in the creation and diffusion of institutions.  
 
Scott (2008) defines institutions to comprise of ‘regulative, normative and cultural-
cognitive elements that, together with associated activities and resources, provide 
       
76 
 
stability and meaning to social life’. This definition emanates from the sociological 
perspective of IT and is the subject of subsequent discussion in this section. Meyer et al. 
(1987) define institutions as ‘cultural rules giving collective meaning and value to 
particular entities and activities, integrating them into larger schemes’. 
  
Unlike CAT, the Institutional theory does not rely on the aggregation of individual action 
or on patterned reaction games between individuals but rather on ‘institutions that 
structure action’ (Clemens & Cook, 1999; page 442). Therefore, institutions are ‘higher-
order’ factors above the individual level constraining or constituting the interest and 
political participation of actors ‘without requiring repeated collective mobilisation or 
authoritative intervention to achieve these regularities’ (Jepperson 1991, page 145). 
Essentially, Institutions are the rules and the predetermined patterns of conduct that are 
generally accepted by individuals in society (Berger & Luckmann 1967; Rutherford 1996). 
There are informal rules, such as norms, habits and customs, or formal rules, such as 
written laws, regulations and standards. Managers, therefore, abide by the rules set out 
in institutions by devising strategies to survive or win in society (North 1993, 2003, 2016).  
 
SI defines institutions to include cognitive scripts, moral templates and symbol systems 
(Hall & Taylor, 1996) that may reside at the supra organisational levels. Therefore, the 
extent of influence and durability of institutions becomes a function of the extent to which 
they are inculcated in political actors at the individual and organisational level, and the 
extent to which they tie up material resources and networks (Clemens & Cook, 1999).  In 
SI theory, organisational structures constitute the medium through which normative, 
cognitive and dependence mechanisms exert their influence, even though other 
explanations have relied on an organisations network of communication and monitoring.  
 
In substance, SI links organisational practices to societal values and argues that 
organisational forms tend towards some form of homogeneity to preserve legitimacy. 
Therefore, the status of organisations legitimacy reflects the ‘social fit’ of the organisation 
with society and environmental context. Society seems to associate legitimacy with formal 
organisational structures and practices. However, these formal structures do not 
necessarily result in technical efficiency. Managers choose an MPR approach that gives 
a perception of conformance to institutional myths by building ‘buffers’ between the formal 
structures which people see (to maintain legitimacy) and the actual work processes that 
create internal functional and technical efficiency (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). The formal 
structures are the observable practices of managers, which are visible to others. These 
formal structures and processes reflect the rationalised institutional rules of the broader 
institutional environments in which organisations operate. 
 
SI contests the CAT assumption of the purposeful pursuit of self-interest. Firstly, SI 
argues that the individualist assumption of interest driven behaviour implies a variety of 
actions, policies and behaviours as well as functional forms among organisations. 
However, the reality is that most organisations, exposed to similar environmental 
variables display not a variety but instead isomorphism despite the supposed differences 
in relevant interest (Meyer et al. 1997). Second, the ambiguity of the linkage between 
observed reality and organisational goals renders impracticable a well-informed pursuit 
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of self-interest (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Third, interest driven theories prematurely 
dismiss the constitutive role of culture in organisational dynamics or conceptualise culture 
as being an artefact of political structures or economic relations (Boli & Thomas, 1999).  
Institutional theory attends to the manner by which rules, norms, and beliefs gain traction 
as standards for social behaviour while impacting the structural orientation of 
organisations (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Selznick, 1996). This theory is typically applied 
as a mechanism for explaining organisational stability and similarity amongst 
organisational fields (Greenwood & Hinings, 1996). The emphasis on how activities 
become rule-like or become social facts renders institutional theory plausible for 
understanding MPR practices (Meyer & Rowan 1977; Zucker 1987). Institutional theory 
is useful for describing how organisational activities may over time come to contribute to 
performance reporting behaviour because of its focus on the process by which these 
activities become embedded in institutions or accepted practices.  
SI, however, vary in the mechanism by which organisational structures maintain stability 
and exert causal influence. Two central mechanisms of SI are isomorphism and 
decoupling. With decoupling, managers tend to use MPR to construct an image of 
responsiveness to various stakeholders when in fact the managerial imperative is the 
maximisation of self and shareholder wealth. Decoupling allows managers to give a 
perception of compliance while adopting different structures and policies. Isomorphism is 
a ‘constraining process that forces one unit in a population to resemble other units that 
face the same set of environmental conditions (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). 
  
One view is that norms, rituals, models and conventions establish what is appropriate 
within a given circumstance (Meyer & Rowan, 1977) and hence managers within an 
organisation, who act on behalf of the organisation, are motivated by status concerns and 
the need for legitimacy especially among peers. Therefore, they adopt and maintain the 
characteristics and form of their parent company or of those peers they consider as 
legitimate. Meyer (2007) defines norms as rules with some degree of binding authority 
over actors. One argument is that norms are created by the actors involved and have 
binding power over the actor in so much as the actor continues to support it. Another 
argument is that, norms may have been created by forces in the past and may have 
binding power irrespective of the actor's support. In such situations, actors through a sort 
of socialisation process internalise norms.  Meyer (2007) refers to this as compromised 
realism where actors are partly creatures of rules and not only creators of them. 
 
A second view is that cognitive schemas, scripts & paradigms establish what is 
conceivable. Managers are motivated by substantive policy concerns but the linkage 
between available means and desired ends are inherently ambiguous, and therefore 
managers select available means based on imperfect bounded rationality (Cohen et al. 
1972). Consequently, they address policy either by working from a shared available stock 
of professional expertise (Hall, 1993) or by emulating peers that they perceive as being 
more successful. Emulating peers may derive from competitive motivations (Dobbin et al. 
2007) or be part of a bounded, heuristic learning process (Weyland, 2005) though such 
a mechanism is difficult to disaggregate (Burt, 1987). This results in normative and mimic 
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isomorphism. DiMaggio & Powell (1983) argue that isomorphism can occur due to the 
fear of uncertainty because ‘uncertainty is a powerful force that encourages imitation’ 
(page 151).  This leads to mimetic isomorphism where managers copy the managerial 
reporting practices of other managers to reduce uncertainty. Normatively this can lead to 
the adopting of group norms such as from professional bodies. 
 
A third view is that managers are epistemologically dependent on other stakeholders to 
develop and demonstrate the cognitive or normative feasibility of policy rationales and 
prescriptions. Therefore, managers delegate technical authority to ‘expert bodies’ and 
hence create policy by enacting the recommendations of such ‘technical communities’ 
(Haas, 1992) or by defaulting to the standard and regulations of ‘global governance’ 
(Dingwerth & Pattberg, 2006). 
 
Coercive explanations of organisational policy have also received attention in the 
literature. Coercive Isomorphism arises when managers change their institutional 
practices because of pressure, force or the fear of it, from stakeholders upon which it 
depends for resources. Neu & Ocampo (2007) indicate that powerful stakeholders may 
have similar expectations of managers within an organisation and hence the likelihood of 
conformity in MPR. 
Several studies describe how institutional characteristics become articulated, enduring, 
and resistant to change over time (Tolbert, 1985; Tolbert & Zucker, 1983). Indeed, the 
general theme of the SI perspective is that an organisation’s survival requires it to conform 
to social norms of acceptable behaviour” (Covaleski & Dirsmith, 1988). An objective 
theoretical approach to institutionalisation in organisations has been described by Zucker 
(1987) as well as Berger & Luckmann (1967). They contend that IT provides a basic 
source of stability and integration in the creation of social commitments or entanglements. 
For instance, through external actions (externalisation), institutionalism make managers 
conscious of social expectation using language to interpret their actions as having an 
external reality separate from themselves (‘objectivation’ of the idea). These 
interpretations or “typifications” are attempts to label the behaviour into categories that 
will enable managers to respond to it on the same wavelength. Thus, “institutionalisation 
occurs whenever there is a reciprocal typification of ‘habitualised’ actions by types of 
actors” (Berger & Luckmann 1967, page 54).  
A fundamental requisite of on-going conformity to institutional practices must then be the 
consensus or “reciprocal typifications” among participants about the meaning, value and 
validity of an organisational form or activity (Berger & Luckmann, 1967; Meyer & 
Rowan,1977; Scott 1987). The main theme emanating out of these institutionalisation 
definitions thus far, tend to focus on the “social process by which individuals come to 
accept a shared definition of social reality – a conception whose validity is seen as 
independent of the actor’s own views or actions but is taken for granted as defining the 
‘way things are’ and/or the ‘way things are to be done’” (Scott 1987, p.496). The key focus 
is based on institutionalisation as a distinctive process, be it the infusion with value or with 
‘taken- for-granted’ meaning.  
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2.2.4.1. Institutional Constraints  
 
Inherent in the definition of sociological perspective of Institutional theory is emphasises 
on the pressure and constraints of the institutional environment. Recently, SI has 
considered perspectives where actors (managers and the organisations they serve) are 
not merely influenced by the societal perceptions and the environment but are also 
constrained in and by it (Jepperson, 2002). Often referred to as ‘constructivism’ it 
argues that institutional practices can emanate from law, ideology, culture and a variety 
of organisational constraints and opportunities. 
Organisational participants can be constrained by institutional arrangements that limit the 
choices available, restraining specific patterns of resources allocation and prohibiting 
courses of actions (Powell & DiMaggio, 1991). Regarding institutional structures such as 
regulatory structures, educational systems, laws, courts, governmental agencies and 
professions, public opinion and interest groups exert pressures and expectations on 
organisational actors (Scott, 1987, DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). 
SI suggests that interests tend to be institutionally or socially defined (Hinings & 
Greenwood, 1988; Hinings & Greenwood 1988). Therefore, the need for legitimacy can 
temper the self-interested behaviour of managers through abiding by ‘obvious’ and 
‘proper’ norms that have achieved the status of a social fact (Rowe, 2013). Thus, 
preconscious acceptance of institutionalised values or practices induces organisational 
behaviour rather than the processes of self-serving advantages (DiMaggio, 1988). 
However, DiMaggio (1988: 9) suggests, “self-interested behaviour tends to be smuggled 
into institutional arguments rather than theorised explicitly.” 
Such constrains elicit varied responses from actors (i.e. managers) which in many 
respects is dependent on the variant of IT a person subscribes to. SI suggests that 
institutional expectation imposes a constraint on managers and results in imitation or 
reproduction of organisational structures, activities, and routines (DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983; Zucker, 1977: 728) to ensure stability and overcome uncertainty.  
Selznick (1992: 232) insists that “when actions touch important interests and salient 
values or when they are embedded in networks of interdependence, options are more 
limited. Institutionalisation constraints conduct in two main ways: by bringing it within a 
normative order, and by making it hostage to its own history.”  
Rowe (2013) confirms earlier empirical findings of an inverse relationship between formal 
institutional constraints imposing a price on decision makers for acting according to their 
convictions and the willingness of these decision makers to follow their beliefs (Scott 
1987; North 1992). Rowe (2013) argues that managers are unlikely to reveal and act on 
their convictions if formal institutions impose a costly implication of such action. He uses 
the theory of cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1962; Rowe & Wehrmeyer, 2001) to 
provide a reason for this revelation.  
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Rowe (2013) describes Cognitive Dissonance as expressing the inconsistency between 
individual decision makers’ predilection (i.e., policies they think should guide decisions) 
and operating assumptions (i.e., policies they think will guide decisions).  
Powell & DiMaggio (1991) provide a similar explanation when there is a conflict between 
the espoused values of an individual and the values of the institutions from which the 
participant operates. Cognition conceptualises both reasoning and the preconscious 
ground of reasoning. The theory of cognitive dissonance predicts that when individuals 
perceive the consequences as too high, the individual will reduce the dissonance by not 
acting on his/her professional beliefs. This compels the individual to obey the prevailing 
institutional rules (North 1992; Hosking & Morley 1991).  
Hukkinen (1999, 2012) uses cognitive dissonance theory to develop an exciting 
perspective of short termism by managers in their performance reporting decisions. He 
suggests that the current dominance of the institutional framework by profit oriented 
operating assumptions makes this action a high likelihood. 
 
2.2.4.2. Institutional Isomorphism  
 
The preceding section portrays the sociological perspective of institutional theory as a 
system of constraints, which creates expectations and impede the organisation's ability 
to fully utilise the strict rationality of its realm (Meyer & Rowan 1977). Therefore, in 
response to societal expectations, a particular form of social change occurs (Lincoln, 
1990) driven by institutional elements that are external to the organisation. This externally 
endorsed social change generates constraints preventing organisational development in 
another course of action (Fogarty, 1992, page 333) even though the impetus for action is 
unclear as the organisation is in an “iron cage” (Zucker, 1987).  
Therefore, Isomorphism is a constraining process that compels a unit in the population to 
resemble other units that encounter the same set of environmental conditions (Hawley, 
1968). It encompasses a process through which ‘similar’ organisations become 
homogeneous (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Hannan & Freeman (1977) assert that 
isomorphism is attributable to the selection of non-optimal forms of organisation or as a 
consequence of organisational decision-makers adjusting their actions upon learning the 
appropriate responses. 
DiMaggio & Powell (1983) discuss the isomorphic tendencies resulting from 
institutionalised action and suggests that organisations competing in a singular field are 
pushed towards structural similarity via isomorphic pressures. Based on Hawley (1968) 
definition of isomorphism, then organisations are structured by phenomena in their 
environments and tend to become isomorphic with them to structurally reflect socially 
constructed realities. Meyer & Rowan (1977) discuss three consequences of 
isomorphism. First, isomorphism causes organisations to incorporate elements, which 
are legitimated externally, rather than in terms of efficiency. Also, because of isomorphic 
pressures, organisations often decouple and employ external or ceremonial assessment 
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criteria to define the value of structural elements. Also, dependence on externally fixed 
institutions often reduces turbulence and maintains stability.  
DiMaggio & Powell (1983) discusses how institutions affect manager’s decisions. On a 
realistic side, they argue that institutional structures affect managers through a coercive 
process including legal action. This is often referred to as Coercive Isomorphism and 
occurs when powerful stakeholders exert pressure.  In the middle ground, they envision 
normative controls of the environment over managers’ decisions emphasising the 
influence of professional standards. On the phenomenological perspective, they suppose 
that environments create standards that managers adopt ‘mimetically’ reflecting taken-
for-granted standards. At this point, managers are no more well bounded entities but may 
become built up cultural and organisational material from the environment. 
Several studies have examined how isomorphism as a process potentially impacts 
organisational actions and why these pressures may directly impact organisations 
competing in the same environment (Rowe, 2013). The consensus seems to be that 
isomorphism and structural change in organisations competing in the same field are less 
driven by competition or efficiency improvement concerns than by the need for conformity 
and similarity to other firms operating in the organisational field.  
Recently, and emanating from isomorphism, the empirical focus has been on how 
institutional ‘logics’ define the meaning and content of institutions (Rowe, 2013). Friedland 
& Alford (1991) defined institutional logics as ideas and beliefs that drive the behaviours 
of individuals within the context of interpersonal relationships, organisations, and society 
as a whole. Concerning organisations, ‘logics’ serve as the basis for structures, actions, 
and individual behaviours in a given institutional environment (Rowe, 2013; Thornton & 
Ocasio, 1999). At the individual level, logics of action serve as precursors to subsequent 
institutional logics (Thornton & Ocasio, 2008).  Thornton (2002) proposes that institutional 
logics influence managerial action because norms, rules and beliefs act as the 
predominant logic that drives decision-making in organisational fields.   
Fligstein (1987, 1990) examined competing conceptions of control related to corporate 
governance and found that intra-organisational power struggles and field-level struggle 
shape logics of action. Applying this to the present research, considering that managers 
are the primary carriers of the contending conceptions of control (Fligstein, 1990) it can 
be theorised that the logics of action guiding the behaviours of managers during inter and 
intra organisational competition will affect performance-reporting behaviour.  
Marquis & Lounsbury (2007) study how competing logics interact in shaping the 
relationship between the organisation and its employees concerning the adoption of or 
resistance to change in the banking industry. They found that banking acquisition 
influenced the local rate of banks. Therefore, managers can be impacted by both the 
frequency and intensity of predominant logics of action related to performance reporting 
decision-making. As suggested by Oliver (1991), organisations are unlikely to resist 
institutional pressures when they emanate from key entities occupying prominent 
positions within its field. This means that smaller, less powerful organisations are likely to 
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succumb to pressures exerted by dominant organisations or governing bodies in a given 
field.  
Recently ‘institutional logic’ has become the new buzzword for IT (Meyer & Hollerer, 
2014). Societies are inter-institutional systems, with each of the institutional orders having 
their own central logic (Thornton et al. 2012). Therefore, in any society, at any given point 
in time, different ‘Leitideen’ (Lepsius, 1997) or substances (Friedland, 2009) provide value 
orientation and criteria of rationality (Weber, 1978) with complex interdependencies and 
overlapping domains of jurisdiction (Meyer & Hollerer, 2014). The logics perspective 
currently provides a viable framework within institutional theory especially when it 
examines ‘institutional imperialism’ associating its spread to other spheres (Meyer & 
Hollerer, 2014). 
Several researchers have criticised IT. The emphasis on the evolution of organisations 
towards isomorphism and hence imitative action is contentious and has not always 
received empirical support. When this is stretched, it assumes that organisations are 
passive recipients of environmental variables (Suddaby, 2010) ignoring the potential of 
entrepreneurial action in influencing the environment. Indeed, evidence exists that 
managers are not merely prisoners of their environment. (Meyer et al., 2009). 
 
Further to this, IT overly focuses on external influences to the neglect of the internal 
organisational dynamics as well as individual managerial attributes. Lewis et al., (2014) 
for instance confirm that personal managerial attributes are critical to managerial actions 
and behavior. Rao & Giorgi (2006) explain the consequence of this grave neglect stating 
that organisations are interpretive mechanisms that filter, decode and translate semiotic 
social systems. Therefore, considering that institutions can only act through managerial 
persons, this neglect affects the predictive ability of IT.  
 
Meyer & Hollerer (2014) express worry about the casual use of the word institutions in 
the empirical literature. They argue that the use of Institutional terminology seems to be 
a prefix to signal membership in a particular research community, rather than indicating 
the actual study of institutions. Added to this, Greenwood et al. (2014) contest the 
presumption of similarity and sameness often associated with IT and call instead for a 
study of differences and comparative research.  Berger & Luckmann (1967) have earlier 
suggested that the possibility for homogenous institutions is untenable because variations 
is a given and order is fragile. Meyer & Hollerer (2014) admit that even in the most 
ritualised institutions, ‘no act can be performed twice in exactly the same manner, and no 
two enactments of one and the same institutions are at close sight identical’. Therefore, 
there will always be differences in setting, context, time or actors involved (Drori et al. 
2014). This makes ‘sameness illusionary and homogeneity and similarity precarious’. 
 
Greenwood et al. (2014) also expressed concern that most institutional theorist, rather 
than focus on the study of organisations, pursue scholarships on field level institutions 
and processes. They argue that IT studies should focus on the organisation as dependent 
variables and explore organisational arrangements in different institutional spheres to be 
relevant to organisation theory. This is because a central objective of IT is to understand 
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how ‘collective purposes could be achieved through the panoply of structures and 
processes of organisation’. Additionally, they contest the assumption of homogenous 
organisations. King et al. (2010) expresses a similar concern and argue that IT 
scholarships have largely ignored the ‘enduring and distinctive’ qualities of organisations 
as actors.  
 
King et al. (2010) agree with the current trend of analysing organisations as actors 
because ‘the features that distinguish humans as actors are functionally equivalent to the 
features common to organisational actors’. Meyer & Hollerer (2014) severely contest this 
assertion and expose its flaws by asserting that organisations are not natural entities or 
natural persons and therefore overemphasising the ‘personhood’ of organisations reifies 
and conceals the distinguishing fact that organisations are more malleable. In that sense, 
it conflates managerial action with organisational action and forces discussions about 
non-existent ‘ideological structure of organisations’, which are in fact non-existent. 
 
Despite these criticisms, however, empirical evidence exists of mimetic, coercive, and 
normative forces influence on MPR (Lewis et al., 2014). Scot (1995) finds evidence that, 
within a certain context, MPR becomes institutionalised over time. Cormier et al. (2004) 
find evidence that MPR practices can be a product of symbolical or genuine isomorphism 
rather than economic consideration. Reid & Toffel (2009) find that firms in the same 
institutional field react similarly to external pressures in HPR while Cho & Patten (2007), 
note that firms operating in high-risk industries are more likely to engage in HPR. Cormier 
et al. (2004) test the influence of institutional pressures and find that imitation and 
routinised action influence MPR. Their results also indicated that MPR has a converging 
pattern over time. Sampaio et al. (2011, 2012) also find evidence of peer influences on 
MPR.  
 
2.2.5. Impression Management Theory (IM). 
 
Using Goffman’s (1959) concept of impression management, this section explores MPR 
as part of a process of managerial impression management as well as ‘organisational 
audiences’ responses to it.  
 
The concept of impression management emanates from social psychology (Merkl-Davies 
& Brennan 2011) and explores how individuals ‘present themselves to others to be 
perceived favourably by others’ (Hoogheimstra, 2000; page 60). Goffman (1959) uses a 
dramaturgical metaphor to explain impression management as the performance of ‘self-
vis-à-vis’ an audience (Merkl-Davies & Brennan 2011). In general, impression 
management involves the use of varied techniques to influence an ‘audience’ impression 
of self, another person, an event, an idea, or an object (Schlenker, 1980) with the intention 
of appealing to the audiences’ perception (Gioia et al., 2000). Schlenker et al. (1994) 
propose that impression management occurs because accountability is expected from 
the ‘performer’ to the ‘audience’.  Merkl-Davies & Brennan (2011) define accountability 
as entailing ‘the obligation of one party to provide explanations and justifications of its 
conduct to another party’ and involves ‘the first party being subjected to scrutiny, 
judgement and sanctioning of the second party (page 425).  Schlenker et al. (1994) and 
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Christopher & Schlenker (2005) define accountability regarding being answerable to 
another party in fulfilment of some responsibility, duty or expectation and suggest that 
accountability involves three stages of inquiry, accounting and verdict. The inquiry 
process involves submitting to an enquiry by an audience who will evaluate your actions 
and decisions based on set criteria; the accounting stage involves the presenter 
‘presenting’ his version of events (Merkl-Davies & Brennan 2011) and describing, 
explaining, interpreting events to the audience. The verdict stage involves the audience 
reviewing the various submissions by the presenter and passing judgement on the 
presenters’ performance and the implementation of rewards or sanctions.    
 
Corporate reports, notably the annual report, serve as an accountability mechanism that 
addresses the concerns of external parties (Merkl-Davies & Brennan 2011, page 425). 
However, ‘extensive impression management could destroy this occasion of 
accountability rendering it a weak or impotent accountability mechanism’ (Solomon et al., 
2013, page 197) and may also result in misallocation of resources as well as well as 
unwarranted approval of organisational activities (hegemony).  
 
Goffman alludes that, when persons are given the opportunity to account for their 
stewardship, often the whole process is similar to a theatrical act, characterised by 
process of a mutual attempt to impress by both the assessor and the assessed.  While 
admitting that this attempt at managing and controlling the impression that others have 
about one’s capability is inherent and unavoidable, various studies have confirmed that, 
without deliberate and conscious interventions, these theatrical acts could render a 
performance monitoring process as superficial and a staged myth creating exercise that 
does little to render genuine accountability. Goffman alludes to the fact that both 
assessors and the assessed contribute (sometimes mutually) to the process of superficial 
impressions and refers to that as a dual myth of mutual impression management.  
 
Goffman (1959) contends that persons (assessor and assessed) stage their performance 
through impression management, ‘fronting’, concealment, fabrication, framing and 
interactive ritual.  
 
Even though Goffman’s initial work was focused on face-to-face interaction, various 
studies (including Goffman at a later date) have extended the theories of impression 
management to cover all forms of social interaction and communication. As performance 
management is a form of communication (Miller, 1987), Goffman’s model becomes a 
useful basis for analysing social interactions that take place during the performance 
management process. 
 
If Goffman’s assessments of social interactions as being characterised by mutual 
impression management and a dual myth are appropriate representations of social reality, 
it is reasonable to expect some element of concealment and fabrication in performance 
reporting and monitoring. Indeed, Goffman asserts that ‘it seems that we spend most of 
our time not engaging in giving information but in giving shows’ (page 108). 
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Goffman’s theories around impression management have been vertically borrowed and 
extensively applied to accounting research to explore the efficacy of accounting as a 
communication medium; the mechanism used and attempts to influence stakeholder’s 
perception of an organisation, as well as the likely effects of impression management on 
varied interest groups.  In defining audience within an organisational performance 
context, the scope has varied between shareholders and financial intermediaries on one 
side and stakeholders and broader society on the other side. Merkl-Davies & Brennan 
(2011), contend that, within accounting literature, impression management has often 
been applied in a corporate reporting context especially, to explain the discretionary 
narrative disclosures. Godfrey et al., (2003) argue that, in line with impression 
management, management of an organisation often deliberately display and present 
various corporate narrative disclosures ‘in a manner that is intended to distort readers’ 
perception of corporate achievements (page 96). Following from Goffman’s theory, 
research has confirmed, for instance, that executives (1) apply varied methods to conceal 
underperformance such as language, narratives, graphs etc. (Beattie, Dhanani & Jones, 
2008), (2) manipulate and fabricate organisational performance results (Solomon et al 
2013), (3) deliberately and strategically highlight good news and obfuscate bad news in 
a performance report (Adelberg, 1979; Kohut & Sears, 1992), (4) deliberately attribute 
performance outcomes to the wrong reasons depending on the reaction they hope to 
achieve from their ‘audience’ (Bettman & Weitz, 1983, Aerts, 2005). Li (2008) uses the 
‘incomplete revelation hypothesis to confirm that managers may choose to manipulate 
the syntactic features to make a performance report of a poorly performing firm difficult to 
read to increase the time and effort needed to extract information. Baird & Zelin (2000) 
test the ‘primacy effect’ and ‘recency effect’ using the belief-adjustment model and find 
that the ordering of good and bad news can influence stakeholder perception of 
performance. 
 
2.2.5.1. Why Does Impression Management Occur During Performance 
Reporting?  
 
There is extensive literature on the possible causes of impression management. Using 
alternative rationality assumptions Merkl-Davies & Brennan (2011) categorised the 
various motivations for impression management into four main perspectives of economic, 
psychological, sociological and critical perspectives. 
 
Goffman (1959) alludes to self-interest or private economic gain as a possible motive for 
impression management. Indeed ‘it is not assumed, of course’ that all cynical performers 
are interested in deluding their audience for purposes of what is called ‘self-interest’ or 
‘private gain’ (page 11). Following on from agency theory, Rutherford (2003) suggests 
that reporting bias, such as obfuscation of negative organisational outcomes will occur 
when management stands to benefit personally and directly because ‘in an environment 
in which their remuneration and wealth is linked to the financial performance of the 
companies that employ them, management has economic incentives to disclose 
messages that convey good performance more clearly than those conveying bad 
performance’ (page 189).   
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While admitting personal economic self-interest has a critical motivation to report 
organisational performance biasedly, various authors have proposed that the agency 
theory is not comprehensive enough to encompass other considerations for performance 
reporting irregularity. Merkl-Davies & Brennan (2011) contend that the agency theory 
does not adequately provide for the motivation to misreport in social and environmental 
performance as well has the growing evidence of misreporting even when no direct 
economic benefit can be envisaged.  
 
Again, using attribution theory, Merkl-Davies & Brennan (2011) argue that psychological 
and other behavioural reasons could also account for managers’ desire to control and/or 
influence the perception of an actual, imagined or implied presence of an audience about 
their performance. Goffman (1959) proposes that managers may engage in self-serving 
bias to avoid embarrassment and/or avoid sanctions and win appreciation (popularity). 
Often executives want to appear as competent, trustworthy, authoritative and honest 
(Hyland, 1998). By attributing performance to the wrong reasons ‘executives often project 
an air of competency and general grasp of the situation, blinding themselves and others 
to the fact that they hold their jobs partly because they look like executives, not because 
they can work like executives…. give the impression that their present poise and 
proficiency are something they have always had and that they have never had to fumble 
their way through a learning period (Goffman, 1959, page 55). Goffman (1959) suggest 
that to maintain ‘an impression of infallibility’ (page 27) managers have a motivation to 
conceal ‘dirty work’, errors and mistakes made, and the effort involved in achieving a 
target.  As an example, evidence exists of the use of complex technical jargons, 
accounting rhetoric (Hanson and White, 2003) or accounting logic (Broadbent, 1998), 
taking credit for success by attributing good performance to deliberate, reasoned and 
conscious behaviour (Knee and Zuckerman, 1996; Mumby and Putnam, 1992) whilst 
obscuring bad performance to ‘external factors beyond their control’ by most executives 
(Merkl-Davies & Brennan 2011, page 426; Adelberg, 1979), as well as retrospective 
sense making (Aerts, 2005; Merkl-Davies et al, 2011).  
 
Using a social psychological perspective, Merkl-Davies & Brennan (2011) also suggest 
that impression management can be based on ‘egocentric bias’ or overconfidence bias 
where managers provide bias performance results to enhance self-esteem as well as to 
protect, maintain or extend their beliefs about themselves or the environment. Goffman, 
(1959) identifies, two opposite extreme type of performers; ‘an individual taken in by his 
own act or be cynical about it’ (page 11). Merkl-Davies & Brennan (2011) suggest that 
impression management can occur in performance reporting because some managers 
are prone to cognitive and social biases.  In such a circumstance ‘managers may assess 
their own abilities in a biased manner manifesting itself in hubris (page 420). Hayward 
and Hambrick, (1997) define Hubris as ‘exaggerated pride or self-confidence (page 106). 
Hubris manifests itself through extreme managerial optimism (Liu and Taffler, 2008; 
Conroy, 2015; Wray, 2016; Spraggon & Bodilica, 2015).  
 
Using stakeholder theory, legitimacy theory (Ng and Tseng, 2008) and institutional theory, 
Merkl-Davies & Brennan (2011) suggest that managers are motivated to ‘playing a role’ 
in order to give an impression of being balanced among various stakeholders (referred to 
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as symbolic management; Boland & Pondy, 1983) and congruent with societal norms, 
societal expectations and the ‘common official values of the society’ even though very 
biased in favour of shareholders. The motivation to present a performance that gives an 
impression of conformity to official societal norms is to gain ‘unwarranted’ social approval 
and ‘forestall the interference of external agencies in the operations of the organisation 
(Merkl-Davies & Brennan 2011, page 420; Hines & Groves, 1989). In a way, this 
constitutes one way in which a ‘performance is ‘socialised, moulded and modified to fit 
into the understanding and expectations of the society’ by offering observers or audiences 
‘an impression that is idealised in several different ways’ (Goffman, 1959, page 23). 
Goffman (1959) refers to it as sacred compatibility between executives and their jobs 
where executives try to give the impression that ‘they have ideal motives for acquiring the 
role in which they are performing, that they have ideal qualifications for the role, and that 
it was not necessary for them to suffer any indignities, insults and humiliations or make 
any tacitly-understood ‘deals’ in order to acquire their role’ (page 29). Goffman (1959) 
identifies that ‘performers’ sustain idealised standards whose ‘inadequate application 
could not be concealed’ ‘in public by the private sacrifice’ of some other standards whose 
‘lose can be concealed’. 
 
Therefore, aside personal self-interest related issues, as stated above, executives also 
use impression management to help restore organisational reputation, image and 
legitimacy especially after performance gaps (Abrahamson & Park, 1994; Courtis, 2004), 
organisational scandals (Linsley & Kajuter, 2008) environmental disasters 
(Hooghiemstra, 2000) and controversial decisions such as reorganisations or 
privatisation (Craig and Amernic, 2008; Arndt & Bigelow, 2000; Odgen & Clarke, 2005). 
In such circumstances, Merkl-Davies & Koller (2012) argue that impression management 
is effective at explaining off the unwarranted event or disaster as an exceptional one-off 
incident that is unlikely to happen again. Impression management is also often applied to 
shape perception on controversial issues among various stakeholders, such as mergers 
(Arndt & Bigelow, 2000; Craig & Amernic, 2008). Because reputation and image focus on 
the external evaluation of an organisation whilst legitimacy deals with a measure of the 
acceptability of an organisational and its practices with respect to a set of social norms 
(Deephouse & Suchman, 2008); Brennan & Merkl-Davies (2013) argue that impression 
management entails ‘constructing an impression of the quality or normative 
appropriateness of organisational structures, processes, practices, or outcomes’ (page 
7). 
 
Using critical theory and theories from political economy, Merkl-Davies & Brennan (2011) 
suggest that impression management is a political tool used in ideological power 
struggles between management and various sections of stakeholders (such as when an 
influential leader wants to impose his choices on an organisation emanating from 
ideological biases). This is achieved in the way organisational performance is presented, 
and the other key stakeholders are presented in a performance report (Amenic & Craig, 
2004).  Merkl-Davies & Brennan (2011) assert that organisational managers are powerful 
organisational actors who attempt to establish and/or maintain an unequal power 
relationship by providing ‘a hegemonic account of organisational outcome, often by 
means of using dominant discourses’ (page 428). In gaining an ideological advantage, 
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the company maintains a ‘privileged position regarding information by keeping society 
unaware of alternative avenues of consumption, or systems of organisation or [of] its 
present and future performance’ (Simpson, 2000; page 245). 
 
2.2.5.2. Consequences Of Impression Management  
 
Following from Goffman’s (1959) theory, both the audience and the performer engage in 
impression management.  In an extreme scenario, the whole theoretical process of 
inquiry, accounting and verdict can be reduced to a game theoretic process where 
audiences and performers are trying to control and/or influence each other’s perception. 
In the other extreme, audiences and performers can collude to delude other stakeholders. 
 
Goffman (1959) identifies concealment of information, misrepresentation, as well as 
fabrication as acts of impression management. In the accounting literature, often the 
discussion about the consequences of impression management focuses on the 
discussions about deliberate and conscious acts of concealment, misreporting or 
fabrication on stakeholders, particularly shareholders in their resource allocation 
decisions. Evidence exists to support the assertion that, for both performers and the 
audience, assuming a semi strong capital market, rational actors can identify and control 
for bias information when they can verify such information from other independent 
sources (Demers and Vega, 2010). However, due to the concept of bounded rationality 
in decision-making, as well as other cognitive and affective biases (Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1979), this process is not immediate and is relatively turbulent.  Bounded 
rationality assumes that individuals make decisions to achieve a satisfactory rather than 
an optimal result, are affected by the external environment and base their decisions on 
information available to them at a point in time. Therefore the quality of decisions can be 
affected by time constraints, the cost of verifying the credibility of the information, the 
capacity of the person to understand the information as well as by other cognitive, 
affective and socially influenced biases such as hindsight bias, primacy and recency bias, 
herd effect as well as the bandwagon effect. 
 
Therefore, in reality, where the individual does not have the benefit of alternative sources 
to verify information, has a time constraint on when he has to make a decision, does not 
have the resources and or expertise to extract the correct information or is influenced by 
other social biases, his decisions on resource allocation may be adversely affected by 
misreported information.  
 
Using the incomplete revelation hypothesis, Bloomfield (2002); Bowen et al. (2005) 
confirm that when investors are constraint by time, they are unable to control 
appropriately for deception in performance reports. Krische (2005), Fredrickson and Miller 
(2004) as well as Elliot (2006) provide evidence that unintentional cognitive biases arising 
from lack of expertise and memory loses can make unsophisticated investors susceptible 
to impression management in performance reporting. MacGregor (2002) confirms that 
stakeholder decision making is not always based on accurate technical details but can be 
affected by affective factors such as the image associated to a particular company (such 
that image evaluations correlate with financial judgements) and even the language used 
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in a performance report. Courtis (2004) find evidence that stakeholder judgements can 
be influenced by colour in annual reports, preferring certain colours to others. 
 
Gouldner (1970), Burns (1992) as well as Macintyre, (l992) have criticised the over 
reliance on ‘the world of appearance’ in IM theory. Garfinkel (1967) exposes the limited 
viability of IM for mundane behaviour, and Habermas (1991) points out an irrational 
cynicism about the motives of other people at the heart of Goffman's theory. Habermas 
(1991) based on his criticism suggests an alternative interactional theory. 
 
2.2.6. A Multi-Theoretical Approach. 
 
Prior studies have attempted to identify the causes and effects of HPR. Reasons have 
ranged from economic, through social and political considerations.  Recently 
considerations of personal managerial attributes, perceptions and convictions have also 
found space in the evolving literature.  Beyond selfish economic needs of managers, most 
of the theories seem to link managerial performance reporting action to a need for 
organisation and managerial survival through legitimacy in a resource dependent 
scenario.  
 
Most of the motivations are discussed within the context of various theoretical frameworks 
that give useful insight into why despite being motivated by same reasons the extent of 
HPR differs among managers.  
 
I adopt a multi-theoretical approach in line with empirical trends (Ntim & Soobaroyen, 
2013; Chen & Roberts, 2010). This is a viable option especially considering that the notion 
of legitimacy cuts across most of the theories discussed above. Chen & Roberts (2010;) 
suggest that these theories share same ‘ontological worldview in that they see 
reality/structures are continually created, reproduced and reoriented by the interactions 
among social organisations’. In explaining my findings, therefore, joint consideration of 
the various theories will be applied since in my view the concepts underlying the theories 
are not distinct but overlapping and complimentary and hence can co-exist. Islam & 
Deegan (2008) argue that the joint consideration of IT and LT ‘provides a richer basis for 
understanding and explaining reporting behavior than will be possible from considering 
one of the theories alone’.  
 
The overarching assumption in these theories is the fact that organisations are influenced 
by their societies and in turn through their actions organisations can influence their 
societies or operating environment (Gray et al. 1995a; Thomson, 1967). While all the 
theories discussed above argue that there are ‘external pressures’ that affect managerial 
performance reporting behaviour, the way such external pressures are identified, 
managed or satisfied differ among theories (Wangombe, 2013). CAT identifies 
shareholders as primary recipients of manager’s attention and satisfying them involves 
pursuing wealth maximisation. The management perspective of stakeholder theory 
(which is predominant in recent empirical literature) focuses on stakeholders with power 
and salience over the organisation. LT focuses on wider society in general (and not just 
those who influence the organisation), and IT identifies external pressures as the 
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institutional pressures of conformity. CAT posits that managers respond to external 
pressures through the pursuit of wealth maximisation either for self or principals, while ST 
suggests that managers will pursue a balance of interest among multiple shareholders. 
LT argues that organisations will respond to external pressure through strategies aimed 
at reducing legitimacy gaps. Such strategies include changing perceptions, deflecting 
attention and altering perception. IM suggests similar approaches as LT except that under 
IM legitimacy is achieve though managing impressions rather than external pressures. 
The sociological perspective of IT argues that managers respond to external pressures 
through mechanisms of isomorphism. There is an obvious overlap between ‘relevant 
public’ of LT and stakeholders of LT and Suchman (1995) propose that legitimacy and 
institutionalisation are synonymous. However, IT can only explain or describe the 
existence of a legitimacy condition but cannot explain the dynamic nature of legitimacy 
(Chen & Roberts, 2010). The application of symbolism in LT. IT and ST involve the use 
of impression management strategies. Whereas Investors base assessments of a firm’s 
legitimacy on its passive conformance to social structures, firm’s managers can shape 
the way stakeholders view the firm (Bansal & Clelland, 2004). MPR can be sued to 
influence perceptions of the firm (Elsbach & Sulton, 1992) by applying IM tactics such as 
excuses, justifications, concessions, apologies and denials. These IM strategies 
inevitably influence unsystematic risks and legitimacy (Bansal & Clelland, 2014). Table 
2.1.  provides a tabular depiction of the link between the research question and theoretical 
frameworks based on a multi theory approach. It is worthy of note that, all five theories 
have a bearing on the primary and every secondary research question. Therefore table 
2.1 only highlights the predominant theories at play for answering each question. Section 
4.7 in chapter four discusses how these theories interact to explain the findings of this 
study vis-à-vis specific research questions. 
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Table 2.1: Link between Research Question and Theoretical Framework Utilised in this Study 
RQ Number & 
Reference 
Description Theoretical Framework 
Primary Research 
Question 
Should stakeholders be concerned about managers’ 
honesty in managerial performance reporting (MPR) and if 
so what are the factors that influence this behaviour? 
Stakeholder Theory, Institutional 
Theory, Legitimacy Theory, Impression 
Management Theory & CAT 
Secondary RQ1 In a self-reporting MPR environment do managers have a 
preference for being honest? 
Stakeholder Theory, Institutional 
Theory, Legitimacy Theory 
Secondary RQ2 Are there implications for HPR? Stakeholder Theory, Institutional 
Theory, Legitimacy Theory 
Secondary RQ3 Can we identify the factors that influence HPR? Stakeholder Theory & Legitimacy 
Theory 
Secondary RQ4 Is there a relationship between HPR and FP? Stakeholder Theory & Legitimacy 
Theory,  
Secondary RQ5 Can we identify the main features of managerial behaviour 
in HPR? 
Impression Management, Institutional 
Theory, Legitimacy Theory & 
Stakeholder Theory 
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2.3. PRIOR RESEARCH OVERVIEW: EMPIRICAL STUDIES ON MANAGERS 
BEHAVIOURAL CHOICE DECISIONS WHEN THERE ARE PERFORMANCE 
GAPS. 
 
Dye & Magee (1991) use a single period agency model and apply a mathematical 
approach to study discretion in reporting managerial performance. They offer solutions 
on how to mitigate the moral hazard problem in scenarios where a manager has some 
discretion in ‘choosing what to report to the principal about his output’. Dye & Magee 
(1991) assume conditions for conservative monotone reporting and argue that where 
such managerial discretion exits, principals should influence and possibly contract 
managerial performance based on reporting procedures and reporting technology (since 
these are observable). Dye (1988) argues that misreporting managerial performance 
distorts equilibrium, which can only be mitigated when communication is costly and 
limited. Green & Laffont (1986) in a general setting provide a necessary and sufficient 
condition under which all equilibria can be produced with ‘truthful disclosures’ (i.e. HPR). 
This condition is termed the Nested Range Condition (NRC). Arya, Young & Woodluck 
(1992) focus on a narrower setting than Green & Laffont (1986) to identify conditions 
under which equilibrium behaviour necessarily requires truthful disclosure. They attempt 
an answer to the question of whether the optimal principal agent contract can be achieved 
via HPR. In their study Arya, Young & Woodluck (1992) conceptualise HPR as reports 
consistent  
 
1) With external auditor’s view (hence focus on accounting reports) which guarantees 
‘honest disclosure’ only up to a materiality threshold and  
2) Internal control systems that detect ‘gross exaggerations of performance’. 
 
Specifically, their work explores a single period agency model and provides conditions 
under which the agent must be permitted to misreport performance if MPR will be valuable 
to optimal contracting. Their findings are mixed and based on the premise that the 
principal’s objective is to minimise the expected cost of inducing HPR, taking into 
consideration the agent’s self-interested behaviour concerning MPR. 
  
Fields et al. (2001) provide a comprehensive review of recent research on HPR including 
the contracting, political and other factors that explain HPR decisions (see also Watts & 
Zimmerman, 1978, 1986). Quite often, the discussions of political considerations include 
management’s concern about attracting explicit or implicit taxes or regulatory actions. 
However, like other empirical studies, Fields et al. (2001) review does not directly discuss 
HPR and instead focuses on deliberate misreporting of private information in MPR. In 
general, very little studies exist on HPR in particular. Considering Murphy’s (1993) 
assertion that encouraging HPR and deterring misreporting of managerial performance 
represent two different managerial challenges that must not be approached in the same 
way, specific studies on HPR need to be encouraged (Palepu, 1987). Zahra, Priem & 
Rasheed (2005) discuss prior research on the antecedents and consequences of HPR 
and conclude that most studies on HPR adopt a governance perspective and rely on the 
CAT including the imperfection of market systems that create information asymmetry. 
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Their analysis suggests that HPR studies focus on proximate indicators, rather than 
attempting to establish underlying causes or antecedents. 
Skinner (1993) argues that the use of managerial performance information in 
compensation contracts should be viewed as endogenous. Moreover, contracts are not 
the only mechanisms for dealing with information asymmetry and Watts & Zimmerman 
(1983, 1986), for instance, discuss the role of reputation as a mechanism for resolving 
information problems in the context of auditing.  
Even though prior research discusses several factors that constitute deliberate 
misreporting (i.e. wilfully undertaking actions to mislead others, lying about facts, failing 
to disclose significant events, cover- ups, etc.), there is ambiguity about how to interpret 
empirical evidence on HPR and MPR (see reviews by Holthausen & Leftwich, 1983; Watts 
& Zimmerman, 1990).  
The rest of the section is organised to discuss empirical literature that relates to each 
secondary research question to provide a basis for hypothesis formulation (in chapter 
four) and highlight the relevance of this study vis-à-vis the existing empirical gaps about 
MPR and HPR. 
 
2.3.1. Managerial Voluntary Preference For HPR 
 
Even though this study focuses on conflicts that arise in decisions on managerial 
behavioural choices in situations involving performance gaps, research on traditional 
organisational conflicts are not recent (see for example Laffont & Martimort, 2002; Antle 
& Eppen, 1985; Fandel & Trockel, 2011).  The surge in the application of the experimental 
methodology to accounting has mostly been in the studies of human behaviour especially 
on MPR (Brown et al., 2009; Sprinkle, 2007; Covaleski et al., 2007; Arnold, 2007). 
 
Researchers have attempted to explore managers’ voluntary propensity for HPR, and 
explain observed behaviour with existing theories, new theories and models. 
Experimental studies have dominated empirical research about managerial preference 
for HPR.  Perhaps the application of experimental research methodology to studies in 
accounting has resulted in the most significant application of theories from other social 
disciplines, existing economic models as well as the proposal of new theories and models 
to the field of accounting studies.  
 
Baiman & Lewis (1989) probably generated more scholarship interest in the study of 
voluntary managerial behavioural choices using experiments with their proposed 
‘threshold model’ as an explanation of observed behaviour in HPR. Baiman & Lewis 
(1989) argued that managers or agents are predominantly self-interested individuals 
motivated by a desire, always, to maximise their wealth. Therefore, managers do not 
voluntarily prefer HPR. They suggest an honesty threshold for monetary rewards that 
guides decisions by mangers in performance disclosure decisions such that when the 
expected monetary benefit is below the threshold, HPR will be high but beyond that 
threshold, managers are rational and will report dishonestly because it maximises their 
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wealth. Most important is their suggestion that the monetary threshold is significantly so 
low and hence almost non-existent such (therefore agents are often incentivised to lie for 
minimal amounts such as $0.25) that a principal achieves very little value in attempting 
to incorporate the threshold into any decision model or contract.   
 
Baiman & Lewis (1989) therefore confirm the effectiveness of the ‘CAT’ in predicting 
voluntary managerial behavioural choices regarding HPR. Essentially Baiman & Lewis 
(1989) suggest that agents have divergent and often opposing interest to their principal 
and are inherently driven to pursue their self-interest rather than the principals’ interest. 
The singular objective of agents is to maximise their wealth (that is, agents are monetary 
incentive driven) and therefore principals can maximise firm value by designing contracts 
that provide monetary rewards to agents for HPR. Agents do not subscribe to the tenets 
of bounded rationality under Baiman & Lewis (1989). 
 
Koford & Pennon (1992) also apply an experimental method to offer alternative evidence 
to predicting behavioural choices (when there is a performance gap) within the 
organisation with the ‘type model’. According to the type model, managers or agents are 
either fully honest (called ‘ethical’) or fully dishonest (‘called economic’). Therefore, the 
voluntary preference for HPR depends on whether the manager is an ethical type or an 
economic type. Ethical agents do not lie and will not be influenced by situational forces 
or other exogenous variables (therefore they will voluntarily prefer HPR). Economic 
agents will tell any lie necessary to maximise their wealth (therefore will not voluntarily 
prefer HPR). Koford & Pennon (1992) argue that the segregation of agents or managers 
into ethical or economic is based on the perceived utility or disutility from lying. Ethical 
persons engage in HPR because they experience an infinite disutility from lying whereas 
economic agents experience no disutility from lying. Koford & Pennon (1992) model, 
aside facing contestations in methodology (similar to Baiman & Lewis, 1989), is 
ambiguous about what determines a manager’s ‘type’. It also leaves unanswered if 
managers can cross between ‘types’. 
 
Recently, several studies such as Evans et al. (2001) have argued that a middle ground 
exists such that some agents are not fully honest or dishonest. Evans et al. (2001) and 
Mazar et al. (2008) refer to it as “partial honesty’ whereas Fischbacher & Heusi (2008) 
refer to the phenomenon as ‘incomplete lying’.  
 
Brickley et al. (1997); Chow et al. (1988); Waller (1988) and Luft (1997) use an 
experimental study to propose a ‘trade-off’ model where individuals make decisions about 
HPR through a trade-off between the utility for wealth and the disutility for lying. Brickley 
et al. (1997) for instance argue that the level of HPR will decline as a manager’s contract 
decreases the pay-off for HPR. Luft (1997) proposes that a managers’ disutility for lying 
increases based on the size of the lie and therefore huge pay-offs for lying increases both 
the utility for lying (because of greater wealth) and the disutility from lying. Evans et al. 
(2001) contests Lufts’ assertion and argue that there are limitations to the ability to test 
Lufts’ (1997) preposition empirically. 
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In recent times, various social preference or ‘fairness models’ (Charness & Gneezy, 2008) 
have been proposed to explain the growing evidence of partially honest managerial 
performance report and to reconcile empirical observations that are inconsistent with 
conventional economic models (Evans et al., 2001). Fairness models propose that 
managerial preferences regarding HPR are contextual on social and other psychological 
considerations. In other words, whether a manager will voluntarily prefer HPR depends 
on the context. Fairness models are underpinned by an assumption (even though not 
always backed by empirical studies - such as Luft, 1997 - but rather inferring from existing 
theories and models in other social disciplines) that agents desire for maximization of 
wealth are tempered by other desires, other constraints, and other considerations such 
as reciprocity, equity and distributional effects.  
 
Charness & Gneezy (2008) classifies the fairness models into two categories based on 
whether the behaviour is influenced by distributional concerns or by intentions. 
Distributional models such as Evans et al. (2001); Kirchsteiger (1994), Fehr & Kirchsteiger 
(1994); Fehr & Schmidt (1999) and Bolton & Ockenfels (2000) suggest that agents are 
motivated by a desire for inequality aversion, fairness, or a desire to match another 
persons’ behaviour. Therefore, agents are influenced by the final distribution of the pay-
offs such that for a given pay-off an agents’ utility will decrease by a margin equal to the 
difference between the pay-off to the agent and that of the other counterpart.  Evans et 
al. (2001) for instance disprove the findings of Antle & Eppen (1985) and find that the 
level of HPR under a ‘hurdle contract’ (that restricts rewards to a fixed ceiling thereby 
restricting pay-offs) was lower than under a ‘simple trust contract’ (where the agent 
received the full amount of pay-off based on his request and expectations). This implies 
that managers reporting behaviour is affected by how the managers’ report affects the 
distribution of the total surplus and hence HPR will increase when their share of the total 
surplus will increase proportionally and because of HPR. Ostermaier (2016) concludes 
from an experimental study that managers take capital rationing to signal distrust and 
spitefully reciprocates by misreporting their information to sabotage feasible investments 
and thus reciprocate owners’ distrust with sabotage. This reciprocity exacerbates the 
underinvestment that capital rationing brings about because spite permits low-cost 
investments only, and as the cost of the investment is low, the cost of lying to sabotage it 
is high. Hence high-cost investments, which offer little potential to create slack to 
compensate the manager’s spite and result in unequal payoffs, are particularly hit by 
sabotage. However, performance reporting curbs sabotage and inhibits spiteful 
reciprocity as it elicits the manager’s honesty. Honesty, therefore, spills over to suppress 
the effect of negative reciprocity on sabotage.  
 
Other distributional models have suggested that the predisposition to HPR improves if it 
helps improve equity for other employees (Kajackaite & Gneezy, 2017; Jung et al., 2017; 
Gino & Pierce 2010a; Gino & Mogilner, 2014; Gino & Ariely, 2012; Ariely et al., 2009) or 
reduce organisational friction. 
 
Voluntary preference for HPR is lower when managers perceive a situation as unfair or 
not equitable. Huseman et al (1987) suggests that managers measure fairness by 
continually comparing the relationship of the input to their output, with a similar effort-
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reward relationship of their peers and are likely to feel emotionally distressed (Homans 
1974) when they perceive inequity which can be a motivation for a misreporting (Gino & 
Pierce 2010) to correct the perceived inequity. Gino and Pierce (2010) admit that 
manager’s perception of fairness is a subjective construct based on a complex interplay 
of “objective fairness”, information, relativity and personal biases. The moral 
disengagement hypothesis (Bandura 1990, 2002; Kunda 1990) and elastic ethical 
justification hypothesis (Hsee 1995; 1996) support this reasoning by suggesting that 
managers are more likely to misreport the underlying private information if they can 
disengage moral responsibility from their actions by self-justifying their actions to make it 
compatible with moral standards. This happens in a setting where the benefits of 
misreporting are shared or benefit others. More recently social intuitionist theory (Haidt, 
2001) has been proposed to explain this behaviour. According to the intuitionist theory, 
just like esthetical judgments, individuals have an immediate feeling of approval or 
disapproval of any action or inaction by others or themselves.  These feelings are similar 
to affect based intuitions, are effortless in consciousness with an affective valence (good 
or bad) and are shaped by natural selection or culture (Greene & Haidt, 2002). Gino and 
Pierce (2010) propose that,  “People are motivated to maintain relationships and defend 
against threatening ideas (Chen et al., 1996; Tetlock et al., 2000), and they can also very 
easily construct post hoc reasons to justify their actions and judgments (Gazzaniga, 1985; 
Nisbett and Wilson, 1977). Individuals can more easily justify their behaviour when their 
actions are aimed at restoring equity. This argument is based on the idea that "people are 
likely to arrive to conclusions that they want to arrive at, but their ability to do so is 
constrained by their ability to construct seemingly reasonable justifications for these 
conclusions" (Kunda, 1990, p. 480), and that people's ethicality is rather elastic (Hsee, 
1995, 1996).”  
 
Matuszewski (2010) examine whether changes in HPR can be influenced by the 
perception of horizontal equity such that preference for HPR will differ in a situation of 
changes in an individual’s own salary than changes in the salary of his peers. The results 
showed that horizontal equity resulting from an increase in an individual’s own salary (with 
peer salary held constant), produced a significantly different HPR behaviour from when 
horizontal equity was increased by decreasing peer salary (with participant salary held 
constant). However, when horizontal equity was decreased, the effect on HPR was about 
the same, whether the decrease was accomplished by decreasing participant salary or 
increasing peer salary. Also, after controlling for effects associated with participants’ 
experience with the task and participants’ own salary changes, perceived changes in the 
horizontal equity of participants’ salaries were positively associated with changes in the 
degree of HPR implying that perceived inequity in pay structure motivates misreporting 
of performance information. In a similar study, Schindler & Pfattheicher (2017) use loss 
aversion theory in two experimental constructs (die-under-the cup paradigm and coin-
toss task) to demonstrate the predicted effect of framing. Their study confirms that people 
misreport performance to avoid a loss compared to approaching an equivalent gain. 
 
Gino & Pierce (2010) suggest that, as a mitigating factor, in situations where there is a 
strong possibility and opportunity for managerial discretion to be used arbitrarily, 
discretion should be constrained, or a requirement imposed for multiple redundancies’ or 
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diverse assessments from other managers. Nickerson & Zengers’ (2008) suggest that 
organisations must address the issue of perceived inequity through creating more 
consistent compensation schemes or by using technology to make individual 
contributions apparent. 
 
Intention models proposed by Rabin (1993), and Dufwenberg & Kirchsteiger (2000 & 
2004) argue that the principle of reciprocity guides agent's behavioural choices about 
HPR and therefore HPR is affected by the process that leads to the final decision and not 
just the outcome. Therefore, managers care about not only the outcome but also care 
about the effect of their choices on others, including the organisation. Therefore, 
managers’ personal desire for maximum gratification will be mitigated by considerations 
about how to achieve the outcome as well as its effect on others. Recently theories such 
as the ‘moral disengagement theory’, ‘Social deception theory’ (Shalvi et al., 2011), moral 
hypocrisy theory’ have been proposed to explain partial HPR along the lines of the 
intention of the agent. Following the intention models, empirical findings have suggested, 
for example, that the intrinsically motivated desire for social approval allows agents to be 
influenced by peers in decisions about HPR (Diekman et al., 2011). 
 
Gino & Pierce (2009) suggest that managers prefer HPR if it helps to achieve a specified 
effect on peers or due to influence by peers: HPR can be contagious, but Paz et al. (2013) 
find dishonest norm violating behaviour to be more contagious than honest behaviour. 
According to Paz et al. (2013), managers will engage in HPR if they perceive it to be the 
social norm. This is perhaps driven by a desire for social acceptance (Quinn et al. 1999).  
Huddart & Qu (2013) postulate further that depending on the manager’s moral type, peer 
influences can motivate HPR. Huddart & Qu (2013) tests, using Kohlberg’s three stages 
of moral development, the reaction of individuals to positive (“sterling performance) or 
negative influences (“bad apples”) of their peers and find results consistent with 
Kohlberg’s expectation. They find that whereas ‘pre-conventional types’ respond to only 
“bad apples” who are dishonest, ‘conventional types’ respond more to “sterling 
performances” and ‘post conventional types’ are immune to any social influences. Maas 
& Rinsum (2013) argue that, in situations where managers have a clear monetary 
incentive to misreport, the behavioural choices are mitigated by the possible effects of 
their choices on the wealth of their peers (due to compensation system design) as well 
as on the perception of peers about their intentions. Maas & Rinsum (2013) find that, 
following social preference theory (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Charness & Rabin, 2002), 
managers are more likely to misreport if their action will increase the wealth of their peers 
than if it will result in a decrease in wealth of their peers. This is because managers find 
it easier to justify an increase in wealth of their peers as an act of kindness especially if 
they get to share in it. Using theories about social norms and lying aversion (Bicchieri, 
2006, Erat & Gneezy, 2012), Maas & Rinsum (2013) find that, where there is no benefit 
to achieve a certain rank (i.e. where there is no competition and jostling for ranks) 
organisations with open information systems (Evans et al., 2001) where performance 
reports of managers are openly disclosed will exhibit more HPR. Remarkably, Maas & 
Rinsum (2013) conclude that perceived social pressures for HPR can mitigate the desire 
for monetary incentives even in situations where misreporting does not impose any direct 
monetary cost on other people within the organisation. In other words, managers are 
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willing to forego wealth to appear honest to their peers. Hannan, Rankin & Towry (2006) 
conclude that managers do not only care about being honest but also to appear honest 
to their superiors (Hao & Houser, 2013, Utikal & Fischbacher, 2013). 
 
Gneezy (2005) contends however that a general limitation of intention models is that, it 
ignores a relevant variable that in a ‘harm doing’ environment, agents consider as well, 
the effect of their own intentions on the outcome and hence it is not only ‘care’ for others 
than motivates behaviour but also aversion to deliberate misreporting of managerial 
performance (i.e. lies). Andreoni (1995) agrees that there is no pure altruism but rather 
impure altruism where the utility of the act of ‘doing good’ motivates the behaviour.  
 
Gneezy (2005) finds evidence to support an aversion to deliberate misreporting of 
managerial performance by a significant proportion of his respondents and proposes that 
managers continually balance ‘process’ against ‘consequence’ in a range of different 
ways in making choices about HPR. Similarly, Gibson, Tarnner & Wagner (2013) find 
evidence to support Gneezy’s proposal of a continuous heterogeneity of preferences for 
HPR but find further evidence of heterogeneity both within and among individuals in their 
preference for HPR implying that preferences for truthfulness are ‘non-separable in 
intrinsic preferences and economic incentives’. 
 
Charness & Rabin (2002), and Falk & Fischbacher (1999) have attempted to combine 
intentions and distribution effects into a single model. Whatever the model and empirical 
evidence the willingness of managers to sacrifice some monetary payoff for the sake of 
a desire to be honest, does not persist unconditionally (Schreck, 2015) 
 
Other studies have attempted to define boundaries for HPR by suggesting frameworks 
that encourage HPR.  Fischbacher & Heusi (2008), for instance, find that learning and 
repetitive participation decreases HPR. Shalvi et al. (2011) adapt Fischbacher & Heusi 
(2008) model with some modifications to test ‘ethical manoeuvring’ and find that 
managers avoid major lies and minor lies and prefer moderate lies. They argue that this 
observed behaviour is because managers attempt to maintain a positive self-concept and 
therefore HPR is defined by a boundary that weighs the minimum gain that misreporting 
of managerial performance must generate to be effective viz-a-viz the maximally 
acceptable lie.  
 
There are gaps in the literature about voluntary managerial preference for HPR. Section 
2.3.6 discusses the contestations about the findings and methods applied in studies about 
managerial preferences for HPR.  Chapter three (section 3.3.1) highlights the challenges 
with the experimental constructs used in such studies and its implications on the credibility 
of conclusions emanating from such studies. Beyond these methodological difficulties, 
there are no studies that explore if cultural influences affect the orientation of managers 
regarding HPR. Neelankavil et al. (2000) hypothesise that culture could affect managerial 
orientation and managerial performance. This is aggravated by the lack of studies about 
this question with a dataset from Africa as can be seen in the summary of literature 
provided in Table 2.2. In many respects, therefore, the fundamental question about 
whether managers voluntarily prefer HPR has no conclusive answer (Gneezy, 2015). This 
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study, therefore, answers the call for more studies about this phenomenon in different 
geographical and cultural settings (Evan et al. 2001).  
 
2.3.2. Implications of HPR And Misreported MPR. 
 
Most studies have focused on the implications of misreported MPR rather than HPR. 
Even though mitigating misreported MPR requires a different set of techniques compared 
to improving HPR, empirical consideration of misreported MPR and HPR as opposite 
concepts is not new and has merit (Bar-Gill & Bebchuk, 2003 a & b). Researchers such 
as Waterman et al. (2004) and Wills (2008) have suggested that in the long run, when 
markets are efficient, and under a scenario of multiple stakeholders, HPR or misreported 
MPR has no implications because information leakage allows stakeholders to incorporate 
rational expectations about MPR practices in their decision making. Hurkens & Kartik 
(2009) however confirm that decision makers can ignore irrelevant information in their 
decision making. Therefore, Waterman et al. (2004), do not consider the growing 
evidence of bounded rationality (Heclo, 1977) in decision making that limits the ability for 
stakeholders to incorporate full information in their decision making. Secondly, 
proponents of this model presume that firms are listed on the secondary market and 
hence can be effectively influenced by market action. In essence, the extrapolation of this 
argument to cover unlisted firms (as is the case for some of the data set for this study) 
may be restrictive. Also, not all markets are efficient or remain efficient all the times 
(Dubey, Geanakoplos & Shubik, 2000; Shubik, 1988). Lastly, the consideration of a long 
run time frame may be ambiguous, and Keynes (1923) suggests that in the long run, we 
are all dead. Moreover, evidence exists that stakeholders do not always think in the long 
term (Heclo, 1977; Yang, 2009). 
 
Empirical discussions about the implications of MPR have focused on misreported MPR 
(see for example Karpoff, Lee & Vendrzyk, 1999; Karpoff, Lee & Martin, 2008 a & b; 
Murphy, Shrieves & Tibbs, 2009; and Dechow, Ge & Schrand, 2010). Few authors have 
identified positive implications of misreported MPR. Sadka (2006) contends that the 
positive implications of misreported MPR are often immediate and short-term and can be 
eroded by medium to long term adverse effects of misreported MPR. Bar-Gill & Bebchuk 
(2003) argue that misreported MPR can improve the terms under which a firm can raise 
new capital and improve employee motivation (with its attendant effects) if it results in 
increased pay-out to employees.  Bar-Gill & Bebchuk (2003 b) show for instance that due 
to these motivations, even where managers cannot sell their shares in the short term, 
there is still an incentive to misreport MPR. 
 
There is a dearth of literature on the probable negative implications of misreported MPR 
especially for the organisation in question. However, most of the literature focuses on the 
adverse implication of misreported MPR for listed firms from the perspective of the firm in 
question as well as the national economy. Few studies explore the adverse implication 
on related firms and internal stakeholders. No study explores the implication of 
misreported MPR from the perspective of employees. Recent literature focuses on how a 
firm’s MPR quality affects its own investment efficiency (Biddle & Hilary, 2006; Biddle, 
Hilary & Verdi, 2008; Beatty, Liao & Weber, 2008). This literature, based on a PAT 
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approach, has resulted in a consensus that misreported MPR has real and potential 
negative consequences.  
 
Bar-Gill & Bebchuk (2003 a & b) for instance, state that misreported MPR distort capital 
allocation decisions and hence ‘has real economic cost and distorts financing and 
investment decisions with firms that misreport raising too much capital and firms that do 
not misreport raising too little’. Ndofor et al. (2015) agree arguing further that MPR 
practices have real implications for the sustainability of secondary markets because the 
resulting misallocation of capital could result in externalities and promote inefficiency at 
the expense of efficiency with dire consequences. Sadka (2006) suggests that purposeful 
misreporting of MPR can deepen information asymmetry resulting in undervaluation of 
firms (due to the inefficient pricing of debt and equity because it generates unrealistic 
expectations), higher cost of capital for firms and makes it harder for good firms to access 
the market.  
 
Often, studies about the adverse implication of misreported HPR focus on the economic 
consequences (on individual, firm and national wealth). Recently some researchers have 
explored changes in systematic risk, trading volume, firms’ propensity to be sued, and 
industry spillover effects. For instance, Gande & Lewis (2009) confirm a large statistically 
significant negative stock price reaction to shareholder-initiated class action lawsuits and 
provide evidence of a spillover effect as investors anticipate similar lawsuits based on 
earlier lawsuits against other firms in the same industry. 
 
The discussions above suggest that, misreported MPR has adverse consequence for the 
organisation in question. Karpoff & Lott (1993), Armour et al. (2010), Palmrose et al. 
(2004), Murphy et al. (2009) and Karpoff et al. (2008) confirm this and show that 
misreported MPR, when it is discovered, could result in negative returns, legal sanctions 
and reputational loss for the organisation. Reputation is the expectation of stakeholders 
of the benefits of doing business with the organisation in the future (Armour et al. 2010). 
Klien & Leffer (1981) confirm that reputation is related to a firm’s reliance on an implicit 
social contract. Therefore reputation loss is a penalty imposed by the market due to a 
breach of trust and could result in significant increases in the cost of capital due to 
regulatory and legal sanctions, cancellation of contracts, inability to attract human and 
capital resources as well as changes to terms of trade and revision to existing contract 
including bank loans.  
 
The costly reputation losses that result from misreported MPR has also receive attention 
(Beatty, Bunsis, & Hand, 1998; Alexander, 1999; Karpoff, Lee, & Vendrzyk, 1999; Karpoff, 
Lee, & Martin, 2008 a & b; Murphy, Shrieves, & Tibbs, 2009; and Dechow, Ge, & Schrand, 
2010). Karpoff et al. (2008) work reveal that misreporting MPR is particularly costly, 
imposing a reputational penalty on the firm that is more than seven times the amount of 
the direct legal and regulatory penalties. The conclusions from Karpoff et al. (2008) are 
significant because it confirms the seriousness of reputation loss by suggesting that when 
misreporting occurs the highest penalties imposed are by the market rather than 
regulators. Jensen (2005) also finds that managers sometimes take steps to prop up 
overvalued shares that ultimately lead to value destruction. The total effect of this is that 
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misreported MPR could affect firm value through its effect on the required rate of returns 
that are influenced by the perception of beta risk. Another reason why misreported MPR 
can affect firm value is due to the growing evidence that managers expend significant 
resources to misreport MPR and to ‘clean up’ after detection. Wang et al. (2006) for 
instance, contend that manager’s investment incentives can be distorted due to the 
incentive to manipulate the likelihood of being caught. Chou & Wang (2006) confirm that 
during misreporting, managers favor volatility-increasing investments (e.g., R&D vs 
CAPEX) even if the investments are negative NPV. Benmelech et al.  (2010) also confirm 
that managers tend to overinvest to sustain the high investor impression and/or 
expectation due to misreported MPR. Kedia & Phillipon (2009) confirm that managers 
that misreport MPR increase investment and employment during the fraud period, and 
then shed assets and labor after revelation. 
 
Recently, empirical literature has also explored the spillover and contagion effect of 
misreported MPR on related organisations. Earlier studies about the effect of MPR 
practices on peer firms, such as by Kellogg (1984), Francis, Philbrick, & Schipper (1994), 
Bizjack & Coles (1995), Beck & Bhagat (1997), Bhagat, Bizjack, & Coles (1998), Ali & 
Kallapur (2001), DuCharme, Malatesta, & Sefcik (2004), Griffin, Grundfest, & Perino 
(2004),  and Karpoff, Lee & Martin (2008) investigate the conventional ‘MPR on the 
market’ hypothesis. This hypothesis posits that misreported MPR initially leads to positive 
abnormal returns during the period between the initial misreporting of MPR and the final 
corrective disclosure after revelation. These positive abnormal returns are followed by 
negative abnormal returns when a corrective action occurs.  
 
Goldman et al. (2012) for instance, find that misreported MPR could result in an 
information spillover effect and an industry competition effect. Beatty, Liaob & Yu (2013) 
investigate how high-profile misreported MPR affect peer firms' investment. They 
conclude that in industries with higher investor sentiment, lower cost of capital and higher 
private benefits of control, peers react to misreported MPR by increasing investment 
during the related periods. They argue that this reaction by peers is not dependent on the 
likelihood of detection or the association between misreported MPR and investment 
booms. Their study suggests that this reaction occurs because when misreported MPR 
occurs equity analysts facilitate the information spillover effect. 
 
A possible reason for this is because managers sometimes rely on the performance 
reports of other firms to distinguish between good and bad investment projects. Bushman 
& Smith, (2001) for instance find evidence that ‘managers can identify promising new 
investment opportunities by the high profit margins reported by managers of other firms’. 
Therefore, misreported MPR of another firm can send a false signal about new investment 
opportunities and this can lead to sub optimal investment by other firms. A second 
possibility is that, misreported MPR affects other firm’s investment decisions because of 
the distorted incentives provided by management compensation contracts that are based 
on misreported MPR by managers of other firms used as a benchmark for performance 
evaluation. Karaoglu, Sandino & Beatty (2006) argue that such ‘inflated performance’ may 
cause the competing firm to mimic investment decisions. Considering that Sadka, (2006), 
and Kedia & Philippon, (2005) find that to manage impressions, firms that misreport MPR 
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often invest aggressively during misreporting periods to appear as efficient as what they 
portray, then the heightened pressure to match the ‘inflated performance’ could also result 
in increased investment by competing firms. Sidak (2003) provides antidotal evidence in 
support of this and confirms that because WorldCom’s falsified internet traffic reports to 
the FCC, it encouraged widespread overinvestment in network capacity by industry rivals. 
Sadka’s (2006) work confirms that managers that engage in misreported MPR (such as 
by WorldCom) may use sub-optimal price cuts and output increases to match their 
reported superior MPR and ‘potentially bankrupt the entire industry’. 
 
Durnev & Mangen (2008) investigate whether the announcement of accounting 
restatement causes a systematic change in  peers’ investment activities and find that peer 
firms significantly lower their investment in the year after another firms’ restatement 
announcements and the reduction in investment growth is greater the more negative the 
competitor’s abnormal return after the restatement announcement (Beatty, Liaob & Yu, 
2013). Durnev & Mangen (2008) interpret the results as peer firms learning from the news 
in the restatement. Therefore, misreported MPR has a negative externality on the 
investment efficiency of competing firms in the same industry because, distorted MPR 
generated by high-profile scandal firms on average lead to overinvestment by industry 
peers (Beatty, Liaob & Yu, 2013). 
 
Bonini & Boraschi (2009) study the contagion effect of misreported MPR and confirm that 
misreported MPR generates a decrease in equity and debt offerings in the industry (for 
both peers and the firm in question) within the first year. Their study sheds light on the 
financing and security issuance behavior of firms engaged in misreported MPR. They 
conclude that independently from their intensity, misreported MPR affects the industry 
level by leading to a contraction in security offerings and a decrease in stock returns for 
all the industry constituents. Bonini & Boraschi (2009) also investigate the effect of 
purposefully misreported MPR on a competitor’s stock prices by testing the presence of 
a negative contagion effect on stock prices of the related industry and find evidence that 
corporate scandals have a negative impact on their industry. More interesting is the fact 
that, their study confirms that the purposefully misreported non-financial information (as 
part of MPR) has a relatively higher bearing on resulting negative stock price reaction of 
local firms. Comparatively, cases with misreported financial information in MPR do not 
show a statistically significant contagion effect in their industry. Palmrose et al. (2004) 
and Gleason et al. (2008) find similar evidence which is also aligned with Gande & Lewis 
(2009) who provided evidence on the price reaction to bankruptcy filing from misreported 
MPR. A reason for the above trend is provided by Giannetti & Wang, (2016) who argue 
that misreported MPR can affect household stock market participation. Merton (1987), 
terms it as the ‘shadow cost’ of limited stock market participation which includes, higher 
equity risk premium, and hence higher cost of capital for firms.   
 
Chen & Goh (2010) study the contagion effect by examining whether corrections 
(‘restatements’) to misreported MPR, which adversely affect shareholder wealth at 
restating firms, induce negative stock price reactions among other firms that have 
directors who sit on the board of the restating firms.  In studying the contagion effect of 
restatements through common directorships, they explore if any identified effect varies 
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with the MPR quality and the tainted directors’ responsibility for MPR at the contagion 
firms. DeFond et al. (2005 a & b) and Farber (2005) contend that stakeholders infer MPR 
quality from the quality and diversity of directors. Therefore, corrections for misreported 
MPR (‘restatements’) can influence investors to perceive the directors of the restating 
firms as incompetent in monitoring MPR and hence affect the share price of other firms 
they serve as directors. Chen & Goh (2010) study confirms that corrected MPR at the 
restating firms induces negative stock price reactions at the contagion firms. The stock 
price reactions are more negative if the contagion firms have lower MPR quality or if the 
tainted directors serve on the audit committees of the contagion firms. Their results are 
consistent with a contagion effect of restatements through common directorships.   
 
Even though most of the literature on the adverse implication of misreported MPR suggest 
that the adverse consequence result only after revelation and hence subsequent 
corrective action by managers of a firm (see for example Francis, Philbrick, & Schipper, 
1994; Bizjack & Coles, 1995; Beck & Bhagat, 1997; Bhagat, Bizjack, & Coles, 1998; Ali 
& Kallapur, 2001), other studies have argued that the consequences on peer 
organisations and peer managers due to information spillover and contagion effect occur 
regardless of revelation (Dechow, Ge, Larson, & Sloan, 2011). 
 
Karpoff et al. (2008) identify the significant adverse effect on managers who engage in 
misreported MPR. The personal penalties when misreporting is detected includes (a) lost 
of jobs (b) sanctions by regulators (c) criminal charges and penalties, including jail terms 
(4) financial loss through forfeiture of shares etc. Regarding other stakeholders, 
misreported MPR can result in misallocation of scarce resources by investors (Bar-Gill & 
Bebchuk, 2003 a & b) and can also create tensions due to false impressions to employees 
(Martins & Terblanche, 2003). The section on hypotheses in chapter three discusses this 
further. 
 
Few studies have focused on the implication of misreported MPR on national economies. 
Sadka (2006) argues that misreported MPR can have a significant adverse impact on 
social welfare. Proponents of this hypothesis argue that misreporting to key state actors 
such as regulators and tax authorities can have adverse consequences on national 
development. Without HPR, regulators can be misguided in their actions, policies and 
guidance offered which can have a distorting effect on a specific industry and hence the 
nation. Such misguided policies could protect or create market imperfections (such as 
protecting monopolies) or affect consumer interest (Doidge, Karolyi & Stulz, 2010). Zhang 
(2007) argues that the economic consequences of misreporting MPR are the introduction 
of more regulation. More regulation imposes a significant cost on firms in their operations 
(Leuz, Triantis, & Wang, 2008).  
 
The implications of MPR behaviour on tax revenues is an ongoing debate without a 
consensus. In one perspective, misreported MPR could result in lower taxes paid by firms, 
and this could affect national development efforts. Richardson et al. (2002) ﬁnd that 
growing firms may misreport to show consecutive earnings increases. Thus, 
overstatements of revenues and earnings are likely to distort expectations of growth by 
those unaware of the misstatement (McNichols & Stubben, 2008). This is particularly 
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relevant for developing economies (such as Ghana) that constantly engage in deficit 
spending to support social programs. Frank, Lynch, & Rego (2009) support this 
hypothesis and estimate a positive relation between misreported MPR and tax 
aggressiveness. They find that managers that intend to pay lower taxes concurrently 
report higher book income but comparatively lower taxable income. Desai (2005) and 
Desai & Dharmapala (2006) find similar evidence that confirms that managers exploit 
complex tax avoidance strategies (under the pretext that lowering taxes beneﬁts 
shareholders) to divert corporate resources, which they later hide by distorting MPR.  
Other studies such as La Porta et al. (1998) and Dyck & Zingales (2004) also find similar 
evidence. 
 
Erickson, Hanlon, & Maydew (2004) provide an alternative argument and perform an 
extensive analysis of 27 ﬁrms censured by the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) for misreporting MPR and find contrary evidence about lower taxes resulting from 
misreported MPR. They conclude that managers of these ﬁrms, on average, deliberately 
overpaid their taxes to legitimise their MPR behaviour. Therefore, some managers 
exaggerate their tax obligations to help disguise their deceit. 
 
There are gaps in the literature about the implications of HPR. Most studies have 
attempted to answer this question from the perspective of investors (Bar-Gill & Bebchuk, 
2003 a & b), regulators (Erickson et al. 2004) or managers (Karpoff et al. 2008) with little 
regard for the perspective of internal stakeholders such as employees. Indeed, during the 
period of this study, no study existed about the implication of HPR or misreported MPR 
from the perspective of employees. This is a critical void that needs to be filled. The 
perspective of employees has been confirmed to be valuable to organisational progress 
and success (Morrison & Milliken, 2000). Indeed, employees are a critical set of 
stakeholders whose opinions and perspectives must be considered in the bid to improve 
our understanding of the HPR phenomenon. There are many reasons for this. Firstly, 
quite often employees are closed to the MPR process (Yang, 2009) and may be active or 
passive participants in the process. Therefore, their opinion about the implications of HPR 
can be assumed to be relatively more insightful and/or credible. Secondly, considering 
that most approaches to study the MPR phenomena mitigate SDB by avoiding the use of 
managers as datasets, employees perhaps provide the closet proxy to the thinking and 
actions of managers (Yang, 2009). Therefore, effective solutions to the MPR process 
must necessarily include employee perspectives (Schneider, 1980).  
 
2.3.3. Factors That Influence HPR 
 
Previous studies have mostly focused on the techniques used by agents to manage 
impressions and individual motives for committing financial reporting fraud (Ndofor, 
Wesley & Priem, 2015) rather than the causes and effects of HPR from an organisational 
perspective. Despite the focus of empirical studies on misreporting rather than HPR, the 
evidence on why managers may purposefully misreport the underlying private information 
about their performance is still scanty. This is notwithstanding the fact that it is relatively 
easy to identify environmental, organisational or individual attributes that are associated 
with the phenomenon. Perhaps the confusion arises because such attributes also exist in 
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many other organisational contexts that do not result in unethical choices. Also, beyond 
external or objectives characteristics, it is difficult to infer the interior motives, personalities 
or combinations of organisational context and individual attributes that drive managers to 
misreport private information. It is also not clear why managers, after initially misreporting 
managerial performance information, often willingly expand the scope and the scale of 
their performance report manipulations (Magnan, 2011).  
In the limited literature that exists, various factors have been suggested to influence HPR. 
Indeed, various personal and situational factors have been suggested to influence the 
trade-off between the costs and benefits of HPR. For example, differences in payment 
schemes (Chow et al., 1988; Waller & Bishop, 1990), information asymmetry (Fisher et 
al., 2002a), reputation considerations (Webb, 2002), and the degree of participation in 
budgeting (Fisher et al., 2000; Rankin et al., 2008) have been suggested to influence 
HPR.  The empirical causes of HPR can be broadly categorised under the following 
perspectives. 
(a) A Market And Economic Incentive Perspective For HPR 
Based on the CAT, perhaps the most reported influence on HPR is the opportunity to 
maximise monetary incentive (Baiman & Lewis, 1989). Gneezy (2005) agrees that 
considerations of economic pay-off are critical for HPR. Mazar et al. (2008) argue that the 
assumptions of the CAT are still relevant in discussions about HPR and that that all things 
being equal, all persons have the same marginal utility for money (Gibson et al., 2013, 
Fehr & Schmidt, 1999). Based on Baiman & Lewis (1989) threshold theory, and Brickley 
et al. (1997) trade off theory, managers, always weigh if the perceived benefits from the 
monetary reward exceed any projected costs of HPR.  
Noe (1999) and Aboody & Kasznik (2000) attribute the extent of HPR to the nature of 
compensation contracts and find that firms delay reporting of good news and accelerate 
the release of ‘bad’ news before stock option award periods with the intention to increase 
stock-based compensation. Miller & Piotroski (2000) find that managers of firms in 
turnaround situations are more likely to ensure HPR if they have higher stock option 
compensation.  
Jensen (2004, 2005); Efendi et al. (2007); Fogarty et al. (2009) argue that performance-
based compensation contracts offer an incentive for misreporting performance 
information. Specifically, managers with extensive stock or option holdings are more likely 
to feel pressure to manipulate performance reports when a performance gap occurs. 
Povel, Singh & Winton (2007) show that misreporting of managerial performance peak 
toward the end of a boom.  
Even though Jensen’s model has the appeal of putting HPR into a context of a dynamic 
interplay between managers and investors, it does not integrate many individuals, intra-
organisational or social factors. This is because it is overly reliant on CAT that holds that 
managers are solely, and rationally, driven by economic incentives. As such, it does not 
adequately cover for the empirical evidence of misreporting when there are no apparent 
economic incentives. 
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(b) Organisational Perspective Of HPR 
Recent studies have explored social referents and firm characteristics as crucial drivers 
of HPR or otherwise. Cullen et al., (1993); Schminke et al. (2005); Weber, (1995) argue 
that organisational structure (such as span of control by the agent) and organisational 
climate influence HPR. Yang (2009) finds evidence to confirm that, in public 
organisations, a hostile internal climate could adversely affect innovation, risk taking and 
stakeholder participation in performance management, which in turn will negatively affect 
HPR. Gino & Pierce (2009) argue that a hostile organisational climate can introduce 
stress on manager’s, which can reduce HPR. Gino & Pierce (2010) suggest that 
aggressive competition among departmental units and Yang (2009) argues that the 
existence of cliques within an organisation reduces HPR (Wang & Rode 2010).   
Healy & Palepu (1990), and DeAngelo et al. (1996) discuss HPR from the perspective of 
obtaining social approval and legitimacy for the manager and organisation and suggest, 
HPR by managers of highly leveraged firms in financial distress may in part reflect an 
attempt to improve organisational survival. 
(c) A Cognitive & Behavioural Perspective For HPR 
Kidder (2005) attributes HPR to cognitive reasons and draws on trait theory, agency 
theory and psychological contracts theory to conclude that personality trait and perceived 
unfairness in the workplace helps predict HPR among workers. Drake et al. (2013) test 
Kidder (2005) theory and conclude that individuals with a preference for HPR (ethical 
persons) reported more honestly and that perceived fairness interacts with individual 
honesty preferences as well as relativism to affect HPR. Therefore, creating a perception 
of fairness in compensation policies can improve HPR. Studies on the characteristics of 
the perpetuators have spanned studies about manager’s cognitive orientation, personality 
traits, development of moral reasoning (Kohlberg 1981) and ethical orientation (e.g., 
Beauchamp & Bowie, 2004; Beauchamp, Bowie, & Arnold, 2004; Kohlberg 1981; Rest, 
1986; Reynolds, 2006a, 2006b). Paz et al. (2013) and Sánchez-Expósito & Naranjo-Gil 
(2012) argue that managers with an individualistic orientation are more likely to misreport 
than managers with a collective orientation. Munhall (1979) argue that managers with a 
low-level development of moral reasoning are likely to misreport than managers with a 
relatively higher level of moral development. Gibson et al. (2013) suggested that 
managers with a strong ethical orientation or ‘protected value of truthfulness’ are more 
amenable to HPR than managers with no ‘protected value’. Baron & Spranca (1997); 
Tetlock (1992), Tetlock et al. (2000); Tanner, Medin and Iliev (2008); and Bernabou & 
Tirole (2011) argue that strong protected values and ethical orientation could result from 
culture as well as a desire by managers to invest in their identity. Gibson et al. (2013) 
argue that managers with highly protected values will experience a significant high 
intrinsic cost from deliberately misreporting performance information. 
In recent times, however, behavioural reasons have dominated the literature regarding 
HPR. Quite recently, the reasoned action model (which predicts behavioural intentions 
and corresponding behaviours) has been tested in explaining managers behavioural 
choices when confronted with ethical dilemmas (see for example Gillett & Uddin; 2005, 
Carpenter & Reimers, 2005; Cohen, Ding, Lesage & Stolowy, 2008). Reasoned action’ 
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hypothesises that humans are rational and use the information at their disposal in a 
systematic way, considering all the implications of their actions before deciding to behave 
in a given way (Magnan & Markarian, 2011; Ajzen & Fishbeing, 1980). 
Gillett & Uddin (2005) posit that individual attitudes (beliefs and need for achievement), 
compensation structure, firm size and the subjective norms derived from referent groups 
underlie a managers intentions to misreport performance information and find that 
negative belief evaluations (managers’ awareness of the magnitude of outcomes that can 
be injurious to them) may contribute to HPR.  That is, a manager’s referent groups (co-
workers or others) strongly influence his/her subjective norms and can improve HPR. 
They find that managers of larger firms exhibit greater intentions to misreport performance 
information. Their study further confirms that manager’s intentions are not affected by the 
need for achievement and positive belief evaluations as well as compensation structure.  
Carpenter & Reimers (2005) also examine managers’ decision to misreport performance 
information.  They apply the theory of planned behaviour, which assumes that managers 
have control over behaviour. Hence, the key to explaining an individual’s behaviour is 
intentions, which are driven by attitudes toward the behaviour, subjective norms and 
perceived control over the behaviour. Cohen et al. (2008), argue that the theory of 
planned behaviour highlights the role of managers’ personality traits in HPR studies and 
enhances the explanatory power of the fraud triangle.  
Carpenter & Reimers (2005) use a survey and experiment to (both with MBA students) 
provide strong support for the theory, with manager’s attitude significantly influencing 
behavioural intent (with predictive value) whereas subjective norms (i.e., the influence of 
family, friends, or other close individuals) do affect behavioural intent. Surprisingly, the 
control that participants perceive to have over a decision seems to have little influence on 
their intention to engage or not in HPR. The application of an experimental methodology 
to behavioural studies in accounting is not new (Brown et al., 2009; Sprinkle & Williamson, 
2007; Covaleski et al., 2007; Arnold, 2007; Libby, Bloomfield & Nelson, 2002). The 
increase studies about behavioural variables in HPR have made the phenomenon 
amenable to new approaches including experimental methods. 
 
(d) Environmental Perspective Of HPR 
Yang (2009) argues that a supportive external environment (less turbulent, less dynamic, 
and less complex) could improve HPR. An overly turbulent and complex external 
environment with varied stakeholders could encourage managers to want to hide 
information to protect their jobs, undo competition or avoid penalties from regulators. Also, 
when the environment is complex, principals may lose focus and not be effective at 
monitoring managers or agents with implications on HPR. 
 
Shreck (2015) analyses the effect of competition on HPR proposing that different types 
of competition have varying effects on HPR and concludes that economic competition 
(one form of competition) affects the economic benefits of misreporting private information 
about managerial performance whereas rivalry (another form of competition) diminishes 
the moral cost of such misreporting.  
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Competition is defined as a social situation of negative goal interdependence such that 
the achievement of a goal by one or more members of a group necessarily implies that 
the other members do not achieve the same goal (Deutsch, 1949 a & b; Johnson & 
Johnson, 1989, Shreck, 2015). Bruggen & Luft (2011) confirm that competition reduces 
managers willingness to resist economic incentives (with implications on HPR) and 
confirm that across different competitive and non-competitive capital budgeting contexts, 
agents under competitive conditions (even in its modest form) were most likely to 
misrepresent their private information to superiors in order to increase the likelihood to 
win funding for their projects (Fisher et al., 2002; Young et al., 1993). 
Competition involves ‘‘a combination of economic and psychological factors’’ (Fisher et 
al., 2002), and hence a set of ‘‘economic and behavioural factors’’ (Frederickson, 1992) 
is necessary to explain the effects of competition on HPR. Shreck (2015) for instance, 
finds that the effect of competition on HPR is affected by gender (under competitive 
conditions males misreport their underlying private information to a greater degree) and 
HPR decreases significantly with rivalry even when economic benefits of misreporting 
private information remain unchanged. Shreck’s (2015) work reveals that economic 
competition only reduces the salience of HPR preferences among male participants. 
Therefore, competition can have adverse effects on HPR. 
Empirical studies suggest that the motivation for HPR is higher when there are no 
performance gaps. Bloomfield (2002) studies the reaction of markets to information that 
is less easily extracted from MPR and tests if managers have more incentive to obfuscate 
information when firm performance is poor. Using the “management obfuscation 
hypothesis”, he argues that the earnings quality is affected by HPR. Li (2008) tests the 
quality of text and syntax in annual reports and finds strong evidence consistent with the 
hypothesis that the ‘positive earnings’ of firms with more complex annual reports are less 
persistent and the ‘negative earnings’ of such firms are more persistent in the immediately 
following years.  
Performance gaps exist when performance is measured against and falls below set 
targets or goals. Relying on Lewicki’s (1983 a & b) model of deception, Schweitzer et al., 
(2004) consider the role of goal setting in influencing the perception of the benefits of 
HPR and find that, irrespective of the existence of economic incentives, managers with 
unmet or unachieved goals or targets are more likely to misreport than managers who 
have no goals at all and are only attempting to do their best. Schweitzer et al. (2004) 
found that the motivation to misreport is stronger when managers fall short of the goals 
by a slim margin. This is backed by social cognition theory (Bandura 1991) which 
suggests that managers derive psychological rewards from attaining goals and the theory 
of deception (Lewicki 1983) that suggest that managers weigh the cost and benefits of 
unethical behaviour.  Neely, Sutcliff & Heyns (2001) suggest that one of the key 
challenges with setting budgetary targets as a form of performance monitoring and reward 
allocation is that it encourages gaming and the perverse behaviour of lying (Hansen, Otley 
& Van der Stede 2003; Lowe & Shaw, 1968; Argyris 1952; Hope & Fraser 2003a,b & c). 
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Douthit, Schwartz, Stevens, & Young, (2017) and Cox (2004) argue that HPR, manager’s 
behavioural choices and stakeholder reaction to reported performance information is 
endogenously determined by the same forces that shape firms’ governance structures 
and management incentives. Shareholders, as primary stakeholders, have a vested 
interest in maximising firm value and hence will endogenously optimise HPR, corporate 
governance, and management incentives.  Often this choice involves trading off the 
reduction in information asymmetry through HPR against the costs of reduced incentives 
(e.g., Evans & Sridhar, 1996), litigation costs (Skinner, 1994), and proprietary costs 
(Verrecchia, 1983). About this, Watts & Zimmerman (1986) argue that in the pursuit of 
firm value maximisation, shareholders do not pursue absolute HPR and accept that not 
all managerial performance manipulation will be eliminated because ‘It may be too costly 
. . . to eliminate all such manipulation (p. 205).  
Considering that it is too costly to eliminate all manipulation the opportunities for 
misreporting performance information increases because managers may be able to add 
some bias to MPR at a low personal cost (e.g., Dye, 1988; Fischer & Verrecchia, 2000). 
Watts & Zimmerman (1986) further suggest the irrelevance of a focus on HPR and 
suggest that ‘In labour and capital markets characterised by rational expectations, 
managers will not, on average, gain from such manipulation’.  
There are gaps in the literature about the causes of HPR. Most studies have focused on 
evaluating singular variables rather than a confluence of variables (see for example 
Gneezy, 2012). Pedhazur & Schmelkin (2013) argue that studies about managerial action 
and practices are more valuable if they consider the real live scenario of how a confluence 
of factors interact to affect the managerial action. As Pedhazur & Schmelkin (1991) note, 
the idea that multiple effects should be studied in research rather than the isolated effects 
of single variables is one of the important contributions of Sir Ronald Fisher (Vyas, 2015). 
Aside from the fact that there are limited studies about this phenomenon using a dataset 
from Africa (see table 2.2), the application of CAT in empirical studies to answer this 
question abound (see for example Baiman & Lewis 1989; Abrahamson & Park, 1994). 
Section 2.2.1 highlights the challenges of CAT and proposes the consideration of the 
predictors of HPR based on a confluence of factors that are bed-rocked on alternative 
theoretical philosophies (Ndofor et al. 2015). This study, therefore, answers this call. 
 
2.3.4. The Influence Of HPR On FP. 
 
Prior literature on MPR provides limited evidence on whether misreporting MPR to 
investor’s results in resource misallocation (and hence adverse FP) or whether HPR 
improves resources allocation decisions (Healy & Wahlen, 1999). There are currently no 
studies on the influence of HPR on FP. However, there is a dearth of literature on the 
influence of other ethical dimensions on perceived and objective measures of FP (of the 
firm in question or other related firms). There is also scanty literature on the influence of 
accounting fraud on FP which provide an appropriate context for hypothesis formulation 
about HPR and FP (Yang, 2009).  
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Discussions about the effect of accounting fraud on FP have been based on impression 
management theory. It is premised on the hypothesis that managerial performance and 
actions must be consistent with each other. Therefore, misreported MPR that portrays 
managerial efficiency must be maintained (through real and visible actions) to sustain 
positive impression and avoid detection (Finnerty, Hedge, & Malone, 2016).  This usually 
results in sub optimal decisions by managers with consequence on FP (Sadka, 2006). 
Malone, Finnerty & Hegde (2010), as well as Fich & Shivdasani (2005, 2007), suggest 
that fraudulently misrepresenting financial information affects the cash flows of the firm 
thus making it difficult for the firm to fulfil some of its obligations with negative 
consequences on FP.  
 
McNichols & Stubben (2008), suggest that earnings management, which is largely viewed 
as targeting parties external to the firm, can also influence internal decisions. They arrived 
at this conclusion after examining whether firms manipulating their reported financial 
results make suboptimal investment decisions. Using fixed asset investments for a large 
sample of public companies during the 1978-2002 period they conclude that firms that 
manipulate their earnings (i.e. firms investigated by the SEC for accounting irregularities, 
firms sued by their shareholders for improper accounting, and firms that restated financial 
statements) over-invest substantially during the misreporting period. Furthermore, 
following the misreporting period, these firms no longer over-invest, consistent with 
corrected information leading to more efficient investment levels. Their study also 
confirms similar patterns for firms with high discretionary revenues or accruals. 
 
Other studies have hypothesised about the relationship between accounting fraud and 
FP through the effect of accounting fraud on the cost of capital. Graham et al. (2008) for 
instance confirms that revelations of accounting fraud increase the perception of risk 
among investors which will affect the cost of capital. This is in line with Diamond’s (1991a) 
preposition that debt maturity is a function of risk ratings (Diamond, 1991b). Palmrose et 
al. (2004), Palmrose & Scholz (2004) and Anderson & Yohn (2002) make a similar 
hypothesis and find evidence to confirm same. 
 
Discussions about the consequence of MPR practices on FP in an efficient market is not 
clear especially as empirical findings have been subjected to varied interpretations and 
contestations. One stream of literature examines the implication of MPR on stock prices. 
For example, Teoh et al. (1998) reveal that misreported MPR can result in the mispricing 
of IPOs. Subsequently, Brav et al. (2000) ﬁnd evidence that the long-run returns of IPOs 
are similar to those of seasoned ﬁrms with similar market capitalisation and hence contest 
Teoh et al. (1998) findings. Bra et al. (2000) argue that the discrepancy between their 
findings and Teoh et al. (1998) may be due to a more pervasive return pattern in the 
broader sample of public companies. 
 
Another group of researchers, such as Foster (1979), Dechow et al. (1996), Beneish 
(1997), and Palmrose et al. (2004), suggest that markets react negatively to disclosure of 
misleading MPR with consequences on FP. This implies that investors are bounded in 
the rational choices and hence may not be completely aware of or can predict misreported 
MPR. McNichols & Stubben (2008) disagree that bounded rational decisions are the 
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reasons for this outcome because, to the extent equity investors have rational 
expectations of the amount of misreporting, even if they cannot identify the magnitude for 
speciﬁc companies, they could observe negative returns to announcements ex post that 
would not necessarily imply resources were misallocated ex ante. 
 
Another stream of literature explores if sub optimal decisions by managers due to 
misreported MPR affects FP. That is to ask if real decisions are distorted because 
misreported MPR results in distorted information for internal decision makers. For 
example, Bushee (1998) explores how research and development (R&D) expenditure is 
affected by MPR and whether the resulting relationship is inﬂuenced by the composition 
of the ﬁrm’s institutional investors. Within this stream of literature, there is a dearth of 
empirical studies about how misreported MPR affects managerial investment decisions. 
Dechow et al. (1996) for instance studies, ﬁrms targeted by SEC enforcement actions 
and contends that since the desire to attract appropriate external ﬁnancing at low cost is 
an important motivation for misreported MPR, then misreported MPR has implications on 
FP through its effect on capital investment decisions.  However, with their study, it is not 
clear why these managers would over-invest rather than invest optimally with the funds 
obtained (McNichols & Stubben, 2008).  
 
Bar-Gill & Bebchuk (2003) postulate that managers who misreport MPR before 
undertaking an investment project will undertake inefﬁcient investment projects due to the 
ability to obtain cheaper funding from misreported MPR. Investment decisions depend on 
expectations of the beneﬁts of the investment, which in turn depend on expectations of 
future growth and product demand. Expectations of future growth are based on 
information that is usually reported as part of MPR (McNichols & Stubben, 2008).   Wang 
(2006) finds complimentary evidence for Bar-Gill & Bebchuk (2003) hypothesis and 
argues that managers who misreport MPR are more likely to over-invest in R&D and 
stock-ﬁnanced mergers and acquisitions. Over investing has a negative effect on FP.  
 
Kedia & Philippon (2009) apply institutional perspectives to predict that managers who 
misreport MPR will usually associate with better performing ﬁrms to avoid detection.  Such 
association could involve over-investing (with consequence on FP) to mimic firms with 
truthfully better performance. McNichols & Stubben (2008) reject this argument about a 
pooling effect because their study finds that ‘sample firms’ invest more than the ‘matched 
control’ firms.  
 
Biddle & Hilary (2006) and Verdi (2006) predict and ﬁnd that HPR reduces information 
asymmetry between managers and stakeholders, allowing for more efﬁcient investment. 
Biddle & Hilary (2006) ﬁnd that measures of MPR are negatively related to investment-
cash-ﬂow sensitivities, and hence the effect of ﬁnancing constraints on investment is 
lower for ﬁrms with higher HPR. Bushman et al. (2006) argue that HPR induces ex ante 
positive net present value investment projects.  Specifically, HPR reduces over-
investment by managers faced with declining investment opportunities. 
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Therefore, MPR practices can affect FP of the organisation in question and other related 
firms (McNichols & Stubben, 2008) through its spill over and contagion effects (discussed 
earlier). 
 
Chun (2005), Cameron et al. (2004) test the empirical relationship between some 
measures of ethics on employee and customer satisfaction as well as FP respectively 
and find a significant positive relationship. However, their ethical construct does not 
include HPR. Chun (2005) proposes a replication of his studies in non-western countries, 
applying other measures of ethics and virtuousness. Specifically, Cameron, Kim & Caza 
(2004) explore the relationships between virtuousness and performance in 18 
organisations and find significant relationships between virtuousness and both perceived 
and objective measures of organisational performance. They explain their findings in 
terms of the two major functions played by virtuousness in organisations: an amplifying 
function that creates self-reinforcing positive spirals and a buffering function that 
strengthens and protects organisations from traumas such as downsizing.  
 
Chun (2005) on the other hand argues that virtue ethics has often been regarded as 
complementary or laissez-faire ethics in solving business problems and explores 
conceptual and methodological improvements through proposing a virtue character scale 
that will enable assessment of the link between organisational level virtue and 
organisational performance, financial or non-financial. Chun (2005) conducts multiple 
studies based on three theoretical assumptions through a content analysis of 158 Fortune 
Global 500 firms’ ethical values and a survey of 2548 customers and employees. Six 
dimensions of organisational virtue (Integrity, Empathy, Warmth, Courage, 
Conscientiousness and Zeal) are identified through confirmatory factor analysis and 
validated against employee satisfaction measure. Chun (2005) finds evidence that ethics 
affect employee satisfaction in a positive and direct relationship. 
 
There are gaps in the literature about the manner and extent of influence of HPR on FP. 
There is no direct study of this relationship. Even though there are studies about the 
influence of ethics on FP, in those studies, the construct of ethics does not include HPR. 
It is not farfetched to estimate that different dimensions of ethical behaivour will affect FP 
differently (Ming-huei, 2013; Angle & Slote, 2013). In that regard, even if HPR is 
considered from an ethical and moral perspective, a distinct study about its influence on 
FP is in the right direction. 
 
2.3.5. MPR Practices Within Organisations 
 
There is currently no literature on MPR practices of Ghanaian companies. However 
scanty literature exists on management accounting practices in Ghana with mixed results. 
Even in Western Europe and the USA, the majority of studies focus on MNOs to the 
neglect of local companies (Hopper et al., 2009). 
 
Cho et al. (2012) confirm that different organisations adopt different MPR practices and 
confirm that the manner of impression management in MPR practices differs across 
companies facing different regulatory structures. McLane (2012) confirms the adoption of 
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unique MPR practices by executive bloggers. Applying Jones (1990) taxonomy of self-
presentation strategies, McLane (2012) finds that executive bloggers frequently adopt 
MPR practices aimed at suggesting competency attributes (self-promotion), likeability 
(ingratiation), and moral worthiness (exemplification) to construct and shape a positive 
identity for themselves and their organisation to the public. Supplication strategies were 
used less frequently, while intimidation strategies were rarely used.   
 
Michelon (2012) takes this argument further and proposes that considering that MPR 
seeks to bestow legitimacy, then MPR practices will differ at different stages of the 
legitimacy process, in particular during the legitimacy building and legitimacy repairing 
phases (Suchman, 1995). Specifically, the study explores if and how the disclosure tone 
adopted by a company in the two different moments is diverse and thus functional to the 
intrinsic objective of each phase. The empirical analysis focuses on the case of British 
Petroleum Plc. and the MPR strategies it adopts during the preparation of the rebranding 
operation, (i.e. a situation in which the company is trying to build legitimacy) and during 
the happenings of two legitimacy crises (like the explosion of the refinery in Texas City 
and the oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico). The evidence aligns with the theoretical prediction 
of legitimacy theory and shows that while the company applies privilege image 
enhancement techniques during the legitimacy-building phase, it uses more obfuscation 
techniques when managing a legitimacy-repairing process. Also, the company 
extensively applies impression management techniques in MPR disclosures to 
shareholders, investors and other market operators than in the MPR disclosures 
addressed to the wide range of other stakeholders.  
 
Drory & Zaidman (2007) compare MPR practices between organic and mechanistic 
organisations. MPR in mechanistic systems is characterised by ‘Ingratiation’, and a 
relatively heavy dose of impression management directed more towards superiors than 
toward peers. On the other hand, MPR in the organic system is characterised by ‘Initiation’ 
and adopt less impression management directed equally toward superiors and peers.  
Drory & Zaidman (2007) explain the differences in MPR practices with the differences in 
the norms and structural characteristics of the two organisational systems. Crant (1996) 
concurs alluding to the fact that stakeholder perception of the appropriateness of MPR 
practices is influenced by the consistency of management tactics, actual performance 
outcomes, and observers' expectations. Therefore, MPR practices do not always achieve 
the intended objective for which they are adopted.  During MPR, Bohte & Meier (2000) 
argue that managers avoid direct lying and cheating because they consider direct lying 
as extremely risky. Therefore, expectations around misreporting MPR usually involves 
other deliberate strategies to mislead, withhold information to, or confuse the 
stakeholders. 
 
The literature on MPR practices is dominated by the application of impression 
management strategies to managerial performance disclosure. Cooper & Slack (2015), 
for instance, apply impression management to evaluate if MPR practices change when 
there are performance gaps. Using longitudinal data, Cooper & Slack (2015) assess 
changes in MPR when there is water leakage using seven-year data from all ten water 
and sewerage companies (WASCs) in England and Wales. Their study confirms that 
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MPR practices are influenced by regulator (OFWAT) targets, and when there is a 
performance gap vis-à-vis these targets, managers apply tactics and presentational 
methods consistent with impression management to obfuscate MPR.  
 
Zhang & Aerts (2015) study the relationship between failure to meet earnings thresholds 
and causal language intensity and find a significant positive association between failure 
to meet earnings thresholds and causal language intensity. Further, firms that have 
performance gaps tend to use more causal language in a weaker information environment 
and experience a less volatile abnormal stock return. This confirms Ashraf & Uddin (2011) 
suggestion that a key criterion in MPR strategies is the technical capacity of external 
stakeholders to discover misreporting.   
 
Falschlunger, Eisl, Losbichler & Greil (2015) study how large listed companies in Europe 
choose to use and misuse graphical representation and conclude that topics displayed, 
and how they are presented, significantly change over time and that graphs are much 
more likely to exaggerate positive trends than to understate them. Additionally, longer 
time sequences (greater than five years) almost exclusively depict favourable trends (86 
per cent) and graphical measurement distortions are applied on purpose for both key 
financial variables (KFV) as well as for non-KFV (around 30 per cent in all years). This 
finding is confirmed by Laidroo (2016) who studies performance attributions to determine 
whether graphs in annual reports could be used for making performance attributions. 
Laidroo (2016) focuses on annual reports of 33 commercial banks from 7 Central and 
Eastern European countries during 2006 to 2013. The study finds evidence for the 
presence of negative performance attributions and attribution enhancements. 
Specifically, a decrease in a bank’s profitability is associated with an increase in the use 
of external indicator graphs. If a bank’s profitability increases simultaneously with 
deterioration in a graphed external indicator, the use of such external indicator graphs 
increases compared with when profitability increase occurs simultaneously with an 
improvement in a graphed external indicator. Also, negative performance attributions are 
intentional and potentially driven by impression management motives. An earlier study by 
Cho et al. (2012) also find evidence that graphs are used in MPR to enhance a positive 
image and to obfuscate negative trends. 
 
There are gaps in the literature about MPR practices among managerial groups. Aside 
from the fact that studies are concentrated in Europe and USA, this study answers the 
call to explore this phenomenon in a different geographical and cultural context. As 
explained in an earlier paragraph, the evidence of the impact of culture on managerial 









       
115 
 
2.3.6. Empirical Literature About Methods Used In MPR & HPR Studies 
 
Aside from experiments, questionnaires have also been used in the explorative study of 
HPR. Yang (2009) proposes a theoretical model for HPR within public organisations in 
Taiwan and finds a significant positive correlation between all his variables and HPR 
within public organisations. Yang (2009) measures the perception of workers (employees 
and middle managers) in public organisations about HPR by business leaders, using 
closed ended questionnaires (seven points Likert scale ranging from “strongly agree” to 
“strongly disagree”) as a research instrument with multi item indices applied to proxy key 
variables. Yang finds evidence to support his hypothesis that stakeholder participation 
and innovative culture are positively associated with HPR, while hostile internal politics is 
negatively associated with HPR. Yang study provides the first evidence of measuring the 
confluence of factors that affect HPR, but this is based on a study within public 
organisations. 
 
Experimental research on HPR has been characterised, for the most part, by 
disagreements on findings, challenges of methodology and inferences made from 
empirical findings. In this section, we highlight three central contradictions and 
contestations. The examples provided below are by no means exhaustive but serve the 
purpose of highlighting the relevance of continuous scholarships in this area of study in 
general and the significance of this empirical work. 
 
Webb & Salterio (2006) critically evaluate Hannan et al. (2006) prediction, design and 
results and contest their approach and conclusion.  Hannan et al. (2006) propose that 
because HPR is affected by a trade-off between the benefits of appearing credible versus 
the benefits of misrepresentation, information systems affect HPR by affecting manager’s 
perception of the cost and benefits of HPR.  Information systems do this by improving the 
principals’ ability to make inferences regarding the managers’ credibility. Therefore, if the 
information system improves the managers’ appearance as credible, then it increases 
HPR and vice versa.  However, as the information system gets more precise, the benefits 
of misrepresentation begin to outweigh the benefits of HPR because the manager must 
give up relatively more misrepresentation to achieve the same level of perceived HPR.  
Hannan et al. (2006) assume that HPR is driven by an intrinsically motivated desire for 
social approval (moral hypocrisy). Subsequent scholars have disproved this assumption 
and provided varied reasons for manager’s desire for HPR (e.g., James Jr. 2002; Schulze 
& Frank 2003; Somanathan & Rubin 2004). 
 
Webb & Salterio (2006) argue that Hannan et al (2006) created an experimental setting 
with conditions deliberately designed to promote lying, by (1) providing an assurance that 
there are no negative consequences to misreporting managerial performance such as 
reputation concerns (2) providing rewards that decrease HPR (3) allowing little 
interpersonal interaction between the manager and the principal such that managers 
merely handed over their budget form with no discussions between the principal and the 
agent. Therefore, Hannan et al. (2006) maximised the likelihood that participants will 
misreport private information to replicate the findings of Evans et al. (2001) as well as find 
a new structural variable that affects HPR.  
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Also, Webb & Salterio (2006) challenged the interpretation that Hannan et al. (2006) 
provide for their findings that a precise information system leading to less HPR implies 
that managers weigh the benefits of misreporting against the benefits of HPR. Rather 
Webb & Salterio (2006) argue that more precise information system highly correlating 
with misreporting private information implies that managers are making a trade-off 
between fairness of profit allocation between parties and the benefits of appearing 
credible. Webb & Salterio (2006) contend that Hannan et al. (2006) did not discover a 
new structural variable that decreases HPR; instead, their findings illustrate the joint 
effects of the interaction between perceived fairness of rewards systems and the 
precision of the information systems on HPR. 
 
Salterio & Webb (2006) sum up their contention in the following words 
“We suggest, on the basis of our analysis of the experimental design, that it is an 
interaction between the reward system and the precision of the information systems, 
rather than fineness alone that causes the HRT (Hannan et al.) results. Hence, we do not 
believe that HRT have identified a new structural variable that increases lying (that is, the 
fineness of the information system). Rather, they illustrate the joint effects on honesty of 
a particular type of reward system and a structural variable (the information system)”.  
 
Interestingly, Webb & Salterio (2006) contest of the methodology adopted by Hanna et 
al. (2006), as enumerated above, extends to contention with Evans et al. (2001) 
methodology as well. For instance, Evans et al. (2001) also use a budgetary process that 
involves no discussions between agent and principal, provide assurances of anonymity 
and increases the reward for lying. Indeed, most studies have adopted a similar 
methodological approach. An additional challenge arises with the assumption of subject 
homogeneity between the sample and the population with the use of students as 
surrogates for real business executives. The methodological difficulties with research into 
HPR are discussed in the next chapter but suffice to say that these methodological 
challenges probably affect the opportunity to generalise findings from several types of 
research into HPR.  
 
Evans et al. (2001) have similar contentions with the work of Baiman & Lewis (1989) 
regarding methodology and interpretation of findings. Evans et al. (2001) states that  
‘The difference between our conclusions and those of Baiman and Lewis (1989) appear 
to reflect different experimental procedures and different interpretation of their 
experimental results”. 
 
Evans et al. (2001) argue that the experimental procedures adopted by Baiman & Lewis 
(1989) suggest that experimental participants were encouraged to be self-seeking to the 
maximum extent possible and this may have affected the validity of the findings of the 
study. Secondly, Evans et al. (2001) argue that the assertion by Baiman & Lewis (1989) 
that ‘any advantage from exploiting an agents’ reluctance to lie explicitly is likely, on 
average, to be small or non-existent’ does not relate to their reported results. Evans et al. 
(2001) make this argument because, according to them, even though Baiman & Lewis 
(2001) encouraged a self-seeking behaviour (‘expected monetary value maximisation’) 
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among participants, a relatively significant percentage (41.7%) of participants still 
engaged in HPR in Baiman & Lewis (1989) experiment. 
 
Gneezy (2005) disproves Koford & Penno’s (1992) ‘type theory’, contests Baiman & Lewis 
(1989) argument that decision makers merely make a cost benefit analysis of their 
monetary benefits, disagrees with Evans et al. (2001) distributional model and proposes 
instead a consequence model that guides the formulation of preferences. Gneezy (2005) 
suggests that consequence is critical to managers in decisions about behavioural choices 
(including HPR) and often managers even though are influenced by how much they gain 
from misreporting private information, also care about how much the ‘other side’ looses 
even though this unselfish motive diminishes with the size of the ‘game’. Also, Gneezy 
(2005) establishes that managers are not indifferent to the process leading to an outcome 
and therefore managers and decision makers display ‘non-consequentialism preference 
in which they treat the same outcome differently depending on the process leading to it’. 
In other words, process matters beyond consequences (Amartya, 1997) and therefore 
how allocations and ‘outcomes come to be’ matters more than what the allocations are 
(Hurkens & Kartik, 2009, 2006). 
 
Gneezy (2005) disagrees with the appropriateness of existing formal models on social 
preferences that have developed to support the accumulation of empirical evidence 
against complete selfishness. Gneezy (2005) argues against the reliability of the 
distributional model in predicting observed behaviour and suggest that ‘a simple 
comparison of relative payoffs misses an important aspect of the HPR phenomenon 
problem, namely the distinction between doing harm and inequality aversion. In other 
words, people care not only about relative outcomes; they also care about the harm done 
by their choices’. Gneezy (2005) argues that the distributional models are ineffective in 
predicting HPR. In summary Gneezy (2005) confirms that not all agents are willing to lie 
to obtain a preferred outcome and that agents are likely to lie when they gain more, 
monetary or otherwise, and the other party loses less. 
 
Hurkens & Kartik (2006) attempted to replicate Gneezy’s (2005) experiment and 
discovered substantial differences in behaviour between their subjects and Gneezy’s 
subjects. Hurkens & Kartik (2006) disagree with the findings of Gneezy (2005) and argue 
that Gneezy’s data cannot disprove the evidence that people are of two kinds (ethical or 
economic) as proposed by Koford & Penno’s (1992) ‘type theory’. Therefore, so long as 
HPR induces a preferred outcome an agents’ decision will be affected by induced 
outcomes such as personal monetary gains vis-s-vis how much the agent's action hurts 
an anonymous ‘other person’.  
 
Hurkens & Kartik (2006) further argue that Gneezy’s (2005) conclusions are not 
supported empirically by findings from his data. They argue that ‘that although Gneezy’s 
main result suggests that some people possess a non-degenerate cost of lying, cs ∈ (0, 
∞), and perform a cost-beneﬁt analysis in deciding whether to lie, this interpretation is not 
supported by his data’, rather Gneezy’s findings support the hypothesis that ‘conditional 
on preferring the outcome of lying over the outcome of truth-telling, a person is sensitive 
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to neither her own [monetary] gain from lying nor how much [monetary] harm she causes 
the other side’. 
 
In testing Gneezy’s (2005) consequence preposition on a different group of subjects, 
Hurkens & Kartik (2006) find that unlike Gneezy’s findings, their subjects care less about 
the consequence of misreporting private information as they do not expect their reports 
to be believed. Sutter (2008) however argues that the definition of HPR should be 
extended to include situations where agents deliberately choose HPR with a reasonable 
and rational expectation that stakeholders will not believe the performance report. Gibson 
et al. (2013) state that ‘In particular, despite the intuitive appeal and real-world relevance 
of the strategic games employed in Gneezy (2005) and in Hurkens and Kartik (2006), 
these games come with some interpretational challenges. For instance, in sender-
receiver games, even telling the truth can be deceptive, because the sender may hope 
that the receiver will not believe the true message that is sent (Sutter 2009). Additionally 
Rode (2010) found that decision makers are significantly less trusting in a competitive 
context than in a corporative context’. 
 
Gibson, Tanner & Wagner (2013) recently found evidence to reject the ‘type model’ but 
support Gneezy’s (2005) suggestion of a continuous heterogeneity of preferences for 
HPR in which managers’ balance ‘process’ against ‘consequence’ in a range of different 
ways in making decisions about reporting behaviour. However, Gibson et al. (2013) 
concede the limitation of the validity of the results for generalisation.  
 
Despite the contradictions in theory to explain HPR, research seems to agree on some 
salient issues. 
 
Firstly, researchers agree that in every organisation, honest, dishonest and partially 
honest MPR occurs (Serota, Levine & Boster, 2010) even though there is no consensus 
on why such behavioural patterns occur. Whereas some scholars suggest that this is due 
to individual cognitive orientation such that some individuals always report underlying 
private information honestly, dishonestly or partially honestly (Grubin 2005; Healy & Healy 
1915; Levine et al 2010; Serota et al 2010; Gino & Margolis 2011; Fischbacher & Utikal 
2013; Shalvi & Leiser 2013) others attribute it to a variety of stimulations or situational 
factors such that depending on the context and stimuli, any individual may report 
underlying private information honestly, or dishonestly or partially honestly (DePaulo et al 
1996; Ariely 2012; Bazerman & Tenbrunsel 2011; Zhong, Bohns & Gino 2010; Lewis et 
al 2012; Gino, Ayal & Ariely 2009; Vohs & Schooler 2008; Gino, Schweitzer, Mead & 
Ariely 2011; Shalvi, Eldar & Bereby-Meyer, 2012). In making choices on HPR, individuals 
weigh the cost and benefits of misreporting against the cost and benefits of HPR, but 
empirical literature disagrees on what constitutes the cost and benefits and how 
individuals assess and/or evaluate these options. Gino & Pierce (2010b) suggest, for 
instance, that individuals downplay the cost of misreporting.  
 
Also, researchers agree that studies about HPR are critical (Halevy et al. 2014) primarily 
as trust bias exists in human communication (Levine, Park and McCornack 1999). 
Empirical findings in human behaviour studies (such as HPR) are relevant to social 
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policies, contract designs, control systems, accountability, effective resource allocation, 
quality business decisions and value maximisation. 
 
However, the disagreements among scholars on the phenomenon of HPR are numerous. 
Firstly, empirical evidence to support a general propensity for HPR among managers has 
been diverse and contradictory (see Mittendorf 2006; Antle & Eppen 1985). The most 
apparent disagreement is between empirical supports for Baiman & Lewis (1989) versus 
Evans et al. (2001) findings. Baiman & Lewis (1989) confirm a propensity to misreport 
underlying private information among managers and indicates that preferences for HPR 
are too small to be a relevant decision variable whereas Evans et al. (2001) confirm a 
propensity for HPR and “partial HPR’. These findings have significant and opposing 
effects on business decisions regarding contract negotiation. Following on from Baiman 
& Lewis (1989), a principal must invest heavily in monitoring, control systems and 
incentive schemes that align the agents’ interest with the principal’s interest. Evans et al. 
(2001) however argue that contracts based on Baiman & Lewis proposal of agent self-
interest may not necessarily be the most optimal from a profit maximising perspective.  
 
Also, there is currently no empirical study on the implications of HPR on firm performance 
and hence value. Cameron et al. (2004) find a significantly positive relationship between 
some dimensions of organisational virtues and morality with perceived and objective firm 
performance, but their dimensions on organisational virtues do not directly include HPR. 
Theoretically, certain performance misreporting behaviour such as budgetary slack 
affects firm value due to poor decision quality that leads to inefficient resource allocation 
and in-optimal compensation schemes (Anderson et al. 1994; and Jeanes, 1996 confirm 
that HPR improves customer satisfaction which can increase firm value). However, 
organisations may be motivated to create slack due to perceived advantages such as 
increasing organisation resilience to change, reducing managerial tension as well as 
making certain resources available that can be used to promote innovation (Merchant 
1998; Merchant & Manzoni 1989). Cyert & March (1963) suggest that slack can protect 
an organisation against uncertainty in the environment. Evans et al. (2001) infer an 
adverse implication of hurdle contracts on firm profit, but this is at best a projection of his 
findings on managers’ preference for HPR. Simon (2010) suggests that HPR benefits 
franchisors and franchisees. Most of the studies have suggested an adverse effect of 
misreporting underlying private information in that it emanates from information 
asymmetry, which is considered to result in moral hazards and adverse selection. 
However, Waterman & Meier (1998) argue that in the long run, in a multi-actor principal 
agent relationship, information leakage from competing agents will reduce information 
asymmetry and its attendant adverse effects. If information asymmetry is irrelevant then 
perhaps, from an organisational perspective, HPR may be irrelevant.  
 
Neely (1999) proposes the need for further research to establish the correlation between 
different dimensions of performance measurement such as HPR and firm performance.  
Neely (1999) states that 
 
‘Given the importance of this question, however, the implication, in terms of further 
research is clear-namely the need to explore if, and how, the relationship between 
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different dimensions of business performance can be mapped. Assuming this proves 
possible, then the benefits will be substantial-not least because this would begin to solve 
the taxing issue of how predictive performance measures or leading indicators can be 
identified.’ 
 
McNichols & Stubben (2008), model the implication on real investment decisions within 
an organisation from manipulation of earnings (external reporting rather than internal 
management report) and find that earnings management to external investors can have 
a direct consequence on investors from inefficient resource allocation. Their study 
however and other studies (such as Dechow et al., 1996; Bar-Gill & Bebchuk, 2003; 
Wang, 2006) only study the implication of HPR in financial accounting (external reports) 
on internal capital allocation decisions. Even then Healy & Wahlen (1999) find that very 
little literature exists on the effect of HPR on internal decisions and the results of these 
studies are mixed. 
 
Thirdly even though recent studies have sought to project the tendency for partial HPR, 
the reasons for these have been subjected to varied and sometimes conflicting 
explanations. Explanations have ranged from Evans et al. (2001) ‘distributional model, to 
Brickley et al. (1997) ‘threshold model’, Luft (1997) ‘trade off model’, moral hypocrisy 
model (Bénabou & Tirole, 2003; Ellingsen & Johannesson, 2004), and ‘self-concept 
maintenance’ (Mazar, Amir & Ariely 2008).   
 
Again, studies on the relationship between individual moral development or thinking and 
a predictable pattern of behavioural choices have mostly been inconclusive. In other 
words, is there a predictable relationship between the stage of moral development and 
thinking and HPR? Halevy, Shalvi, & Verschuere (2014) find evidence to suggest that a 
high level of moral development motivates HPR.  
 
For instance, even though an implicit assumption in the literature suggests that persons 
at a higher level of moral reasoning are likely to act more “morally” than those at a lower 
moral development stage (Munhall 1979), research findings have been inconclusive. 
Ketefian (1981) indicates that such thinking perhaps emanates from the often-used 
categorisation of moral development stages into ‘post conventional’ or ‘principled’ rather 
than from a body of empirical evidence. Kohlberg (1975) proposes a correlation between 
moral reasoning (i.e. stage of moral development) and behavioural choices by suggesting 
that moral behaviour is likely to be more consistent, predictable and “responsible” at 
higher stages of moral development. Research has partially supported this hypothesis 
especially regarding cheating and dishonesty (Blasi 1980; Brown and Herrnstein 1975; 
Grim, Kohlberg and White 1968; Schwartz, Feldman, Brown & Heingartner 1969). 
Kohlberg (1975) suggests that moral thinking influences behavioural choices by providing 
a cognitive definition of a person’s frame of rights and duties in any situation.  
 
Huddart & Qu (2013) tests, using Kohlberg’s three staged moral development, the 
reaction of individuals to positive (“sterling performance) or negative influences (“bad 
apples”) of their peers and find results consistent with Kohlberg’s expectation. They find 
that whereas ‘pre-conventional types’ respond to only “bad apples” who are dishonest, 
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‘conventional types’ respond more to “sterling performances” and ‘post conventional 
types’ are immune to any social influences.  
 
Admittedly, even though previous studies have confirmed a form of relationship between 
moral reasoning and behavioural choices, the nature of the relationship is not clear. There 
is a general difficulty in understanding how behavioural choices on managerial 
performance reporting and moral reasoning relate at the different stages of moral 
development (Blasi, 1980). 
 
Also, the relevance of the CAT to discussions on HPR has received varied approval. 
Baiman & Lewis (1989) argue for the continuous relevance of the CAT in the formulation 
of contracts and rewards schemes, Evans et al. (2001) suggest a limited relevance of the 
theory whereas Yang (2009) argues for a multi-actor principal agent relationship. 
 
Neely (1999) argues that studies on HPR have focused on the current and short term 
rather than attempting to deal with resulting and likely evolution in scholarships in this 
area of study in the long term. Neely contends that a wide variety of academia has 
researched HPR with different perspectives (‘mental models’) on what constitutes good 
research. The result of this has been that scholarships in this area of study have often 
been contradictory and lack cohesion. Neely (1999) proposes that research in this area 
of study can be improved if different academics work together to develop a common 
language and shared research agenda. 
 
A summarised tabular presentation of various studies on HPR is presented below (table 
2.2). The essence of this is only to guide discussions of the main features of studies on 
HPR. This list is by no means exhaustive or comprehensive. Most studies on HPR have 
been focused on exploring the behavioural tendencies of managers regarding 
performance reporting and identifying factors that may influence reporting behaviour. 
However, these studies have often been based on hypotheses that are not based on 
theory modelling and explore factors as individual units rather than the interrelationships 
between them. No studies have explored the implication of HPR on firm value empirically. 
Various studies have offered varied and contradictory definitions of the phenomenon of 
HPR. Also, there is a significant application of laboratory and quasi laboratory 
experiments in studies on reporting behaviour. None of the studies listed below took place 
in the African continent and over 96% of the studies took place in Western Europe (UK, 
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Table 2.2: Tabular Representation Of Selected Scholarships Related To Honest Managerial Performance Reporting. 
Author(s) Journal Methodology Research 
Hannan, R. L., 
Rankin, F. W., & 
Towry, K. L. 
(2006). 
The effect of information 
systems on honesty in 





Experiments Using experiments examines the behavioural impact of 
information systems (IS) and how that impact varies in an 
internal reporting environment and find that although the 
existence of IS increases HPR, HPR is lower under a 
precise than a coarse IS. Therefore, unless an IS system 
is sufficiently precise, principals will profit more by not 
contracting on its outputs.  
Matuszewski, L. J. 
(2010). 
Honesty in managerial 
reporting: is it affected by 
perceptions of horizontal 




Experiments Examines if changes in salary and horizontal equity in pay 
structure affects the degree of HPR and find that increase 
horizontal equity resulting from increase in participants, 
salary (with peer salary constant) resulted in a different 
reporting behaviour from when increase horizontal equity 
resulted from a decrease in peer salary (with participant’s 
salary constant). Often there was a strong positive 
correlation between perceived increases in horizontal 
equity result from own salary increase and HPR. 
However, decreases in horizontal equity had similar 
effects on honesty irrespective of whether the decrease in 
horizontal equity was driven by own salary reduction or 
peer salary increases. Therefore, a perceived inequity in 
pay structure influences HPR. 
Schreck, P. (2015). Honesty in managerial 
reporting: How 
competition affects the 







Analyses the effect of competition on HPR proposing that 
different types of competition have varying effects HPR. 
Concludes that economic competition (one form of 
competition) affects the economic benefits of misreporting 
private information about managerial performance 
whereas rivalry (another form of competition) diminishes 




Accounting, 27, 177-188. 
the moral cost of such misreporting. Finds that the effect 
of competition on HPR is affected by gender and HPR 
decreases significantly with rivalry even when economic 
benefits of misreporting private information remain 
unchanged. Economic competition only reduced the 
salience of HPR preferences among male participants. 
Therefore, competition can have adverse effects on HPR. 
Drake, A. R., 
Matuszewski, L. J., 
& Miller, F. (2014). 
The effect of personality 
traits and fairness on 
honesty in managerial 
reporting. In Advances in 
management accounting 
(pp. 43-69). Emerald 
Group Publishing Limited. 
Experiment and 
empirical analysis 
Tests Kidder (2005) theory. Kidder draws on trait theory, 
agency theory and psychological contracts theory to 
conclude that personality trait and perceived unfairness in 
the workplace helps predict HPR among workers. Drake 
et al. conclude that individuals with a preference for HPR 
reported more honestly and that perceived fairness 
interacts with individual honesty preferences as well as 
relativism to affect HPR. Therefore, creating a perception 
of fairness in compensation policies can improve HPR. 
Salterio, S., & 
Webb, A. (2006). 
Honesty in Accounting & 
Control: A Discussion of 




23(4), 919-932.  
Empirical Review Evaluates Hannan et al’s. (2006) prediction, design and 
results and question the validity of the methodology 
applied as well as the conclusions arrived at. Contest 
Hannan et al. (2006) proposal of a new structural variable 
affecting HPR and proposes an alternative explanation 
that managers arrive at their reporting behaviours through 
the interaction of perceived fairness of a reward system 
and information systems. 
Cohn M (2004) Honest reporting at Toys 
“R” Us PC Magazine, Vol. 
23(4), 66-72 
Case study Explores the application of the Sarbanes Oxley Act in 
improving financial reporting practices at Toys R Us. 
Feeney, O., & 
Pierce, B. (2007). 
Honest Bean Counters 
and Savvy Business 
Exploratory 
Study/ Survey 
Summarises the findings of research studies in Ireland 
and find that management accountants are perceived to 




Ireland, 39(5), 16-21 
be ethical, report private information about managerial 
performance honestly and possess important personal 
traits that reassure shareholders. 
Takala, T., & 
Urpilainen, J. 
(1999). 
Managerial work and 
lying: A conceptual 
framework and an 
explorative case study. 
Journal of Business 









Study the decision-making process connected with HPR 
to stakeholders both within and outside of the 
organisation. Attempts to find out the kind of situations 
that create ethical dilemmas and how managers misreport 
underlying private information about performance. 
Simon L. (2010) Honest reporting benefits 
Franchisors and 
Franchisees; NZ 
Business; June; Vol. 
24(5); 57-57 
Survey Surveys franchisors and franchisees in New Zealand and 
Australia and determines that HPR is critical to both 
franchisors and franchisees. 
Sridhar, S. S. 
(1994). 
Managerial reputation 
and internal reporting. 
Accounting Review, 343-
363. 
Experiments Demonstrate how managers concern for reputation can 
affect HPR in investment projects and find that talented 
managers often prefer HPR while less talented managers 
often do not and that the magnitude of HPR for less 
talented managers is affected by the size of the difference 
in productivities between more and less talented 
mangers. Therefore, capital investments decisions can be 
adversely affected by the level of competence of the 
reporting manager. 
Mayhew, B. W., & 
Murphy, P. R. 
(2009). 
The impact of ethics 
education on reporting 
behaviour. Journal of 
Experiments Examines the impact of ethic education on reporting 
behaviour by designing two social conditions of anonymity 
and public disclosure to examine what extent ethical 
behaviours are internalised by students. Find that when 
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Business Ethics, 86(3), 
397-416. 
participants are anonymous HPR is the same regardless 
of whether students have benefited from ethics education 
or not. However, under scenarios of public disclosure, 
participants who undertook ethics education misreport at 
significantly lower rates. Therefore, ethics education does 
not necessarily result in internalised ethical values but can 
impact ethical behaviour.  
Rankin, F. W., 
Schwartz, S. T., & 
Young, R. A. 
(2008). 
The effect of honesty and 
superior authority on 
budget proposals. The 
Accounting Review, 
83(4), 1083-1099. 
Experiments Find that less slack is created when budget 
communication requires a factual assertion in the 
subordinate authority treatment but not when the superior 
has final authority. The incremental effect of HPR occurs 
only when the subordinate has final authority.  
Church, B. K., 
Hannan, R. L., & 
Kuang, X. J. 
(2012). 
Shared interest and 
honesty in budget 
reporting. Accounting, 
Organisations and 
Society, 37(3), 155-167. 
Experiments Study HPR in managerial budgetary reports when the 
benefits of slack are shared by the manager with other 
non-reporting employees and find that managers’ report 
less HPR when the benefits of slack is shared than when 
it is not shared regardless of whether others are aware of 
the misreporting. Also, managers prefer HPR when other 
employees have known preferences for honesty than 
others. 
Maas, V. S., & Van 
Rinsum, M. (2013). 
How control system 
design influences 
performance 





Postulate that managers consider the effects of 
misreporting on their peers and this effect is determined 
by the control system, in particular, the reward system and 
the information policy regarding disclosure of individual 
performance report. Find that individuals are more likely 
to overstate performance if this increases monetary pay-
off of others than if misreporting decreases others 
monetary gain. Also, overstatements are lower under an 
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open information policy compared to a closed information 
policy. 
Fisher, A., & 




Journal of economics & 
management strategy, 
17(2), 489-540. 
Experiments Investigate truth telling by an informed insider (manager) 
and find that managers build a reputation in good times 
when HPR is affordable and exploits reputation in times 
of need, and hence endogenous reputation for HPR 
follows from self-insurance. 
Bird, F., & Waters, 
J. A. (1987). 
The nature of managerial 
moral standards. Journal 
of Business Ethics, 6(1), 
1-13. 
Survey method Find that managers draw on various moral assumptions 
that include honest communication, in their thinking, but 
managers usually involve these normative standards as 
mostly private intuitions.  
Mittendorf, B. 
(2006). 
Capital budgeting when 
managers value both 
honesty and perquisites. 





Models, the confluence of padding and managerial 
preference for HPR and considers its implications on 
optimal budgeting policies and find that optimal contracts 
take the middle ground between “trust contracts” and 
“hurdle contracts”. Therefore, if honesty preferences are 
strong, enough then a firm may maximise profit from not 
using hurdle or trust contracts but rather fine-tune the 
sensitivities of transfers to reported amounts. 
Quinn, J. K., Reed, 
J. D., Browne, M. 
N., & Hiers, W. J. 
(1997). 
Honesty, individualism, 
and pragmatic business 
ethics: Implications for 
corporate hierarchy. 
Journal of Business 
Ethics, 16(12), 1419-
1430. 
Review of the 
empirical 
literature 
Reviews empirical accounts of managerial struggles with 
ethical dilemmas and proposes a contextual precondition 
for encouraging the development of reflective moral 
agents within the organisation. 





Honesty is the best policy; 
Charter April, 81(3), 50-
51 
Article Discusses the importance of HPR in ensuring equitable 
managerial decisions and proposes that honesty must 
begin with an open, ethical dialogue. 
Grover, S. L. 
(2005). 
The truth, the whole truth, 
and nothing but the truth: 
The causes and 
management of 
workplace lying. The 
Academy of Management 
Executive, 19(2), 148-
157. 
Empirical studies Provides recommendations for improving HPR within the 
organisation. 
Sarker, S., Storrud-
Barnes, S. F., & 




and governance: The 
case of misleading 
financial disclosures; In 
Academy of Management 
Proceedings (Vol. 2008, 
No. 1, pp. 1-6). Academy 
of Management  
Experiments Examines the effect of mangers personal characteristics, 
organisational climate and governance drivers of 
misreporting and conclude that individuals with situational 
ethics are likely to engage in dishonest MPR. 
Mastilak, C., 
Matuszewski, L., 
Miller, F., & Woods, 
A. (2011). 
Designing honesty into 
your organisation. 
Strategic Finance, 93(6), 
35-47 
Article Discusses dishonesty at the workplace and suggests that 
fairness in the treatment of employees can influence 
HPR. Therefore, organisations should ensure vertical and 
horizontal fairness in compensation policies, improve 
communication and reward HPR. 
Erard, B., & 
Feinstein, J. S. 
(1994). 
Honesty and evasion in 
the tax compliance game. 




Build a game theoretic model of tax compliance that 
includes honest and dishonest taxpayers and improves 
empirical predictions and hence policy making. 
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Shu, L. L., Mazar, 
N., Gino, F., Ariely, 
D., & Bazerman, M. 
H. (2012). 
Signing at the beginning 
makes ethics salient and 
decreases dishonest self-
reports in comparison to 
signing at the end. 
Proceedings of the 





Find that signing before rather than after the opportunity 
to cheat reduces dishonest MPR. 
Matsushima, H. 
(2008). 
Role of honesty in full 
implementation. Journal 




Proposes a new concept for full implementation based on 
agents’ preferences for HPR that eliminates unwarranted 
equilibrium from a practical perspective. 
Boadway, R., & 
Sato, M. (2000). 
The optimality of 
punishing only the 
innocent: The case of tax 
evasion. International Tax 




Study the effects on tax enforcement and tax policy of 
unintentional compliance errors and administrative errors 
and suggest that without rewards for HPR, the revelation 
principle need not apply so intentional evasion can occur.  
Mazar, N., Amir, 
O., & Ariely, D. 
(2008). 
The dishonesty of honest 
people: A theory of self-
concept maintenance. 
Journal of marketing 
research, 45(6), 633-644. 
Experiments Perform six experiments and find evidence to back the 
theory of self-maintenance and offer practical solutions for 
curbing dishonesty in everyday life. 
Amaria, A. H., & 
Honest, P. K. E. 
(2012). 
A Matter of Corporate 
Culture, Changes in 
Employee Lifestyle, or 
Greed. International 
Journal of Business, 
Experiments Presents a study that examines the role of lifestyle 
changes, corporate culture and greed on HPR of an 
employee and shows that corporate culture and fraud risk 
awareness are critical motivators of misreporting 
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Accounting & Finance, 
6(1), 92-123. 
underlying private information about managerial 
performance.  
Gneezy, U. (2005). Deception: The role of 
consequences. The 
American Economic 





Alters relative and absolute pay-off (the consequence of 
lying) to empirically study the role of consequence in the 
decision to report dishonestly in a case where dishonesty 
increases the payoff to the manager. 
Hurkens, S., & 
Kartik, N. (2006). 
 (When) Would i lie to 
you? Comment on? 
Experimental Economics 
12, 180–192 
Empirical Review Considers the evidence of lying and deception presented 
by Gneezy (2005) and argues that Gneezy’s data cannot 
reject the hypothesis that people are one of two kinds: 
either a person will never lie, or a person will lie whenever 
she prefers the outcome obtained by lying over the 
outcome obtained by telling the truth. 
Gibson, R., 
Tanner, C., & 





and within individuals. 
The American Economic 




Find evidence to support Gneezy’s (2005) proposal of 
manager’s balance of ‘process’ against consequence in 
decision-making about HPR. Also finds evidence of 
heterogeneity among and within individuals.  
Yang, K. (2008). Examining perceived 
honest performance 
reporting by public 
organisations: 
Bureaucratic politics and 
organisational practice. 
Journal of Public 
Administration Research 




Used survey results from Taiwan to confirm that 
supportive external environments and harmonious 
internal environments enhance stakeholder participation 
and innovation culture, which in turn enhances HPR. 
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Evans III, J. H., 
Hannan, R. L., 
Krishnan, R., & 
Moser, D. V. 
(2001). 
Honesty in managerial 
reporting. The Accounting 
Review, 76(4), 537-559. 
Experiments Find evidence to disprove the validity of the threshold, 
type and trade-off models and suggest a distributional 
model for explaining empirically observed behaviour of 
‘partially HPR’ agents. 
Baiman, S., & 
Lewis, B. L. (1989). 
An experiment testing the 
behavioural equivalence 
of strategically equivalent 
employment contracts. 
Journal of Accounting 
Research, 1-20. 
Experiments Find evidence to support the classical agency model and 
proposes a threshold model for explaining agent’s 
preference for HPR. 
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2.4. WHY IS THE STUDY OF HPR RELEVANT?  
 
Modern business practices require profit-oriented businesses to separate ownership 
from management. In such a separation (Berle & Means, 1932), a critical element of 
accountability in the business relationship is regular communication of managerial 
performance (MP) to shareholders (Neely, 1999). MPR takes many forms (Hopper et 
al., 2009) but has been accepted as an effective accountability measure (Kreps, 1997), 
especially if done creditably. MPR is often conceptualised to include all the processes 
leading to the supply of information, financial and non-financial, as well as appraisal 
systems generated within an organisation for effective decision making and resource 
allocation (Demers & Vega, 2010), as well as to assess the performance of managers 
by those with the authority to do so.  
 
Despite its usefulness, the effectiveness of MPR as a control, accountability and 
communication tool divides opinion in the literature. Goffman (1959), for instance, 
contends that impression management characterises accountability processes 
(especially in a face to face interaction) by both the assessor and the assessed leading 
to fabrications, distortions, etc.  Krep (1997) and Gellatly et al. (1991) also highlight 
the inherent limitations of MPR in measuring all relevant dimensions of MP or even 
the ability of assessors to verify performance claims by the assessed (i.e. managers).   
 
Despite these challenges, however, Merchant (1998) and Neely (1998) still maintain 
that MPR serves a critical information and motivational role and hence needs to be 
improved rather than discarded. Chenhall (2003) also argues for further studies on 
MPR to achieve the critical mass necessary for theorisation. Such statements confirm 
the relevance of this study, which provides empirical insight into the efficacy of 
conventional thinking about MPR. 
 
Further confirmation of the relevance of empirical studies about MPR and HPR 
phenomena is provided by Kahneman & Tversky (1979). They explain that MPR has 
implications on decision making about resource allocation even in an efficient market 
because of the concept of bonded rationality and the possibility of other cognitive, 
social and affective biases in decision making. The reason is that rational actors may 
not necessarily be able to immediately control for bias information, especially where 
such decision-makers have no alternative source to verify such information, are 
constrained by time or lack the expertise and resources to extract the correct 
information (Bloomfield, 2002; Krische, 2005). Arguably, misreported MP in a self-
reporting scenario represents an escalation of detrimental behaviour when compared 
to managerial performance shirking or aggressive risk taking (Ndofor, Wesley & Priem, 
2015), and hence studies about HPR require all the attention it is receiving from 
researchers. 
 
Additionally, based on CAT, a primary prescription, offered to curb goal misalignment 
between agents and principals is the purposeful distribution of equity to top managers 
(Dalton et al., 2008) because managers are ‘inherently oriented’ to exploit private 
information and unobservable behaivour. Researchers who support this proposal 
argue that goal alignment between agents and principals increases with the 
distribution of equity to agents and consequently decreases managerial misconduct 
(Hall & Liebman, 2000) in MPR. The prevalent approach has been the issue of stock 
options to top management (Westphal & Zajac, 1995). However, empirical research 
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does not necessarily support a relationship with subsequent MPR behaviour (Rhoades 
& Rechner, 2005). Dasai et al., (2006) for instance argue that such ‘costly’ goal 
alignment practices can have the unintended effect of motivating managers to use 
overly aggressive accounting practices to misreport their performance (O’Connor et 
al., 2006; Zhang et al., 2008 and Harris & Bromiley, 2007). It is imperative therefore to 
confirm if managers voluntarily prefer HPR in which case HPR can be achieved 
without such ‘costly’ goal alignment measures. 
 
In this study, I examine various dimensions of MPR with the view to improve HPR. 
Studies about HPR are relevant because since organisations are essentially a lose 
network of cliques and relationships with divergent interests (Yang 2009; Cyert & 
March 1963; Pfeffer 1981), understanding human behaviour is critical to ensuring that 
organisations achieved the desired outcome. Theoretically, even though no empirical 
studies exist, HPR could affect firm value or profit maximisation due to its effect on 
optimal contract structure as well as optimal decision making on effective resource 
allocation. Perhaps it is logical to infer that since HPR could affect the efficient 
allocation of resources, then it is a critical variable in firm valuation. Ndofor et al. (2015) 
argue that information asymmetry is a significant cause of opportunism and hence 
reduces HPR. However, Hurkens & Kartik (2009) find evidence to suggest that 
principals can ignore irrelevant information in their decision matrix. This could imply 
that business leaders, as well as principals, can mitigate the effect of misreported 
managerial performance information in their decision matrixes in which case HPR will 
make no difference. Indeed, according to the efficient market hypothesis, in an efficient 
market, information asymmetry is mitigated, and the associated cost of adverse 
selection and moral hazard does not exist. Waterman, Rouse & Wright (2004) argue 
that in a multi actor environment, competition among agents and principals can lead 
to information leakage such that in the long run, information asymmetry will be 
irrelevant. Considering however that bonded rationality suggests that not all relevant 
variables affect critical decisions as well as Yang (2009) and Heclo’s (1977) argument 
that mangers do not think in a long-term perspective, studies on HPR are still relevant.  
 
Despite the ambiguity of the effect of HPR on firm value, empirical evidence exists to 
suggest that misreported private information in performance reports breaches 
organisational trust, which can affect organisation moral through heightened tensions. 
Empirical evidence on the benefits of organisational harmony is widely documented 
(Sutcliffe & Vogus, 2003; Fredrickson, 2003; Dienstbier & Zillig, 2002; Masten & Reed, 
2002; Hatch, 1999; Seligman, Schulman, DeRubeis, & Hollon, 1999). 
 
Similarly, HPR to external stakeholders could reduce tension with and suspicion from 
regulators and the media and improve any measure of public perception index. This 
could have a positive effect on brand imagery and perceptions of brand equity. 
 
Lastly, the process of attempting to understand HPR can improve stakeholder 
knowledge on how to get the best out of workers for the mutual benefit of the 
organisation and society. Therefore, even without empirical evidence about the 
implication of HPR on firm value, there are clear benefits from studies about human 
behaviour within an organisational setting in general and on HPR in particular. 
 
I propose a theoretical framework to guide the formulation of theory on HPR (figure 
2.4). This provides a graphical presentation of the relevance of the objectives of this 
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research in enriching the literature on HPR. The study proposes four ‘buckets’ (figure 
2.4) required for cohesion in future studies to ensure relevance and reduce 
contradictions in the quest for a thorough theoretical framework. The gaps with each 
bucket are identified, and a proposal is provided to guide actions required to mitigate 
knowledge gaps. 



















Towards A Theoretical Framework For Studies In Honesty In Performance Reporting (HPR) Within Organisations 
What is HPR? How to Observe, 
Measure and 
Evaluate HPR 
What Does HPR affect 
and how is HPR 
affected? 
How does HPR Knowledge 
enhance self, Organisation 





2) Research focus on 
HBR at the 
organisational level 






1) Varied and 
sometimes conflicting 
definitions of HPR 
2) Mixed focus on 




1) Consistency in how 
to measure HBR in 
varied scenarios to 
ensure replicability re 
methodology, 
measured variables 














1) Replicable hypothesised 
relationships with determined variables 
grounded in logic and theoretical 
modelling rather than mere 
conjectures and experimentation with 
a mix of variables 
2) Determined implications of 
occurrence of and change in HPR 
3) Replicable determined relationship 
between cause-effect-outcome to 
guide recommendations. 
4) Established evidence of inter 
relationships with other disciplines in 
social science 
Current Situation 
1) No clear evidence on what HPR 
affects 
2) Contradictions in hypothesis 
formulation as well as findings on 
hypothesized relationships 
3) Hypothesis often based on trial and 
error rather than on theoretical 
modelling. 
4) Evidence of relationship with other 
social sciences not clearly established 
Planned Outcome 
1) Determined 
relevance of study and 
knowledge of HPR to 
self, organizations, 




1) No empirical 
evidence of relevance 
of study even though a 
lot of positive 
implications are implied  
 
Figure 2.4: Depiction of Research Gap 




















U= what we should know Subset-what we know 
1) Resolve methodological 
difficulties in future research 
2) More research and 
empirical results that is 
replicable 
3) Establish clear relevance 
of knowledge to self, 
business, economy and 
society 
4) Retest empirical evidence 
of current research that 






1) Replicable empirical findings with clear 
relevance to self, economy and society 
2) Improve perception of relevance to 
stakeholder 
2) Guidance for Future Research 
 
Dishonest MPR (DPR) occurs within 
organisations. 
Partial HPR occurs within organisations. 
DPR is affected by multiple factors. 
How pervasive is HPR? 
How does HPR affects FP? 
Conceptualisation of HPR 
How to compare multiple 
organisations on HPR. 
How to 
measure HPR 
What Affects HPR & 
what does HPR 
affect? 
Why is the Study of MPR 
& HPR relevant? 
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2.5. GHANA AS AN EFFECTIVE REPRESENTATION OF AFRICA AND THE 
OPPORTUNITY FOR GENERALISING RESEARCH FINDING. 
 
Ghana is a developing country in Africa, south of the Saharan (see figure 2.5). 
Developing countries are often characterised by structural deficiencies (Rabelos & 
Vasconcelos, 2002) such as undeveloped and illiquid stock markets (Tsamenyi et al, 
2007), volatile and unpredictable economic environment, ineffective and weak 
regulations; frequent government interventions in private enterprise, a predominance 
of concentrated ownership and shareholding (Ahunwan, 2002). 
 




Ghana has experienced tremendous changes over the last 50 years (Acquah 1957, 
AMA, 1999). Perhaps the most significant driver of change in Ghana was the 
successful introduction of liberalisation policies from 1983. Ghana is perhaps in the 
final stages of evolution in corporate governance and corporate management 
practices in Africa.  Grant (2001) examines the extent of corporate activity in Ghana 
and finds evidence of inclusion in the world economy, increasing investment in the 
service sector rather than the extractive sector, and increasing participation of foreign 
organisations. Most organisations operating within the sub region have situated the 
headquarters in Accra Ghana (Grant 2001), and this was even more evident following 
the civil war in neighbouring Ivory Coast in 2008. Organisations such as Nestle 
relocated their West African head-office to Ghana from Ivory Coast during that period. 
 
Ghana has gained notoriety as a beacon for positive change and development among 
the international community (World Bank 1994) and has benefited immensely from 
such a perception. Economically, Ghana is characterised by a modest market size of 
24 million people (the second largest in West Africa after Nigeria), rapid urbanisation 
(Acquah, 1957; Habitat, 1999) and improving infrastructure. This has been made 
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possible by the relative political stability Ghana has enjoyed since 1981 and mainly 
from the advent of democracy in 1996. 
 
Afriyie (1998) posits that besides its market size, the attraction of Ghana as a business 
location is because of the abundance of natural resources such as gold, bauxite, 
diamond, timber, and manganese, cocoa and recently the discovery of oil in 
commercial quantities.    
 
Before liberalisation, government dominated the economy and was active in enterprise 
with a significant shareholding in over 400 organisations (Grayson, 1979; World Bank 
1994). Policies, before liberalisation were designed to promote government 
domination of enterprise through the creation of government, owned and operated 
monopolies in key sectors (in line with a socialist agenda), the restriction of private 
participation in enterprise especially foreigners (Killick, 1978). 
 
Following market reforms in 1983, and the adoption and implementation of the 
structural adjustment program, transparency was encouraged in national economic 
management through the involvement of civil society in governance, private sector 
participation in enterprise was stimulated through regulatory reforms (such as the 
introduction of the investment code of 1985), improvement in infrastructure, the 
creation of business parks and zones, and the deliberate mitigation of government 
participation in enterprise (most SOEs, were fully or partially privatized).  
 
Ghana indeed stands apart from other developing countries within the sub-region 
because liberalisation policies have been initiated since 1983, without halting or 
backtracking (Grant, 2001). The government of Ghana has sought to portray Ghana 
as a friendly, competitive, and investor friendly location for business that provides 
unique access to the rest of Africa. Indeed, most of Africa is within six hours reach of 
Ghana by flight.  Without location-specific research (Grant, 2001), critical information 
about African countries will be misrepresented or missing in international dialogue, 
and policy planning. Grant (2001) discovers for instance that as at 2001, Ghana had 
655 foreign firms operating within the principal city of Accra, in Ghana alone, but this 
was woefully understated by international business directories on foreign business 
participation in Africa. 
 
The growth in investment opportunities, as well as the economic stability, has made 
Ghana an emerging cosmopolitan country (Garlick 1960), with the influx of varied 
nationals and cultures from all over the world including African countries. Aside 
economic and political stability, Grant (2001) discovers that most organisations refer 
to the improving international transportation hubs (the Tema Harbour and Port, the 
Takoradi harbour and Port, as well as the Kotoka International airport), the availability 
of liberalised financial institutions (albeit properly regulated), as critical considerations 
for the choice of Ghana as a business location. 
 
This point is critical, in the choice of Ghana as a location for this study. Firstly, 
considering Ghana’s’ relatively advancement in liberation and improvement in the 
business and investment climate, the essence of this empirical study cannot be over 
emphasised. This research may be relevant in guiding government policy and 
business decisions to consolidate and enhance continuing private participation in 
enterprise. Secondly, the opportunities provided for generalisation (at least to south 
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Saharan Africa) of empirical findings of this study across other African countries are 
enormous. The influx of cultures from other African countries following liberalisation 
has positioned Ghana as a unique blend of varied cultures, especially from Africa.  In 
any case, in most parts, the cultures across most African countries south of the 
Saharan are mostly similar, but Ghana presents a unique opportunity, probably to 
extend any empirical findings to french speaking west Africa (at least) as well, due to 
its proximity to three french speaking countries (Ghana shares a border on all its 
boundaries with three African countries except the south that is boarded by the sea). 
Lastly, the growing sophistication of business in Ghana lends itself to relevant 
research methodologies. Beyond the fact that studies in HPR are relevant in Africa, 
the growing sophistication in business in Ghana, the development of technology, the 
level of literacy etc., makes this study practically researchable in a manner that may 
not be possible in other African countries. 
    
2.5.1. Reporting Practices In Ghana And Relevant Governance Framework: -
Ghana Club 100 Ranking (GC 100) 
 
The Ghana Investment Promotion Centre (GIPC) in its bid to promote improved 
corporate performance and enterprise building initiated a yearly official ranking of top 
100 Ghanaian companies in Ghana. Participation is voluntary and all companies that 
wish to participate need to provide the GIPC with information about the size (turnover), 
profitability (three-year average Return on Equity – ROE -, from two years before the 
year being ranked to the year being ranked), and growth (three year compounded 
average annual growth rate of turnover from two years before the year being ranked 
to the year being ranked). Weights are applied to the criteria of size, profitability and 
growth to arrive at the rankings. In the event of a tie, reference is made to the growth 
index.  This annual compilation of Ghana’s top 100 companies has been done annually 
since 1998 except in 2006 and 2007. 
 
Ghanaian firms attach huge relevance to this ranking and publish their position in 
GC100 widely. To participate, a firm must be a limited liability company duly 
incorporated in Ghana, must have positive cumulated net profits for the most recent 
three years, and may have no more than 50% government ownership over the last 
three years except where the company is listed on the Ghana Stock Exchange. 
 
Recently, specific sector rankings have been initiated for agriculture and agribusiness, 
education, financial services, health, ICT, Media, Petroleum and Mining as well as 
tourism.  Often these rankings are based on an organisation’s position within the 
overall ranking. Determination of an appropriate sector an organisation belongs to is 
based on the business objective as stated in the company’s incorporation documents. 
Interestingly, almost always, most companies listed on the Ghana Stock Exchange 
are included in the GC 100 ranking. 
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2.6. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 
The chapter has focused on MPR and HPR. It has reviewed the existing studies and 
their contribution to our understanding of the MPR & HPR phenomena. This was done 
to put the study in perspective. The chapter also provides a conceptualisation for HPR 
and MPR, highlights the empirical challenges with CAT, exposes the contradictions 
and contestations between scholarships on HPR and proposes a theoretical 
framework that emphasises the need for further empirical studies hence the relevance 
of this study. This provides a basis for developing testable hypotheses in chapter 
three. The review has also shown the high use of experiments in HPR studies and 
confirmed the over concentration of studies about MNOs and in Western Europe and 
the USA (with no studies currently undertaken in Africa). It has also revealed that the 







   METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK FOR THIS RESEARCH STUDY 
 
3.1 . INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter explains the methodology used to achieve the research objectives 
enumerated in chapter one. The research strategy is to propose an approach that 
overcomes the limitations of previous research in this area of study and takes into 
consideration any constrains imposed by the research environment (i.e. Ghana). The 
limitations and strengths of all research tools are discussed to guide decisions around the 
generalisation of findings from this study. 
 
3.2. RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
This study uses multiple methods to address the enumerated objectives in chapter one. 
Evan et al. (2001) used a similar approach. Zeff (1983) encourages the use of multiple 
methodologies in accounting research and to design methodologies that can effectively 
answer a research question (“questions in search of methods rather than methods in 
search of questions”). Subotnik (1988) and Sterling (1971) argue for methodological 
tolerance in accounting research. Firestone (1987) and Denscombe (1998) argue that no 
research method is superior to others in an absolute sense and therefore the choice of a 
research method is more an issue of which method is more appropriate within a given 
context. Accounting research differs from research in other social disciplines because 
accounting research emphasises the institutional phenomena vis-à-vis the social 
discipline on which it draws (Ball & Foster 1982). In this sense, often, in its bid to fit the 
constructs of existing models with institutional data, accounting research must trade-off 
between integration of these institutional aspects with models from other social sciences. 
Therefore, special care must be taken in the methodological design to ensure ‘internal’ 
and ‘construct’ validity. 
 
Asante (1990) proposes an Afro centric approach to research methodology that 
challenges the traditional “Eurocentric research criteria of objectivity, reliability and validity 
in the enquiry process” (Reviere 2001) and argues that research questions that possess 
“embedded assumptions about race and culture” must be approached and viewed 
differently. According to Asante (1987; 1990), any research methodology that fails to 
consider the peculiar cultural sensitivities in the design of methodology, especially in the 
study of human behaviour is inadequate and inevitably deceptive (Reviere 2001). 
 
Afro centrism allows the researcher to assume the right and responsibility to describe 
reality from his/her own perspective (Reviere 2001; Oliver 1988; Banks 1992; Nobles 
1986). Reviere (2001) proposes a new criterion for research studies that borders on five 
cannons of ukweli; utuliva; uhaki; ujamaa; and kujitoa. These cannons are based on 
Asante’s’ (1987; 1990) Afro centric principles of Ma’am, and Nommo. Whereas these 
cannons may be ambiguous or contradictory at best, there lies within this assertion a 
presumption that Africa as a place for research enquiry presents an intriguing set of 
challenges and opportunities that must be taken into consideration in evaluating the 
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validity of research findings and research methodologies. For a fact, the standards of 
objectivity and validity may not always hold in research in Africa. However, Africa presents 
a virgin opportunity for new knowledge that perhaps, have a greater positive effect on 
social development than in advanced economies. In line with Afro- centrism, if the 
purpose of research is to promote social development and human progress, then a 
compelling case arises for continuous empirical studies in Africa even in the face of 
methodological difficulties. 
 
Table 3.1 summarises the research methodology adopted for each research objective. In 
the rest of the chapter, each research objective will be analysed in greater detail, 
specifying the research approach, the reasons, benefits and limitation of a chosen 
methodology.   
 
Table 3.1: Representation Of Varied Research Approach (es) Adopted For Each Objective 
 
Sub Objective Research Approach Theoretical Basis 
To reassess the empirical 
evidence of managers’ 
preference for being 
honest in reporting their 
performance. 
Multiple laboratory experiments 
using business managers as 
subjects, questionnaire and 
interviews. 
Paz et al., 2013, Evans et al. 
2001; Baiman & Lewis 1989; 
Young 1985; Waller 1988; 
Chow et al. 1988; Waller & 
Bishop 1990; Gibson et al., 
2013. 
To identify and evaluate, 
from a stakeholder 
perspective, the 
implications of HPR. 
Survey method through 
questionnaire administration and 
interviews. 
Chow et al. 1988 
To identify factors that 
influence HPR. 
Hypothesis testing using a survey 
method, through questionnaire 
administration, that pioneers a 
multi actor principal agent 
relationship and combines 
interplay on environmental, 
organisational and individual 
attributes. Following that, limited 
interviews used to confirm 
responses from the questionnaire. 
Galliers (1999); Yang 2009 
To provide evidence of the 
relationship between HPR 
and FP. 
Multiple regression analysis with 
variable constructs as independent 
variables and measures of FP as 
dependent variables. 
Evans et al. 2001; Cameron et 
al., 2004 
To identify the main 
features of managerial 
behaivour in HPR among 
managerial groups within 
GC100. 
Survey method based on a 
questionnaire and limited 
interviews applying Vignettes to 
test various scenarios of HPR. 





Denzin (1970) conceptualises triangulation as the combination of different research 
methodologies, methods and approaches in the study of a given phenomenon. It is 
important to appreciate that essentially, this study attempts to explore MPR behaviours 
within profit seeking organisations in Ghana, in a situation where ownership is divorced 
from management. I study MPR as a phenomenon, and hence the study adopts multiple 
methods and approaches to achieve its objectives. Jick (1979); Coombes (2001), Ghauri 
& Gronhaug (2002) as well as Collis & Hussey (2003) argue that the adoption of multiple 
approaches in a research study can be more effective than a single method approach. 
This is because multiple methods improve the overall credibility, validity and reliability of 
any research findings especially in a scenario where the conclusions from the various 
methods are the same (Denzin 1970). Even when varied methods result in different 
conclusions, it indicates further research areas and may bring other perspectives to bear 
in the explanation of a phenomenon (Denzin, 1970). Collins & Hussey (2003, page 78) 
state that  
 
‘The use of different research approaches, methods and techniques in the same study is 
known as triangulation and can overcome the potential bias and sterility of a single-
method approach.’ 
 
Easterby-Smith, Thorpe & Lowe (1991) identify different types of triangulation. Data 
triangulation involves the collection of data either at different time periods about the same 
phenomenon or from different sources in the same study. Investigation triangulation 
occurs when different independent researchers collect data on a similar phenomenon in 
the same study and compare results. Methodological triangulation involves the use of a 
combination of data collection tools such as the collection and use of both quantitative 
and qualitative data. Finally, theoretical triangulation occurs when theories from a different 
discipline are borrowed and applied to studies in another discipline. This study applies all 
four types of triangulation even though the application of investigation triangulation is 
applied in a limited manner.   
 












































Rather than an absolute qualitative or quantitative approach, Morgan (2007) argues for a 
pragmatic approach that combines qualitative and quantitative research. Pragmatism 
does not involve an extreme commitment to any research philosophy or method and 
hence usually allows for mixed approaches. Morgan (2007, page 71) provides a 
comparison of a pragmatic research approach to a qualitative and quantitative approach 
that is reproduced below (see table 3.2).  
 
Triangulation Methods Applied In This Study 
THEORY TRIANGULATION 
Theories from other 
disciplines, particularly the 
social sciences, psychology 
and sociology are applied to 
explain findings in this study. 
The study borrows from 
sociological theories like 
Impression Management. 
Also, research approaches in 
other disciplines such as 
Cameron (2004); Chun 
(2005) are applied in this 
study. 
DATA TRIANGULATION 
Data will be collected from business 
managers, relevant external stakeholders 
and financial statements of organisations. In 
some cases, such as the computation of 
ROCE and ROA, data will be collected over 
more than one accounting year. 
METHODOLOGICAL 
TRIANGULATION 
Data will be collected through 
experiments, interviews and 
predominately closed ended 
structured questionnaires with a 
few open-ended questions 
(Bryman 2006; Kuhn 1970). In 
explaining the findings, varied 
approaches that involves the use 
of both inductive and deductive 




The experiments test some scenarios 
in an attempt to replicate and/or 
validate empirical findings (such as by 
Evans et al. 2001) in a different 
setting. As an example, this study re-
tests the empirical evidence about 












theories and Data 
Inductive Deductive Abduction 
Relationship to the 
research process 
Subjectivity Objectivity Inter-Subjectivity 
Inference from Data Context Generality Transferability 
 
This study uses a pragmatic approach by adopting varied methods to achieve specific 
objectives and mitigate the limitations of other methods. This is done to improve the 
credibility of research findings and enhance the opportunities for generalisation.  
 
3.3. RESEARCH APPROACHES FOR EACH RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 
 
The various approaches adopted for the varied objectives are explained below. 
 
3.3.1. Experiments: OBJ 1: Reassessing The Empirical Evidence Of Managers’ 
Preference For Being Honest In Reporting Their Performance. 
 
Most studies on HPR exhibit the following characteristics; 
Firstly, studies are usually based on laboratory experiments that rely on students as 
subjects. (See, for example, Baiman & Lewis 1989; Hegarty & Sims 1978; Evans et al. 
2001; Berg et al. 1985). Experiments within a laboratory setting ensure a simpler and 
sharper empirical test of relevant variables (Young & Lewis 1995; Luft 1997) controlling 
for the confounding effects (Berg & Dickhaut 1986; Swieringa & Weick 1982) from 
intervening complications (Evans et al. 2001) and exogenous variables (Baiman & Lewis 
1989).  Also, most studies have relied on the assumption that the behaviour of a randomly 
selected group of students is not different in any apparent way from the behaviour of a 
random selection of the population. MBA students are particularly used as a proxy for 
business managers/executives because often no technical knowledge is required and 
because a key requirement for admission into an MBA program is for the student or 
applicant to have at least one-year work experience. MBA students are therefore used as 
a proxy for generalisation of experiment results in human behaviour within organisations. 
As well, since most experiments involve monetary incentives for the subjects (see Evans 
et al. 2001, Baiman & Lewis 1989), students present a relatively cheaper option than 
working business managers/executives earning corporate level salaries. Also, it is 
relatively difficult to achieve the relevant critical mass required for a relevant sense of 
power from statistical analysis (Siegel & Castellan, 1988) if managers are the sample. 
 
Secondly, studies often use a budgeting scenario where subjects self-report performance 
and are requested to make a budget request to headquarters (based on self-reported 
performance), In such a hypothetical MPR process, subjects can benefit from 
misreporting MPR (Baiman & Lewis 1989, Evans et al. 2001, Huang & Wu 1994) under 
conditions where subjects are assured that headquarters will not detect the lie, and there 
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is no monitoring and hence no punishment or adverse reputation effect for deliberate 
misreporting of underlying private information about MP. This approach simplifies the 
research and reduces challenges from confounding (Swieringa & Weick 1982) by 
measuring HPR about a privately observed cost signal in a participatory budgeting 
process (Maas & Rinsum 2013). While this study considers the scenarios using budgets 
as overly simplistic, the approach is still relevant as the real objective of such studies is 
to measure the propensity and orientation of agents to cheat rather than an actual 
cheating scenario. Often, these studies are designed to measure agents’ orientation and 
preferences and not necessarily how they cheat in an organisation setting. However, the 
constructs of such experiments do not reflect real scenarios in an organisation, and the 
budgeting process in most organisations are more complicated with varied variables.  
Maas & Rinsum (2013) argue that the use of budget settings to measure HPR may be 
problematic because  
 
“First, theoretically, it is not straightforward that individuals who are willing to lie about an 
exogenously determined, essentially random, cost figure are also willing to lie about their 
own performance. Second, a participatory budgeting context is different from a 
performance reporting context because budgeting can easily be framed as a strategic 
bargaining game in which dishonesty is not necessarily inappropriate.” 
 
MBA students may not necessarily be an appropriate proxy for business 
managers/executives. In recent times, it is possible to pursue an MBA without previous 
work experience, and some MBA students may have misrepresented their work 
experience to get into a post graduate program. More so, the assumption that MBA 
students, even if they possess previous work experience, will bring it to bear on their 
behaviour within an experiment may not wholly be accurate (Brownell, 1995; Miller, 1966; 
Sears, 1986; Gordon, Slade, & Schmitt, 1986). Cole & Smith (1995), Stevens et al. (1993) 
as well as Glenn & Van Loo (1993) find evidence that students are significantly less ethical 
than business managers. Birnberg & Nath (1968) argue that considering the critical nature 
of subject variables in any laboratory research, the assumption of population homogeneity 
must not be taken casually. Recent studies have indicated that students do not behave 
or react similarly to business managers in a laboratory setting (Alpert 1967; Churchill & 
Cooper 1964). Business managers may differ from students in two ways; (1) a difference 
in skill sets and experience (Argyris, 1952) as well as (2) differences in personal traits 
(Lazarus 1963). The possibility of differences in experience between the subjects and the 
relevant non-experimental reference group is particularly important in this research 
because differences in experience could affect the outcome of the laboratory 
experiments. Prior experience, for instance, could lead to more flexibility as well as the 
development of additional skill sets. Secondly repeated exposure to a task could lead to 
a routinised pattern of behaviour. Birnberg & Nath (1968) suggest that a formal check on 
the validity of population homogeneity and subject surrogating in an experimental setting 
is to use a sample of the appropriate group from the real world as a form of control in a 
pilot study or during the real experiment. 
 
This study argues that an agent’s orientation or preference for HPR will be influenced by 
possibilities for monitoring, as well as the probability of punishments and reputational 
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effects from dishonesty in MPR. It is probable to expect that when an experiment is 
designed to include these variables the propensity for HPR will increase among agents. 
While a recent study by Paz et al. (2013) confirms that the possibility for adverse 
reputation reduces the propensity to lie in self-reported MPR, Evans et al. (2001) suggest 
that budget caps (“production hurdles”), a form of reputation effect, increases dishonesty 
in MPR. If agents’ preference for HPR increases under scenarios of monitoring, 
punishments and reputational effects, which are real organisational scenarios, then it is 
possible that the preference for HPR among agents is higher than suggested by existing 
literature. In such a case, the resulting contract designs and other decisions based on the 
existing perception of the extent of HPR among agents may require reconsideration. In 
organisations, the reality is that MP monitoring and auditing occur except that, managers 
may be able to explain off any queries, or that monitoring systems may be ineffective. 
Maas & Rinsum (2013) find evidence to suggest that misreported MPR is affected by the 
design of the internal control systems. 
 
Also, this study posits that previous studies seem to have conflated the effects of 
individual orientation with issues of individual behaviour. We assume that orientation may 
most likely be defined by cognition (Kohlberg 1969), but environmental and organisational 
settings shape issues of behaviour. Therefore, in measuring preference for HPR, this 
study focuses on assessing agents’ behaviour rather than their cognition and attempts to 
design experiments that may be closer to such settings.  
 
The actual constructs of experiments have varied among researchers’. While some 
researchers have focused their scenario constructs on issues that border on personal 
honesty thresholds and preferences, others have focused their scenarios on business 
and organisational related issues. For instance, Gibson et al. (2013) use a scenario that 
assesses truthfulness in announcing earnings per share (a business-related issue) and 
find a general preference for truthfulness within and among individuals. Evans et al. 
(2001) and Baiman & Lewis (1989), use a scenario construct that involves business 
budgeting (an organisational issue) and report varying results on agents’ preference for 
HPR. Maas & Van Rinsum (2011) use a scenario that involves subjects self-reporting on 
an examination result (individual rather than an organisational related issue).   
 
This study adopts a methodology that mitigates some of the challenges with previous 
methodologies. In reassessing the empirical evidence of managers’ preference for HPR, 
this study follows other literature and uses experimental research to investigate if 
employees within an organisational setting will use private information for their selfish 
benefit at the expense of the principal. Using experiments allows the observation of 
employee behaviour in a simulated organisational environment while controlling for 
unwarranted exogenous variables. That way, experiments helps the focus of this research 
on the construct(s) or variable(s) of interest allowing for their segregation (that ordinarily 
will confound) and hence can provide deeper insights on behavioural issues if properly 
constructed. Laboratory experiments provide a practical way to measure relevant 
variables of human behaviour while controlling for other variables and construct not 
relevant to the research question (Ashton, 1982) to establish a more credible cause and 
effect relationship. Therefore, well-designed experiments provide an effective ability to 
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make strong causal inferences, to study research questions for which archival data is not 
available and to disentangle effects of factors that are often confounded (Nelson 1998). 
Ashton (1982) suggests that for findings to be credible, experiments should be designed 
and analysed with more rigor that ensures an appropriate balance between the benefits 
and challenges of “realism” and a controlled environment (“artificiality”). A well-designed 
laboratory experiment must begin with a deep understanding of theoretical issues.  Since 
the experimental approach used in this study is descriptive, as it seeks to study 
organisational behaviour (Ashton, 1982), this study uses actual business employees as 
participants to achieve the required balance between “realism” and “artificiality”.  
 
However, Maines (1995) enumerates various methodological difficulties that create 
‘internal’ and ‘construct’ validity issues with the use of experiments in exploratory research 
highlighting the prohibitive cost involved in their use, as well as the difficulty in achieving 
an appropriate balance between ‘realism’ and a controlled environment. Indeed, 
experimental research in accounting has been suggested to have methodological 
difficulties (Gonedes & Dopuch 1974; Maines 1995; Berg, Dickhaut & McCabe 1995) 
emanating from  
1) A focus on the study of individual behaviour that may not be relevant in a market 
setting due to competitive forces, 
2) A general difficulty in matching research methods to research questions, 
3) A lack of appropriate theory that predicts and explains findings, 
4) A failure to capture, monitor and measure relevant variables and decisions of 
interest, 
5) A growing concern that accounting experiments may not be tight enough 
(“artificial”) to test formal theories nor “loose” enough to capture naturally occurring 
settings - “realism”- (Ashton 1982). 
6) A cost barrier that emanates from the relatively large sample size required to yield 
sufficient statistical power and the difficulty in controlling for exogenous variables 
in exploratory research.  
Despite these challenges of internal and construct validity, Lev & Ohlson (1982) 
acknowledge that in recent times, significant methodological improvements have 
occurred in the use of experiments in accounting research. This is because most 
researchers have become aware of and addressed, adequately, experimental design and 
application problems such as those arising from sample non-randomisation and cross-
sectional correlation of data; choice of appropriate statistical tools and recognising the 
limitations of the choice of model.  
 
To ensure ‘internal’ and ‘construct’ validity, Ball & Foster (1982); Becker (2010) 
emphasise the need for experimental research in accounting to rely on more formal 
models or theories, employ better experimental controls and apply more precise 
measurements (Becker (1967, 1971, Jensen 2001, 1976; Hofstedt 1975; Dyckman, 
Gibbins & Swieringa 1978). The internal validity of an experiment is enhanced if the 
experimental construct tests existing theories rather than unsupported hypothesis.  
 
Cook & Campbell (1979) define internal validity as “the approximate validity with which 
we refer a relationship between two variables is causal or that the absence of a 
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relationship implies the absence of cause”. This is the evaluation of a third variable 
alternative interpretation in any causal relationship. Cook & Campbell (1979) 
acknowledge that in a quasi-experimental setting, as is often applied in accounting 
research, the process of ensuring internal validity is more laborious because the 
researcher rather than relying on randomisation to mitigate most internal validity threats 
must make such threats explicit to rule them out one by one.  As such quasi-experimental 
research is particularly exposed to internal threats through “selection” and “ambiguity 
about the direction of causal inference”. As an example, a subject selection threat 
introduces a validity risk when results are due to the difference between the kinds of 
people in one experiment group as opposed to another (Cook & Campbell 1979). 
 
Ambiguity about the direction of causal references often occurs in cross sectional 
experiments when there is no temporal test of the direction of causality such that the 
absence or near absence of prior beliefs concerning causality or chance relationships 
makes it difficult to rule out other predictions (Ball 1980). Cook & Campbell (1979) 
acknowledge that mitigating internal validity issues is a deductive process that may not 
be entirely successful and that researchers must appropriately acknowledge the 
possibility of other causality inferences when they are in doubt of absolute internal validity. 
 
Construct validity measures the tightness of theoretical constructs and their operational 
proxies and refers to the possibility that the set of operations or scenarios that are meant 
to represent a process could be inexact or interpreted to represent another construct or 
scenario (Cook & Campbell 1979). As an example, the use of firm size to operationalise 
“political cost” may introduce ‘construct validity’ issues because it ignores other elements 
relevant in the determination of political cost such as industry membership (Ball & Foster 
1982). 
 
Einhorn (1976) criticises the use of experimental research in accounting and the 
effectiveness in generalising conclusions from such studies. He asserts that the general 
construct of such experiments allows for judgment tasks that are well defined, all 
information relevant for decision making are provided to the subjects, and such 
information is reliable, and the range of hypotheses considered are restricted. In the real 
world, Einhorn (1976) asserts that judgment task may not be well defined, information 
search may be necessary, information obtained may not be entirely reliable and 
hypothesis formation is within a range of possibilities. Previous experiments in accounting 
studies such as Ashton (1974); Joyce (1976); Gaumnitz et al. (1982); Mock & Turner 
(1979; 1981) have incorporated realism.   
 
Table 3.3 summarises the evidence of methodological challenges in existing research 
and the mitigation methods adopted in this study.
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Table 3.3: Evidence Of Methodological Quality In Existing Research And 
Mitigation Methods Adopted In This Study 
Methodological Difficulties In 
Existing Studies 
Mitigation Strategy In This Research Remarks 
Use of laboratory experiments Adopted similar approach. The study 
tests the efficacy of existing models, 
rather than unsupported hypothesis, in 
managerial preference for HPR. This 
reduces the relevant issues to a 
manageable size and reduces the 
complexity of the experimental setting.  
Ashton 1982; 
Joyce 1976 
Use of students as subjects and 
proxy for business executives and 
attempt to generalise the results 
after 
This study avoids subject surrogating 
(Miller 1966) using business 
executives rather than students. This 
provides a more quality opportunity for 
generalisation of the results to 
organisations. Students may exhibit 
more aggression and may be naïve 
about relevant considerations that may 
influence their behaviour in a real 
organisation setting. 








Use of scenarios in experiment 
constructs that measures issues of 
individual relevance than 
organisational relevance 
This study tests both approaches. The 
study tests a scenario that is based on 
an experimental construct of individual 
relevance and another that measures 




calls for such tests 
as well as scholarly 
calls for replication 
studies. 
Experimental constructs that 
assure anonymity and exclude the 
potential for reputational effects 
This study appreciates the need for 
anonymity and signals it rather than 
explicitly announce it. Anonymity is 
signalled using codes that are 
randomly selected to identify subjects 
and other methods. In testing the 
results of potential reputation effects 
as a relevant variable, the study tests 
two scenarios, one involving 
immediate pay-off after the experiment 
and another involving a delay in 
payment. The second scenario is 
designed to signal the possibility of an 
audit even though subjects can 










Challenges with internal and 
construct validity to ensure credible 
findings 
The construct of the scenarios is not 
designed to induce HPR unlike Baiman 
& Lewis (1989). A pre-experimental 
analysis was done by testing the 
experiment on colleague PhD 
students. Only one variable will be 
tested, monitored and measured per 
experiment. The experimental setting 
will provide equal and fair opportunity 
for honest, dishonest MPR and partial 
HPR to occur. Results obtained will be 





(2003); Collis & 
Hussey (2009); 
Saunders et al. 
(2007) 
 
The laboratory experiment is performed using actual employees (i.e. business 
executives) as subjects. As part of the process to ensure the validity of the results of the 
actual experiment, the study performs the following controls 
 
1. Participation is voluntary. However, participants are paid a sum after the 
completion of the exercise. This sum is made up of a fixed amount for participation 
(to encourage participation) and a variable amount that depends on the construct 
and requirement of the experiments. Payments are anonymous in a separate 
room. Ariely, Bracha & Meier (2009) show how publicly displayed monetary 
incentives may interfere with the credibility of research findings. Birnberg & Nath 
(1968) indicate that rewards in experimental research provide an analogue of the 
real-world situation for rewards and punishments and is a critical factor that 
influences the extent of subjects’ involvement in the experimental situation. While 
non-monetary rewards (“intrinsic interest”) are equally strong motivation for 
subjects’ performance, Bass (1964); Birnberg & Nath (1968) argue that the effects 
of non-monetary rewards are difficult to measure, and explicit rewards are more 
effective in eliciting motivation. 
 
2. In ensuring that subjects understood the tasks and the rules of the experiment, 
during the administration of the experiment, all instructions were read aloud, and 
an example visibly demonstrated. Before each experiment, the contents and 
requirements of the experiment were explained to participants as well as the 
mechanics of payoff by the researcher or his associate. A period is allotted to 
answering all questions to reduce ambiguity and provide clarity. This instruction is 
also part of the cover letter accompanying each experiment. All experiments 
started and ended at the same time for all four groups. 
 
3. A post-experiment questionnaire (Gibson et al., 2013) is administered as a 
manipulation check to ensure that participants understood the requirements of the 
experiments, can clearly distinguish between the relevant issues, have a 
reasonable assurance of anonymity, understand the basis for payment and have 
no understanding of the real reason for the experiment. Responses to the post 
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experiment questionnaire indicated that all respondents understood the basis for 
the payoff, the anonymity of their responses and felt free to provide any answers 
they considered appropriate. 
 
Unlike previous studies, this research does not expressly communicate the assurance of 
anonymity to subjects. This is in the quest to ensure an appropriate balance between 
“realism” and a controlled environment. Salterio & Webb (2006) imply validity challenges 
with Hannan et al. (2006) findings because the experimental setting provided conditions 
that encouraged lying because anonymity was assured. Rather we implement a 
mechanism, in a manner visible to participants that can be interpreted as guaranteeing 
anonymity to subjects.  For instance, we use codes that are randomly selected by all 
participants on the day of the experiment to identify participants rather than their real 
names. We do not record the codes in any form except for participants to use as unique 
registration identity for the experiments. All payments are by codes and made by an 
administrative assistant in another room, who plays no part in the experiment and has no 
knowledge of what the experiment is about. This fact is communicated to all participants. 
Birnberg & Nath (1968) argue that to create an isomorphic environment closer to reality 
requires that all relevant variables be included, but as well, irrelevant variables and 
inconsistent variables must be excluded. They caution that when subjects are 
sophisticated, a growing desire to ensure realism could instead introduce glaring 
inconsistency into the experiment setting and therefore, strive for realism may not 
necessarily require the inclusion of all real-life facts into a less complex situation. 
Following on, Jenson (1969) suggests an appropriate balance between “realism” and a 
controlled environment in experimental research. 
 
In appropriately isolating the relevant variables for testing, this study runs a series of 
experiments, each one measuring one variable. The first experiment measures agent’s 
preference for HPR using a scenario that relates more to personal issues than 
organisational relevant variables. The study tests an agent’s preference for HPR in 
reporting examination results and pays participants an incentive based on the agents own 
reporting of his performance. The questions asked bothered on facts relating to the 
national history of Ghana (e.g. What was the name of the wife of the first President of 
Ghana?). 
 
The second, third and fourth experiments (discussed in detail below) measure agents’ 
preference for HPR when they are confronted with scenarios directly related to their 
performance within an organisation rather than the current dominance in the empirical 
literature of reporting a privately observed cost signal in a budget setting process. Using 
a budgeting scenario affects the credibility of findings because inflating budgets may be 
justified as conventional (Jenson 2001; Church et al. 2014) and hence participants may 
be engaging in it from a game theoretic perspective without necessarily intending to 
misreport MP. This introduces ambiguity into our operational definition for HPR. 
 
This study differs because participants report their organisational-related performance in 
a “real effort task” setting and the experimental setting while making participants aware 
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that misreporting was possible did not implicitly or expressly signal its appropriateness or 
in-appropriateness. 
 
Freeman & Gilbert Jr. (1988) provide evidence to suggest that individuals’ preference for 
HPR in an organisational setting may vary from preferences outside the work 
environment. Jackall (1988), Ford & Richardson (1994), Liedtka (1989); O’Neil & Pienta 
(1994) and have suggested that the bureaucratic setting of the work environment 
introduces other variables that may affect an individuals’ behaviour and his preferences.  
Quinn et al. (1997) refer to this dualism of preferences as resulting from an adaptation 
process that may take place for an individual to progress up the corporate ladder. If this 
disposition is accurate, and considering reputation effects, then perhaps individuals will 
display less HPR in a personal scenario than in an organisational construct during our 
experimentation. Quinn et al. (1997) refer to this disposition as the pragmatic business 
ethics model. 
 
It is possible to see a distinction in the decision variables that an agent faces with both 
experiment types. In the latter case (‘individual scenario’), the repercussions for HPR are 
“closer to home” and may affect the preferences of agents differently. Jansen & Glinow 
(1985) argue that “it is far more common and dramatic to focus on individual culpability 
…however greater knowledge of the organisational context of the behaviour may change 
attributions of individual culpability”.  
 
Grover (2005) segregates business lies from personal lies and acknowledges that 
competition and social pressures may affect business lies. Grover (2005) suggests further 
that it is important to understand how normal organisational participants behave daily at 
the work place. 
 
For each of these scenarios (private related and organisational related scenarios) 
possible sub scenarios are plausible, where payments to subjects were immediate but 
capped, immediate uncapped, not immediate but capped, not immediate uncapped. 
Since Gneezy (2002) argues that experiments are effective for gathering data on 
economic behaviour when real monetary incentives are involved, and hence a study of 
capped and uncapped pay-offs and immediate and delayed pay-offs becomes relevant. 
This study may be the first to introduce experiment scenarios where pay-off to subjects 
are not immediate and will be made at a future time to signal detection risk. Tayler & 
Bloomfield (2010) suggest further studies on how audits can affect HPR. Nagin & 
Pogarsky (2001; 2003) conclude that increasing the likelihood of being caught is a more 
effective deterrent to dishonest MPR than a proportional increase in the severity of 
punishments. Results on the implication of detection risk on HPR have not been 
conclusive (Huang & Wu 1994; Lindbeck 1995; Mazar et al. 2008). The idea is to signal 
a form of control from the possibility of audits and checks even though subjects could 
reasonably estimate that it was impractical to do any form of audits and checks.  Most 
studies have admitted a limitation to the generalisation of findings due to the non-inclusion 
of variables to measure the implications of reputation effects. Maas & Rinsum (2013) for 




“Care should be taken in generalising our results…… we examined a one-period 
situation, ignoring reputation effects. Outside of the laboratory, however, reputation 
effects are likely to play an important role in shaping managerial reporting decisions. A 
related issue is that we used a setting with zero probability that an overstatement would 
be exposed with absolute certainty or would have detrimental monetary consequences…. 
also, overstatements will generally be punished. Future research is needed to address 
these limitations and to investigate how robust our results are in settings that differ from 
ours”. 
 
As stated earlier, this study conceptualises the issue of preference by agents for HPR 
from a behavioural rather than a cognitive perspective and as such attempts to model an 
environment that includes the constraints of a real organisational setting.  Other studies 
may have confused cognition with behaviour. In actual organisational setting, 
considerations of punishments or reputational retrogression play a significant role in 
behavioural preferences.  
 
This study also runs a scenario of capped pay-offs to replicate Evans et al. (2001) finding 
for a “production hurdle” that places a cap on potential payoffs within a laboratory 
experiment. Antle & Eppen (1985) and Antle & Fellingham (1995) argue that in real 
business situations, production hurdles are critical decision variables in behavioural 
disposition. Evans et al. (2001) ask for further tests of their ‘distributional hypotheses. 
 
Following on from assertions in the literature that experiments are effective in testing 
existing theories and models rather than unsupported hypothesis (Becker 1967; Jensen 
1969; Birnberg 1973), our research strategy is to test models that have already been 
proposed in the literature to explain managerial preference, or otherwise, for HPR. 
Birnberg & Nath (1969) argue that when experiments are based on models or theories, 
the credibility of any findings consistent with the model or theory are high especially as 
such findings will not only be supported by the laboratory findings but also the logic of the 
model from which it was deduced. This approach helps to narrow the scope of 
experiments to a reasonable size (see table 3.4 for evidence of theoretical modelling). 
 
Table 3.4: The Experimental Scenarios And The Basis For Their Relevance. 
Experiment Existing Model(s) Tested In This Study 
Individual versus 
organisational scenarios 
Pragmatic business ethics model (Quinn et al. 1997; 
Badaracco & Well 1995; Soutar et al. 1994; Bass et al. 1999). 
The pay-off is immediate 
and uncapped 
CAT; Threshold model and Revelation Principle (Baiman & 
Lewis 1989); Type model; Trade-off model (Brickley et al. 
1997; Chow et al. 1988; Waller 1988; Luft 1997) 
The pay-off is not 
immediate and uncapped 
Reputation effects and control systems: Paz et al. (2013); 
Tayler & Bloomfield (2010). 
The pay-off is immediate 
and capped 
Distributional hypothesis (Evans et al. 2001; Bolton & 
Ockenfels, 2000; Rabin 1993; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999). 
The pay-off is not 
immediate and capped 
Reputation effects and control systems; (Paz et al., 2013; 
Nagin & Pogarsky, 2002). 
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This will have involved eight experiments.  
 
1 Individual Scenario Immediate Pay-off The Payoff is uncapped 
2 Individual Scenario Immediate Pay-off The Payoff is capped 
3 Individual Scenario Future Pay-off The Payoff is uncapped 
4 Individual Scenario Future Pay-off The Payoff is capped 
5 Organisation Scenario Immediate Pay-off The Payoff is uncapped 
6 Organisation Scenario Immediate Pay-off The Payoff is capped 
7 Organisation Scenario Future Pay-off The Payoff is uncapped 
8 Organisation Scenario Future Pay-off The Payoff is capped 
 
Aside resource and time considerations, performing eight (8) experiments introduce two 
additional risks to the quality of findings. Fatigue could affect the quality of later 
experiments within the chain, and secondly, subjects may begin to realise the real import 
of the experiments and begin to provide inaccurate answers based on socially desirable 
behavioural expectations. Splitting the experiments among the participants may also 
affect the overall quality of any comparison and generalisation. Therefore, four 
experiments are selected out of the possible set, as are presented below, in the sequence 
in which they will be administered. 
 
Experiment 1 Individual Scenario Immediate Pay-off Payoff is uncapped 
Experiment 2 Organization Scenario Immediate Pay-off Payoff is uncapped 
Experiment 3 Organization Scenario Immediate Pay-off Payoff is capped 
Experiment 4 Organization Scenario Future Pay-off Payoff is uncapped 
 
This study uses a basic experimental setting in which participants’ report their earnings 
and participants are paid based on the earnings they report. The study follows Evans et 
al. (2001) and adopts a ‘trust contract’ approach where principals expect managers to 
report in good faith even though the fourth experiment attempts to signal an attempt to 
induce ‘truthful’ performance reporting (Antle & Eppen 1985; Church et al. 2014). 
 
The choice of these four scenarios is sufficient to answer the research questions and 
address the research objectives. The interest in exploring a scenario on agents’ 
behavioural choices in a scenario bothering on a personal issue is only to ascertain 
whether behavioural choices are different for agents between a personal setting and an 
organisational setting. Experiment one and Experiment two provides adequate evidence 
to answer that question. As this study is essentially concerned with behavioural choices 
in an organisational setting, the rest of the experiments are based on scenarios with 
organisational constructs. The interest in a scenario with a capped pay-off is to explore 
Evans et al. (2001) suggestion that capped pay-offs or “production hurdles” increase the 
propensity to report managerial performance dishonestly. As indicated earlier, other 





Finally, the interest in a scenario where pay-offs are not immediate is to test the 
implications of the possibility of repercussions and future audits on behavioural choices. 
This has been discussed extensively in earlier sections of this chapter. 
 
The first test that uses a scenario involving individual construct was based on participants 
reporting their score after a multiple-choice test on current affairs issues in Ghana. Based 
on their reported results, they will be paid a sum.  
 
One experimental construct is used to test the remaining three scenarios. The experiment 
measures how honestly subjects report their previously agreed performance results (with 
their managers), when the performance management system crashes, their superiors 
have resigned and are inaccessible, and the organisation has to rely on them to re-inform 
the organisation of their previously agreed performance ratings. This is a typical scenario 
in which a manager has private information that the organisation does not possess 
(information asymmetry), and hence this test will provide evidence as to the extent to 
which managers will use such private information to their own benefit. In ensuring that 
managers remain unaware of what the experiment is testing, other questions are 
deliberately included for subjects to answer. These questions deliberately focus on data 
management systems and how the organisation could ensure their reliability. 
 
The experiment uses 150 business managers as subjects rather than students. A control 
group of 150 students also participated albeit at a different date and location. This 
provided an opportunity to contribute to the evolving debate about the appropriateness of 
students as surrogates in organisational related real task efforts.  
 
A disproportionately stratified sampling method is used to select business managers who 
are familiar with performance measurement within their organisations from various 
business organisations in Ghana and assembled within a “neutral location” for the test. 
This allows the researcher to control for exogenous variables and provides an opportunity 
for the researcher to assure that the research measures and monitors the variables 
intended. The internal validity of the experiment was tested on eight PhD Students. 
Birnberg & Nath (1968) suggest that a greater emphasis on pre-experiment analysis of 
the appropriateness of the experimental task (both for the experiment setting and the 
subjects) serves the same purpose as formal models in enhancing the credibility of 
findings. The selection of student participants was based on stratified random sampling 
to ensure an equal representation of females and males within the sample. 
 
Participants were grouped into three sets representing different sets for experiment two, 
three and four. Using the same set of respondents across experiments two to four will 
have resulted in fatigue and affected the quality of responses. Moreover, the repetition of 
subjects across the experimental scenarios could have increased the likelihood that 
respondents become aware of the true reason for the experiments and provide socially 
desirable responses. All experiments were administered simultaneously with each set of 
participants seated in a different room.  
 
For each individual, HPR is measured as  
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HPRind=1- (actual pay-off claimed/maximum possible payoff);  
 
such that when a manager misreports to gain the highest pay-off possible the answer will 
be zero and when a manager reports truthfully, the answer will be one. Evans et al. (2001) 
use a similar method. For the entire study, HPR is measured as ∑HPRind. Essentially 
∑HPRind is the weighted average of all individual HPR using maximum payoff possible as 
the weights. This places the magnitude of any specific lie in perspective by relating it to 
the maximum possible lie for that draw (Evans et al., 2001).  
 
To enable this computation to be done for each individual, each randomly selected code 
will include, as well, predetermined actual bonus ratings (for four periods of Q1, Q2, Q3, 
Q4) that will be pre-recorded to guide analysis (this fact will be unknown to subjects). The 
determination of the bonus ratings will be based on a random selection performed by the 
researcher (with replacements from 0% to 100%) to identify fifty sets of four bonus ratings 
at each time. This process was repeated fifty times resulting in four sets of quarterly 
performances per respondent. This set of four bonus ratings were replicated across the 
three sets of experiments. Following that, another process of random selection, without 
replacement was used to attach each set of ‘actual quarterly performance’ to a seat 
number or code.  
 
The random selection of participation codes was from seat one to seat fifty. Following 
that, the next set of fifty numbers (51-100) replicated the set of bonus ratings in the same 
order as the earlier set. Therefore, unknown to respondent, seat numbers 51 to 100 
(experiment group two) and seat numbers 101-150 (Experiment group three) merely 
repeated the quarterly performance combination for seat numbers 1-50 (experiment 
group one). As an example, seat one, seat 51 and seat 101 had the same ‘actual quarterly 
performance combination. The combination of ‘actual quarterly performance’ and code 
numbers had been pre-recorded by the researcher. This was unknown to respondents. 
Admittedly the use of computers could have simplified this process, but the context of 
Ghana makes it difficult to have access to many such computers, appropriately set up for 
this purpose. Even where possible, the cost implications will be prohibitive.  
 
Participants draw a unique code (from between 1-150). This code is used as the I.D 
throughout the experiment and must be clearly displayed on the ‘return sheet’ submitted 
by the respondent for the payoff. This code also represented sitting arrangement. All 
participants were requested to keep their codes secret. Each code was attached with four 
sealed envelopes clearly labelled as Q1 or Q2 or Q3 or Q4. These sealed envelopes were 
required for experiment two, three and four, and represented the ‘actual quarterly 
performance’ for each respondent.  
 
The experimental design for students (control group), which took place later, used a 
similar method and the same quarterly performance ratings that were used for business 
managers. Student participants with ID 106 had the same quarterly performance ratings 
as a business manager participant with ID 106. This simplifies the likelihood of exogenous 
various and helps to ensure that the experimental construct and variables for students 





A questionnaire with limited interviews is used to explore the following research 
objectives. 
 
1) OBJ2: To Identify And Evaluate, From A Stakeholder Perspective, The 
Implications Of HPR. 
Following on from the Douglas McGregor’s (1960; 1985) theory of self-fulfilling prophecy, 
if managers believe that there are adverse implications from HPR or purposefully 
misreported MPR, then there are. This study assesses the perceptions of stakeholders 
on the implications of purposefully misreported MPR firstly through a questionnaire and 
then an interview process after that (n=30). Interview participants were mostly external 
stakeholders such as the media, civil society organisations and regulators. The 
questionnaire presents respondents with possible effects (negative and positive) of the 
implications of misreported MPR or HPR using a seven-point Likert scale. In designing 
the questionnaire, the study draws on existing literature to extract possible effects of HPR 
or purposefully misreported MPR.  In line with a multi actor stakeholder perspective, 
questionnaires and interviews are administered to employees, regulators, employees and 
institutional investors (as a proxy for shareholders). The research strategy is effective in 
eliciting first-hand information from active stakeholders on the actual effects of dishonest 
MPR. 
 
2) OBJ3: To Identify Factors That Influence HPR. 
This study follows Yang’s (2009) argument and accepts that studies on HPR are more 
relevant for social development if viewed from a wider organisational perspective. The 
research approach uses a survey method (questionnaire) to elicit information to confirm 
or otherwise certain hypotheses regarding the perceived factors that influence HPR. This 
research design offers several advantages. 
 
Firstly, the study focuses on honesty at the organisational level and adopt a multi actor 
principal-agent model proposed by Yang (2009) in his examination of HPR within public 
organisations. This model is adapted to suit private organisations. Quinn et al. (1997) 
argue that  
 
“the tendency to see honesty as an individual responsibility is a naïve approach and fails 
to consider the interactive effects between individual choices and corporate social norms”. 
 
Chun (2005) argues that empirical studies on ethics, including HPR, must shift from a 
focus on the individual level to a focus on an organisational level. Chun (2005), Dyck & 
Kleysen (2001); Cameron et al. (2004) argue that ethical behaviour must be investigated 
from an organisational context. This is because the focus on individual level studies is 
perhaps the main reason why scholarships in this area of study are not generating 
strategic implications for the firm and thereby limiting practical application of such studies. 
 
Secondly, our hypotheses are not tested in a laboratory setting. Grover (1993) attests’ 
that often research on lying and deceptive behaviours focus on interpersonal and inter 
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organisational behaviours in a laboratory setting. This study does not suggest the 
superiority of our methodology over typical laboratory setting experiments; rather it 
provides findings based on an alternative method to enrich the literature in this area of 
study. Essentially our hypotheses are designed to postulate that the factors that influence 
HPR within an organisational setting are a complex interplay of environmental, 
organisational, economic and individual attribute variables. Most studies have often 
focused on one or the other, particularly on individual attributes. Evans et al. (2001) 
propose and test a model that combines economic factors with behavioural factors on the 
individual’s propensity for HPR but excludes considerations of the environment and the 
organisation. The need for further research that integrates varied variables beyond mere 
economic considerations has been suggested by many researchers such as Young & 
Lewis (1995); Moser (1998); Luft (1997); Kachelmeier (1994). 
 
This study is the first application of a multi-actor principal agency model, based on the 
interplay of economic, environmental variables, organisational variables and individual 
attributes, not in a laboratory setting, to studies on the determinants of HPR in private 
organisations. Chun (2005), Cameron et al. (2004) test the empirical relationship between 
some measures of organisational virtuousness on employee and customer satisfaction 
as well as firm performance respectively and find a significant positive relationship. 
However, their construct of organisational virtuousness does not include HPR. Chun 
(2005) proposes a replication of his studies in non-western countries, applying other 
measures of ethics and virtuousness.  
 
3) OBJ5: To Identify The Main Features Of Managerial Behaivour In HPR Among 
Managerial Groups Within GC100. 
This objective was achieved by using Vignettes within the questionnaire (and limited 
interviews). Scenarios are widely used in business ethics studies (Robin et al., 1996; 
Randall & Gibson 1990; Weber, 1992). Scenarios (also referred to as vignettes) in ethics 
studies apply a precise description of a social situation that makes the decision-making 
situation more real. This helps to focus research on the critical factors in decision-making 
(Alexander & Becker 1978) and measure multiple variables simultaneously in a 
standardised manner across respondents (Cavanagh & Fritzsche 1985). 
 
In ensuring the effectiveness of vignettes as an exploratory tool, scenarios must avoid 
ambiguity (Randall & Gibson, 1990), must be interesting to the participants, must use 
precise language to describe real life situations that participants are familiar with, and 
must reflect realistic ethical dilemmas (Weber, 1992) relating to the phenomenon being 
studied. 
 
In this study, the scenarios measured the five broad elements of HPR. Scenario one 
attempted to measure the extent of ‘responsible reporting’ through adhering to company 
policy and used a realistic organisational construct where tempering with the outlook of a 
report is technically correct and similar in substance but disobeys a company policy on 
reporting format. Scenario two measured the extent of ‘truthfulness’ in disclosure and 
performance reporting when a real benefit accrues to the organisation from a deliberate 
inaccurate disclosure. Scenario three measured the extent to which organisations 
 159 
 
deliberately attribute performance gaps to the wrong reasons. Scenario four measured 
the extent to which organisations deliberately hide information to conceal performance 
gaps while Scenario five measured the extent to which organisations deliberately shroud 
performance gaps in complexity using complex and ambiguous technical jargons. 
 
A pilot of the questionnaire among colleague PHD students, relatives and friends as well 
as a few respondents within organisations suggested that the construct of the scenarios 
were clear, realistic and easy to comprehend. For each scenario, respondents were 
asked (1) how likely it was for a similar event to occur within their organisation, (2) what 
the likely response of their organisation and/or colleagues will be and (3) in some cases, 
what their response will be. All questions were open ended. Aside from the administering 
of the questionnaire, 15 persons agreed to be interviewed (instead of responding to the 
questionnaire) using the scenarios as an interview guide.  During the interview, the 
respondents were made to understand the commitment of the researcher to the 
anonymity of participants. All interviews were recorded, and respondents did not provide 
any unique identification information such as personal data or name of the organisation 
they work for. The interviews lasted for approximately 30 (thirty) minutes per person. 
Interviewees were handed a write up of the various scenarios and asked to answer the 
questions therein orally. Where required, the researcher asked further questions to probe 
the responses. After the interview, the recording was played back for respondents to 
agree to its contents and permission obtained for its use. All respondents agreed to the 
use of their responses (except two respondents), without any further edits. 
 
Peatman & Greenspan (1935; 1936) suggest that properly designed and administered 
questionnaires are reliable for obtaining information. Seham & Schey (1934) find 
evidence to confirm this assertion. Questionnaires are useful for large scale studies, due 
to logistical and cost reasons (Reading et al. 1996; Macdonald & Johnson 2000; Vaughan 
et al. 2003), interdisciplinary studies and studies that seek to quantify human behaviour, 
attitudes and perceptions (Kerr & Cullen 1995; White et al. 1997; White, Bennett & Hayes 
2001; Jim & Xu 2002; Obiri & Lawes 2002; Bouton & Frederick 2003; White et al. 2003). 
 
The validity of the use of questionnaires as a research tool has been criticised in recent 
times particularly for the following reasons: - 
 
1) Respondents may not understand the questions and therefore answer 
inappropriately (Vadnjal & O'Connor 1994; Clark, Burgess & Harrison 2000). 
2) Biases affect research outcomes (Neill et al. 1994; Loomis et al. 1996; Foster, 
Bateman & Harley 1997; Horowitz & McConnell 2002; Venkatachalam, 2004). 
Bateman et al. (2002) however contend that researchers understand better the 
nature of the biases, their effects and how they can be mitigated or quantified. 
 
Postal surveys are frequently used than in-person interviews (White et al., 2005) due to 
cost considerations. However postal surveys suffer from a low response rate that could 
affect the validity of findings (Bowen, Krosnick & Weisberg 1996). Babbie (1990) suggest 
that a response rate of at least 50% is the minimum required for valid analysis. Harris 
(2001) contends that low response rate from postal surveys could be the result of many 
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factors including the possibility that the questions are not considered as relevant by the 
target population.  
 
Postal surveys (questionnaires administered by post or an indirect way without any 
involvement of the researcher or his representative) also suffer from biases from self-
selection and non-response (Oppenheim 1992). Loomis & King (1994) argue that this 
bias can be mitigated by ‘researcher-administered’ questionnaires such as telephone 
survey but contend that there may still be some biases in telephone surveys. Non-
response bias often occurs when response rates are low however a high response rate 
may not necessarily mean that non-response bias has been eliminated (Brown & Wilkins 
1978). Non-response bias is critical if any research intends to generalise or extrapolate 
its results to a wider targeted group (Dalecki, Whitehead & Blomquist 1993). In such a 
case, White et al. (2005) suggest that the extent to which the respondents are 
representative should be quantified, for example by (1) resurveying the non-respondents 
(Heydon & Reynolds 2000). This is difficult to acheive for ‘in person interviews’, telephone 
interviews or postal surveys in which anonymity is allowed (Moberly et al. 2003; Vaughan 
et al. 2003) or (2) by statistical comparison of the respondents with the intended sample 
population (White & Whiting 2000; Vaughan et al. 2003). 
 
Arrow et al. (1993); Schuman (1996) contend that postal surveys reduce the possibility of 
biases from different interviewers because postal survey allows greater ease of 
centralised supervision. Jahoda, Deutsch & Cook (1951) assert that  
 
“in certain circumstances, an anonymous questionnaire may provide even more candid 
responses than an interview…”  
 
Ellis (1947), Gomm (2004) find no significant difference between a questionnaire and an 
interview as research tools even though Ellis (1947) Presser et al. (2004) reported a slight 
edge for questionnaires over interviews. Lundberg & Larsen (1949) also find no difference 
in the extent of bias between a questionnaire and an interview. McDonagh & Rosenblum 
(1965) confirm this assertion. 
 
Even though Loomis & White (1996) suggest that the format of a questionnaire is 
unimportant, White et al. (2005) indicate that close-ended questions are widely used, and 
Arrow et al. (1993); Bateman et al. (1995) argue that close-ended questions help mitigate 
the biases and skewness from extreme values. Gomm (2004) assert that the purpose of 
opened ended questionnaires is better served with in depth interviews. This study uses a 
structured closed ended questionnaire distributed to organisational employees. Such 
employees (respondents) are differentiated from business managers. The questionnaire 
will be based on a seven-point Likert scale ranging from ‘strongly agree’ to ‘strongly 
disagree’. The use of employees, rather than students, is to avoid the biases from subject 
surrogating and ensure that the sample population is representative of the target 
population (business managers). Respondents must have knowledge of and participate 
in the MPR process, measurement and reporting but excludes business leaders (senior 
managers) such as Chief Executive Officers, Chief Financial Officers, Chief Operating 
Officers and other Executive Directors and departmental and divisional heads as well as 
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any manager with a span of control (direct and indirect) of more than ten employees. 
Yang (2009) uses a similar approach in his study of MPR in public organisations and 
contends that the use of employees, to measure superior action, such as MPR, whose 
job security are not directly related to the organisational performance (at least compared 
to business leaders (senior managers) provides an opportunity for credible responses. 
Cameron et al. (2004) measure organisational virtuousness through the perception of 
employees using a structured close ended questionnaire that elicits employees’ 
perspective on key variables and avoiding the situation of employees describing their 
personal attributes or behaviour. Evidence exists to confirm that ‘subordinate 
assessments’ often correlate with an objective assessment (Bommer, Johnson, Rich, 
Podsakoff, & Mackenzie, 1995; Venkatraman & Ramanujam, 1987). 
 
Organisations on the Ghana Club 100 list are approached and a request made for an 
opportunity to administer questionnaires. The criteria were provided to the organisation 
to guide their selection of potential subjects. Questions were included in the questionnaire 
to assess the appropriateness of the participant vis-à-vis his role in the organisation. A 
set of questionnaires was then enveloped and addressed to the specific persons 
nominated by the organisation. This was to compliment the process of ensuring that 
questionnaires reach targeted respondents.  
 
In ensuring anonymity and improving the quality of responses (Jahoda, Deutsch & Cook, 
1951; Koltringer 1995), a return envelope was included that does not reference the 
respondent. The questionnaire does not ask for the respondents’ name or any other 
identification method unique to the respondent. The return envelopes were collected by 
the researcher personally or submitted by post to avoid the fear of repudiation from within 
the organisation. To mitigate the bias of ambiguity in questions, the questionnaire 
provided background and stated the objective(s) of the survey, provided examples to 
clarify some questions and provided a cell phone contact of the researcher for easy 
contact when clarification is required. Where the organisation allowed it, the researcher 
personally administered the questionnaire to respondents who do not prefer anonymity. 
This will reduce non-response rate and the biases thereof.  
 
To improve response rate, the researcher continuously followed-up with respondents, 
through the point of contact in the organisation. Easterby-Smith et al. (2002); Oppenheim 
(2003) argue that to reduce validity issues and improve reliability, the sequencing of 
questions, ambiguity and the length of questions must be subjected to alternative review 
through several rounds of pre-testing. Randall & Gibson (1990) argue that piloting and 
pre-testing should be done on a sample similar to the target population and hence must 
be drawn from the same population. However, Collis & Hussey (2009); Oppenheim (2003) 
and Saunders et al. (2007) contend that the objectives of pre-testing can equally be 
achieved through piloting a questionnaire on friends, colleagues, and similar groups to 
the sample as well as people of varied backgrounds to the sample. In reducing any biases 
from ambiguity in the question design, the questionnaire was piloted on a sample of 
colleague PhD students, relatives and friends and any amendments made to the structure 
and content of the questionnaire before it was administered. Statistical analysis was then 
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performed on the responses received to the questionnaire and the results analysed for 
trends and deviations.   
 
Closed ended questionnaires are used in this study because they provide an economical 
and effective way to solicit responses on human perception from a relatively large sample 
size (Kerr & Cullen 1995; White et al. 1997; White, Bennett & Hayes 2001; Jim & Xu 2002; 
Obiri & Lawes 2002; Bouton & Frederick 2003; White et al. 2003) and are more effective 
when the questionnaire is long and time consuming (Coopers, &Schindler, 2008; De 
Vaus, 2002; Hair, 2003; Hair et al., 2003). They also provide an opportunity for 
standardisation and reduce biases from coding open ended questionnaires or interviews, 
and biases from skewness introduced by extreme responses and agree. I agree with 
Gomm (2004) that the purpose of an open-ended questionnaire is better served with an 
in-depth interview.  
 
Interviews are costly and time consuming in eliciting responses from a wide sample size. 
Also, the quality of responses can be affected by the lack of anonymity and biases can 
be introduced through multiple interviewers leading to standardisation issues from coding. 
This study follows numerous examples in the literature in our preference for close-ended 
questions (Arrow et al. 1993; Bateman et al. 1995). I expect that the ambiguity from the 
application of the measurement on the Likert scale will be mitigated by the background 
provided as part of the questionnaire as well as prior experience from respondents to a 
similar questionnaire. A question is included to obtain information about the prior 
experience of respondents to a similar questionnaire. This study is an explorative 
investigation into human perception and attitudes, as such other methods of investigation 
were considered but judged to be inappropriate for this study due to the complexity and 
cost implications and/or inability to adequately and validly address the research objectives 
of this study. Saunders et al. (2007) identify five types of closed ended questionnaires 
which are;- (1) list questions: - where participants choose from a list of answers provided 
(2) Category questions (3) ranking questions: - where participants placed things in a rank 
order (4) rating questions: - used to obtain ratings on participants’ opinions such as on a 
Likert Scale and (5) quantity questions: - where participants provide a figure that 
represents an amount, weight or some other measure. 
 
Often a structured closed ended questionnaire will include a mixture of all the types as 
enumerated above. Rating questions in the form of a Likert scale are predominantly used 
in this study because they are easier and quicker to answer, are cost effective and allow 
for the use of varied statistical techniques (Easterby-Smith et al. 2002; Oppenheim, 2003; 
Sekaran, 2003).  
 
Various studies (reviewed by Cox, 1980) have examined the reliability and validity of 
varied rating scales (e.g., Cicchetti, Showalter, & Tyrer, 1985; Matell & Jacoby, 1971; 
Schutz & Rucker, 1975). Often Likert scales and other attitude and opinion measures 
contain either five or seven response categories (Bearden, Netmeyer, & Mobley, 1993; 
Shaw & Wright, 1967).  The preference for odd numbers allows the middle number to be 
interpreted as neutral and other studies have re-enforced the preference for odd number 
scales (e.g. Green & Rao, 1970; Neumann & Neumann, 1981). Miller (1956) argues that 
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the ‘human mind has a span of absolute judgment that can distinguish about seven 
distinct categories, a span of immediate memory for about seven items, and a span of 
attention that can encompass about six objects at a time, which suggested that any 
increase in number of response categories beyond six or seven might be futile’ (cited 
from Colman, Norris & Preston, 1997). 
 
Even though Elmore & Beggs (1975) argue that there is no statistically significant 
difference between a five point and a seven point Likert scale, (e.g. Green & Rao, 1970; 
Neumann & Neumann, 1981), this study adopts a seven point Likert scale because it 
allows for granularity, and optimises reliability (Symonds, 1924; see Ghiselli, 1955 for a 
comprehensive review). Aside from the seven-point Likert scale, the questionnaire 
includes questions requesting categorisation, ranking and listing. Most importantly, all 
closed ended questions include an opportunity for participants to provide any other 
answers, not within the options provided. All questions include a line for ‘others (please 
specify)’. Additionally, only a few questions are open ended.  
 
White, Jennings, Renwick & Barker (2005) make recommendations for improvement in 
the validity of findings from questionnaire administration as presented in the table below 
(table 3.5). 
 
Table 3.5: Proposed Strategies For Improving The Credibility Of Questionnaire 
Administration 
 White et al. (2005) 
Recommendation 
 Appropriate Action In This study 
1 A clear definition of the target 
population, any hypothesis and 
procedures for selection of the 
participants. This guides 
judgment around the reliability 
of the data and the extent to 
which the same is 
representative of the target 
population 
Sekaran (2003) argues that to ensure reliability, the 
development of a survey instrument must be based on 
empirical literature. In this study, varied empirical 
literature and theories are relied on (such as Evans et 
al., 2001; Yang, 2009, Chun, 2005, Cameron, 2004) in 
choosing a research method, formulating a hypothesis, 
and designing the questionnaire. The target population 
is business managers (from the private sector) within 
Ghana and the sample is a selected number of 
employees and business leaders in companies listed 
on the Ghana Club 100. This mitigates ‘construct’ 
validity and reliability challenges. 
2 Piloting of the questionnaire 
before use. 
Questionnaires were pre-tested severally on colleague 
PhD students within HBS and other schools (Collis & 
Hussey 2009). This mitigates internal validity 
challenges. 
3 The sample size should be 
sufficient for statistical 
analysis. 
The questionnaire was administered to sixty-seven (67) 
organisations with an average of four persons from 
each organisation. A selected number of business 




4 The rational for the choice of 
the survey method must be 
clearly stated. 
The closed ended questionnaire was chosen due to its 
reliability and effectiveness in addressing the objectives 
of this research, using a pragmatist approach. A 
detailed explanation has been provided for the reason 
for a choice of the closed ended questionnaire as well 
as the limitations for generalisation thereof. 
5 The number of non-
respondents should be 
minimised. 
Continuous follow-ups were used to mitigate non-
response bias. As well, due to the non-sensitive nature 
of the questions asked, participants did not shun away, 
and socially desirable responses were mitigated. 
Anonymity is assured, and a background that 
emphasises that this research is for academic purposes 
is highlighted. Where participants do not opt for 
anonymity, the researcher administered the 
questionnaire. 
6 The question and answer 
format should be simple and 
devoid of ambiguity. 
Ambiguity is mitigated by providing a background to the 
research as part of the questionnaire, providing a 
contact number of the researcher in case a participant 
wanted to seek clarification. Additionally, piloting the 
questionnaire helped to reduce ambiguity and improve 
the sequencing and quality of the questions. Various 
statistical measures were used to measure the validity 
of the questionnaire.  
7 The structure of the 
questionnaire and the data 
emerging from it should be 
unambiguously shown in any 
publication. 
The questionnaire is attached as an appendix and the 
responses summarised and analysed within the study. 
The questionnaire design and why specific questions 
were included is also discussed within this chapter. 
8 Bias arising from non-response 
should be quantified 
This was analysed and discussed in chapter four. 
9 The accuracy of data should be 
assessed by ‘ground-truthing’ 
where relevant. 
Limited interviews were conducted on a selected 
number of senior managers to collaborate research 
findings. 
10 The analysis of potentially 
interrelated data should be 
done using modelling. 
Various statistical methods were used to analyse data. 
11 Consider whether alternative, 
interpretative methods are 
more appropriate. 
Even though the questionnaire is predominantly closed 
ended, opportunities were provided with each question 
for an alternative response. ‘Others (please specify)’ is 
added to all questions. A few open-ended questions 
were included, and responses collaborated with 
interviews. 
 
After the administration of the closed ended questionnaire, a limited number of in-depth 
interviews (n=30) were conducted to validate key responses from the questionnaire. The 




3.3.2.1. The Questionnaire Design And Content 
 
As explained earlier, in line with a pragmatist approach (Morgan, 2007), a survey method 
was used for this study, adopting a predominately closed ended questionnaire as a 
research instrument.  The closed ended questionnaire allowed for a cost efficient and 
effective method of eliciting responses from a wide range of respondents within the 
shortest possible time. It was also easy to answer and hence reduce non-response bias, 
allowing for the application of varied statistical methods for analysis, and reduces biases 
introduced from coding or transcribing interviews and open ended questions. Most 
questions required a response on a seven-point Likert scale. However, there were a few 
open-ended questions, list questions, rank questions and categorisation questions as 
well. The mixture of methods can only serve to increase the reliability of responses 
obtained (Adams et al., 2001; Rottig & Heischmidt, 2007; Stohs & Brannick, 1999). In 
improving ‘construct’ reliability, the questionnaire was pre-tested on colleague PhD 
students, friends and relatives and amendments made as appropriate to sequencing, 
question construct, length of questions etc.  
 
The target population of the study are managers (i.e. business leaders) who are 
responsible for MPR within privately owned profit oriented firms in Ghana. In such private 
organisations, ownership and management are segregated. The sample is chosen from 
employees (also referred to as business managers/executives) within organisations listed 
on the 2014 published ‘Ghana Club 100’ (GC 100) that meet this criterion (all 
organisations in GC100 meet this criterion). The selection of a sample from GC 100 is to 
ensure effectiveness in the administration of the questionnaire. These organisations are 
easy to identify and locate, usually, have governance structures that allow for segregation 
of ownership from management and hence the need for MPR. As well, they may be more 
receptive to responding to a questionnaire and/or interviews.   
 
To ensure reliability and validity (Bryman & Bell, 2007) of the research instrument, several 
approaches where adopted. Reliability measures the extent of bias and requires that 
responses to the research instrument, to the same individual, are replicable and 
consistent over time (Sekaran, 2003). Validity assesses whether the research instrument 
and the questions therein, measure effectively the targeted concept. 
 
Various statistical techniques can be used to verify internal reliability such as Cronbach’s 
coefficient alpha, Test-retest; internal consistency and parallel form reliability (Easterby-
Smith et al., 2002). Cronbach’s coefficient alpha was calculated to determine the overall 
reliability of the multiple items used in this study. 
 
There are four types of validity widely discussed in the literature. Content validity (or face 
validity) measures the extent to which measurement scales are appropriate for measuring 
the targeted concept and can be achieved through a careful definition of the research 
topic and stated objectives, review of the empirical literature and piloting a research 
instrument (Emory & Cooper, 1991; De Vaus, 2002). De Vaus, (2002) cautions that it is 
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challenging to effectively mitigate content validity due to the difference in opinion among 
researchers about the relevant content of concepts.  
 
‘Construct’ validity is arguably the most relevant validity consideration, and attempts to 
evaluate the validity of hypotheses based on existing theoretical framework. Challenges 
with ‘construct’ validility can be mitigated by developing hypotheses based on theory 
modelling and using empirically tested and proven research instruments (Bryman & Bell, 
2007; Litwin, 1995; Oppenheim, 2003; De Vaus, 2002). 
 
Concurrent validity measures the comparability of results from one scale with a different 
scale that measures a similar phenomenon (Litwin, 1995; Oppenheim, 2003). Predictive 
validity measures the ability of an instrument to appropriately predict variables, such as 
behaviour. All in all, the predictive ability of an instrument can be measured over a period 
and is heavily dependent on the instruments content, construct and concurrent validities 
(Litwin, 1995; Oppenheim, 2003). 
 
The approach used in questionnaire distribution is that organisation on GC 100 are 
identified and approached based on a criterion. The purpose of the study is explained to 
the contact person, and his/her support is enlisted to identify potential subjects. 
Questionnaires are then placed in an envelope and addressed to the identified 
respondent. A return envelope addressed to the researcher is included. Follow ups are 
made to the contact person to reduce non-response bias. The kind of questions included 
does not encourage desirable social response, but there is a risk of selection bias 
introduced by the contact person. Providing a criterion to the contact person to guide 
his/her choice of potential respondents mitigates this.  Essentially respondents must be 
employees (not directors, or senior managers) with a reasonable knowledge of the 
organisation's MPR system for at least two years (see chapter two for the detailed 
conceptualisation of employees-Figure 2.1). A question is included in the questionnaire 
to measure this criterion. Additionally, a background is provided as part of the 
questionnaire explaining the essence of the research to reduce any misconceptions. As 
well, more than one questionnaire is administered in every organisation and questions 
are constructed to assess organisational leaders (senior managers) rather than 
respondents (McMahon & Harvey, 2006; Ng et al., 2009; Ponemon & Gabhart, 1990; 
Simga-Mugan et al., 2005). The anonymity guaranteed is also likely to improve the 
credibility of any responses and reduce the effects of selection bias (Fritzsche, 2000; 
Nederhof, 1985; Ng et al., 2009; Sweeney & Costello, 2009; Watley & May, 2004). No 
responses are returned to the contact person within the organisation. This is clearly 
indicated on the questionnaire. Responses are posted to the respondent or collected in 
person by the researcher or his agent. 
 
Section A of the questionnaire was designed to measure bio data even though care was 
taken not to request any information that will suggest an attempt to reveal the participants’ 
identity. Most questions in this section were closed ended and provided various 
categories for participants to choose from. Included in the categories was ‘others (please 
specify)’. This was to provide an opportunity for respondents to indicate any other 
answers not spelt out in the categories. There were a few YES/NO questions and one 
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opened ended question that requested respondents to indicate the number of employed 
staff within the organisation. Questions in Section A sought information on age, gender, 
marital status, highest academic qualification, number of working years of experience of 
the participants, type of industry the organisation belongs to, ownership structure of the 
organizations and the size of the organisation measured in terms of the number of 
employees (both full time and part time, permanent and on contract). In most cases, the 
categorisations provided were supported empirically and are like categorisations adopted 
by other researchers (Yang, 2009, Martey et al., 2013). The categorisation on industry 
type was based on classifications in GC100 but was synthesised based on the 
researcher’s knowledge of the Ghanaian corporate sector. The question about ownership 
structure is intended to help ensure that only privately controlled firms, rather than 
government-controlled firms are used in this study. As stated earlier, the targeted 
population for this study is managers within profit-seeking organisations that are privately 
controlled and registered as ‘private or public limited liability’ organisations at the 
Registrar of Companies. The essence is to replicate as thoroughly as possible an agency 
context where ownership and management are segregated and where there are a 
genuine interest and effort by the principal to mitigate adverse behaviour from agents. 
Therefore, any analysis will exclude sole proprietorships, and any other owner managed 
organisations, as well as government-controlled organisations. The emphasis here is on 
control rather than mere share ownership even though share ownership is used in most 
cases as a proxy for control. Other questions in section A explore the extent of control 
where there is partial government share ownership. Even though principal-agent conflicts 
replicate even in government organisations, they are excluded in this study. This is 
because, especially in Africa, governments acting as principals do a very poor job at 
organisational monitoring and control and therefore MPR behaviours between 
government controlled organisations as well as the factors that influence such behaviours 
are likely to be different from profit seeking private firms were ownership is segregated 
from management (Yang, 2009). Most sole proprietorships are owner managed in Ghana 
(Martey et al., 2013) and therefore will not significantly espouse principal-agent problems.  
 
Part B of the questionnaire elicits respondent’s perception of key statements using a 
seven-point Likert Scale ranging from ‘strongly disagree’ to `strongly agree`. 
Respondents are encouraged to provide answers based on their perspective of the 
organisation and its business leaders as a group rather than a specific individual or 
specific event in isolation over the past three years. Since organisational attitudes take a 
long time to change (Brynjolfsson, Hitt & Kim, 2011), the consideration of MPR behaviour 
over a three-year horizon, will provide a credible assessment of MPR behaviour. The 
construct of the statements is designed to measure environmental dynamism and 
complexity, internal organisational dynamism, tension and politics, individuals within the 
organisation cognitive orientation towards collectivism, transparency and fairness in 
remuneration systems and other economic benefits to employees (see section on 
hypothesis). The essence is to correlate key environmental, organisational, economic and 
individual cognitive variables with HPR (see table 3.6). The first six questions in section 
B seek respondent’s perception of the level of overall HPR within the organisation to its 
key stakeholders (based on a multi actor principal-agency approach). 
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Table 3.6: Explanation Of Survey Questions 
Question Range Intended Objective 
A1-A7 Demographics required for computing test of independence and 
relatedness (Chi square, Fisher Exact Test etc.). Imputed into SPSS 
A8-A11 Used (together with A5) for confirming whether respondent and/or 
organisation meet the selection criteria. Not imputed in SPSS except for 
A10, where listed companies are coded 1 and not listed are coded 2. 
B1-B6 A measure of overall perception on HPR. Imputed in SPSS 
B7-B11 A measure of external participation in performance management system. 
Imputed in SPSS 
B12-B15 A measure of innovation. Imputed in SPSS 
B16-B20 A measure of environmental variables. Imputed in SPSS. 
B21-B24 A measure of internal organisational politics. Imputed in SPSS 
B25-B30 A measure of MCS. Imputed in SPSS 
B31-B36 A measure of the fairness of economic incentives. Imputed in SPSS 
B37-B40 A measure of individual characteristics. Imputed in SPSS. 
B41-B47 A measure of perception of effects of HPR. Imputed in SPSS 
C1-C4 A measure of the relative importance of effects of benefits of HPR. Not 
imputed to SPSS 
C5-C8  A measure of employee’s perception of the financial performance of the 
organisation. Imputed into SPSS 
C9 Test of reliability of responses. Imputed into SPSS 
C10 A measure of employee’s satisfaction with the organisation. Imputed into 
SPSS 
SECTION D Exploration of the misreporting strategies adopted by organisations. 
Used to evaluate B1-B6. Not imputed to SPSS. 
 
Table 3.6 above provides content details of various sections of the questionnaire and 
indicates if responses from a specific section were imputed in SPSS. The inclusion of the 
environmental constructs (B16-B20) emphasises multiple principals, and the inclusion of 
internal organisational variables (B21-B24) emphasises multiple agents.  All questions 
are framed using the words ‘in this organisation’ rather than ‘in your organisation’ to 
mitigate biases from self-inclusion. 
 
The second part of section B seeks to explore participant’s perspective about the effects, 
positive and negative, of purposefully misreported MPR using the same seven-point Likert 
scale. Statements provided are mostly based on existing empirical findings except for a 
few. For instance, question B41 AND B43 are from Gino & Pierce (2009). This section of 
the questionnaire is also administered to external stakeholders such as regulators, civil 
society groups etc. Responses in this section are based on perspectives and experiences 
of respondents and not necessarily specifically related to any organisation making it 
possible to seek external stakeholder views. Even though the questions are similar, a 
separate questionnaire (that excludes Section A and Section D) was sent to external 
stakeholders (see questionnaire in appendix) and are analysed in chapter four in addition 




In Section C, two separate opened ended questions deliberately ask respondents to state 
the (a) positive effects (if any) of misreported MPR and (b) the negative effects of 
misreported MPR. Even though part two of section B attempted to achieve the same 
objective, these two questions intend to explore if participants perceive other variables. It 
is estimated that some participants will restate the effects stated in part two of section B. 
If this happens, then it only re-emphasises the credibility of the pre-identified effects in 
part two of section B. Two separate questions ask respondents to rank (a) in order of 
likelihood of occurrence the effects (positive and negative) of dishonest MPR and (b) in 
order of the highest adverse effect on firm profit the effects (positive and negative) of 
dishonest MPR. 
 
Finally, questions are asked to assess participants’ perception of the FP vis-à-vis certain 
benchmarks (such as against best competitor or internally set targets). This is in line with 
Cameron et al. (2004) approach and is designed to help explore the relationship between 
HPR and perceived FP. Henri, (2006); Khandwalla, (1972); Brownell & Merchant, (1990) 
adopt a similar approach of rating perception of FP. This analysis will be done using 
multiple regressions and structural equation modelling. Another question explores 
participant’s overall satisfaction with the organisation, using a seven-point Likert scale. 
This helps to replicate Chun’s (2005) method in exploring the relationship between HPR 
and employee satisfaction, with employee satisfaction as a proxy for FP.  
 
A question in section C seeks to determine if participants have responded to a similar 
questionnaire (regarding the object of the questionnaire) before. This helps to assess the 
overall credibility of the findings because socially desirable results are likely to occur when 
participants have taken part in similar research before. Hence the inclusion of this 
question is to help assess biases from desirable social responses and their significance.  
A final question assesses participants understanding of the organisation's MPR process 
to measure the credibility of responses provided. 
 
The final section of the questionnaire (Section D) introduces five scenarios to measure 
MPR behaviours in GC100 organisations. The scenarios are designed to measure the 
key variables in the conceptualisation of HPR in this study; Responsible reporting; 
truthfulness; timely reporting; and attributing accurate reasons for performance 
gaps, simplicity and easy to comprehend reporting. As an example, ‘scenario one’ 
measures responsible reporting with a scenario construct where managers have the 
option to disobey headquarters reporting directives and still be ‘technically accurate in 
their reporting’. The second scenario measures ‘truthfulness’ in reporting. The third 
scenario measures the opportunity to deliberately assign wrong reasons for a 
performance gap. The fourth scenario measures the opportunity to deliberately exclude 
and/or delay the submission of a report that highlights performance gaps. The fifth 
scenario measures the deliberate use of technical jargons and complex presentations to 
confuse stakeholders. Constructed scenarios were piloted with KPMG (Ghana) partners, 
and a select group of management accountants within Ghanaian firms to assess the 
practicability of the scenarios and how real they are regarding the Ghanaian business 
environment. The responses from these ‘pilot participants’ indicated that these scenarios 
are practical and relevant to the Ghanaian business environment. It is important to know 
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that the organisations that these ‘pilot participants’ did not participate in the actual 
administration of the questionnaire to avoid biases from pre-knowledge. In most cases, 
participants were asked to indicate how the organisation in which they are currently 
employed usually reacts when confronted with a similar scenario and why. All questions 
in ‘Section D’ were open ended.  
 
Responses from the second part of section B, Section C and Section D of the 
questionnaires collaborate with a limited number of interviews. As an example, section D 
collaborated with 15 interviews. Interviews were semi structured. 
 
3.3.3. Statistical Analysis: OBJ4: - To Provide Evidence Of The Relationship 
Between HPR And FP.  
 
3.3.3.1. Theoretical Basis For Relationship Between HPR & ROCE & ROA. 
 
The theoretical basis for exploring the relationship between HPR and ‘objective 
measures’ of FP can be analysed from two mutually exclusive and yet complimentary 
perspectives. These are enumerated below and further explained in the ensuing sections. 
 
1) The first argument is that HPR, as measured from employees perspective, is 
synonymous with objective measures of HPR. Therefore, considering that the 
factors that affect HPR, as demonstrated in this study (such as innovation, less 
hostile working relationship among peers etc.), have been empirically established 
(in prior studies) to affect the ‘bottom line’, then a theoretical basis is established 
to explore this relationship. Cameroon & Quinn (2011) argue that subordinate 
perceptions of dimensions of MPR are credible. 
2) The second argument is that, in any case, empirical evidence has confirmed the 
fact that employee perceptions can influence FP. 
 
Evidence exists to confirm that ‘subordinate assessments’ often correlate with an 
objective assessment (Bommer, Johnson, Rich, Podsakoff, & Mackenzie, 1995; 
Venkatraman & Ramanujam, 1987). The construct of HPR in this study, even though a 
perceptual measure, can be conceptualised as synonymous with an objective measure 
of organisational HPR. Several studies have confirmed the fact that employee 
perceptions about performance (organisational and managerial) are substitutable with 
objective assessments.  Bommer et al. (1995) confirm that objective and subjective 
measures of the same performance construct, at the same level, may be used 
interchangeably due to significantly high convergent validity. Therefore, objective and 
subjective perceptions of HPR are substitutable (Fried 1991, Williams & Livingstone, 
1994).  
 
Objective measures are defined as direct measures of countable behaviours or outcomes 
whereas subjective measures include employee’s ratings and/or perceptions of 
managerial performance. Subjective measures are often based on personal impression 
and judgements of the assessor (Dawes, 1999). Nathan & Alexander (1988), for instance, 
find no significant evidence of a distinction between objective and subjective measures 
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of performance and argue that the objective/subjective distinction ‘may be more illusory 
than real’ (page 531). They conclude that objective measures of performance variables 
are not more predictive than subjective perceptions of performance. Campbell (1990), 
Muckler & Seven (1992) as well as Pfeffer (1981) agree arguing that all measures of 
performance inherently have subjective aspects. 
 
McEvoy & Cascio (1989), Ones, Viswesvaran & Schmidt (1993), Tett, Jackson & 
Rothstein (1991), Mathieu & Zajac (1990), Williams & Livingstone (1994) test and find no 
significant differences between objective and subjective perceptions of various 
dimensions of performance assessment. Bommer et al. (1995) argue that objective and 
subjective dimensions of performance assessment can be used interchangeably or 
combined largely without incident and hence equal predictability is a function of the 
substitutability of objective and subjective measures rather than mere chance. 
 
Dess Gregory & Robinson Jr. (1984), Pearce, Robbins & Robinson (1987), Covin, Slevin 
& Schultz (1994) and Hart & Banbury (1994) find a significant association between 
subjective (perceptual) and objective measures of performance. Dawes (1999), Krem & 
Tyson (2009), Gibbs et al. (2004) comment that, even though objective measures are 
preferable, subjective measures are valid proxies.  
 
Cameroon & Quinn (2011) argue that subordinate perceptions of dimensions of 
managerial performance are credible. This is because various dimensions of managerial 
performance are experienced by employees (McGregor 1960) since employees are close 
to the action and are affected by managerial performance (Dess & Robinson Jr. 1984). 
Munoz & Alvarez (2007) argue that employees’ perception of superior performance is 
often accurate because employees can make valid judgements about own and superior 
performance. Various studies confirm the validity of using employee perceptions of 
superior performance as a proxy for objective evaluations (see Cram, 1997; Oskarsson, 
1989; LeBlanc, & Painchaud, 1985; Von Elek, 1985).  Cameroon (2005), as well as Chun 
(2004), attempted to correlate perceptual variables (measured based on employee 
perceptions) with firm performance. 
 
The substitutability of objective and perceptual assessments of some dimension of 
managerial performance is strengthened by the consideration that both objective and 
subjective measures of dimensions of MPR have inherent limitations. Subjective 
measures are assumed to be prone to ‘contamination’ (Campbell, 1990) and bias and 
include a sizeable random error (Bommer et al., 1995) usually due to the assessors 
bounded cognitive abilities (Feldman, 1981) and/or limited observational opportunities. 
   
Objective measures, even though are usually preferred and proposed as a superior 
alternative, are also excessively narrow, tapping a singular lower-order construct and only 
partially constituting a higher order performance construct of interest (Bommer et al., 
1995). In any case, no measure can objectively measure all relevant performance 
aspects. Indeed, in my opinion, the empirical evidence of the distinctiveness between 




Based on the above, the construct of HPR within this study can be a reasonable 
approximation of an objective evaluation of HPR. If this is the case, then a theoretical 
basis becomes viable for exploring the relationship between HPR and ROCE/ROA. This 
is because, the empirically proven variables that affect HPR (which are tested in this 
study, albeit with a different approach) have been confirmed to affect FP. As an example, 
the level of hostility in organisational relationships, the fairness of economic incentives 
and innovation have been confirmed to affect HPR and also FP. Considering that this 
study explores and confirms the confluence of factors (acting together) that affect HPR, 
and these factors (based on prior literature) also affect FP, then a theoretical basis is 
provided, prima facie, to explore the relationship. Irrespective of the results of this test, 
however, admittedly, further studies will be required on this phenomenon. 
 
Secondly, even if HPR is seen as a purely perceptual measure, evidence exists of the 
effects of employee perceptions on FP. Other studies (such as Nielson, 2012) confirm 
that ‘powerful’ external stakeholders are influenced in their conclusions, perceptions and 
subsequent action by employee perceptions. This will be explained in more detailed in 
the hypothesis modelling section (see section 3.4.3). If employees indeed perceive 
managerial honesty as a measure of fairness, then perceptual HPR can affect motivation 
and consequent organisational trust with its attendant effects on FP.  This also provides 
a theoretical basis to explore the relationship between HPR and FP. Perceptions 
stimulate action, affecting moral and/or motivation. Harter, Schmidt, Asplund, Killham, & 
Agrawal, (2010) establish an impact of employee perception on the bottom line of 
organisations. They argue that managerial action can impact employee perceptions, 
which affect the perception of work conditions and could result in improved performance 
outcomes. Their study uses a massive longitudinal database involving 2178 business 
units and finds supporting evidence of the causal impact of employee perception on the 
bottom line. Reverse causality of bottom line measures on employee perceptions also 
existed but was weaker. Also, if ‘powerful’ external stakeholders can influence FP through 
their control over critical resources required by organisations and such powerful 
stakeholders can be influenced by employee perception, then it is reasonable to postulate 
that employee perceptions affect FP.   
 
In discussing the influence of HPR on FP, it is possible to argue that HPR is a dependent 
variable of FP and vice versa. For instance, prior research suggests performance 
shortfalls increase the propensity of business managers to misreport MP (Harris & 
Bromiley, 2007; Arthaud-Day et al., 2006; Zhang et al., 2008). It is also possible to explore 
the idea of a vicious cycle where companies with good FPs ensure HPR (because there 
are no performance gaps), leading to efficient resource allocation decisions and hence 
improve FP further and so on.  However, Gujarati (2006) argues that the relationship 
between variables is a conceptual option for the researcher. I argue that HPR influences 
FP. This does not in any way suggest that there is no reverse influence of FP on HPR, 
but rather, in my opinion, good HPR precedes good FP.  I based my argument on 
stakeholder theory, specifically, good management theory (Waddock & Graves, 1997) 
and posit that stakeholders perceive organisations that report honestly as having a good 
reputation and hence through market mechanisms (employability power, more 





An HPR index was constructed to explore this objective. Using the ‘performance-reporting 
index’, a statistical regression analysis was performed to test the relationship between 
HPR and FP. Firm performance (FP) was measured by  
a) Return on capital employed (ROCE) and return on assets (ROA); Even though 
market based measures are generally considered as preferable to accounting 
based measures as indicators of firm performance, because this study is not 
restricted to listed companies, it was difficult to estimate Tobin’s Q and other 
market based measures; 
b) Employees perception of FP measured as employees perception of FP vis-à-vis 
organisational targets, industry average, best competitor and organisational three 
year average (Cameron et al., 2004). Cameron, (1978, 1986) argues that providing 
standards against which to rate performance results is more reliable data than 
asking for a simple numerical rating of employee satisfaction score with the 
organisation on a seven-point Likert Scale (Chun, 2005). 
 
The regression equations were of the form 
 
ROA= a + (B1 X HPR) + DUMMYSIZE+ DUMMYINDUSTRY+ DUMMYLISTED+ 
e1…………………. equation (1) 
 
ROCE= A+ (B1 X HPR) + DUMMYSIZE+ DUMMYINDUSTRY+ DUMMYLISTED+ 
e1………………… equation (2) 
 
Dummy variables were introduced to control for industry, listing on the Ghana Stock 
Exchange and organisational size. Where 
 
ROCE = Return on capital employed. This was based on information obtained from the 
organisation itself (if they are not listed) or from their annual reports (when they are listed 
on the Ghana Stock exchange). For standardisation, it is computed as  
 
Annual profit 
Stated Capital + Long term Debt + Accumulated Reserves + Preference Shares 
 
ROA= Return on Assets. This was based on information obtained from the organisation 
itself (if they are not listed) or from their annual reports (when they are listed on the Ghana 
Stock exchange). For standardisation, it is computed as  
 
Annual profit 
   Fixed Assets 
 
The definition of annual profit, fixed assets, stated capital, long-term debt, accumulated 





In performing the regression for each equation, two different computations of HPR were 
used as independent variables. The first was the individual HPR score per respondent 
and the second is ORGHPR, which is a mean estimated HPR score of the responses 
received from each organisation. The second method (ORG HPR) allowed for every 
organisation to have a standardised HPR measure. 
 
Typically, higher ROA and ROCE percentages suggest relatively better performance. 
Therefore, HPR and ORGHPR were reversed to allow for directional alignment with ROA 
and ROCE.  
 
DUMMYSIZE, DUMMY LISTED, DUMMYINDUSTRY represented dummy variables 
within each regression equation to control for size (measured by the number of 
employees), the effects of listing on the stock exchange and the effects of industry specific 
factors respectively (Waddock & Graves, 1997). 
 
Regression analysis was performed to investigate the relationship between ‘objective FP’ 
and perceived HPR. The results obtained were more of a test of the relationship between 
HPR and firm performance rather than between dishonest MPR and firm performance. 
This is because, if per the performance reporting index an organisation is judged to 
purposefully misreport MP, then reliance on reported accounting indices may not be 
appropriate as it will be difficult to adjust for errors resulting from dishonest MPR. Market 
measures may have been more appropriate under such a circumstance if the market is 
efficient. It is difficult to judge the extent of market efficiency in Ghana, particularly as this 
is not the focus of this study. Also, not all organisations within the sample were listed on 
the GSE. Therefore, conclusions drawn from this regression will most probably confirm 
the kind of relationship between HPR and firm performance rather than between 
dishonest MPR and firm performance.  
 
In mitigating this limitation, an analysis is done to correlate perception of honesty in MPR 
with employee satisfaction (a non-financial measure). Employee satisfaction is used as a 
measure of business success. Chun (2005) applied a similar approach in investigating 
the relationship between ethics and firm performance.  Also, in line with Cameron et al. 
(2004), the relationship between employee perceptions of FP with the perception of HPR 
was investigated. This reduces the dependence on supposed ‘objective measure’ of FP 
that may involve deliberate machinations. The measurement of FP by non-monetary 
indicators is more recent and has increased in acceptance particularly because of the 
contemporary concern regarding the social action of firms as well as the proven inability 
of financial indicators to capture all essential dimensions (Oliveira et al., 2001). The 
regression equations were of the form: -  
 
Employee Perception L3Y = a + (B1 X HPR) + DUMMYSIZE+ DUMMYINDUSTRY+ 
DUMMYLISTED+ e1…………………equation (7) 
 
Employee Perception BC = a + (B1 X HPR) + DUMMYSIZE+ DUMMYINDUSTRY+ 




Employee Perception TARGET = a + (B1 X HPR) + DUMMYSIZE+ DUMMYINDUSTRY+ 
DUMMYLISTED+ e1…………………equation (6) 
 
Employee Perception INDUSTRY = a + (B1 X HPR) + DUMMYSIZE+ 
DUMMYINDUSTRY+ DUMMYLISTED+ e1…………………equation (5) 
 
Employee Satisfaction = a + (B1 X HPR) + DUMMYSIZE+ DUMMYINDUSTRY+ 
DUMMYLISTED+ e1…………………equation (3) 
 
Where  
Employees Satisfaction was measured from Likert scale responses provided to a 
question that asked respondents to indicate their overall satisfaction with their current 
organisation on a seven-point Likert Scale from strongly dissatisfied (7) to strongly 
satisfied (1). Chun (2005) adopted a similar method. 
 
‘Employee Perception TARGET’ measures employee perception of FP compared to the 
organisations own targets for the year in question. It was computed after coding response 
‘a: outperformed target’ = 1; ‘b: Marginally above target’=2; ‘c=at par with target’=3; ‘d: 
marginally below target’=4 and ‘e: significantly below target’=5. 
 
‘Employee Perception BC’ measures employee perception of FP against its best 
competitor and was computed after coding responses as ‘a=1, b=2, c=3, d=4 and e=5’. 
 
‘Employee Perception L3Y’ measures employee perception of FP against its last three 
years’ average and was computed after coding of responses as ‘a=1, b=2, c=3, d=4 and 
e=5’. 
 
‘Employee Perception INDUSTRY’ measures employee perception of FP against the 
industry average and was computed after coding responses as ‘a=1, b=2, c=3, d=4 and 
e=5’. 
 
3.3.3.3. Sampling And Data Collection 
 
Essentially this study attempted to replicate the methodology of Cameron et al. (2004) 
and Chun (2005) used for investigating the relationship between some dimensions of 
virtue with perceived and ‘objective’ FP. The sampling criterion is based on the possibility 
of the availability of data. All samples in GC100 provided verifiable data. Organisations 
were selected if relevant information about the ROA and ROCE as well as their 
independent variables over a two-year period was available and verifiable. Data were 
obtained through the questionnaire administration process. Factor analysis and average 
mean scores (Burke & Dunlop 2002) were performed to assess whether sufficient 
agreement exits for all questionnaires to justify aggregation to the organisational level. 
Aggregation to the organisation level was based on mean scores for all qualifying 
responses received from the same organisation. This was collaborated by other 
information sources such as from the annual report of the organisation, media, and civil 
society groups etc. As an example, information about tensions between staff unions and 
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management may be an indication of perception of unfairness in compensations. The 
combination of methods helped to mitigate the challenge of insufficient scientific data to 
measure these variables.  
 
The data collected was cross sectional because the essence of this study was to test the 
extent of influence of certain variables on HPR. To do this, the perceptions of employees 
were obtained on several variables. Various regression methods were applied and 
preferred because it was effective at achieving the intended objective. The choice of 
regression method mainly depended on the nature of the dependent variable. Other 
studies such as Reckers et al. (1994) have used a similar approach. 
 
The survey method was used to gather information on employee overall satisfaction, as 
well as employee perception of FP, on a seven-point Likert Scale. Churn (2012) applied 
a similar method. The targeted sample population was the top performing organisations 
in Ghana as per the Ghana Club 100 Rankings in 2014. 265 questionnaires were 
administered to employees in 65 qualifying organisations. Based on the data collected, 
linear regression (OLS, binary Logistic, and marginal effects) and SEM were performed 
to establish the strength of the relationship between HPR and FP. 
 
In summary, the testing of the extent of the relationship between firm performance (FP) 
and HPR, applied various constructs of firm performance (FP). HPR was regressed 
against Return on Assets (ROA), Return on Capital Employed (ROCE), an employee 
satisfaction index and various measures of employees’ perception of FP. Since, 
Cameron, (1978, 1986) argues that providing standards against which to rate 
performance results is more reliable than asking for a simple numerical rating of employee 
satisfaction score with the organisation on a seven-point Likert Scale (Chun, 2005), the 
application of multiple indices of firm performance improves the research. 
 
3.3.3.4. Dealing With Financial Performance ‘Halo’ Effects 
 
Evidence exists to suggest that perception-based reputation rankings, such as the type 
used in this survey, can be affected by respondent’s opinion of prior financial performance 
(Bharadwaj, 2000). More so, evidence exists to suggest that existing and future 
organisational financial performance is often strongly correlated with past financial 
performance (Fama & French, 2000) even though the strength of the correlation will vary 
depending on domestic factors (Griffin, 2002). 
 
Financial performance ‘halo’ effect describes the situation where estimations of reputation 
rankings (such as HPR) and its effect on current financial performance is heavily 
influenced by actual and perceived prior financial performance which has not been 
appropriately mitigated for in the prediction model. Since the prior financial performance 
of an organisation may affect respondents’ perception about current reputation rankings, 
it is useful to adjust for prior financial performance in any model that estimates an impact 




To mitigate the ‘halo’ effects, often, a ‘halo’ effect index is constructed, tested and the 
results evaluated (Brown & Perry, 1994; Bharadwaj, 2000). In this study, a halo effect 
index was constructed using five year averages (from 2008-2012) that combined financial 
and operational performances matrixes on past financial performance; (1) Return on 
Assets (ROA), (2) Return on Equity (ROE), (3) annual change in sales (Growth), (4) 
debt/equity, (RISK) and (5) Logarithm of average sales over the past five years (SALES).  
Average industry performance is used as an appropriate standard for performance 
comparison (Robbins & Pearce 1992; Wisner & Eakins, 1994; Santhanam & Hartono, 
2003). Except for four (4) organisations, all other organisations provided complete 
financial data for the computation of five-year averages for the ‘halo index’. Computed 
means were used to fill in for missing data for the remaining four. Excluding the four 
organisations, due to missing data, from the halo index computation did not significantly 
affect the logistic regression results.  
 
To test for ‘halo’ effect, the ‘halo index’ comprising of the five-year average of past 
financial performance was employed as independent variables in a regression analysis 
on the perception of HPR (derived from the survey responses). HPR scores for each 
questionnaire (B1-B6 of the questionnaire) with a mean score of between 1 and 3 where 
classified as organisations that report managerial performance honestly, while HPR 
scores of 4-7 were classified as organisations that misreported their performance. The 
dependent variable (HPR) was coded as a binary variable with Y0 for HPR (mean score 
between 1 and 3) and Y1 for dishonest MPR (HPR mean score of between 4 and 7). That 
is  
 
Y0= a+B1ROA+B2ROE+B3GROWTH+B4SALES+ B5RISK+e1 
Y1= a+B1ROA+B2ROE+B3GROWTH+B4SALES+ B5RISK+e1 
 
The overall model was not significant, with model chi square not significant, implying that 
past financial performance did not account for significant differences between the groups 
(Y0, and Y1).  Also, t test of significance between each variable (dependent variables) did 
not show significant values. Therefore, organisations that report managerial performance 
honestly were not enjoying any ‘special halo effects’ (Bharadwaj, 2000) due to past 
performance. This confirms Griffin (2002) suggestion that the argument that past financial 
performance heavily correlates with current financial performance is heavily dependent 
on domestic circumstances than on a general rule. 
 
Santhanam & Hartono, (2003) contest the Bharadwaj, (2000) approach for measuring the 
‘halo’ effect and argue against the application of five-year averages in the construction of 
a ‘halo index’. Rather, Santhanam & Hartono, (2003) propose that reputation rankings 
are more affected by the immediate past performance rather than ‘an average of several 
years’. More so, Santhanam & Hartono, (2003) contend that financial performance ‘halo’ 
effect cannot be ruled out completely because several studies confirm that current 
financial performance is often heavily positively correlated with past financial 
performance. Santhanam & Hartono, (2003) propose that a more effective approach will 
be to assume the existence of some form of financial performance ‘halo effect’ and 
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determine the impact of HPR on financial performance after adjusting for some estimate 
of halo effects.    
 
Santhanam & Hartono, (2003) propose two models for testing for and/or accounting for 
‘halo effect’. First is a regression of prior year financial performance on current financial 
performance in an equation of the form FP1=a +B1FP0. Where FP1 measures current year 
financial performance and FP0 measure immediate prior year financial performance. The 
essence of this equation is to test for a statistically significant causal relationship between 
immediate prior year financial performance and current year financial performance.  
 
The second model involves the addition of a single variable FP1=a +B1FP0 + B1D where 
D represents binary variables of 1 for organisations that report managerial performance 
honestly (means score between 1 and 3) and 0 for organisations that do not report 
managerial performance honestly, (HPR mean score between 4 and 7). Since the second 
model involves the addition of a single variable, its coefficient will indicate whether HPR 
has a statistically significant effect on financial performance after adjusting for immediate 
prior financial performance on both the independent and dependent variable (Neter et al., 
1996, Brown & Perry, 1994). 
 
The limitations of the second model FP1=a +B1FP0 + B1D is that it only controls for one 
variable, past financial performance, and excludes other variables and considerations that 
may have a bearing on financial performance. Moreover, if FP1=a +B1FP0 confirms that 
the relationship between immediate past and current financial performance is not 
significant, it is difficult to appreciate the need to control for ‘halo effect’. In this study, the 
results of FP1=a +B1FP0 showed no statistically significant relationship between current 
and immediate past financial performance. As this confirms earlier models applied in this 
study to test for ‘halo effect’, this study did not proceed to analyse FP1=a +B1FP0 + B1D. 
Rather a model that controlled for other variables such as organisational size, industry 
type etc. was preferred.   
  
3.4. HYPOTHESES FORMULATION 
 
3.4.1. Managers’ Preference For HPR 
 
Freeman & Gilbert Jr. (1988) provide evidence to suggest that individuals’ preference for 
HPR in an organisational setting may vary from preferences outside the work 
environment. Jackall (1988), Ford & Richardson (1994), Liedtka (1989); O’Neil & Pienta 
(1994) have suggested that the bureaucratic setting of the work environment introduces 
other variables that may affect an individuals’ behaviour and his preferences.  Quinn et 
al. (1997) refer to this dualism of preferences as resulting from an adaptation process that 
may take place for an individual to progress up the corporate ladder. If this disposition is 
accurate, then perhaps individuals will display less HPR in a personal scenario than in an 
organisational construct during our experimentation.  It is possible to see a distinction in 
the decision variables that an agent faces with both experiment types. In the latter case, 
the repercussions for dishonesty are “closer to home” and may affect the preferences of 




“it is far more common and dramatic to focus on individual culpability …however greater 
knowledge of the organisational context of the behaviour may change attributions of 
individual culpability”.  
 
Grover (2005) segregates business lies from personal lies and acknowledges that 
competition and social pressures may affect business lies. Grover (2005) suggest further 
that it is important to understand how normal organisational participants behave daily at 
the work place. The organisational context introduces peculiarities from group dynamics, 
reputational risk as well as controls systems (e.g. audits) that may mitigate dishonest 
MPR.  Therefore, it is likely that; 
 
H1 For Business Managers, HPR will be higher with an ‘organisational related’ 
construct than an ‘individual based’ construct. 
 
Nagin & Pogarsky (2003) argue that increasing the likelihood of being caught is a more 
effective deterrent to purposefully misreported MPR than a proportional increase in the 
severity of punishments. However, results on the implication of detection risk on HPR 
have not been conclusive (Huang & Wu 1994; Lindbeck 1995; Mazar et al. 2008) even 
though most studies have suggested that the risk of detection can mitigate misreported 
MPR (Nagin & Pogarsky; 2003). Due to this Tayler & Bloomfield (2011) suggest further 
studies on how the possibility of future audits can affect HPR. Various studies have 
suggested that deferred compensation increases the risk of detecting misreported MPR 
and improves HPR (Bhagat & Romana, 2009; Bebchuk & Fried, 2009). Most studies have 
admitted a limitation to the generalisation of findings due to the non-inclusion of variables 
to measure the implications of reputation effects from dishonest MPR. Maas & Rinsum 
(2013: 1182) for instance confirm that 
 
“Care should be taken in generalising our results…… we examined a one-period 
situation, ignoring reputation effects. Outside of the laboratory, however, reputation 
effects are likely to play an important role in shaping managerial reporting decisions. A 
related issue is that we used a setting with zero probability that an overstatement would 
be exposed with absolute certainty or would have detrimental monetary consequences…. 
also, overstatements will generally be punished. Future research is needed to address 




H2 For Business Managers, HPR of a scenario involving an immediate pay-off will 
be lower than HPR involving a deferred pay-off. 
 
The idea in this study is to signal a form of control from the possibility of future detection 
(e.g. audits) even though subjects could reasonably estimate that it was impractical to do 




Fisher et al. (2007) confirm that capped pay-offs adversely affect performance. Yang 
(2009), as well as Goffman (1959), confirms that a strong motivation for misreported MPR 
occurs when actual performance is below expectation. Therefore, it is reasonable to 
expect that when capped bonuses result in low performance pay-offs, agents will be 
motivated to purposefully misreport MPR to mitigate any adverse effect from low 
performance. Jensen (2003) confirms that capping of pay-offs motivates agents to 
attempt to game the system, withhold or distort information and hence affecting the 
credibility of performance reporting. Therefore 
 
H3 For Business Managers, HPR of a scenario with capped pay-off will be lower 
than HPR of a scenario with an uncapped pay-off. 
 
The study runs a scenario of capped pay offs to test Evans et al. (2001) finding for a 
“production hurdle” that places a cap on potential payoffs. Antle & Eppen (1985) and Antle 
& Fellingham (1995) argue that in real business situations, ‘production hurdles’ are critical 
decision variables in behavioural disposition. Evans et al. (2001) ask for further tests of 
his ‘distributional’ hypotheses. 
 
Considering the earlier discussions about the appropriateness of students as surrogates 
for practicing managers within an experimental setting, we postulate further that;  
 
H4 The mean HPR for students will be significantly different from the mean HPR for 
business managers across the various experiment groups.  
 
3.4.2. Predicting HPR: - Factors That Influence HPR 
 
In a multi-actor principal agent setting, agents may misreport MPR to a principal if the 
perceived utility of dishonesty exceeds the perceived utility of truthfulness relative to the 
reporting relationship with other principals or agents. Yang (2009), suggests that in such 
a setting, misreported MPR is likely to occur when (1) there is a perceived benefit 
(material or otherwise) from the deliberate misreporting (such as getting a reward or 
avoiding punishment) and (2) the misreporting cannot be detected due to information 
asymmetry. The critical difference between a multi actor principal agent relationship and 
the CAT lies in the perception of utility. Under the multi actor model, the principle of 
relativity (between principals and other agents) plays a critical role in the evaluation of 
utility. 
 
Therefore, to enhance HPR, principal(s) must reduce the perceived benefits of deception 
and/or reduce information asymmetry.  Waterman, Rouse & Wright (2004) argue that in 
a multi-actor setting the opportunities for misreported MPR based on reasons of 
information asymmetry are minimal due to the possibility of information leakage. 
However, Yang (2009) suggests that in public organisations the long run is hardly 
considered. This study argues that the constructs of contracts and performance 
measurements systems in business organisations currently reward short-term efforts 
over long run efforts (Heclo, 1977). Therefore, business managers (agents) hardly 
consider the long run in decision-making. Also, the principle of bounded rationality (Simon 
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1990, 1991) may reduce the likelihood of information leakage as well as the probability 
that any such leakage will influence stakeholder action. Additionally, information 
asymmetry is still likely to exist regardless of information leakage as stakeholders cannot 
constantly keep track of all activities within multiple relationships. As well, the definition 
of a long run can be ambiguous. Keynes (1923) argues that ‘in the long run we are all 
dead’. 
 
Following on from existing studies, we propose a four-phased approach (solution) for 
dealing with the dilemma of improving HPR. Our model postulates that HPR within 
organisations can be influenced by interplay and confluence of economic, environmental, 
organisational and individual cognitive factors (see table 3.7).  
 
Table 3.7: Proposed Predictive Variables Of HPR 
















case of multiple 
agents) 
Stakeholder participation in 
performance management and 
measurement 
The existence of an innovative 
performance Culture 
The existence of well-designed 
management control systems (belief 
boundary systems) with well 
communicated business rules, 
organisational values and code of 
conduct 
Harmonised internal organisation 




case of multiple 
principals): - Dull 
2006; Rainey 
2003 
Less complex and diversified 
environmental sub factors 
Less dynamic and more stable 




3.4.2.1. Economic Incentive 
 
This is based on existing empirical evidence from CAT and proposes that an appropriate 
economic incentive structure can align the interest of agents and principals, increasing 
the disutility for lying and improving HPR. Baiman & Lewis (1989) suggest that monetary 
incentive is perhaps the most critical factor in an agents’ decision to misreport MPR. 
Gneezy (2005) suggests that in an organisation without any formal control and penalty 
for lying, individuals are motivated by the size of the monetary incentive to be dishonest.  
 
Similarly, Evans et al. (2001) find evidence to suggest that the extent of HPR may depend 
on how a firm divides business profit among the firm and management (agents) but 
Erickson, Hanlon & Maydew (2006) find evidence to the contrary. Therefore, even though 
Yang (2009) suggests economic incentives for HPR rather encourages misreported MPR, 
especially when there are performance gaps, rather than mitigate it, the literature is 
overwhelming in its documentation of appropriate economic incentives as a mitigation 
measure for dishonest MPR. For ease of measurement, the construct of the research 
questionnaire measures monetary incentives as a proxy for the economic incentive.  
 
However, empirical evidence suggests that the utility function of all economic actors are 
different. Therefore the construct of an incentive structure must be based on a unique 
assessment of the preferences, interest and expectations of the relevant economic actors 
(Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000; Rabin,1993; Schmidt, 1999; Bolton, 1991).  
 
This study postulates that HPR can be induced by monetary incentive, even though this 
can be expensive for the organisation (Luft & Shields 2009). Gino & Pierce (2010) suggest 
that HPR can be affected by employee perception of the inequity from wealth distribution 
that is randomly or non-randomly assigned. Huseman et al., (1987) assert that people 
evaluate fairness by comparing their input-outcome ratio to a similar ratio of a “referent 
other” such as a co-worker.  Perception of unfairness causes emotional distress that can 
result in misreported MPR (Gino & Pierce 2010). Lazear (1989) and Prendergast (1999) 
suggest that agents will consciously misreport MP based on the incentive structure to 
derive short-term gain or long term pay-off (Duggan & Levitt 2002; Fehr & Gachter 2000).  
 
This is particularly the case in a scenario of reward discrepancies and when reward 
discrepancies are based on a subjective managerial evaluation of employees or the value 
of the organisation (Gino & Pierce 2010). This is because most employees are over 
confident in their abilities (Zenger 1992) and will find a subjective and less transparent 
reward allocation as unfair and inequitable. Greenberg (2002; 1987; 1990) has suggested 
that an agent’s perception of fairness affects performance and encourages misreported 
MP when there are performance gaps (Schwarzwald et al. 1992). 
 
As well, when compensation is linked to the performance of others, agents are often 
motivated to misrepresent that performance to achieve a higher reward for themselves 





Therefore,   
 
H5 A fair economic incentive (INC) is positively associated with HPR 
 
Yang (2001) acknowledges that incentive structure remains a relevant consideration in 
HPR, even though he excludes it as a variable in his model construct. According to Devine 
(1966), measurement is a process that requires extremely high levels of abstraction. This 
study measures economic incentive through an index of four factors adapted from various 
sources including Kacmar & Carlson (1997) Perception of Organizational Politics scale 
(POPS) under the pay and promotion subscale and Gino & Pierce (2009a and 2010).  
These factors measure the existence of an incentive structure, its transparency, and 
perception of fairness.  
 
3.4.2.2. A Conducive Control Environment 
 
Rather than an extensive effort to monitor MP through third parties, such as auditors, 
(although relevant from a ‘confidence signalling’ perspective), this study hypothesises that 
a conducive control environment, within an organisational setting, can induce HPR. The 
conducive control environment is conceptualised as an environment with (1) high 
participation of relevant stakeholders in performance measurement and management (2) 
a high innovative performance culture (3) well designed management control systems 
that are widely communicated and (4) a harmonised internal environment devoid of 
hostile internal politics. 
 
Stakeholder participation in performance management means stakeholders are actively 
involved in designing performance indicators, establishing performance targets, collecting 
data, analysing data and reporting results (Yang, 2001). Epstein, Coates & Wray (2005) 
confirm that stakeholder involvement in performance management can improve the 
relationship between agents and shareholders. Yang (2009) suggests that the resulting 
reduction in hostility between agents and principals enhances honest communication 
(Garnett, 1992), reduces information asymmetry by improving process-based trust 
(Zucker, 1986) and facilitates expression of stakeholder expectations to reduce ambiguity 
(Worsham & Gatrell 2005). A critical balance, however, has to be achieved to ensure that 
stakeholder participation does not result in undue interference from interest groups or 
micro management of all agency activities. Therefore,  
 
H6 Stakeholder participation in performance measurement (PERF) is positively 
associated with HPR. 
 
Stakeholder participation in performance measurement is measured by an index of five 
factors adapted from Yang (2009) with some modifications to suit private organisations. 
These factors capture the extent of involvement of shareholders (through BODs) in 
performance indicator design and the extent to which regulators influence key 
performance targets (Melkers & Willoughby 2005). It also captures the extent of 
involvement of employees in performance management design and the level of familiarity 
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of regulators with measurement targets and performance results (Epstein, Coates & 
Wray, 2005). 
 
Brehm & Gates (1999), Dilulio (1994) and Miller & Whitford (2006) demonstrate that a 
strong performance culture that encourages agents to internalise value preferences of 
the principal can encourage innovation. This is because innovation is a key dimension of 
organisational culture (O’Reilly, Chatman & Caldwell, 1991).  Yang (2009) confirms in his 
studies that, a culture that values honesty can improve HPR.  Grover (2005) suggests 
that an organisation that makes honesty an essential part of its culture risks driving 
dishonesty underground, however De Lancer Julnes & Holzer (2001) find a correlation 
between innovation culture and performance management.  Since group culture has been 
found to improve external communication of organisations performance (Pandey & 
Garnett 2006), this study argues that innovation culture will improve HPR. This is because 
innovation culture is in essence similar to group culture (Yang 2009) and intellectual 
honesty is an essential element of innovation culture (Amabile 1988; Ahmed 1998). A 
culture that promotes new ideas and creativity supports responsible risk taking, 
experimentation and initiative and tolerates errors is more likely to improve HPR. 
Therefore,  
 
H7 A high innovative performance culture (INNOVATE) is positively associated with 
HPR. 
 
This study measures innovative performance culture using an index of four items adapted 
from Schein (1985), Yang (2009), Zeitz, Johannesson & Ritchie (1997) as well as Sarros 
et al. (2005), with some modifications. The indexes measure values, leadership 
commitment to innovation and organisation support for innovation. 
 
Maas & Rinsum (2013) find that the tendency to misreport MPR is affected by the design 
of the control system. They argue that in an organisation with an “open information 
system” (Evans et al., 2001]), where performance reports are openly shared, misreported 
MPR is mitigated. Management control systems (MCS hereafter) are essentially all 
methods and procedures applied by management in the safeguarding of an organisations 
asset. Simon (1995; 2000) suggests that an appropriately designed MCS can moderate 
the tensions between personal self-interest and organisational interest and drive a focus 
on ‘organisational wide’ perspectives. Henri (2006) and Naranjo Gill & Hartman (2007) 
find evidence to confirm this. A well-designed MCS combines effectively values (belief 
systems such as mission statements, statement of purpose etc.) and rules (boundary 
systems such as code of conducts and standard operating procedures) to influence 
agents’ behaviour (Simon 1995; 2000) and may encourage HPR (Widener 2007; Mazar 
et al. 2008).  
 
Essentially while beliefs systems seek to reinforce the core value and purpose of 
existence of the organisation, boundary systems seek to communicate actions that 
employees must avoid with appropriate sanctions for default. According to Coleman 
(1990), credible sanctions reinforce appropriate behaviour.  Various studies have 
identified a limitation with their findings for not considering the effects of sanctions of 
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dishonest behaviour (see for example Paz et al. 2013). Even though recent studies have 
sought to explore the possibility that a boundary system could be perceived as a 
constraint on freedom for agents with individualist cognitive orientation (Dillard & Shen 
2005) resulting in psychological reactance (Brehm & Brehm 1981), based on reactance 
theory, which can result in misreported MPR (Waterman, 1981; Seeman et al., 2008), the 
results have been inconclusive. This study argues that a well-designed MCS that 
effectively communicates values and rules will enhance HPR. Agents will at least reflect 
on well-communicated and internalised beliefs and boundary systems when confronted 
with an ethical dilemma. Sprinkle (2003) and Cohen et al. (2007) suggest the need for 
further studies that combine the governance systems with other variables in studying 
HPR. Therefore, 
 
H8 A well communicated belief and boundary system (MCS) is positively associated 
with HPR. 
 
The study measures MCS using an index of seven factors. These factors cover the clear 
existence and communication of belief and value systems, sanctions for default, rewards 
for compliance and leadership adherence to belief and value systems. This is based on 
an adaptation of the experiment of Mazar et al. (2008).  
 
Following on from the multi actor principal agent model, we view organisations as a loose 
network of cliques and coalitions with varied interest (Pfeffer 1981; Cyert & March, 1963), 
rather than an integrated rational system (Yang 2009). The internal politics, interactions 
and dynamism within an organisation have been linked with performance management 
in recent times (De Lancer Julnes & Holzer 2001; McDavid & Hawthorn, 2006). Whereas 
Pfeffer (1981) considers internal organisational politics a neutral concept with no 
consequence on an organisation, Ferris et al (1989) argues that all organisational politics 
is necessarily detrimental and that the subjective perception of workplace politics whether 
or not actual often has adverse consequences on performance through producing 
conflicts that have adverse effects on employee morale, employee commitment and job 
satisfaction (Porter 1976; Gandz & Murray 1980; Miller, Rutherford & Kolodinsky 2008; 
Rosen, Levy & Hall 2006). For this study, hostile politics and internal dynamics are 
conceptualised as the opposite of harmonised internal politics and dynamics and defined 
to encompass behaviours that are self-serving, and not officially sanctioned by the 
organisation (Yang 2009). Since hostile internal politics adversely affects all forms of 
communication (Amabile et al. 1996; Damanpour 1991), it is negatively correlated with 
HPR. This is because hostile internal politics can generate excessive conflicts and 
unhealthy competitive behaviour. Grover (1993; 2005) suggests that often, competition 
and conflicts encourage lying. Therefore, 
 
H9 Non-Hostile internal politics (POLITICS) is positively associated with HPR. 
 
Internal politics is measured by an index of five factors derived from an adaptation and 
modification of Kacmar & Carlsons (1997) POPS under the subsections ‘general political 




3.4.2.3. External Environment 
 
According to the threat rigidity theory, potential external threats, actual or perceived could 
influence an organisation to centralise controls, conserve resources, restrict information 
flow and avoid risk taking (Staw, Sanderland & Dutton, 1981). The restriction of 
information flow could affect effective communication and hence HPR. 
 
In line with the measurement of other variables in this study, this study measures 
employees’ perception of uncertainty within the task environment rather than an 
‘objective’ measure of any such uncertainty. Other studies such as Govindarajan, (1984); 
Dill, (1958) Lawrence & Lorsch (1967), Duncan (1972), Weick (1969) Downey & Slocum 
(1975) and Downey et al. (1975), have used and/or supported this approach.  
 
Essentially the environment is viewed as a source of information that can result in 
organisational changes based on the actors’ perception of the information (Govindarajan, 
1984). Often the instrument used to measure perceived environmental uncertainty, by 
researchers, is the instrument developed by Miles & Snow, (1978) with slight 
modifications.  Adopting the Miles & Slow (1987) approach, Govindarajan, (1984) asked 
decision makers to indicate on a Likert Scale the predictability or unpredictability of a set 
of factors (such as competitor action, raw materials supply and availability, government 
regulations etc.), within the context of their business unit. A score was computed as a 
simple average of responses and was interpreted as an index of the perceived 
environmental uncertainty 
 
Unlike Govindarajan, (1984), this study seeks to elicit responses from employees who 
may not necessarily be key decision makers within their organisation. Moreover, the 
concept of predictability may be ambiguous especially to employees who may not be key 
decision makers. As an example, it is perfectly possible for an employee to consider a 
Just in Time (JIT) system as an indication of unpredictable raw material supply either 
because he is not aware of the deliberate organisational strategy not to stock raw 
materials, or the occasional mishap from logistical constraints that affect timely delivery. 
It is this researchers’ opinion that where logistical constraints (which is often well within 
managements control to alter), results in disruptive and hence unpredictable supply for 
raw materials, that cannot be classified as resulting from environmental uncertainty.  
Inherent in the differentiating definition of external environment is the concept of ‘beyond 
the control of internal management’. Because of this limitation of the Miles & Slow (1987), 
approach, significant modifications were made (see question B17) and other observable 
variables (based on literature) were included to measure perceived environmental 
uncertainty.  
 
Duncan (1972) conceptualises perceived environmental uncertainty as having two 
dimensions. These are (1) dynamism and/or turbulence and (2) complexity. Rainey 
(2013) introduces other dimensions such as stability, fragmentation, homogeneity, 
resource scarcity and relative power of interest groups.  This study argues that Duncan’s’ 
(1972) definition is a relevant conceptualisation of the environment especially as all the 
other dimensions proposed by Rainey (2003) can be fitted under the dimensions of 
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turbulence or complexity. This study argues that the existence of multiple principals’ affect 
HPR based on the extent of certainty with which their actions can be predicted. The level 
of dynamism and the level of complexity of the actions of principals from the perspective 
of the agent measure this certainty. 
 
Complexity is a measure of the heterogeneity or diversity in environmental sub factors 
(Teopaco 1993; Chae & Hill 1997). As complexity increases, the ability to reduce 
information asymmetry also decreases as well as the ability of agents to stay focused on 
critical activities of principals (Black & Farias 1997; Farell 1998; Conner 1998). A key 
measure of complexity will be the number of perceived external stakeholders and the 
changes in that number over time.  
 
Also, the extent of diversity among the interest of various stakeholder groups could affect 
perceptions of complexity. If stakeholder participation improves HPR, then it is logical to 
conclude that difficulty in encouraging stakeholder participation that may result from a 
high number of diverse stakeholders will hurt HPR. Similarly, as the number and diversity 
of stakeholders increase, in a multi-actor principal-agent relationship, information quality 
and HPR may reduce due to the higher number of targeted communication and different 
reports that must be done by agents.  
 
Complexity can introduce ambiguities into strategy (cost leadership versus 
differentiation), goal congruence, structure and the extent of formalisation of business 
processes and procedures. Dynamism or Turbulence measures rapid, frequent and 
unexpected changes in environmental sub dimensions (Conner 1998; Vorhies 1998). 
These changes are often caused by changes in and interaction between environmental 
factors such as advancement in technology, regulation and competitive forces (McKenna 
1991; Samli 1993; Iansiti 1995).  
 
Environmental turbulence drives pressure for innovation, greater business growth and a 
general difficulty in reducing information asymmetry as well as monitoring the 
unobservable behaviour of agents (Davis et al. 1991). Milliken (1987) suggests that high 
levels of environmental uncertainty are related to strategies that increase diversification 
within an organisation to diminish its vulnerability to effects of environmental conditions.  
 
Whereas Yang (2009) study suggests no direct relationship between an organisation's 
external environment and HPR, this study argues that a direct relationship exists in a multi 
actor principal agent relationship. Therefore, 
 
H10 A favourable external environment (ENV) is positively associated with HPR. 
 
Environmental constructs are difficult to measure (Yang 2009). However, several studies 
have used the scale developed by Duncan (1972) although with some modification (e.g. 
Anderson & Kida 1985; Brown & Schwab 1984; Mccabe 1990).  The study measures the 
environment through reflective measures that assess the quality of an organisations 
interface with its environment (Whicker, Strickland & Olshfski 1993). These measures 
only manifest rather than mirror the external environment. Yang (2009) adopts a similar 
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approach in the study of variables in his study. This study modifies Duncan’s scale to 
include important constructs from Miles & Snow (1978) designed to mitigate the identified 
weaknesses in Duncan’s scale (see table 3.7 for ENV dimensions applied in this study). 
 
The conceptual approach this study adopts in predicting the quality of an organisation-
environment interface assumes that environmental uncertainty is determined by the 
extent of predictability of conditions in the environment.  
 
Table 3.7: Environmental Dimensions And The Observed Variables Used To Measure 
Environmental Dimension Manifest Measure Used In This Study 
Complexity The changes to the number of key stakeholders over a period 
The perceived homogeneity or alignment among stakeholder 
interest. 
Dynamism and Turbulence The frequency of changes to products and production process 
(innovation). 
The extent of business diversification  
The extent of decentralised decision making 
 
3.4.2.4. Characteristics Of The Perpetuators: - Individual Cognitive 
Orientation. 
 
Various scholarships have confirmed that reporting behaviour is correlated with individual 
characteristics (Serota et al. 2010; Halevy, Shalvi & Verschuere 2014; Kashy & DePaulo 
1996; Healy & Healy 1916). 
 
Halevy et al. (2014) conclude that “Taken together, our findings contribute to the 
developing debate regarding the role of individual differences in lying behaviour. We 
provide solid evidence showing that both self-reports regarding lying frequency and 
cheating in the lab are correlated and associated with certain individual characteristics. 
This evidence strengthens the need to continue investigating the role of individual 
differences in deceptive communication, as clearly such individual differences matter. 
While situational factors are likely to play a role in the decision to lie or cheat, as lying or 
cheating is easier or more appealing in some situations, certain personality traits 
seemingly make some of us more prone to deceptive behaviour than others”.  
 
Schweiger (1985) defines cognition as the ‘characteristic or habitual process by which 
individuals gather and evaluate information. Most management literature interchange 
cognition with terms such as problem solving or decision-making styles (Schweiger, 
1985). A growing body of research is focused on how individual characteristics affect 
moral judgments and ethical decision-making (Seybert 2010; Hobson et al. 2011). 
Research has suggested that within certain organisational contexts, such as where it is 
difficult to observe the behaviour of agents or to measure output, employing persons on 
the basis of their attributes or characteristics can mitigate moral hazard (Campbell et al., 
2012; Merchant 1985). Fischer & Huddart (2008) also show that organisations can benefit 
from considering individual ethical types in designing an organisational structure. Church 
et al. (2014) encourage principals to employ mechanisms to identify the ethical types of 
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their employees. Luft (1997), and Mittendorf (2006) argue that the magnitude of disutility 
from dishonest MPR varies among individuals. This argument suggests that managers 
may have different inherent preferences for HPR, which makes them predisposed to 
report in a particular manner (Church et al., 2014). For instance, Hobson et al. (2011) 
show that personal values influence an individual’s moral judgement. 
 
An implicit assumption in the literature suggests that persons at a higher level of moral 
reasoning are likely to act more “morally” than those at a lower moral development stage 
(Munhall 1979). However, Ketefan (1981) indicates that such thinking perhaps emanates 
from the often-used categorisation of moral development stages into ‘post conventional’ 
or ‘principled’ rather than from a body of empirical evidence. Kohlberg (1975) proposes a 
correlation between moral reasoning (i.e. stage of moral development) and behavioural 
choices by suggesting that moral behaviour is likely to be more consistent, predictable 
and “responsible” at higher stages of moral development. This hypothesis has been 
supported by research especially regarding cheating and dishonesty (Blasi 1980; Brown 
& Hernstein 1975; Grim, Kohlberg & White 1968; Schwatz, Feldman, Brown & 
Heingartner 1969). Kohlberg  (see table 3.8) suggests that moral thinking influences 
behavioural choices by providing a cognitive definition of a persons’ frame of rights and 
duties in any situation. 
 
Admittedly, even though previous studies have confirmed a form of relationship between 
moral reasoning and behavioural choices, the nature of the relationship is not clear. There 
is a general difficulty in understanding how behavioural choices and moral reasoning 
relate at the different stage of moral development. 
 
A proposal to bridge the gap may lie with cognitive orientation (see table 3.8). Cognitive 
orientation (i.e. individualism – collectivism theory) distinguishes between two types of 
personality tendencies of people (Chow et al. 2001; Ilies et al. 2007).  Individualism 
underlies a cognitive orientation of a person who pursues personal interest over group 
interest because gratification from personal interest is perceived to be higher than 
gratification from group interest (Triandis & Gelfand 1998; Wagner 1995; Wagner & Moch. 
1986). In such a case, the cognitive orientation of individuals is defined by individualism, 
self-service and disassociation. Collectivists, however, rank team interest over individual 
interest (Kim et al. 1994; Wagner 1995; Eby & Dobbins 1997, Gundlach et al., 2006). 
Collectivism as an orientation differs from traditional group attraction constructs such as 
cohesiveness (Eby & Dobbins 1997) in that collectivism is context free and hence is not 
affected by the nature of the task at hand or the incentive systems in place (Wagner & 
Moch 1986).  
 
Underlying Kohlberg’s moral development stages, which is presented in table 3.8 below, 
is the focus on self, or a few persons or wider society to form reasoning and guide moral 
thinking and perhaps, moral thinking has a relationship with behavioural choices. 
Kohlberg argues that the stage of universal principles is a theoretical stage and difficult 
to distinguish from the stage of social contacts and individual rights. Turiel & Rothman 
(1972) find that relationships between moral reasoning and behavioural choices are more 
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consistent from sub-stage four; Rothman (1976) in a further study includes sub-stage 
three. 
 
It is possible to stipulate that an organisation that has a predominant set of collectivists 
as employees will report honestly relative to an organisation with a predominant set of 
individualists.  The appeal of group interest may be effective in mitigating any antisocial 
self-interest and encourage accepted behaviour except in rare cases where the entire 
organisation has a culture of cheating and lying. In such a case the pressures of group 
acceptance may encourage dishonest MPR. However, the possibility of a diverse 
cognitive orientation makes it difficult for such organisational wide cultures to exist. 
 
H11: A predominant set of collectivists (IND) within an organisation is positively 
associated with HPR.  
 
Collectivism is measured by a set of variables drawn from an adaptation of Kohlberg’s 
scale (hence the reason for attempting to establish a relationship), Yaniaguchi (1994) and 
Naranjo-Gil et al. (2012). The variables measure perception of the strength of leaders and 
employees’ values, the sense of collective responsibility, the focus on a personal 
relationship outside the work environment etc.  
 
This study could have followed other studies in measuring personal characteristics by 
administering instruments to identify individual types using a certain type of personality 
inventory. In line with a similar approach adopted by Church et al. (2014), this study 
argues that individual characteristics as measured by such personality inventory may not 
necessarily carry on to the experimental setting. Prior research argues that individual 
characteristics are context specific (Brown 1996; Dohmen et al. 2011; Koutsos et al. 
2008). Church et al. (2014) argue that ‘type classiﬁcation’ based on observed behaviour 
is arguably more reliable than that based on responses to hypothetical questions’. Chun 
(2005) suggests that ‘validity problems occur when researchers use an existing human 
personality scale directly for an organisational level study since some human virtue 
characters or personality items might not be relevant to an organisational context’. 
 
Even though there is evidence to support the argument that the use of psychological or 
behavioural measures (e.g., integrity tests) to help identify managers predisposed to 
report truthfully (Murphy 1993), reduces counterproductive behaviour and increases job 
performance (Brown et al. 1987, 1998; Ones et al. 1993; Robinson and Bennett, 1995), 
there are also concerns about the validity of those measures and their vulnerability to 
manipulation and biases (see, e.g., Guastello & Rieke 1991; Sackett et al., 1989, 1991; 
Sackett & Decker, 1979; Sackett & Harris, 1984). 
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Table 3.8: Kohlberg’s Moral Development Stages 




















Individualism Unpredictable and 











defined by the 





Collectivism Predictable and moral 




Stage 5: Social 
Contracts and 
Individual Rights 
Collectivism Predictable and moral 
behaviour and 
predominantly honest 
Stage 6: Universal 
Principles 




Table 3.8 above summarises Kohlberg’s moral development stages and postulate, for 
each stage, a dominate cognitive orientation as well as suggest (based on researchers 
synthesis) if behavioural tendencies are predictable. Huddart & Qu (2012) tests, using 
Kohlberg’s three stages of moral development, the reaction of individuals to positive 
(“sterling performance) or negative influences (“bad apples”) of their peers and find results 
consistent with Kohlberg’s expectation. They find that whereas ‘pre-conventional types’ 
respond to only “bad apples” who are dishonest, ‘conventional types’ respond more to 
“sterling performances” and ‘post conventional types’ are immune to any social 
influences. Following their findings, Huddart & Qu (2012) conclude that 
 
 “It is important for economic models to incorporate such type differences because the 
composition of agent types in a multi-agent setting may lead to different equilibrium 
outcomes”.  
 
Below (figure 3.2) is a diagrammatical depiction of the proposed relationship between 
personal, organisational, economic and environmental variables on which the hypotheses 
are based. All relationships in this model are proposed as positive direct relationships. 
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 Figure 3.2: Proposed Model On The Relationship Between Independent Variables And HPR 
Cognitive 
Development 
Environment Organisation Control  Economic Performance 
Report 































Even though the separation between the internal and external environments of an 
organization is common in management literature (O’Toole & Meier 1999), often the 
dichotomy between the external environment and the internal organisations may be 
blurred such that external factors may influence the internal environment and vice versa 
(Polonsky et al. 1999; Brooks & Weatherston 1997; Anderson et al. 1994; Ford 1997). 
Aside from the seven main hypotheses enumerated above, this study hypothesises also 
that: - 
 
H12 Stakeholder participation in performance measurement (PERF) is positively 
associated with a stronger innovation and performance culture (INNOVATE). 
 
Damanpour (1991) suggests that stakeholder participation is a form of external 
communication that encourages organisational innovation through the introduction of new 
ideas by stakeholders (Hult, Hurley & Knight 2004). Schon & Rein (1994) argue that 
stakeholder participation could reduce ambiguity around stakeholder preferences, 
increase sympathy towards stakeholders and energise innovation.  
 
H13 Supportive external environment (ENV) is positively associated with a stronger 
innovation and performance culture (INNOVATE). 
 
As discussed earlier, the threat rigidity theory suggests that a complex and turbulent 
external environment could minimise risk taking and influence organisations towards 
reliance on well tested routines and ways of working (Staw et al., 1981; Behn 2001).  
When the complexity and turbulence of the external environment is predictable 
organizational creativity increases, agents are likely to experiment with new ideas (Levin 
and Sanger 1994) and businesses may focus on long-term goals and innovation (Amabile 
et al. 1996; Cohen & Levinthal 1990; Damanpour 1991; O’Toole & Meier 2003; Rainey 
2003). 
 
H14 Supportive external environment (ENV) is positively associated with 
stakeholder participation in performance measurement (PERF). 
 
When the external environment is not overly complex and turbulent, agents are less 
hostile to external stakeholder participation in performance management. Additionally, 
external stakeholders will have few issues taking their attention and therefore will have 
the clarity of mind to participate in performance management with the ability to clearly 
monitor all the relevant variables. 
 
H15 Harmonious internal politics (POLITICS) is positively associated with a stronger 
innovation and performance culture (INNOVATE). 
 
Amabile et al. (1996) contend that hostile internal politics adversely affects effective 
communication, which is critical for innovation (Parker, Dipboye & Jackson 1995). This is 
because in a hostile internal environment the fear of the repercussion of mistakes will 




In summary, objective two uses a multi-item index with a Likert scale to solicit the 
perspective of employees on a variety of variables that are hypothesised to influence 
HPR. This study is based on the preposition that employees are best placed to indicate 
the extent of HPR within their organisations and the closed ended questionnaire that 
provides the opportunity for anonymity and a standardised base to evaluate these results 
is the appropriate research tool to use. HPR is measured through employees perception 
of honest managerial performance reporting (HPR) to shareholders, regulators, 
employees and the media. Yang, (2009); Chun (2005), and Cameron et al., (2004), 
adopted a similar approach of measuring HPR and organisational virtuousness 
respectively, through employee perspective on a Likert Scale. Yang (2009) argues that in 
the study of behavioural issues such as HPR, it is the perception that matters.  
 
Statements to measure HPR are phrased like this  
 
“When there are performance gaps, leaders of this organisation report honestly to 
regulators”.  
 
The Likert scale ranges from ‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly agree’. A definition and 
scenario of HPR are provided as part of the questionnaire to reduce ambiguity. The use 
of the words “Leaders of this organisation” rather than say “leaders of your/our 
organisation” is adopted from Yang (2009) and prevents the pressures of self-involvement 
from affecting the responses. An alternative approach will have been to frame the 
question as “When there are performance gaps, this organisation reports honestly to its 
regulators”. Chun (2005) argues that in order to capture the complexity of human 
behaviour within an organisation, the ‘company as a person’ metaphor serves a useful 
purpose of aiding understanding of a targeted concept and hence it is accepted and not 
uncommon to see a personification approach used in defining specific characters as 
perceived by both internal and external stakeholders. The ‘company as a person 
metaphor’ may well have served the same purposes but following on from Chun (2005) 
perhaps it is more useful in the study of characters than behaviour.  
 
Moreover, HPR is a multidimensional measure, and hence the relevant dimensions will 
be correlated with some measure of HPR (Chun 2005). Therefore, the inclusion of an 
overall question of the extent of honesty in managerial performance reporting (questions 
B1-B6), as a dependent variable, assessed with a seven-point Likert scale is not to 
develop an HPR construct but to test if the hypothesised factors that affect HPR have 
predictive value. In such a case, Yi (1990) argues that a one-item measure of overall 
performance criteria (such as HPR in this case or say, customer satisfaction) adequately 
serves the purpose.  
 
To ensure the validity of the entire research, the experiments will be performed (in the 
order indicated in section 3.5) before the questionnaires are administered. This is 
because the questionnaires may give away the objective of the research if they are 
administered before or with the experiments. A critical eliminate of validity for the 
experiments is to ensure that participants are not aware of the reason for the research. 
All questionnaires will be subject to the same methodology for sampling and validity 
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checks. It is possible that participants in the experiments may also become respondents 
for the questionnaire, but this will not be by deliberate design and does not interfere with 
the credibility of findings. 
 
Following the administration of the closed ended questionnaire, a limited number of 
interviews will be conducted with senior management (about 30 interviews) to collaborate 
any significant findings from the analysis of the questionnaire. Chun (2005) studies 
organisational characteristics from the perspective of employees and customers using 
structured questionnaires and interviews. 
 
3.4.3. The Relationship Between HPR And FP 
 
An earlier session in this chapter (section 3.3.3.1.) explains the theoretical basis for 
exploring this relationship. The hypotheses for this section of the study mainly emanates 
from Stakeholder Theory.  
 
This study posits that HPR has a direct and indirect effect (through stakeholder 
satisfaction) on FP. The relationship between HPR and stakeholder satisfaction, for 
instance, can be explained through the normative approach to stakeholder relationship 
management.  The normative approach posits that (1) stakeholders have a legitimate 
interest in the organisation and this interest is not related in any way to organisational 
actions and (2) each stakeholder has intrinsic worth (Dolason & Preston, 1995). 
Therefore, encouraging HPR improves stakeholder satisfaction because of the intrinsic 
worth of stakeholder interest, even if there are no perceived direct benefits to the 
organisation itself.  Impliedly a positive relationship can be posited between HPR and 
stakeholder satisfaction (such as employee satisfaction) to the extent that a firm 
successfully satisfies the reporting requirements of stakeholders. 
 
Reporting requirements of an organisation will be influenced by the expectations of 
stakeholders with whom an organisation interacts. Bearing in mind that HPR is, in 
essence, a perception (Yang, 2009), the way an organisation responds to stakeholder 
reporting requirements could stimulate trust and commitment between stakeholders and 
their organisation. Considering that stakeholders expect an honest representation of 
performance from management (Ferrell et al., 2000), the resulting improvement in trust 
and commitment will result in higher satisfaction (Fritz et al., 1999, Strong et al., 2001) 
especially as stakeholders will feel that their voices are being heard. Therefore, if a firm 
successfully follows the normative approach of understanding the reporting requirements 
of stakeholders, and adhering to such requirements, it is likely to achieve more 
stakeholder satisfaction. The positive and direct influence of stakeholder satisfaction on 
FP has been empirically proven in several studies.  
 
Social exchange theory (Gouldner, 1960) suggests that employees engage in a mutual 
contingent exchange of gratification with their organisations. When such organisations 
report responsibly and truthfully, it improves employee motivation as well as effort with its 




This is because, employees use an overall fairness heuristic to decide about relationships 
with their organisations (Tevino & Weaver, 2001) and often perceive HPR as a 
demonstration of fairness to stakeholders (Colquitt, 2004). 
 
HPR has a positive effect on employee satisfaction because employees, like other 
stakeholders, expect the organisation and its managers to report managerial performance 
honestly. To the extent that this is achieved, employees are willing to expend efforts, 
which in turn enhance performance.  Considering that fairness is a primary social 
expectation that guides employee perception and subsequent behaviour, a company that 
reports managerial performance honestly can create a friendly and ethical working 
environment which reflects organisational practices with moral consequences (Wimbus, 
Shepard & Markham, 1997; Naumann & Bennett, 2000). HPR reassures employees 
about their status within the organisation (Tyler & Blader, 2003). The relationship between 
employee satisfaction and firm performance has been suggested by Anderson et al. 
(1994) and proven in various studies. Yoon & Suh (2003) collaborate this finding and 
argue that satisfied employees work harder and deliver better quality services which 
improve customer satisfaction Babakus et al. (2004), as well as, Howard & Gengler 
(2001) argue that customer satisfaction improves quality of service and firm financial 
performance. Management literature provides several empirical pieces of evidence that 
confirm that improved stakeholder satisfaction positively influences financial performance 
of a firm. Riordan, Gatewood & Bill (1997) also find evidence that employee perception 
can influence employee job satisfaction. This rational is captured in the hypothesis: - 
 
H16 HPR has a directly significant and positive influence on Employee Satisfaction 
(C10). 
 
According to social identity theory, people identify with organisations they perceive as (1) 
highly prestigious and with a credible image, (2) and the organisation's identity can 
enhance their self-esteem (Pratt, 1998; Ashforth & Mael, 1989). This explains why 
employees care about HPR and develop positive perceptions about organisations that 
engage in HPR. That is, the favourable public reputation from HPR (Fombrum & Shanley, 
1990) improves employees’ self-esteem and their perceptions. 
 
H17 HPR has a directly significant and positive influence on Employee perception 
of FP (C5, C6 & C7). 
 
ROA is the variable widely used in empirical studies of financial performance 
(Boaventura, Silva, Bandeira De-Mello, 2012). The institutional approach to stakeholder 
theory posits that stakeholder’s orientation is a source of competitive advantage, which 
drives improved financial performance. This approach suggests that stakeholder 
management has a strategic rather than intrinsic value and is therefore only a means to 
an end (Berman et al., 1999). Accordingly, stakeholders have legitimate authority over 
the organisation and will exercise this authority (withdraw resources etc.) if management 
misreports performance. HPR, therefore, ensure continuous support and commitment 
from stakeholders, which results in superior financial performance (Hosmer, 1994; 
Stevens et al., 2005). Various studies have confirmed the role of disclosure on firm 
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performance through the resulting effect on the efficient allocation of resources (Healy & 
Palepu, 2001). Other studies (such as Nielson, 2012) confirm that ‘powerful’ external 
stakeholders are influenced in their conclusions, perceptions and subsequent action by 
employee perceptions. Therefore 
 
H18 HPR has a directly significant and positive influence on ROA. 
 
H19 HPR has a directly significant and positive influence on ROCE. 
 
Intangible assets such as good reputation, trust and commitment are generated through 
HPR (Fombrum et al. 2000). This improves the ability of the firm to have access to 
resources, enhance performance and build a competitive edge while still satisfying 
stakeholder needs (Hosmer, 1994). 
 
3.5. ORDER OF THE RESEARCH APPROACH 
 
Figure 3.3 summarises the overall methodological framework applied in this study. The 
various research methodologies were administered in the order below to ensure cohesion 
and validity of findings. 
 
1) OBJ 1: Use experiments to reassess the empirical evidence of mangers 
preference for being honest in reporting their performance. To ensure validity and 
credibility of findings, four experiments were performed in this order: -  
 
Experiment 1 Individual Scenario Immediate Pay-off Payoff is uncapped 
Experiment 2 Organization Scenario Immediate Pay-off Payoff is uncapped 
Experiment 3 Organization Scenario Immediate Pay-off Payoff is capped 
Experiment 4 Organization Scenario Future Pay-off Payoff is uncapped 
 
Experiment two, three, and five were tested simultaneously among different sub groups. 
2) OBJ 2, OBJ 3 & OBJ 5 will be tested together: A close ended questionnaire (with 
limited interviews) on a seven-point Likert scale was used to test managers 
understanding of the implications of misreported MPR, the factors that influence 
HPR as well as MPR practices within GC100 companies. This approach is cost 
effective, and feasible because the research instrument is similar, the sample 
selection process is similar, and the relationship between the three objectives 
makes it technically feasible to include questions to address all objectives without 
confusing the respondents.  
3) OBJ 4: Use various regression techniques to test the implications of HPR on firm 
performance. The construct of the independent variables for the regression 
equation depended on the validity of the hypotheses for objective three and two.  
4) Limited numbers of interviews were conducted with respondents to complement 
OBJ 2 (n=30), OBJ 3 (n=30), & OBJ 5 (n=15).  
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Figure 3.3: Overall Methodological Framework For This Study 
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3.5. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter summarises the mixed methods used in the study, highlighting, for each 
method, strength, weakness and mitigating measures. Experiments were used to test 
managers’ preference to be honest during the MPR process. The experiments used 
managers (rather than students) as respondents even though some students were 
used as a control group. Based on the findings of these experiments, the factors that 
influence HPR were investigated with hypotheses developed from theoretical 
modelling based on stakeholder theory and tested. To test the hypotheses, data was 
collected from employees within an organisation using structured questionnaires. To 
explore the relationship between HPR and FP, HPR was regressed on various 
measures of FP and a proposed model was tested using SEM. The perceptions of 
stakeholders on the implication of HPR is also explored using interviews and 
responses to a questionaire that measures stakeholder views on the likelihood of 
occurrence and estimated effects of misreported MPR. MPR behaviours among 
managerial groups in GC100, is also explored with responses to interviews and 
vignettes.  
 
Considering the sensitive nature of this research area, the choice of research 
method(s) was critical to avoid eliciting socially desirable responses (SDR). This 
resulted in the use of multiple methodologies and in some cases multiple categories 
of respondents. All hypotheses were based on theoretical modelling (Sekeran, 2003) 
and the framing of survey questions deliberately avoided the focus on self (Chun, 
2005; Yang, 2009). More importantly, in administering questionnaires within GC100 
organisations, employees rather than business managers were targeted as 
respondents. To avoid ambiguity, the definition and qualifying criteria for employees 
were communicated and provided as part of the questionnaire (See figure 2.1 in 
chapter two). Yang (2009) contends that employees offer a reliable basis for a study 
on MPR because they are not as directly affected by perceptions of misreporting within 
the organisation.  Figure 3.5 depicts how the research objectives help to address the 
primary research question.  
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Below (figure 3.4) is a modification of Hesse-Biber & Leavy (2006) as well as Low 
(2007) processes in data analysis and interpretation that summarises my approach to 
data analysis in the next chapter. The height of the bubbles represents the relative 
amount of raw data used in the task, while the width of the bubble represents the 




FIGURE 3.4: Data Analysis Approach Adopted In This Study 
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FIG. 3.5: How The Research Objectives Address The Primary Research Question 
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This chapter analyses the data from the research instruments and discusses the major 
findings. It also interlinks the key findings from each research objective to existing 
empirical work.  
 
4.1. REASSESSING THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF MANAGERS’ PREFERENCE 
FOR HPR. 
Three hundred (300) participants (150 business managers and 150 students) participated 
in the experiment. The experiments for business managers and students took place on 
different dates. This allowed for effective monitoring and logistics management. For the 
business managers (this process was replicated for the students), participants were 
grouped into three sub groups of fifty members (50) each and seated in different rooms 
even though all experiments took place at the same time. Four experimental sessions 
were conducted with experiment two, three and four taking place simultaneously. All 
participants participated in experiment one (involving the individual scenario). Then after, 
each group participated in a different experiment. This approach was used to save time 
and cost to the researcher. Previous studies have mitigated excessive payoff, by 
randomly selecting one response from a set of repeated procedures and basing payments 
on the randomly selected response. In such an approach, respondents cannot, with 
certainty, know the amount they are entitled to at the end of the exercise and could result 
in respondents perceiving the exercise as a game theoretic process and may, therefore, 
introduce biases in the responses provided. All business managers were employed and 
knew the performance management system within their organisations. Except for 
experiment one (1), all experiments consisted of four periods of performance reporting 
(Q1, Q2, Q3, and Q4).  
 
The first experiment (referred to as experiment one hereafter) involved a set of five 
multiple-choice questions on social issues in Ghana. No form of identification existed on 
the question sheet. The time allocated was five minutes after which the answers were 
displayed via a projector. Respondents were asked to mark their own scripts and record 
the answers on a separate sheet. Respondents were made aware that the payoff was 
USD1 for each correct answer and that the basis for payment was the recorded scores 
on the completed ‘return sheet’ that they complete. The researcher collected the answer 
sheets after the test. Cancellation of ticked answers was not allowed. Where a respondent 
wanted to change a previously ticked answer, the respondent could request for a new 
answer sheet. This was to prevent a scenario of answer changes during the self-marking 
process. No respondent requested for a new answer sheet. The researcher collected the 
question sheets with the marked answers carefully, in order of sitting arrangements. That 
is the question sheet for ‘seat one’ was picked before that of seat two et cetera.  After the 
experiment and in the absence of the respondents, the researcher re-marked all the 
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sheets and the scores compared with the scores on the return sheets submitted by the 
respondents.  
 
The second, third and fourth experiment involved a scenario with an organisational 
construct (See Appendix) allowing for a scenario where respondents could manipulate 
information to their benefit. 
 
For the business managers experiments, the average payoff, excluding the fixed pay-off 
of $5 for participation was $4.08 (minimum $1, maximum $5) for experiment one, $21.49 
(minimum $9.84, maximum $32) for experiment two, $22.40 (minimum $8.48, maximum 
$27) for experiment three and $19.34 (minimum $7.04, maximum $32) for experiment 
four. In total $4,524 was paid out (including the $5 for participation) at an exchange rate 
of 1USD= 3.75 GHS. For the students experiments, the average payoff, excluding the 
fixed pay-off of $5 for participation was $4.15 (minimum $0, maximum $5) for experiment 
one, $26.43 (minimum $13.28, maximum $32) for experiment two, $23.95 (minimum 
$8.48, maximum $27) for experiment three and $25.20 (minimum $12.88, maximum $32) 
for experiment four. In total $5,151 was paid out (including the $5 for participation) at an 
exchange rate of 1USD= 3.75 GHS. 
 
The second experiment involved a scenario with an organisational construct and an 
immediate uncapped payoff. The third experiment involved a scenario of an 
organisational construct with an immediate capped payoff. The payoff was capped at 
USD27. The fourth scenario involved a scenario of an organisational construct, with 
uncapped payoff but the payoff is not immediate. The fourth experiment probably provides 
credence to the current attempt by shareholders to pay bonuses at some future period 
rather than immediately. Table 4.9 provides a summary of HPR for each experimental 
scenario. 
 
The Chi square test of relatedness shows that demographics do not affect HPR scores 
for these groups of participants (See Table 4.1). In measuring demographics, I follow 
Kidwell et al. (1987) and measure GENDER, AGE, and NUMBER OF YEARS OF 
EMPLOYMENT. I include RELIGION in the demographic metrics. None of the 
demographic metrics is significantly related to HPR. This finding is consistent with 
O’Connell (1998) suggestion that in general, demographics have no bearing on ethical 
behaviour and MPR practices.  
 
Table 4.1: Chi Square Test 
  Value df      Asymp Sig (2 sided) 
Age 727.411 684 0.121 
Religion 1404.267 1596 1 
Gender 226.676 228 0.512 
Manager/Student 231.905 228 0.416 




Subsequently, I perform a T test of independence between GENDER and HPR (Tables 
4.2 & 4.3) and find no statistically significant difference between the mean HPR for 
females and male, t (298) = -0.886, p=0.367.  
 
Table 4. 2: T Test Of Independence Group Statistics 






HPR Female 150 .4808 .28062 .02291 
Male 150 .5111 .31139 .02543 
 
Table 4.3: Independent Samples Test 
Levenes Test 
for Equality of 
Variances 
    HPR Score 








F   3.016   
Sig   .083   
T Test for 
equality of 
means 
t   -.886 -.886 
df   298 294.832 
Sig. (2-tailed)   .376 .376 
Mean Difference   -.03032 -.03032 
Std. Error Difference   .03423 .03423 
95% Confidence 
Interval of Difference 
Lower 
-.09768 -.09768 
Upper .03704 .03704 
 
In confirming that students mean HPR scores are statistically and significantly different 
from business managers, I perform a t test of independence (Tables 4.4. & 4.5) and find 
a statistically significant difference in mean HPR scores between business managers 
(referred to as MANAGER in our statistical analysis) and students, t (298) = 7.149, 
p=0.000. The group statistics in table 4.4 confirms that business managers have 
significantly higher HPR means scores (0.61 ± 0.28) compared to students (0.39 ± 0.27). 
This difference in mean HPR scores is further confirmed by a 2 x 3 univariate analysis of 
variance (Two-way ANOVA) test between groups (Student vs Employee) and within 
groups (Experiment group 2, 3, and 4). The results of the two-way ANOVA is shown in 
tables 4.12 & 4.13 and provide evidence that whether a participant was a student or an 
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employee [t (1) =60.610; p=0.000], and/or the experimental manipulation [experiment 2, 
3, 4; t (2) =20.339; p=0.000] significantly affected the mean HPR score. 
 
Even though the two way ANOVA showed a statistically significant interaction between 
the effects of experimental type (GROUP) and type of respondent (STUDENT or 
MANAGER) on HPR with results F(2, 294) = 9.314, p=0.000, a simple main effects tests 
confirmed that mean HPR scores for managers and students were statistically 
significantly different.  Therefore, we can accept the hypotheses (hypothesis four) that 
students and business managers have significantly different mean HPR scores and 
hence react differently to organisational related ethical issues about MPR.  
 
Table 4.4: T Test Of Independence Group Statistics 






HPR MANAGER 150 .6092 .27621 .02255 
STUDENT 150 .3828 .27220 .02222 
 
 
Table 4.5:  Independent Samples Test 
Levenes Test for Equality of 
Variances 
    HPR Score 







F   0.004   
Sig   .949   
T Test for equality of means 
T   7.149 7.149 
Df   298 297.936 
Sig. (2-tailed)   .000 .000 
Mean 
Difference   .22636 .22636 
Std. Error 





Lower .16405 .16405 
Upper .28867 .28867 
 
To proceed with testing the remaining hypotheses, it was important to establish that the 
manipulations in experiment 2, 3, and 4 were statistically different. Tables 4.5 & 4.6 show 
the results of a Kruskal-Wallis H test. The test confirms that there was a statistically 
significant difference in HPR score between the different groups, χ2 (2) = 30.279, p = 
0.000, with a mean rank HPR score of 156.94 for GROUP A, 114.00 for GROUP B and 
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180.57 for GROUP C (Group A, B & C in the statistical analysis are equivalent to 
experiment 2, 3, and 4 in this study).  
 
Table 4.6: Kruskal-Wallis Test 
Ranks 
GROUP N Mean Rank 
HPR A 100 156.94 
B 100 114.00 
C 100 180.57 
Total 300   
 
 
Table 4.7: Test Statisticsa,b 
  HPR 
Chi-Square 30.279 
Df 2 
Asymp. Sig. .000 
a. Kruskal Wallis Test 
b. Grouping Variable: GROUP 
 
A one-way ANOVA (Table 4.8) also confirms that experiment 2, 3, and 4 are statistically 
different at p=0.000. This is also confirmed by the univariate analysis of variances (two-
way ANOVA) as shown in Table 4.10 - 4.13 below.  
 






Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 2.585 2 1.293 16.224 .000 
Within Groups 23.665 297 .080     
Total 26.250 299       
 
This study, like other similar studies (Evans et al., 2001) found a significant number of 
honest and partially honest managers within an organisation and disproves the 
preposition of the CAT as an explanation for all purposefully misreported MPR (Table 
4.9). For the CAT to be a valid explanation for all forms of misreported MPR, HPR should 
have been zero for all scenarios (especially scenario two) in table 4.9. 
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 Table 4.9: Summary Of Experiment Results 
























N 150 50 50 50 
HPR –
computed 
34% 69% 44% 82% 
Students N 150 50 50 50 
HPR –
computed 
32% 36% 29% 44% 
 Table 5.9: Summary of Experiment Results 
 
Again, this study finds evidence to support the argument that for persons with 
employment experience (managers), MPR behaviour is generally more honest within an 
organisational environment than involving purely personal issues. This confirms 
hypothesis One (1). While the essence of this study is not to provide probably 
explanations for this trend, it will seem that studies about HPR behaviour should be 
focused at the organisational level rather than at the individual level. This is because it is 
probable, that due to the peculiarities of an organisational environment, including the 
possibility of sanctions when discovered, the desire to be fully dishonest is mitigated. The 
significant differences in HPR scores between students and business managers found in 
this study may be due to students’ lack of appreciation of the peculiarities of the work 
environment. Students’ responses were not materially different between experiment 1 
(HPR 32%) and experiment 2 (HPR 36%) whereas business managers HPR scores 
significantly differed between the Experiment ‘1’ (HPR 34%) and Experiment ‘2’ (HPR 
69%).  
 
This study also confirms Evans et al. (2001), preposition that dishonest MPR increases 
when pay-offs are capped. This confirms Hypothesis two (2). Various studies have 
confirmed that employees rebel when their freedoms are restricted (Maas & Rinsum; 
2013), or when they feel an injustice being done (Rabin, 1993). Evans et al. (2001) 
propose a ‘distributional hypothesis’ for explaining this phenomenon and argue that 
respondents report relatively less honestly under the scenario of capped payoff because 
they want to achieve the desired distribution of the ‘total surplus’ between themselves 
and the firm. Arguments about considerations of equity and reciprocity (Gino & Pierce, 
2009) also suggest that when employees perceive a cap as unfair, they may report MPR 
dishonestly. It is worth noting that when the pay-off is capped, HPR falls below the 
individual scenario HPR for students (HPR 29%) but remains above the experiment 1 for 
business managers (HPR 44%). 
 
In the scenario where pay-off is uncapped but not immediate, HPR improves significantly 
to 82 percent (82%) for business managers and marginally to 44% for students. This 
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confirms Hypothesis three of the study. This revelation provides credence to the ongoing 
debate about delaying the payment of performance pay-offs.  As well it provides credence 
to the argument that manager’s assessment of the likelihood and effectiveness of 
monitoring mechanisms can mitigate dishonest MPR. Clearly, the possibility of sanctions 
within an organisational environment could be one possible explanation for the wide 
differences in HPR between individual and organisational constructs. Hypothesis three 
(3) can be accepted because for both students and business managers HPR is higher in 
experiment four compared to experiment two. 
 
Table 4.10: Between-Subjects Factors 
  Value Label N 
Industry 1 INDUSTRY 150 
2 STUDENT 150 
GROUP 1.00 A 100 
2.00 B 100 
3.00 C 100 
 
Table 4.11: Descriptive Statistics 




INDUSTRY A .6712 .23383 50 
B .3973 .25783 50 
C .7590 .19545 50 
Total .6092 .27621 150 
STUDENT A .3660 .25846 50 
B .3480 .28140 50 
C .4343 .27400 50 
Total .3828 .27220 150 
Total A .5186 .28923 100 
B .3727 .26964 100 
C .5967 .28754 100 












Table 4.12 Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:  HPR         
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares Df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 7.609a 5 1.522 24.003 .000 
Intercept 73.797 1 73.797 1163.911 .000 
Industry 3.843 1 3.843 60.610 .000 
GROUP 2.585 2 1.293 20.389 .000 
Industry * GROUP 1.181 2 .591 9.314 .000 
Error 18.641 294 .063     
Total 100.047 300       
Corrected Total 26.250 299       
a. R Squared = .290 (Adjusted R Squared = .278) 
 
Table 4.13:   Multiple Comparisons 
Dependent 











Tukey HSD A B .1460* .03561 .000 .0621 .2298 
C -.0780 .03561 .074 -.1619 .0058 
B A -.1460* .03561 .000 -.2298 -.0621 
C -.2240* .03561 .000 -.3079 -.1401 
C A .0780 .03561 .074 -.0058 .1619 
B .2240* .03561 .000 .1401 .3079 
Based on observed means. 
 The error term is Mean Square (Error) = .063. 
*. The mean difference is significant at the .05 level. 
 
4.1.1. Summary And Conclusion On Experimental Tests 
 
Overall, these findings suggest that organisations may be able to benefit more from a 
redesign of employment contracts from the existing CAT convention of attempting to align 
agents’ interest with shareholder interest. Perhaps, the overemphasis of a self-serving 
agent whose only desire is to maximise utility at any cost, including dishonest MPR, may 
not be appropriate and is costly. The evidence from this study suggests that agent’s 
willingness to lie is affected by a variety of variables including the kind of employment 
contracts as well as the kind of managerial compensation adopted. As an example, 
managerial compensation that caps pay-offs may be detrimental, and perhaps as 
suggested by Evans et al. (2001), organisations will benefit from paying business 
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managers a higher fixed salary rather than an over focus on performance related bonus 
schemes.    
 
For these findings to have any predictive credibility, it is critical to test for certain biases. 
Firstly, the internal and construct validity of the experiments must be confirmed. This was 
done through various methods. Firstly, the hypotheses on which the various experimental 
scenarios were based on emanated from existing theories in various social disciplines. 
Secondly, the respondents used were actual employees within organisations rather than 
the use of students as surrogates. Thirdly, the post experimental questionnaire suggested 
that respondents understood the experiments, were aware that their responses were 
anonymous and were free to provide any responses they deemed appropriate. Lastly, the 
experimental constructs used were similar in substance to other scenarios that had been 
used by other researchers but had been tweaked to be more practical, and relevant to 
the Ghana situation. All experimental constructs were submitted for review to colleague 
PhD students and a ‘Big Four Auditing Firm’, and the feedback suggested that it was an 
appropriate fit for the test being conducted. 
 
A second bias that needs to be tested is the extent to which the sample (participants) is 
representative of the total population (Ghanaian employees). Considering that no 
computers were used, a larger sample size will have created management and 
administrative challenges for the researcher. The sample compared to other similar 
studies is appropriate. Evan et al. (2001) for instance based their conclusions on an 
experiment involving 28 students in the USA. This experiment uses 300 persons in total, 
with fifty persons in each sub group. Most importantly this experiment compared student 
participants with business managers and finds evidence that students mean HPR are 
significantly different from business managers. The challenges with using students as 
surrogates for employees are well documented. Quite clearly, the USA has more 
corporate entities than Ghana, and therefore if the number of respondents is put in context 
(relative to the number of corporate entities), then the sample used in this research is 
quite representative.  Also, the categorisation of respondents into the various sub groups 
was based on randomisation. This suggests that responses within each sub group of fifty 
persons could be generalised to the general sample of 300. 
 
The likelihood of socially desirable responses (SDR) introducing a bias was highly 
minimal. Firstly, aside from the researcher, no one was aware of the main purpose of the 
experiment. Indeed, a set of questions are deliberately included in the post experimental 
questionnaire to divert attention from the main object of the experiment. Based on 
responses to the post experiment questionnaire, none of the respondents had ever 
participated in a similar experiment before. Experiments were all carried out 
simultaneously across groups. More importantly, the relatively high number of ‘negative 




4.2. FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE HPR 
4.2.1. Sample Demographics 
A total of three hundred and thirty-five (335) questionnaires were distributed to 67 
companies. Overall, 265 useable responses were received equivalent to an average of 4 
responses per organisation. Seventy-Four (74) responses, representing 27.9% of the 
total responses were from organisations with employees more than 500 persons. 
Therefore, the responses in this analysis may be skewed to large organisations, but this 
is to be expected considering that the sample was selected from organisations within 
Ghana’s top 100 companies in 2014. The sample demography is presented below (Table 




 TABLE 4.14 Sample Descriptive Statistics By Sector 
  AGRIC ICT FIN SERV MPC FMCG MINING EOG SERVICES  Total 
Number of Companies 5 5 61 7 5 3 2 12 100 
Exclude                 0 
GOVT 1 1 1       1   4 
Owner Managed   1 9 2       7 19 
Unable to establish   
Ownership     3           3 
Unwilling to Take part     7           7 
Available Sample 4 3 41 5 5 3 1 5 67 
Questionnaire 
Administered 20 15 205 25 25 15 5 25 335 
Responses Received 20 15 151 25 25 15 5 24 280 
Unusable 0 0 11 0 0 0 0 4 15 
Useable Responses 20 15 140 25 25 15 5 20 265 
Response Rate 100% 100% 68% 100% 100% 100% 100% 80% 79% 











Table 4.15: Sample Demographics 
Industry 





Small Medium Big Large 
Employees<50 50<Employees<100 100<Employees<500 Employees<500 
FMCG 10 15 0 5 0 20 25 
ICT 0 10 0 0 5 5 10 
OTHER SERVICE 0 25 0 3 10 12 25 
FINANCIAL 
SERVICES 40 100 10 31 48 51 140 
AGRICULTURE 5 15 0 0 20 0 20 
ENERGY/OIL/GAS 0 5 0 0 0 5 5 
ENGINEERING 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
METALS AND 
CHEMICALS 0 25 0 0 20 5 25 
GOVERNMENT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
MINING 0 15 0 0 0 15 15 












TABLE 4.16: Detailed Description Of Respondents  
  




M F Yes NO 
No 








50 >50 3->5 5->10 >10 
 
FMCG 21 4 15 10 5 10 5 5 1 10 12 2 9 11 5 25 
ICT 9 1 6 4 0 1 4 5 0 6 4 0 2 8 0 10 
OTHER SERVICE 21 4 24 1 1 9 9 6 1 16 6 2 3 9 13 25 
FINANCIAL 
SERVICES 99 41 101 39 9 58 38 35 16 79 34 11 29 69 42 140 
AGRICULTURE 16 4 14 6 2 11 4 3 3 9 8 0 0 13 7 20 
ENERGY/OIL/GA
S 4 1 5 0 1 3 0 1 0 1 4 0 0 5 0 5 
ENGINEERING 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
METALS AND 
CHEMICALS 21 4 20 5 2 14 7 2 0 15 8 2 3 12 10 25 
GOVERNMENT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
MINING 9 6 9 6 2 4 3 6 2 8 5 0 8 6 1 15 
Total 200 65 194 71 22 110 70 63 23 144 81 17 54 133 78 265 
Married “YES” is defined to include ‘married and engaged.  
‘Post Grad’ refers to respondents who indicated a post graduate degree as their highest qualification. Postgraduate includes 
masters only as there are no PhD respondents. 
‘Bach’ refers to respondents who indicated a bachelor’s degree as their highest qualification. 






4.2.2. Representativeness Of Sample To Target Population 
 
Sixty-Seven (67) organisations out of the population of 100 were targeted with an average 
of 5 questionnaires per organisation. The response rate was 79% with an average 
response of 4 per organisation. The targeted sample was very representative of the 
private businesses with ownership divorced from management. Additionally, a sizable 
number of organisations within the sample are also listed on the Ghana Stock Exchange 
(30%). The sample cuts across various industry segments and includes organisations 
within the manufacturing, oil and energy, food and beverage manufacturing, insurance 
financial services, ICT and telecommunications, construction and mining companies. 
 
4.2.3. Test For Reliability And Validity: Reliability and Validity tests were performed in 
SPSS. 
 
4.2.3.1 Non-Response Bias And Response Rate 
 
A total of three hundred and thirty-five (335) questionnaires were distributed to 67 
companies. 265 useable responses were received. Responses from one organisation 
were excluded because they were received after the analysis of data had been 
completed. This was because the CEO requested to vet through all responses (six 
responses in total) from that organisation before they were submitted to the researcher.  
 
This was in breach of the agreement between the researcher and the Human Resource 
Director for that organisation. Since confidentiality could not be guaranteed, the 
researcher believed socially desirable response bias might have occurred and hence the 
decision to exclude those responses from the analysis. In any case, the late submission 
of the response made it impossible to include it in the analysis.   
 
4.2.3.2. Social Desirability Bias (SDB):  
 
SDB occurs in situations where, for various reasons, respondents in any investigation 
provide answers and react in a certain manner based on their perception of what is 
socially approved or desirable (Bryman & Bell, 2007; Zaid, 1997). Often the respondent 
intends to provide answers or act in a manner that is socially desirable or acceptable. 
SDB can manifest itself through non-response to a questionnaire. This happens, when 
due to certain reasons (such as answer the questionnaire honestly and risk providing 
socially undesirable responses), certain persons refuse to answer the questionnaire and 
therefore the persons who answer the questionnaire belong to a skewed group. 
Therefore, when SDB exists, responses provided, and behaviour observed may not be 
credible for analysis and generalisation. SDB has pervaded most behavioural studies 
include ethics and the processes of managerial decision-making (Fernandes & Randall, 
1992; Zerbe & Paulhus, 1987). Essentially, it is critical therefore for research studies to 
(1) minimize the possibility of SDB during their studies and data collection procedures, 
(2) scientifically assess the possibility of SDB in data collected and analysed and finally 
(3) to disclose in their study the level of SDB, or the possibility thereof of its existence to 




Avoiding SDB during data collection involves several strategies. Often questionnaires and 
interviews that do not focus excessively on asking for prying personal information are 
likely to receive relatively less social desirable responses. Secondly, questionnaires and 
interviews that assure anonymity and visibly demonstrate the intention to ensure 
anonymity also receive relatively less socially desirable responses. Widening the sample 
size and reducing the non-response rate can also help to minimise the likelihood that 
certain persons rather than provide honest answers (that are socially undesirable) will 
refuse to respond to the questionnaire. 
 
Various methods exist for measuring the existence of SDB within collected and analysed 
data. Firstly, to find out the reason for non-responses, the researcher can interview non-
respondents. These interviews are supposed to provide an opportunity to assess if a 
significant number of non-responses were to avoid providing ‘socially undesirable’ 
responses. However, the method of making this determination may be difficult and 
arbitrary (Zaid, 1997). Secondly, early responses can be compared to late responses to 
determine if a statistically significant difference exists in the responses. Late responses 
are used, in this case, as a proxy for non-responses and have been by other researchers 
such as Armstrong & Overton (1977). Depending on the number of questionnaires 
involved, this can be done manually or through statistical software’s. Statistical software’s 
such as SPSS can be used to calculate sample t test (Table 4.18) and chi-square to 
determine SDB.  
 
In this study, because the expected count for most categorical variables was below five 
(5) ‘Likelihood Ratio’ was used in computing chi-square (Table 4.17). For all variables, no 
evidence was found of a significant relationship between categorical variables and the 
mean score of respondents on all questions (B1-C10, except C1-C4 that were not 
imputed into SPSS) at the 95% confidence level (p=0.05). Similar results are obtained 
when categorical variables are related to the sum of all responses (rather than the mean) 
on all questions from B1-C10 (Please see questionnaire). 
 
Table 4.17:  Likelihood Ratio Test of Relatedness 
Dimension Pearson Chi-Square df Sig (2 tailed) 
Age 415.079 417 0.991 
Gender 142.524 139 0.066 
Educational Level 699.588 695 1.000 
Marital Status 604.523 556 1.000 
Organizational Size 602.654 556 1.000 
Experience 309.209 278 0.096 
Industry 1009.807 973 1.000 
 
Table 4.17 confirms that there is evidence that the population samples from early 
respondents and late respondents are significantly different (Levene’s test significance 
higher than 0.05 for all computations) whereas Table 4.18 shows no evidence of a 
significant statistical difference in responses between early and late respondents (t test 
significance level in excess of 0.05 for all variables).
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Table 4.18: T Test Of Relatedness Responses And Non-Responses 
Dimension Levene’s Test 
for equality of 
Variance 
T test  Response 
 F Sig (2 
tailed) 






Mean of all 
responses 
0.549 0.459 263 -0.643 0.521 N 235 30 
M 3.4230 3.5893 
SD 1.34378 1.24475 
SE 0.8766 0.22726 




N 235 30 
M 3.4248 3.9677 
SD 1.52071 1.71283 









N 235 30 
M 3.4757 3.8333 
SD 1.44348 1.63419 




0.346 0.557 263 -1.439 0.151 N 235 30 
M 3.4277 3.8500 
SD 1.51209 1.52649 





0.483 0.488 263 -2.269 0.240 N 235 30 
M 3.6017 4.2467 
SD 1.46235 1.49545 





4.145 0.430 263 -1.174 0.242 N 235 30 
M 3.5667 3.9250 
SD 1.59469 1.40066 





2.590 0.109 263 -0.186 0.853 N 235 30 
M 3.4115 3.4660 
SD 1.48319 1.72981 




1.486 0.224 263 -1.855 0.065 N 235 30 
M 3.5353 4.1053 
SD 1.56863 1.71122 
SE 0.10233 0.31242 
IND (B37-B40) 0.260 0.610 263 0.012 0.990 
 
 
N 235 30 
M 3.6128 3.6083 
SD 1.89284 1.42285 
SE 0.12348 0.25978 




Methods such as the Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR) and the 
Crowne-Marlowe social desirability scale – CMSDS - (Crowne & Marlowe, 1964) have 
been developed and used in studies similar to this research to measure the existence 
and effects of SDB (Manley, Benavidez & Dunn, 2007). However, to use these methods 
require extra data that is often achieved by embedding extra questions with the research 
instrument. In the specific case of this study, BIDR, and CMSDS were not used because 
the (1) researcher was of the opinion that this will have made the questionnaire 
cumbersome and lengthy and therefore may have affected the response rate (creating 
another risk of SDB)  (2) the researcher was of the opinion that SDB, even if it existed will 
be very minimal due to the strategies used during data collection to mitigate SDB and (3) 
other equally effective methods such as the sample t test and the chi-square could be 
used to measure the extent of SDB. 
 
The biases from socially desirable responses are minimal in this study because of the 
following reasons  
a) The non-response rate of 21% was relatively minimal compared to other 
similar studies (e.g. Evans et al., 2001). 
b) A relatively significant number of negative responses were received 
suggesting that very minimal attempt was made by respondents to provide 
a socially desirable response (Bampton & Cowton, 2002). Indeed, there 
evidence from this study suggests that a significant number of organisations 
do not report honestly on managerial performance. 47% of respondents 
(Scores from 4 to 7 on the Likert Scale) suggested that managers within  
their organisation do not honestly report MPR. 
c) Questionnaires avoided excessive intrusion into the private lives of 
respondents (this was confirmed during the piloting of the questionnaire), 
promised and expressly assured anonymity, and questions (including 
scenarios) within the questionnaire were written in the third person to allow 
respondents to exclude personal considerations in their responses.  The 
covering letter that accompanied the questionnaire, as well as the 
introductory remarks to every interview conducted confirmed anonymity and 
confidentiality, and this was expressly maintained throughout the study 
(Sweeney & Costello, 2009). Scenarios used actors rather than specifically 
referring to the respondent, to mitigate the effect of personal considerations 
on responses (Ng et al., 2009). 
d) Questionnaires in most cases were self-administered, and responses were 
returned in a sealed envelope, directly to the researcher. The envelope and 
responses had no marking to identify the respondents. 
e) An interview of late and non-respondents did not suggest SDB as a 
challenge. Most ‘late respondents’ and ‘non-respondents’ stated (1) the lack 
of time, specifically the coincidence of the questionnaire administration with 
the month end financial close and other responsibilities, (67%) (2) the 
inability to meet the qualifying criteria and receiving the questionnaire in 
error, i.e. the number of years within the organisation and level of 
managerial responsibility (18%) and (3) inadvertently misplaced, made a 
mistake or soiled the questionnaire and felt shy to ask for a new one (15%). 
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4.2.3.3. Test Of Internal Validity:   
 
Cronbach (1951) alpha is a coefficient that describes how well a group of items focuses 
on a single idea. An analysis of responses (as shown in table 4.19) shows a computed 
Cronbach Alpha of more than 0.9 for all variables. 
 









B1-B47 40 0.983 
HPR B1-B6 6 0.929 
PERF B7-B11 5 0.903 
INNOVATE B12-B15 4 0.909 
ENV B16-B20 5 0.906 
POLITICS B21-B24 4 0.907 
MCS B25-B30 6 0.928 
INC B31-B36 6 0.939 
IND B37-B40 4 0.900 
 
A Cronbach alpha of 0.7 or higher is often a measure of good internal validity (Pallant, 
2001), even though an alpha of between 0.5 and 0.6 is an acceptable level of reliability 
(Nunnally, 1978; Peter, 1979). A Principal Component Analysis (PCA) also resulted in 
one factor extraction explaining about 74% of each latent variable (See Table 4.32). This 
confirms the results of the Cronbach Alpha test. 
 
4.2.4. Data Preparation For Analysis 
 
Data was prepared, coded and imputed into SPSS. In most cases (except for question 
A6 and A10) the coding was the same as the categorisation or intervals defined in the 
questionnaire. As an example, question A1: AGE was coded as 1= Below 18; 2 =18 yrs. 
– 25 yrs.; 3 = 26 yrs. -35 yrs.; 4= 36 yrs. – 50 yrs. & 5= above 50 yrs.; Questions B1 to 
B47 were coded in the manner similar to the seven-points Likert scale used in the 
questionnaire.  Question A6: ‘Number of Employees’ was coded as follows; 1= up to 50 
employees; 2=more than 50 and up to 100 employees; 3=more than a 100 and up to 500 
employees and 4=more than 500 employees. Question A10 was coded as 1 for the listed 
company on the Ghana Stock Exchange and 2 for the unlisted company. Before including 
into SPSS, questions A5; ‘Number of years of experience within the organisation, A8: 
‘Ownership structure’, A9, A10, and A11: ‘Knowledge about the organisation's 
performance reporting system’ were used to determine the usability or otherwise of the 
completed questionnaire. Questionnaires responses were only included if they were fully 
completed (Section A, Section, B, Section C and Section D), by a respondent with a span 
of control of less than ten employees, who had been within the organisation in question 
for at least three years and had a fair knowledge about the MPR system within the 
organisation. Additionally, management must be separated from ownership within the 
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organisation, and the organisation must have more than 50% private ownership (local or 
foreign) and management, and ‘private shareholders’ must control critical business 
decisions. 26.67% of the unusable responses indicated in Table 4.14 were due to 
questionnaire responses not meeting these criteria. The remaining was due to incomplete 
responses (40%) or illegible responses (33.3%). Even though no specific question(s) was 
asked about respondents’ span of control, the covering letter specifically mentioned this 
criterion. More-so this criterion was discussed with the contact person within 
organisations in deciding on the appropriate respondents to target. In the distribution of 
these questionnaires, most organisations allowed for personal contact with the 
respondents, based on the researcher’s request. The researcher personally distributed 
86% of the questionnaires, and the researcher personally collected all completed 
questionnaires. The researcher used this opportunity to highlight the qualifying criteria 
before distributing the questionnaire and when collecting the completed responses. 
Additionally, because some respondents stated not meeting the qualifying criteria as the 
reason for non-response, the possibility of responses from unintended respondents is 
very minimal.  Question A9 and A11, C1; C2; C3 and C4 and Section D were not coded 
into SPSS. C5 to C8 were coded into SPSS in the following manner 1=a; 2=b; 3=c; 4=d; 
5=e. The intention was to mimic the trend with the Likert scale were higher number values 
are relatively more adverse than smaller number values. C9 was code as 1=Yes and 
2=No. C10 was coded similarly to B1-B47. MVIVO was minimally used to aid the analysis 
of interview responses of Section D and C1-C4.  
 
SPSS AMOS version 24 was used to test and confirm the model proposed in Fig 4.5. To 
do this, section B1 to B46 were treated as continuum variables by assuming that the 
seven-points Likert scale represented intervals (Field, 2009) and various parametric tests 
were used to analyse the data. All requirements for using parametric test were met; that 
is; the selection of the sample was random within the specified population or group; the 
data is taken from an interval or ratio scale; the samples are independent; and the specific 
characteristics are normally distributed within the population (a test of some of these 
assumptions will be discussed as part of a discussion of the test of the assumptions for a 
regression analysis).  
 
To ensure the credibility of any regression analysis performed, the data was checked to 
ensure that all critical assumptions required for credible regression analysis were met. 
O’Brien (2007) argues that multiple measures, rather than a single measure should be 
used to test regression assumptions because using a single measure can have 
unintended consequences on a research outcome.  
 
HPR is the dependent variable in this section (assessing the confluence of factors that 
affect HPR), and hence various parametric tests are performed on HPR to confirm the 
reliability of data. HPR, (like PERF, INNOVATE, MCS, INC, IND, POLITIC and ENV) are 
latent unobservable variables which were measure through various observable variables. 
HPR was computed in two ways. One method involved adding up the set of responses 
related to the latent variable for each respondent. The other method involved performing 
a PCA to identify a unique factor for each latent variable (these two methods are 
discussed in greater detail in the following sections). In performing the credibility and 
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reliability test of data related to HPR etc., the two outputs of HPR are used. However, no 
significant differences were found in the results of the various reliability and validity tests 
using the two approaches. The results presented below (Table 4.20 to Table 4.21 and Fig 
4.1 to Fig 4.4) are the results based on HPR as a sum of responses for each response 
that measures a latent variable. The discussion below confirms the validity of the data 
used for analysis. 
 
1. Checking Data for Outlying and Influencing Variables: Box plots are more effective 
graphical tools for detecting outliers than histograms (Field, 2013). Scatter plots 
suggested no significant outliers for all relevant variables. Typically, in SPSS, mild 
outliers will be indicated by a nut (o) on the box plot, and extreme outliers will be 
represented by a star sign on the box plot. Figure 4.1 presents the box plot for 
HPR. The box plots for the remaining variables are within the appendix and confirm 
similar results of insignificant outliers and influencing variables (Figure 10.1). 
 
FIG. 4.1: Box Plots To Test For Outliers. 
 
Additionally, cooks distance, centred leverage value, Case wise diagnostics and 
Mahalanobis distance were computed using SPSS with HPR as the dependent variable. 
Case wise diagnostics (based on a threshold of 3) identified only one case. For the 
number of responses of 256, one case (case 111) as an outlier cannot be considered to 
have a significant effect. More-so, taking out the specific case did not significantly alter 
the output of the regression analysis. This outlier or influencing factor was evaluated and 
considered an appropriate response.  In making decisions concerning outliers, this study 
attempted to balance the potential bias from any outliers with the need to ensure that 
responses were not tempered with in a manner that skewed the results. Because this was 
a study based on employee perception, differences in perception can reflect in varied 
responses. Therefore, in making decisions about outliers and influencing factors, this 
study, rather than rely on a single statistical method, considered the total effect of a varied 
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set of methods including case-wise diagnostics, Mahalanobis Distance, Cooks distance 
and centred leverage value, histograms and box plots. Together these statistics showed 
very minimal effects of outliers and influencing factors. More-so, the identified outlier 
when excluded did not significantly affect the findings. Rather it strengthened the 
predictive power of the regression model hence no exclusions were made in this analysis 
on the grounds of outliers or influencing values. 
 
2. Ensuring all Predictors are quantitatively measured on a continuous scale (such 
as interval or ratio or categorical). Likert scales used in this study were treated as 
parametric measures and converted to continuous variables. Considering that the 
qualitative variables are of a ranking nature, Nunnally (1978) argues that is 
possible to treat ranking variables as leading to interval or ratio scales for purposes 
of statistical analysis. Various other studies such as Reckers et al. (1994) have 
used a similar method.  
 
3. Testing for Normality, Linearity and Homoscedasticity: Normality, Linearity and 
Homoscedasticity are often evaluated using scatter plots and various other graphs. 
Normality can also be checked by computing Skewness (Pearson, 1895) and 
Kurtosis (Pearson 1905) with SPSS. 
 
Due to the data size, a graphical analysis was used to assess normality of variables. To 
gain an indication of the shape of the distribution, a normal approximation curve was 
super imposed on each histogram. Also, the Q-Q plot was analysed for each variable. 
With a Q-Q plot, the scatter should lie as close to the line as possible with no obvious 
pattern coming away from the line for the data to be considered normally distributed 
(Marshall & Samuels, 2015).  Measures of skewness and kurtosis and their standard 
errors were not computed because it is difficult to agree on the threshold for assuming 
approximate normality (Rose et al., 2015). Indeed Field (2013, page 185) argues that 
‘Always plot your data as well and try to make an informed decision about the extent of 
non-normality based on converging evidence’.  Kolmogorov-Smirnov test and the 
Shapiro-Wilk’s W test were also not computed because both tests are sensitive to outliers 
and are influenced by sample size (Rose et al., 2015). For smaller sample sizes, the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test and the Shapiro-Wilk’s W test is less likely to detect non-
normality even though the Shapiro-Wilk test is relatively more sensitive. For larger 
samples, the assumption of normality might be rejected too easily.  Marshall & Samuels 
(2015, page 3) argue that ‘any assessment should also include an evaluation of the 
normality of histograms or Q-Q plots’. The Q-Q plots and histograms suggest that all the 
variables HPR, ENV, PERF, POLITICS etc. are appropriately normally distributed to 
support the use of various parametric tests. Figure 4.2 presents the histogram and Q-Q 
plots for HPR. The remaining histograms and Q-Q plots are in the appendix (figure 10.2) 













Since HPR is the dependent variable in this section, a normal P-P plot was generated 
(with an interpretation like the Q-Q plot). Also, a histogram of the standardised predicted 
values for HPR suggests an approximately normal distribution of the data. 







Scatter plots were used to test the linearity in the relationship between HRP (DV) and the 
independent variables (Becker & Cleveland, 1987) and evidence was found to support 
the assumption of linearity when a trend line was superimposed on the scatter plot.  
 
In checking for homoscedasticity, a scatter plot of the regression standardised residual (y 
axis) and regression standardised predicted value (x axis) for HPR was extracted. A trend 
line super imposed on the scatter plot was horizontal and parallel to the x-axis at the point 
0, suggesting Homoscedasticity. 
 
Figure 4.4: Evidence Of Data Normal Distribution 
 
4. Eliminating Multi-collinearity: Whereas testing for multi-collinearity is important, the 
existence of multi-collinearity does not necessarily reduce the predictive power and 
reliability of any model. Multi-collinearity only affects calculations relating to 
individual predictors (Wikipedia, 11th August 2014). In other words, if multi-
collinearity exists, a multiple regression model can still offer an effective prediction 
of how a group of variables, working together predict an outcome, but the 
regression model may not provide valid results regarding the predictive ability of 
any individual predictor or about which predictors are redundant with respect to 
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others. Gujarati (2012, page 363) argues that ‘the existence of collinearity does 
not affect the efficacy of extrapolating the fitted model to new data provided that 
the predictor variables follow the same pattern of multi collinearity in the new data 
as in the data on which the regression model is based’ (taken from Wikipedia on 
the 11th of August, 2014). Rawlings et al. (1998) agree with Gujarati (2012) and 
argue that collinearity concerns do not matter when extrapolation is to a similar 
data set. 
 
It is important to note that a critical departure of this study from other studies is the 
fact that, rather than focus on the effect of a single variable on HPR, the study 
focuses on a confluence of factors and how they interact to affect HPR. To that 
end, multi collinearity, even if it exists, will not affect the efficacy of the predictive 
power of a multiple regression model that is statistically significant. Often, 
correlation factors above 0.8 provide a cause for investigating multi collinearity 
(Cooper & Schindler, 2008). Statistical methods such as tolerance level, variance 
inflation factor (VIF) and condition index (CI) are used to investigate multi 
collinearity.  A tolerance level below 0.2 is often an indication for collinearity 
(Hutcheson & Sofroniou, 1999) requiring further investigation. Most studies prefer 
a tolerance factor of below 0.1, but tolerance factors between 0.1 and 0.2 are 
acceptable (Gerbing 2013). VIF lower than 10 is appropriate (Hocking, 1996; 
Cohen et al.; 2003) and a CI should be below 30 to be appropriate (Cohen et al., 
2003). O’Brien (2007) cautions the use of the rule of thumb for VIF and states that 
‘when VIF reaches these threshold values researchers often attempt to reduce the 
collinearity by eliminating one or more variables from their analysis, using ridge 
regression to analyse their data, or combining two or more variables into one index. 
These techniques for curing problems associated with multi-collinearity can create 
problems more serious than those they solve. Because of this, VIF (and tolerance) 
need to be evaluated in the context of several other factors that influence variance 
regression coefficient. Values of the VIF of 10, 20, 40 or even higher do not by 
themselves, discount the results of a regression analysis, call for the elimination of 
one or more independent variables from the analysis, suggest the use of ridge 
regression or require combining of independent variables into a single index’. 
 
Fox (1991) argues that numerical thresholds should only be used to compliment 
other considerations such as graphical analysis. The size of the data can affect 
collinearity. All things being equal relatively large data sets are less likely to exhibit 
collinearity relative to smaller data sets. A total number of 265 valid responses 
constitute the data for this analysis and Tolerance, VIF and CI were calculated 










Table 4.20: Results Of Tests For Collinearity 
 
Collinearity Statistics   Model 
Dimension Eigenvalue 
Condition 
Index Tolerance VIF  
(Constant)       1 7.752 1.000 
PERF 0.154 6.485  2 0.125 7.871 
INNOVATE 0.126 7.925  3 0.027 16.916 
ENV 0.153 6.531  4 0.026 17.429 
POLITICS 0.147 6.818  5 0.023 18.443 
MCS 0.144 6.968  6 0.018 20.630 
INC 0.133 7.542  7 0.017 21.640 
IND 0.146 6.867   8 0.012 25.200 
a. Dependent Variable: HPR    
 
The collinearity diagnostics (CI, VIF, Tolerance), in table 4.20, confirm minimal 
problems with multicollinearity indicating that the predictors are not highly inter-
correlated and that small changes in the data values will not lead to large changes 
in the estimates of the coefficients. 
 
All tolerance values are above 0.1, and below 0.2, all VIF values are below 10, and 
all CI values are below 30. Belsley et al. (1980); Chatterjee & Price (1991); Hocking 
(1996) suggest that an appropriate CI should be below 30. Considering the 
relatively high alpha values, as well as the fact that the focus of the proposed model 
was to consider the effect of a confluence of factors on HPR, multi collinearity, 
even if it existed will not affect the predictive power of the model. Indeed, some 
level of multi collinearity is perceived to be necessarily inherent in improving the 
predictive power of this model and the methodology thereof. The result of the 
regression model was significant at less than 1%. Berry & Feldman (1993) caution 
against removing explanatory variables from an equation merely because it has a 
high degree of multicollinearity as this could result in a model, which is mis-
specified. 
 
5. Independence of Outcomes: Durbin-Watson test was calculated to measure the 
independence of the outcome of variables. Durbin-Watson values should be close 
to 2 to suggest appropriate autocorrelation (Montgomery et al., 2001). The Durbin 
Watson value for this regression model was 1.432. 
 
6. Size of Data: Hair et al. (1998) argue that the number of cases of each independent 
variable for an effective multi regression should be above 28. This study has 265 
cases for each independent variable.  
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4.2.5. Hypotheses Results 
 
The descriptive statistics (Table 4.21) suggest that HPR is near the midpoint and the 
standard deviations were not high. Respondents reported relatively low (compared to 
other matrixes in the questionnaire) on INC and reported relatively high on a favourable 
external environment (ENV, with mean of 3.67) and on MCS (mean of 3.61).  
 
In estimating the factors that affect HPR, various statistical methods were used to 
compute all relevant variables (dependent and independent variables). In general, 
however, one method involved the estimation of variables (HPR, ENV etc.) based on the 
sum of responses per each respondent. Various studies have used a similar method 
(Gray et al., 2016) and involve an assumption that in the use of Likert scales, an 
underlying continuum is present that justifies the use of parametric statistics (Knapp, 
1994). The results from this method were not significantly different from the results from 
estimating the relevant variables as the mean of responses.   
 
The second method involved the application of Principal Component Analysis (PCA) in 
the extraction of one ‘representive variable’ for each respondent based on eigen values. 
This preserves the non-parametric nature of the responses and adopts PCA to convert 
the variables to a useable parametric form. 
 
The estimation of correlations was done in SPSS. Both parametric and non-parametric 
correlations were computed due to the nature of the data. All correlations were positive 
and significant at p=0.01, and hence all Hypotheses (H5-H15) are accepted. Tables 4.22 
to 4.25 present the results. 
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Table 4.21: Univariate Statistics 







Midpoint Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation Variance 
Statistic Statistic Statistic Std. Error Statistic Statistic 
HPR 6 1-7 3.5 1 7 3.4862 .09520 1.54975 2.402 
PERF 5 1-7 3.5 1 7 3.5162 .09014 1.46735 2.153 
INNOVATE 4 1-7 3.5 1 7 3.4755 .09317 1.51675 2.301 
ENV 5 1-7 3.5 1 7 3.6747 .09076 1.47751 2.183 
MCS 6 1-7 3.5 1 7 3.6072 .09679 1.57560 2.483 
INC 6 1-7 3.5 1 7 3.4177 .09273 1.50959 2.279 
IND 4 1-7 3.5 1 7 3.5998 .09781 1.59230 2.535 





Table 4.22: Pearson Correlation When Variables Are Computed As The Sum Of Responses 
 
HPR PERF INNOVATE ENV POLITICS MCS INC IND 
HPR 1        
PERF .885** 1       
INNOVATE .875** .884** 1      
ENV .852** .862** .880** 1     
POLITICS .838** .860** .868** .866** 1    
MCS .861** .874** .889** .832** .864** 1   
INC .878** .868** .876** .880** .856** .876** 1  
IND .848** .842** .869** .836** .885** .868** .883** 1 
 
 
Table 4.23: Non-Parametric Test – Correlations When Variables Are Computed As The Sum Of Responses 
  HPR PERF INNOVATE ENV POLITICS MCS INC IND 
Kendall's tau_b HPR 1.000        
PERF .705** 1.000       
INNOVATE .693** .702** 1.000      
ENV .665** .677** .702** 1.000     
POLITICS .632** .659** .682** .667** 1.000    
MCS .639** .657** .699** .625** .649** 1.000   
INC .677** .663** .673** .694** .643** .648** 1.000  
IND .664** .656** .691** .644** .714** .679** .697** 1.000 
Spearman's rho HPR 1.000        
PERF .875** 1.000       
INNOVATE .866** .869** 1.000      
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ENV .846** .854** .872** 1.000     
POLITICS .823** .842** .858** .849** 1.000    
MCS .828** .840** .868** .812** .835** 1.000   
INC .857** .849** .852** .869** .835** .834** 1.000  
IND .843** .839** .863** .832** .877** .852** .872** 1.000 
 
Table 4.24: Pearson Correlation When Variables Are Computed Using Principal Component Analysis 
 PERF INNOVATE ENV POLITICS MCS INC IND HPR 
PERF 1        
INNOVATE .761** 1       
ENV .726** .737** 1      
POLITICS .748** .771** .787** 1     
MCS .822** .811** .739** .764** 1    
INC .740** .766** .767** .757** .795** 1   
IND .802** .763** .752** .802** .829** .796** 1  














Table 4.25: Non-Parametric Correlations When Variables Are Computed Using Principal Component Analysis 
  PERF INNOVATE ENV POLITICS MCS INC IND HPR 
Kendall's tau_b PERF 1.000        
INNOVATE .575** 1.000       
ENV .531** .552** 1.000      
POLITICS .538** .582** .574** 1.000     
MCS .587** .586** .512** .506** 1.000    
INC .537** .576** .569** .555** .565** 1.000   
IND .591** .553** .533** .572** .598** .579** 1.000  
HPR .575** .587** .541** .562** .616** .579** .593** 1.000 
Spearman's rho PERF 1.000        
INNOVATE .778** 1.000       
ENV .734** .748** 1.000      
POLITICS .754** .782** .780** 1.000     
 MCS .804** .793** .719** .736** 1.000    
INC .745** .776** .765** .769** .776** 1.000   
IND .801** .762** .740** .790** .792** .788** 1.000  





4.2.6. Testing The Model With Structural Equation Modelling (SEM).  
A confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was performed using structural equation 
modelling (SEM). SEM corrects for errors and biases in multiple regression and can 
account for measurement errors with the use of multiple indicators for each latent 
factor or latent construct or latent variable. It can also handle more complex data, such 
as data that is not ‘normally distributed’, incomplete data, collinearity problems, as well 
as auto correlation errors (Kline, 1998).  Within the framework of SEM, Confirmatory 
Factor Analysis (CFA) validates a priori specified measurement model based on 
observed patterns of correlations or covariance, commonly referred to as `model fit 
(Chun, 2005). CFA employs a method that estimates the relationship between ‘latent 
factors’ and indicators (observed variables, such as items in a survey instrument). 
 
This study adopts a method that uses observed variables to measure latent constructs 
rather than using observed variables as a substitute for such constructs. Various 
studies adopt a similar approach (e.g. Chun, 2005; Yang, 2009, etc.). SEM allows us 
to account for measurement errors of the observed variables and therefore allows for 
a better interpretation of regression coefficients compared to the use of estimated 
factor scores in a regression analysis (Walker & Madden, 2008). 
 
The statistical software used in performing SEM was SPSS AMOS applying the 
principle Maximum Likelihood estimation (Anderson & Gerbing, 1988). All latent 
factors had more than three unique indicators or observed variables.  Typically to 
assure reasonably appropriate results from SEM, there must be more than one latent 
construct in a measurement model and each latent construct must have more than 
two observed variables (Hair et al., 2013). 
 
There were seven latent factors included in the measurement model, enough to avoid 
problems from lack of parsimony.  Observed variables were matched to each latent 
construct in this study in a similar manner to the survey questionnaire.  
 
Kline (1998), as well as Anderson & Gerbing (1988) urge researchers to first test 
measurement models for appropriateness before proceeding to test the ‘goodness of 
fit’ for a structural model. As a first step, a measurement model was proposed and 
tested for ‘good fit’. Essentially a measurement model tests the strength of covariance 
and variances between latent constructs and observed variables (similar to a 
Cronbach alpha). The measurement model evaluates whether the latent constructs 
(made up of exogenous independent variables –i.e. ENV, INC, IND, MCS, POLITICS-
, the mediating variables – i.e. PERF, INNOVATE-, and the endogenous dependent 
variable – i.e. HPR-), are adequately measured by the observed variables B1-B40 (per 
the survey questionnaire). This is a reconfirmation of the Cronbach alpha.    
 
In a typical measurement model, no causal relationship is suggested among latent 
constructs. Instead, covariance or correlations is tested among all latent variables. 
Therefore, the typical output of a measurement model is the loading factors of each 
observed variable on a latent factor, the error estimate for each observed variable, the 
covariance or correlation coefficients between latent constructs with their p values as 
well as the variance of each latent construct. Regression weights for directional 




For observed variables to be considered as appropriately measuring a latent construct, 
the t-statistics for factor loading for each observed variable on the specific latent 
construct must exceed 0.6 (Barclay et al., 1995; Hair et al., 2013). The standardised 
factor loading for all observed variables in the measurement model was above 0.9, 
suggesting that observed variables appropriately measured the latent variable they 
related to. This confirms the results of the Cronbach alpha. The t values for the factor 
loadings of all observed variable was significant, indicating convergent validity (Yang, 
2009).  
 
Hair et al., (2010) argue that a Composite Reliability (CR) greater than 0.7 for all 
endogenous variables demonstrates reliability while an average variance extracted 
(AVE) greater than 0.5 demonstrates convergent reliability.  CR was above 0.7 for all 
endogenous variables. 
 
To further confirm convergent validity, the Average Variance Extracted (AVE) was 
computed (as the sum of the squared standard loadings divided by the sum of the 
squared standard loadings plus the sum of the indicator measure errors). The AVE 
was greater than 0.5 (Fornell & Larcker, 1981) with most above 0.7 (Table 11.1 in the 
Appendix). 
 
Two methods are usually used in the literature to check for discriminate validity. A 
maximum shared variance (MSV) < AVE and squared root of AVE > than inter 
construct correlations. Discriminant validity was confirmed by comparing the shared 
variances between factors with AVE of individual factors. The shared variance 
between factors is lower than AVE for the individual factors (see appendix- table 10.1-
for a detailed explanation of iterated steps). 
 
The structural model tests the direction of relationships between latent constructs. It 
is worthy of note that, for ease of presentation, the latent variables used here in the 
structural model are extracted based on factor loadings from PCA (discussed in detail 
in the next section). Various studies have used a similar approach (e.g. Yang, 2001). 
Extracting the latent variables based on the sum of responses per respondent or 
measuring latent variables using observed variables in AMOS yielded similar results. 
Appendix (Fig. 10.6) presents the full path model that shows the observed variables 
and the latent constructs that were used for the measurement test and the confirmation 
of the structural model (figure 4.5). As explained, results from a test of that model 











The standardised correlation coefficients between the latent construct are all below 
the threshold of 0.9 (Chun, 2005; Yang, 2009; Bagozzi et al., 1991) suggesting 
distinctiveness between the various constructs regarding their effect on HPR. 
Modification indices suggested that no modification was required to improve the 
model. AMOS does not provide opportunities for langrage multiplier test and Walde 
test, so it was impossible to test if any inclusions or exclusions were required to 
improve the model further.   
 
The confirmatory factor analysis shows an acceptable overall fit, and hence the 
theorised model fits well with the observed data. It can be concluded that the 
hypothesised CFA model fits the sample data appropriately well. The test of model 
fitness for the structural model provided the results presented in table 4.26. The R2 on 
the endogenous variables are HPR, 80%, PERF, 62% and INNOVATE 53%. 
Therefore, the proposed model is a good fit explaining about 80% of the variations in 
HPR. The nomological validity and path estimates (B values and standardised 
regression weights) are shown in table 4.27. The recommended thresholds presented 
below (table 4.26) are from Hu & Bentler (1999). 
 
TABLE 4.26:  Results From Test Of Model Fitness Using SEM 
Fit Statistics Recommended Threshold Obtained 
X2  2.206 
df  3 
X2 significance P<-0.05 .531 
X2 / df <3 good; <5 acceptable .735 
Goodness of Fit Index (GFI) >0.95 great; >0.90 
traditional; >0.80 acceptable 
.998 
Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index (AGFI) >0.80 .975 
PGFI >0.80 .083 
Normed Fit Index (NFI) >0.90 .999 
Relative Fit Index (RFI) >0.90 .994 
Comparative Fit Index (CFI) >0.90 1 
Incremental Fit Index (IFI) >0.90 1 
Tucker Lewis Index (TLI) >0.90 1.002 
Root Mean Square Error of 
Approximation (RMSEA) 
<0.05 good, 0.05-0.10 
moderate, >0.10 bad 
.000 
Root Mean Square Residual (RMR) <0.02 0.004 
PCLOSE >0.05 .749 
SRMR <0.09 .0047 
 
Also, a comparison of the proposed model with the independence model generated 
by AMOS confirmed the proposed model as a relatively more appropriate model using 
parameters from AIC (Akaike Information Criterion). Therefore considering (a) the 
argument by Bollen & Pearl (2013) that models rather be cross validated rather than 
based on an accept/reject decision, (b) the split scores across various fit test indices 
between ‘accept’ or ‘reject’, I believe that the structural model can not be rejected 
because it provided a good fit of the variables hypothesised.  
 
If for nothing at all, this model offers the first attempt at a measurement model and 
structural model for HPR within profit-making organisations and will serve a useful 




Table 4.27: Standardised Regression Weights 
Path Relationship Estimate S.E. C.R. P Sig. @ P=0.05 
INNOVATE <--- ENV .196 .086 2.481 .013 
YES 
INNOVATE <--- POLITICS .307 .098 3.681 *** 
YES 
INNOVATE <--- IND .239 .099 2.429 .015 
YES 
PERF <--- IND .205 .094 2.421 .015 
YES 
INNOVATE <--- MCS .689 .081 6.412 *** 
YES 
INNOVATE <--- INC .197 .072 2.429 .015 
YES 
HPR <--- ENV .006 .075 .122 .903 
NO 
HPR <--- POLITICS .112 .087 2.039 .041 
YES 
HPR <--- MCS .306 .062 4.922 *** 
YES 
HPR <--- INC .163 .064 3.021 .003 
YES 
HPR <--- IND .134 .081 2.228 .026 
YES 
HPR <--- INNOVATE .136 .072 2.525 .012 
YES 
HPR <--- PERF .123 .066 2.270 .023 
YES 
INNOVATE <--- PERF -.745 .149 -4.527 *** 
YES 






Table 4.28: Covariance and Correlation 
   Covariance Correlation S.E. C.R. P 
ENV <--> POLITICS 1.090 .787 .109 10.047 *** 
ENV <--> MCS 1.606 .739 .166 9.659 *** 
ENV <--> INC 1.415 .767 .143 9.888 *** 
ENV <--> IND 1.219 .752 .125 9.765 *** 
POLITICS <--> MCS 1.546 .764 .157 9.864 *** 
POLITICS <--> INC 1.301 .757 .133 9.803 *** 
POLITICS <--> IND 1.211 .802 .119 10.165 *** 
MCS <--> INC 2.142 .795 .212 10.110 *** 
MCS <--> IND 1.962 .829 .189 10.368 *** 




ENV, MCS, INC, PERF, INNOVATE, POLITICS and IND show a directly positive 
relationship with HPR.  
 
The direct relationship between independent variables (ENV, POLITICS, IND, INC, 
MCS) and INNOVATE is positive (and significant at P=0.05). Innovation requires 
stability, patience and a focus on the long term to thrive effectively (Shirivastava & 
Souder, 1987; Yang, 2009). Therefore a stable external environment (Sørensen, 
2002), harmonious internal politics (Alvesson, 2002), well incentivised employees 
(Baiman & Lewis, 1989), a collectivist leadership style (Bass & Avolio,1993) and a 
well-designed managed control system (Shields & Young, 1994), provide the 
necessary essentials to encourage the sharing of ideas (team work) and motivated 
employees which are critical to INNOVATE. 
 
Innovative culture is based on a sense of collective responsibility and shared vision 
and hence strengthens team efforts. Shirivastava & Souder (1987) argue that an 
organisation with a high innovation culture displays a clear commitment to rules and 
appropriate behaviour with a high sense of commitment and loyalty from employees.  
Ahmed (1998) argues that honesty in the use and application of knowledge is a critical 
element for effective innovation. Yang (2009) suggests that for innovation to be 
effective, an organisation must encourage experimentation, tolerate errors, and have 
a collective orientation to dealing with performance gaps.  It is not surprising therefore 
that innovation has a positive, direct and significant effect (at P=0.05) on HPR. This is 
consistent with Yang’s (2009) findings for public organisations. Often persons with a 
drive for innovation display a high sense of honesty and are often ‘principled’. (Yang, 
2009). Secondly, an innovation culture is effective in mitigating performance problems 
(Julnes & Holzer, 2001) and hence reduces the likelihood of performance gaps with 
the attendant temptation to misreport MP. Moreover, an organisation with an 
innovative culture will see performance gaps as opportunities for changing the 
organisation (Yang, 2009; Dilulio, 1994). 
 
Participation by external stakeholders in the performance management system of an 
organisation has a significant direct positive effect on HPR (at p=0.05). When external 
stakeholders, particularly regulators, customers and the media participate actively in 
performance management within an organisation, the varied interests of stakeholders 
lead to information leakage that makes it difficult to hide information or misreport 
(Waterman et al., 2004). As well, the implication of misreporting to relatively powerful 
external stakeholders, who by their participation in the organisation can effectively 
evaluate MPR acts as a critical deterrent to misreporting MP. 
 
It is not surprising that the ethical orientation of organisational leaders has a directly 
positive relationship with HPR.  Leaders within the organisation have a significant 
influence on the culture (Načinović et al., 2009) and ways of working within the 
organisation (Bass & Avolio, 1993). Therefore when organisational leaders have a 
collectivist orientation, the resulting openness reduces the fear of making errors and 
the desire to hide bad performance results. The individual ethical orientation of leaders 
has a positive direct relationship on innovation which is significant at p=0.05. Because 
innovation emphasises a focus on organisational vision and team work, the positive 




As expected, monetary incentives (INC) have a positive and significant relationship 
with HPR and INNOVATE (at p=0.05). Various literature has confirmed that ‘agents’ 
will typically lie to gain an economic incentive (Baiman & Lewis, 1989; Schreck, 2015) 
and therefore when the economic incentive structure within an organisation is fair and 
transparent, misreporting will be minimised and innovation significantly improved 
(regression weight 0.752, P=0.008). 
 
MCS is a significant predictor of HPR, with a direct and positive relationship with HPR.  
A well-designed management control system is effective in building a strong culture 
(March, 1991) that ensures that ‘agents’ voluntarily adopt the appropriate 
organisational values (Rosenthal and Masarech, 2003) as well as promote 
transparency and team effort (Načinović et al., 2009). Chelariu et al. (2008) confirm 
that an effective management control system (MCS) positively influences 
organisational culture and values. Organisational culture also shapes employee 
behaviour and influences individual actions (Načinović et al., 2009). Kotter & Heskett, 
(1992) contend that the resulting organisational culture from MCS positively affects 
employee performance and hence firm performance especially under conditions of a 
stable external environment (Sorensen, 2002). Little wonder then that Dilulio (1994) 
argues for an emphasis on building the appropriate culture within organisations. Henri 
(2006) proposes that a well-designed MCS also results in a fair and transparent 
compensation system and promotes exploratory learning and innovation. This 
perhaps explains the positive, significant direct relationship between MCS and 
innovation (RW 0.608, p value <0). Dávila (2000), and Shields & Young (1994) find 
that an effective MCS improves innovation effectiveness. Impliedly, an appropriate 
MCS that is based on belief systems and cultural values rather than boundary systems 
promotes transparency, ensures fair compensation and improves innovation and firm 
performance. Under these circumstances HPR is high. 
 
The effect of ENV on HPR is positive even though not significant. Alvesson (2002) 
argues that an organisational cultural perspective is critical to understanding employee 
behaviour. Because organisations are open systems, the external environment 
influences organisational culture (Načinović et al., 2009). Schein (2004) defines 
organisational culture as “pattern of shared basic assumptions that was learned by a 
group as it solved its problems of external adaptation and internal integration, that has 
worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new 
members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems 
(page 17). Impliedly, organisational culture adapts to changes in the external 
environment. Načinović et al., (2009) find that when the external environment is stable, 
simple and homogenous, organisational culture is characterised by initiative, flexibility, 
team work and openness.  Lumpkin & Dess (2001) argue that when environmental 
conditions are hostile, the pressures of competition exert more pressure on the firm 
and its leaders due to the high likelihood of performance problems. As well, hostile 
environment reduces the slack available for experimentation on new strategies and 
forces organisations to focus on conserving resources (Chakravarthy, 1982). Lumpkin 
& Dess (2001) argue that organisations can react more appropriately to competition in 
a scenario of a ‘stable and certain environment where the “rules of the game” are more 
evident and unchanging. Adaptation and reaction are quite difficult if one must chase 
the constantly moving target associated with dynamic and uncertain environments’ 
(page, 9). Miller & Friesen (1983) state that ‘extensive risk taking, “forceful 
proactiveness”, and a strong emphasis on novelty can be very hazardous when 
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competitive conditions are becoming more taxing’ (page 223). Impliedly, a hostile 
environment that is turbulent and dynamic reduces the opportunities for innovation 
(regression weight 0.969, P=0.002) and increases the likelihood of performance 
problems from aggressive competition. This reduces HPR. 
 
INNOVATE has a significant, direct positive relationship with PERF and PERF has a 
significant direct negative relationship with INNOVATE. That is to say, an organisation 
with a high innovative culture encourages stakeholder participation in performance 
management (RW 1.077, p < 0) but stakeholder participation reduces innovation (RW 
-0.868, p< 0) and the total effect of the relationship is negative. Innovation requires a 
team effort, openness and transparency, and most critically relies on feedback from 
internal and external stakeholders to identify challenges that need improvement. 
External stakeholders play a critical role in proposing new ideas, reviewing proposed 
solutions for effectiveness and evaluating new products or services for effectiveness 
(Yang, 2009; Aghion & Tirole, 1997). Unfortunately, active involvement by external 
stakeholders can result in less innovation. Perhaps, the fact that varied stakeholders 
pursue varied interest can result in conflicts that reduce team effort, and blurr the focus 
on a shared organisational vision (Lumpkin & Dess, 2001; Niu & Easterbrook, 2008). 
The resulting conflicts may decrease the autonomy of working teams which is a critical 
element of an effective innovation culture (Shirivastava & Souder, 1987). Overall the 
net effect of the relationship between innovation and stakeholder participation is 
negative with a total effect estimate of -0.0464. 
 
Harmonious organisational internal politics (POLITICS) promotes team work and open 
communication which is critical for innovation. The net effect, direct and indirect, of 
POLITICS on HPR, is positive and significant (Total effect of 0.053). 
 
4.2.7. Conclusion On Factors That Influence HPR 
 
Even though ENV, MCS, INC, PERF, INNOVATE, POLITICS and IND show a directly 
positive relationship with HPR, further studies using new methods are required to 
confirm these findings. Participant observation of employees or other longitudinal 
study methods may be helpful in building a comprehensive theoretical disposition on 
HPR.  
 
I adopted a stakeholder approach using a multi-actor-principal-agent-model and 
develop hypotheses based on theoretical modelling and synthesis of the literature. I 
tested the hypotheses using correlation parameters (for an associational relationship) 
as well as SEM (for a directional relationship). Data was collected using a 
questionnaire that was administered to 265 respondents within 65 organisations in 
GC100 companies. 
 
Following the results of the experimental study discussed earlier, I am convinced that 
the causes of HPR are varied. My preposition is that HPR is affected by a broad 
category of economic, individual, organisational and environmental variables (See Fig, 
4.5a). For instance, Ndofor, Wesley & Priem (2015), argue that financial misreporting 
generally results from information asymmetry (‘lack of transparency) and requires 
three simultaneous circumstances; opportunity to deceive (i.e. environmental, 
situational and organisational circumstances), motive for doing so (economic, cultural 
etc.) and willingness on the part of the perpetuator (individual characteristics of the 
 242 
 
perpetuator). I proceeded to develop sub variables (and hypotheses) for each of these 
broad categories and then tested them. I applied a SEM because it mimics the real-
life scenario of these variables working together simultaneously to affect HPR. Other 
studies have applied OLS regressions to selected variables with its attendant 
limitations.  
 
Even though this is an exploratory test of MPR behaviour, I focused on testing my 
hypotheses with data from organisational employees, rather than business managers, 
about their perception on various variables of HPR (similar to earlier studies by 
Cameron et al., 2004, Chun, 2005 and Yang, 2009). This is because HPR is essentially 
a perception issue, especially in a scenario of multiple stakeholders (Yang, 2009). 
Moreover, employees are best placed to provide the best perspective on MPR 
behaviour of business managers and the organisation because their job security is not 
so directly tied to overall MP (Chun, 2005; Yang, 2009). 
 
I provide a clear definition of who qualifies as an employee for purposes of this study 
(See Fig 2.1) to avoid ambiguity. In designing my questionnaire, I adopt the approach 
of the ‘company as a person’ metaphor to avoid the sensitivity of employees relating 
their answers to personal self and hence introducing bias into their responses. Chun 
(2005) confirms that to capture the complexity of human behaviour within an 
organisation, the company as a person metaphor serves an effective purpose. 
Therefore, I use words like ‘Leaders of this organisation’ rather than ‘Leaders of 
your/our organisation’.  
 
I first tested the associative relationship (correlation) between my variables before 
proceeding to test for directional effects. The summary of the results of the test of the 
various hypotheses are presented below (Table 4.28a, 4.28b. 4.28c). Pearson 
correlation matrixes find a significant correlation, two tailed, (evidence of association 
and not necessarily causality) between the proposed variables and HPR. All 
relationships are significant and positive at P value=0.01 and hence hypotheses H5-
H15 (alternative hypotheses) were accepted (See Table 4.28a). 
 
Since the responses were on a Likert scale, which was ordinal, non-parametric tests 
of relationships between the variables were also computed using SPSS version 24. 
The results of the various parametric and non-parametric tests (Table 4.28a) confirm 
that hypotheses H5-H15 can be accepted. Table 4.24 & 4.25 provides the results when 
variables are computed using Principal Component Analysis (PCA) and shows similar 
significant findings such as Table 4.28a (where latent variables were computed as a 
sum of Likert Responses). However, when PCA is used, the coefficients are relatively 
smaller in absolute terms (See table 4.22 – 4.25) even though all the hypothesised 




TABLE 4.28a: Results Of Correlation Test Between Variables And HPR 
Correlation Results When Variables Are Computed As Sum Of Likert Responses Per Respondent 











H5 A fair economic incentive (INC) is 
positively associated with HPR 
0.878 0.677 0.857 P=0.01 Supported 
H6 Stakeholder participation in 
performance measurement (PERF) is 
positively associated with HPR 
0.885 0.705 0.875 P=0.01 Supported 
H7 A high innovative performance culture 
(INNOVATE) is positively associated 
with HPR 
0.875 0.693 0.866 P=0.01 Supported 
H8 A well communicated belief and 
boundary system (MCS) is positively 
associated with HPR 
0.861 0.639 0.828 P=0.01 Supported 
H9 Non-Hostile internal politics 
(POLITICS) is positively associated 
with HPR 
0.838 0.632 0.823 P=0.01 Supported 
H10 A favourable external environment 
(ENV) is positively associated with 
HPR 
0.852 0.665 0.846 P=0.01 Supported 
H11 A predominant set of collectivists (IND) 
within an organisation is positively 
associated with HPR 
0.848 0.664 0.843 P=0.01 Supported 
H12 Stakeholder participation in 
performance measurement (PERF) is 
positively associated with a stronger 
innovation and performance culture 
(INNOVATE) 




H13 Supportive external environment 
(ENV) is positively associated with a 
stronger innovation and performance 
culture (INNOVATE) 
0.880 0.702 0.872 P=0.01 Supported 
H14 Supportive external environment 
(ENV) is positively associated with 
stakeholder participation in 
performance measurement (PERF) 
0.862 0.677 0.854 P=0.01 Supported 
H15 Harmonious internal politics 
(POLITICS) is positively associated 
with a stronger innovation and 
performance culture (INNOVATE) 
0.868 0.682 0.858 P=0.01 Supported 
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SEM was then applied to test the close to real life situation of the hypothesised 
variables working simultaneously. My proposed model was based on theory and was 
initially modelled to suggest that HPR is influenced by a confluence of ENV, 
POLITICS, IND, INC, MCS, PERF and INNOVATE working together. That is  
 
HPR= A +B1ENV+B2POLITICS+B3MCS+B4INC+B5IND+ B6PERF + B7INNOVATE+e  
 
However, empirical evidence of the directional influence of all the other variables on 
INNOVATE, and of INNOVATE on PERF (Lumpkin & Dess, 2001; Niu & Easterbrook, 
2008; Aghion & Tirole, 1997) resulted in a variation of the model with PERF and 
INNOVATE as mediating variables (Figure 4.5a). 
 











The results of the SEM analysis are summarised below (Table 4.28b, 4.28c). 
Predominantly, the results confirm my proposed model (Fig. 4.5a) and reconfirm the 
results of the correlation hypotheses (H5 – H15).  
 
Table 4.28b: Covariance Among Factors That Affect HPR 
   Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
ENV <--> POLITICS 1.090 .109 10.047 *** 
ENV <--> MCS 1.606 .166 9.659 *** 
ENV <--> INC 1.415 .143 9.888 *** 
ENV <--> IND 1.219 .125 9.765 *** 
POLITICS <--> MCS 1.546 .157 9.864 *** 
POLITICS <--> INC 1.301 .133 9.803 *** 
POLITICS <--> IND 1.211 .119 10.165 *** 
MCS <--> INC 2.142 .212 10.110 *** 
MCS <--> IND 1.962 .189 10.368 *** 
















TABLE 4.28c: Results Of SEM/CFA Test Of Hypothesis Sig. @ P= 
0.05 




S.E. C.R. P 
INNOVATE <--- ENV .214 .086 2.501 .012 
YES 
INNOVATE <--- POLITICS .360 .100 3.610 *** 
YES 
INNOVATE <--- IND .241 .098 2.459 .014 
YES 
PERF <--- IND .228 .093 2.438 .015 
YES 
INNOVATE <--- MCS .517 .075 6.858 *** 
YES 
INNOVATE <--- INC .174 .073 2.391 .017 
YES 
HPR <--- ENV .009 .075 .122 .903 
NO 
HPR <--- POLITICS .177 .087 2.042 .041 
YES 
HPR <--- MCS .307 .062 4.937 *** 
YES 
HPR <--- INC .193 .064 3.031 .002 
YES 
HPR <--- IND .180 .081 2.234 .025 
YES 
HPR <--- INNOVATE .182 .072 2.532 .011 
YES 
HPR <--- PERF .150 .066 2.280 .023 
YES 
INNOVATE <--- PERF -.674 .147 -4.598 *** 
YES 
PERF <--- INNOVATE .867 .109 7.971 *** 
YES 
 
Individually, all relationships are significant at p=0.05 (except the effect of ENV on HPR, 
which is positive but not significant). The model fit indices (see Table 4.26) suggests that 
the model can be accepted. My model confirms that HPR is influenced by a confluence 
of factors working together and ENV, MCS, INC, IND, INNOVATE, & PERF have a direct 
and positive influence on HPR. Curiously, INNOVATE has a significant, direct positive 
influence on PERF and PERF has a significant direct negative influence on INNOVATE 
and the total effect of the relationship is negative.  
 
This study assumes a multi-actor-principal-agent relationship in developing models for 
testing. The inclusion of the environment constructs emphasises multiple principals, and 




4.3. FIRM PERFORMANCE AND HPR. 
 
Discussions about data preparation methods earlier in this chapter are relevant to both 
section 4.3 and Section 4.4. I used a combination of statistical software for my analysis. 
This was intended to improve robustness as well as offer complimentary confirmation of 
results. Table 4.29 summarises the various statistical software applied in analysing the 
relationship between HPR and FP. 
 






Data Validation X  X  
OLS regression Analysis   X X 
Binary logistic Regression   X X 
Ordered Probit (Marginal Analysis)    X 
Structural Equation Modelling  X   
 
Variables HPR, ENV, INC, IND, POLITICS, INNOVATE, MCS were measured as the sum 
of the relevant responses of each respondent in SPSS, AMOS and R. Using the mean 
scores as a measure of central tendency produced similar results. In Stata however, HPR 
was computed based on a method that applied Principal component analysis as a data 
reduction tool. Table 4.30 summarises how HPR and other variables were computed in 
each statistical software. 
 
Table 4.30: How HPR Was Estimated In Various Statistical Software Packages 
Sum of Likert Responses Principal Component Analysis 
SPSS & AMOS Stata 
R  
 
To improve the strength of my findings, various tests were performed on the raw data to 
ensure completeness, rigour and appropriateness of data for use in regression analysis. 
These have been discussed in section 4.2. Various regression methods were applied 
depending on the nature of the constituting variables especially the dependent variable 
as well as the intended objective of the analysis. Table 4.31 summarises the various 




 Table 4.31: Tabular Presentation Of Various Regression Methods Applied 
Equation Number  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 























with HPR coded in 
a Binary Form (0/1) 










OLS at the 
respondent and 
organisational level 






4.3.1. Dependent Variable (HPR) Computed Through Principal Component 
Analysis (PCA). 
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) was performed on the responses to the Likert 
scale to arrive at HPR values for each response (a similar approach was used to arrive 
at values for ENV, MCS, INNOVATE, POLITICS, IND, INC and PERF).  The principal 
component analysis is often used to reduce the number of dimensions of a set of 
variables and eliminate measures that are not appropriately correlated (see, for 
instance, Everitt, 1993 and Hair et al., 1998 for the use of principal components). The 
principal component analysis identifies patterns or variations in a dataset by converting 
a set of possibly correlated variables into a set of uncorrelated variables. PCA is, 
therefore, a useful statistical tool in data reduction, by generating variables that are 
mostly a series of uncorrelated linear combinations that contain most of the variance 
within a set of data.  
 
In performing the principal component analysis, the extraction technique with varimax 
rotation was used and the latent root criterion that required that the eigenvalues are 
greater than one was used to select the appropriate number of factors. The KMO 
measure of sampling adequacy was used to test if the variables were suitable for the 
component analysis. This test validates the factorability assumption of the analysis by 
ensuring that there is some degree of correlation between variables. Theoretically, 
KMO measures should exceed 0.5 (Kaiser, 1974). All the variables used had KMOs 
higher than 0.5. To further validate the number of appropriate factors generated with 
the PCA, standard errors were computed for each variable used to generate the factor 
to ascertain the extent to which these variables load onto the factor. This is done by 
assuming the underlying distribution is multivariate normally distributed. 
 
For each respondent, one factor was generated for the set of responses representing 
HPR (similarly for ENV, MCS, INNOVATE, POLITICS, IND, INC and PERF, one factor 
each was obtained). Table 4.32 presents results of the principal component analysis 
showing how the eigen value test validated the generation of the factor as well as the 
proportion of the variance explained. As can be observed from table 4.32, the first 
factor for all the variables had eigen values greater than one and explained over 70% 
of the variations in the responses used. For instance, the eigen value for the HPR 











Table 4.32: PCA For Response Variables 
Factors 

















Comp1 4.4488 0.7415 2.9049 0.7262 4.4210 0.7368 3.1479 0.7870 
Comp2 0.3956 0.0659 0.4411 0.1103 0.4380 0.0730 0.4097 0.1024 
Comp3 0.3607 0.0601 0.3929 0.0982 0.3635 0.0606 0.2324 0.0581 
Comp4 0.3153 0.0526 0.2611 0.0653 0.3093 0.0515 0.2100 0.0525 
Comp5 0.2603 0.0434     0.2657 0.0443     
                  
Factors 

















Comp1 3.1340 0.7835 3.0842 0.7711 4.6147 0.7691 3.6087 0.7217 
Comp2 0.3324 0.0831 0.4740 0.1185 0.4808 0.0801 0.5253 0.1051 
Comp3 0.2892 0.0723 0.2397 0.0599 0.3250 0.0542 0.3622 0.0724 
Comp4 0.2443 0.0611 0.2021 0.0505 0.2344 0.0391 0.2588 0.0518 
Comp5         0.1926 0.0321 0.2451 0.0490 
 
4.3.1.1. Ordered Probit 
 
The specific question that the ordered probit model attempts to address is whether 
changes in HPR affects a set of variables (separate dependent variables) which 
include overall employee satisfaction as well as employee perception against 
INDUSTRY, TARGET and L3Y. Since respondents were asked to rank these variables 
using a standard Likert scale and the outcomes were more than two, an ordered probit 
becomes necessary in preserving the order of these responses. In an ordered probit, 
an underlying score is estimated as a linear function of the independent variables and 
a set of cut points. This framework can be understood by assuming the following 
model: 
 
Pr (outcomej = i) = Pr(κi−1 < β1x1j + β2x2j +···+ βkxkj + uj ≤ κi)  
                              
Where, the probability of observing outcome i corresponds to the probability that the 
estimated linear function, plus random error, falls within the range of the cut points 
estimated for the outcome, uj is assumed to have a normal distribution. For each 
outcome, we estimate the coefficients β1, β2, …, βk together with cut points K1, K2, … 
, KI-1 , where I represents the number of possible outcomes. κ0 is taken as −∞, and κI 
is taken as +∞. The coefficients β1, β2, … βk are coefficients of the firm level 
characteristics used in the model. Given the difficulty in appropriately interpreting the 
usual coefficients of an ordered probit model, average marginal effects are generated 
and interpreted as probabilities. The results obtained from the estimations are 








4.3.1.1.1. HPR on Employee Satisfaction 
Table 4.33 shows the results of the average marginal effects for the different outcomes 
of how HPR influences the probability of an employee’s overall satisfaction with the 
organisation. Employee satisfaction is measured on a 7-point Likert Scale, and hence 
the outcomes follow a 7-point Likert scale from strongly dissatisfied (7) to strongly 
satisfied (1). In each of the outcomes, an employee being neutral in his/her response 
is used as the reference category. The results, as can be observed in Table 4.33, 
confirm that HPR is negatively associated with all the different degrees of 
dissatisfaction and positively associated with the different degrees of satisfaction.  
 
More specifically, as the HPR measure increases, there is a 2.5% lower probability 
that employees will be strongly dissatisfied with the organisation, 1.6% lower 
probability that they will be somewhat dissatisfied and a 1.2% lower probability that 
they will be dissatisfied. Conversely, as the HPR measures improve and employees 
tend to agree with it, there is a 1.3% higher probability that they will be satisfied with 
the organisation, 5.2% higher probability that they will be somewhat satisfied and 5.6% 
higher probability that they will be strongly satisfied. Overall, as HPR improves, the 
probability that employees will be satisfied with the organisation increases, with the 
change in the magnitude of the probabilities increasing towards strongly satisfied. 
There is, therefore, a directly positive and significant relationship between HPR and 
employee satisfaction at p<0.01. However, no statistically significant relationship could 
be found for the effect of listing on the GSE, size and industry dummies on the overall 
satisfaction of the employees. 
 
Table 4.33: Regression: Marginal Effects (Ordered Probit) 









HPR -0.025*** -0.016*** -0.012*** 0.013*** 0.052*** 0.056*** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.009) 
GSE -0.005 -0.003 -0.002 0.003 0.010 0.011 
 (0.012) (0.008) (0.006) (0.007) (0.025) (0.027) 
Size       
Big -0.014 -0.009 -0.007 0.008 0.029 0.030 
 (0.013) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.027) (0.026) 
Medium -0.006 -0.004 -0.002 0.004 0.012 0.012 
 (0.016) (0.010) (0.007) (0.011) (0.034) (0.032) 
Small -0.028 -0.019 -0.016 0.010 0.055 0.065 
 (0.020) (0.014) (0.014) (0.008) (0.036) (0.049) 
Industry       
FMCG -0.009 -0.006 -0.004 0.004 0.018 0.020 
 (0.012) (0.008) (0.006) (0.005) (0.023) (0.027) 
ICT 0.018 0.010 0.004 -0.017 -0.042 -0.035 
 (0.018) (0.010) (0.004) (0.021) (0.043) (0.032) 
Service 0.007 0.005 0.003 -0.005 -0.016 -0.015 
 (0.016) (0.010) (0.005) (0.013) (0.035) (0.031) 
Agric. -0.022 -0.015 -0.014 0.006 0.042 0.055 
 (0.016) (0.011) (0.012) (0.004) (0.028) (0.043) 
Energy -0.010 -0.007 -0.005 0.005 0.021 0.023 
 (0.013) (0.009) (0.007) (0.005) (0.027) (0.033) 
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Metals -0.010 -0.006 -0.005 0.004 0.019 0.022 
 (0.017) (0.012) (0.010) (0.006) (0.034) (0.041) 
Mining 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.022) (0.014) (0.009) (0.013) (0.046) (0.046) 
Observations 265 265 265 265 265 265 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Reference for Size is ‘Large’, and that for Industry is ‘banking.’ 
 
4.3.1.1.2. HPR on Employee Perception of Firm Performance against Best 
Competitor (BC). 
The variable and relationship of interest is estimating the extent to which HPR 
influences employee perception about FP as against its best competitor.  Employee 
perception about FP is measured on a five-point Likert scale from ‘Significantly below 
performance’ to ‘Significantly above performance’. In each of the outcomes, as 
presented in Table 4.34, ‘performance at par’ is used as the reference category. As 
HPR increases, there is a 2.7% lower probability that their perception of FP, as against 
its best competitor, will significantly be below target. Similarly, there is a 0.6% lower 
probability that their perception of the FP, against the best competitor, will be 
marginally below target. Conversely, there is a 4% higher probability that their 
perception about the FP, against the best competitor, will be above target and a 4.6% 
higher probability that their perception, against the best competitor, will be that they 
outperformed their target. Overall, HPR has a directly positive and significant 
relationship with employee perception about FP against BC. 
 
Regarding the other independent variables, employees in bigger firms (relative to 
larger firms) have a statistically significant increasing probability that their perception 
about FP, against the best competitor, will outperform their targets. A similar 
interpretation can be given to industries such as ICT, Energy and Mining; but relative 















Table 4.34: Regression: Marginal Effects (Ordered Probit) 








HPR -0.027*** -0.006 0.040*** 0.046*** 
 (0.006) (0.004) (0.007) (0.009) 
GSE -0.010 -0.002 0.014 0.016 
 (0.022) (0.005) (0.032) (0.036) 
Size     
Big -0.045* -0.013 0.061* 0.074* 
 (0.024) (0.009) (0.032) (0.040) 
Medium 0.013 -0.002 -0.026 -0.020 
 (0.020) (0.004) (0.041) (0.030) 
Small -0.025 -0.005 0.038 0.039 
 (0.030) (0.009) (0.042) (0.048) 
Industry     
FMCG -0.027 -0.009 0.035 0.049 
 (0.026) (0.011) (0.031) (0.048) 
ICT -0.188*** -0.231*** -0.293*** 0.881*** 
 (0.025) (0.026) (0.029) (0.024) 
Service 0.016 0.000 -0.029 -0.027 
 (0.023) (0.003) (0.044) (0.038) 
Agric. 0.025 -0.002 -0.049 -0.042 
 (0.018) (0.007) (0.040) (0.033) 
Energy -0.084*** -0.049*** 0.070*** 0.176*** 
 (0.022) (0.015) (0.020) (0.046) 
Metals 0.017 0.000 -0.030 -0.028 
 (0.020) (0.003) (0.038) (0.034) 
Mining -0.104** -0.070* 0.069*** 0.235* 
 (0.042) (0.042) (0.024) (0.121) 
Observations 265 265 265 265 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Reference for Size is Large, and that for Industry is banking 
 
4.3.1.1.3. HPR on Employee Perception of Firm Performance against Industry 
Average (INDUSTRY) 
Table 4.35 suggest that as HPR improves, there is an increasing probability that 
employees’ perception of FP against the industry average, is outperforming their 
targets. HPR is significantly positively related to all the different degrees of perceived 
improved FP and negatively associated with ‘significantly below industry average’. 
Similar interpretations can be given to the other statistically significant independent 
variables, except the Agric Industry dummy. For the Agric industry dummy, the 
coefficients suggest employee perceptions of FP against the industry average are 
below that of the bank sector. This to a large extent is reflective of the difficulties that 








Table 4.35: Regression: Marginal Effects (Ordered Probit) 








HPR -0.009** 0.002 0.017*** 0.023*** 
 (0.004) (0.001) (0.006) (0.008) 
GSE -0.026* 0.006 0.053* 0.069* 
 (0.015) (0.006) (0.030) (0.040) 
Size     
Big -0.037*** 0.010 0.077*** 0.102*** 
 (0.014) (0.009) (0.026) (0.037) 
Medium -0.021 0.013 0.053* 0.061 
 (0.015) (0.008) (0.031) (0.041) 
Small -0.045* 0.007 0.086** 0.123* 
 (0.027) (0.015) (0.036) (0.072) 
Industry     
FMCG -0.041* -0.005 0.065** 0.103* 
 (0.025) (0.013) (0.029) (0.059) 
ICT -0.169*** -0.188*** -0.044 0.660*** 
 (0.025) (0.037) (0.060) (0.104) 
Service 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.014) (0.008) (0.036) (0.038) 
Agric. 0.007 -0.065* -0.112*** -0.077*** 
 (0.015) (0.036) (0.042) (0.025) 
Energy -0.081*** -0.037*** 0.089*** 0.215*** 
 (0.017) (0.014) (0.020) (0.044) 
Metals -0.010 0.003 0.021 0.025 
 (0.018) (0.004) (0.036) (0.044) 
Mining -0.087** -0.043 0.089*** 0.231* 
 (0.041) (0.043) (0.021) (0.128) 
Observations 265 265 265 265 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Reference for Size is Large, and that for Industry is banking 
 
4.3.1.1.4. HPR on Employee Perception of Firm Performance against Target 
Similar interpretations, as before, can be given to the relationship between HPR and 
employee perception of FP against Target (Table 4.36). Table 4.36 suggests an 
increasing probability between HPR and the various measures of employee’s 
perception of FP against their target. As HPR improves, employees are more likely to 
have a favourable perception of FP against set targets. Improved HPR has a 
significant positive relationship with all the different dimensions of improved FP against 
set targets and a negative relationship with ‘significantly below target’. Similarly, 







Table 4.36: Regression: Marginal Effects (Ordered Probit) 








HPR -0.029*** 0.005 0.043*** 0.032*** 
 (0.007) (0.003) (0.008) (0.007) 
GSE -0.009 0.002 0.014 0.010 
 (0.025) (0.004) (0.037) (0.027) 
Size     
Big -0.025 0.005 0.037 0.026 
 (0.026) (0.006) (0.038) (0.027) 
Medium -0.031 0.005 0.046 0.034 
 (0.027) (0.006) (0.039) (0.030) 
Small -0.008 0.003 0.014 0.009 
 (0.044) (0.012) (0.070) (0.047) 
Industry     
FMCG -0.023 0.002 0.032 0.026 
 (0.028) (0.003) (0.037) (0.032) 
ICT -0.100* -0.026 0.103*** 0.133 
 (0.052) (0.029) (0.039) (0.084) 
Service 0.019 -0.007 -0.032 -0.020 
 (0.024) (0.012) (0.044) (0.026) 
Agric. 0.024 -0.010 -0.042 -0.025 
 (0.022) (0.013) (0.043) (0.024) 
Energy -0.125*** -0.044*** 0.115*** 0.180*** 
 (0.026) (0.015) (0.026) (0.042) 
Metals -0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 
 (0.035) (0.007) (0.053) (0.037) 
Mining -0.001 0.000 0.002 0.001 
 (0.042) (0.008) (0.064) (0.045) 
Observations 265 265 265 265 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Reference for Size is Large, and that for Industry is banking 
 
4.3.1.1.5. HPR on Employee Perception of Firm Performance in the last three 
years (L3Y). 
Table 4.37 presents the results for the relationship between HPR and employee 
perception of FP over the last three years. Similarly, as HPR improves, employees are 
more likely to have a favourable perception of FP over the last three years. Statistically, 
significant differences exist when size and industry type disaggregate the firms. For 
instance, employees of bigger firms are more likely to perceive their FP to outperform 







Table 4.37: Regression: Marginal Effects (Ordered Probit) 








HPR -0.018*** 0.003 0.033*** 0.031*** 
 (0.005) (0.003) (0.008) (0.008) 
GSE -0.003 0.001 0.005 0.005 
 (0.018) (0.003) (0.034) (0.032) 
Size     
Big -0.051*** 0.003 0.091*** 0.088** 
 (0.020) (0.011) (0.034) (0.034) 
Medium -0.018 0.009 0.040 0.030 
 (0.018) (0.009) (0.037) (0.029) 
Small 0.005 -0.007 -0.016 -0.009 
 (0.019) (0.027) (0.058) (0.034) 
Industry     
FMCG -0.040** -0.008 0.060** 0.074* 
 (0.019) (0.010) (0.026) (0.038) 
ICT -0.063 -0.024 0.083** 0.123 
 (0.040) (0.032) (0.038) (0.088) 
Service -0.013 0.001 0.023 0.023 
 (0.023) (0.003) (0.038) (0.040) 
Agric. 0.022 -0.092** -0.142*** -0.077*** 
 (0.017) (0.041) (0.040) (0.021) 
Energy -0.091*** -0.054*** 0.099*** 0.197*** 
 (0.019) (0.016) (0.022) (0.044) 
Metals 0.006 -0.002 -0.013 -0.011 
 (0.021) (0.010) (0.044) (0.036) 
Mining -0.038 -0.006 0.057 0.069 
 (0.033) (0.016) (0.042) (0.066) 
Observations 265 265 265 265 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Reference for Size is Large, and that for Industry is banking 
 
4.3.1.2. HPR On ROA. 
 
The theoretical basis for exploring the relationship between ROA and HPR has been 
explained in chapter three (Section 3.3.3.1). Ordinary least squares regression was 
performed to ascertain the effect of HPR on ROA. Two types of estimations were done: 
one at the individual employee level (using 265 responses) and the other at the 
organisational level (using 65 organisations). For the organisational level analysis, a 
composite HPR index was computed using the averages of the HPRs that were 
obtained from the PCA. The essence was to find out if significant differences exist 
between the two approaches. Table 4.38 presents the results of the relationship 
between HPR and ROA at the individual employee level. The results generally confirm 
that the coefficient of HPR has a directly positive and statistically significant 
relationship with ROA. Using a stepwise regression method, different specifications 
were estimated to ascertain the robustness of the HPR coefficient. Specification (1) 
presents the results only when HPR was introduced into the ROA model, and the result 
was statistically significant and positive, suggesting as the overall perception of HPR 
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increases (i.e. as employees tend to agree with the HPR measures), ROA responds 
positively with a magnitude of about 0.036. In specification (2), listing on the GSE was 
introduced, and the HPR coefficient did not change much (it reduced by 0.003 units). 
The results remained the same with the introduction of size and industry dummies 
separately (i.e. specification 3 and 4 respectively) and together (specification 5). In all 
the specifications, the HPR coefficient remained positive and statistically significant 
and did not change much.  
 
Table 4.38: Regression: Least Squares (Respondent Level): HPR on ROA 
ROA (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
HPR 0.036*** 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) 
GSE  0.057** 0.068*** 0.040 0.046 
  (0.024) (0.026) (0.026) (0.028) 
Industry      
FMCG    -0.069*** -0.066*** 
    (0.024) (0.025) 
ICT    -0.031 -0.027 
    (0.022) (0.026) 
Service    -0.187*** -0.184*** 
    (0.025) (0.027) 
Agric.    -0.203*** -0.204*** 
    (0.042) (0.047) 
Energy    -0.266*** -0.258*** 
    (0.028) (0.032) 
Metals    -0.037* -0.036 
    (0.021) (0.027) 
Mining    -0.047* -0.038 
    (0.024) (0.029) 
Size      
Big   -0.012  0.009 
   (0.021)  (0.024) 
Medium   0.052*  0.021 
   (0.031)  (0.031) 
Small   0.049  -0.004 
   (0.039)  (0.046) 
Constant 0.163*** 0.151*** 0.143*** 0.206*** 0.197*** 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.016) (0.017) (0.023) 
      
Observations 265 265 265 265 265 
R-squared 0.145 0.162 0.179 0.350 0.351 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Reference for Size is 
Large and that for Industry is banking 
 
Regarding the rest of the explanatory variables, listing on the stock market is positively 
associated with ROA; at least in the specification (2) and (3). The GSE coefficient 
becomes insignificant with the introduction of industry dummies. Also, almost all the 
industries included have lower ROAs compared to the banking sector (the reference 
category); but the results are significant only for the following industries: FMCG, 
Services, Agric, Metals, Mining and Energy. Similarly, medium-sized firms seem to 
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have statistically significant higher ROAs in the specification (3) relatively to large 
firms. 
 
Table 4.39 provides the estimation of HPR on ROA at the organisational level. The 
results, to a large extent, agree with those in Table 4.38 (i.e. results at the individual 
employee level). A statistically significant positive relationship was established 
between HPR and ROA. However, the HPR coefficients are slightly larger at the 
organisational level than the individual employee level. This could probably be 
because the organisational estimates are based on the aggregates of the individual 
estimates. More important, organisational ROAs appear smaller for the services and 
energy sector relative to the banking sector (similar to the results obtained in Table 
4.38). 
 
Table 4.39: Regression: Least Squares (Organisational Level) HPR on ROA 
ROA (1) (2) (3) (4) 
HPR 0.061*** 0.059*** 0.060*** 0.052*** 
 (0.013) (0.015) (0.015) (0.018) 
GSE  0.032 0.039 0.038 
  (0.045) (0.054) (0.064) 
Size     
Big   -0.045 -0.038 
   (0.047) (0.059) 
Medium   0.029 0.017 
   (0.064) (0.070) 
Small   0.044 0.020 
   (0.054) (0.070) 
Industry     
FMCG    -0.059 
    (0.054) 
ICT    0.002 
    (0.047) 
Service    -0.140** 
    (0.064) 
Agric.    -0.148 
    (0.128) 
Energy    -0.184** 
    (0.079) 
Metals    0.012 
    (0.060) 
Mining    0.009 
    (0.071) 
Constant 0.159*** 0.153*** 0.161*** 0.191*** 
 (0.020) (0.023) (0.035) (0.055) 
Observations 65 65 65 65 
R-squared 0.258 0.262 0.291 0.379 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 





4.3.1.3. HPR On ROCE. 
For the effect of HPR on ROCE, similar stepwise linear regressions (like those 
presented in Tables 4.38 – 4.39) are presented in Table 4.40 & 4.41. Like equation 1, 
estimations for HPR on ROCE was done at the respondent level as well as at the 
organisational level. Table 4.40 presents the results of the estimation of HPR on 
ROCE at the respondent level, and the results show that the coefficient of HPR has a 
significant direct relationship with ROCE. The results remain statistically significant in 
the different specifications except for specification (5). In that specification, HPR 
becomes insignificant with the introduction of the industry dummies probably becomes 
of the strong heterogeneity in the selected firms. Listing on the GSE positively 
influences ROCE, while most industries have ROCEs lower than that of the banking 
industry. 
 
Table 4.40: Regression: Least Squares (Respondent Level) HPR on ROCE 
ROCE (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
HPR 0.030*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.015* 0.012 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
GSE  0.107*** 0.107** 0.105** 0.093* 
  (0.040) (0.046) (0.041) (0.049) 
Industry      
FMCG    -0.156*** -0.148*** 
    (0.028) (0.030) 
ICT    0.110*** 0.089** 
    (0.027) (0.039) 
Service    -0.187*** -0.203*** 
    (0.033) (0.040) 
Agric.    -0.303*** -0.340*** 
    (0.051) (0.060) 
Energy    -0.193*** -0.201*** 
    (0.039) (0.053) 
Metals    -0.070** -0.103** 
    (0.033) (0.041) 
Mining    -0.071** -0.077 
    (0.034) (0.050) 
Size      
Big   -0.005  0.038 
   (0.036)  (0.043) 
Medium   0.005  -0.027 
   (0.034)  (0.043) 
Small   -0.005  -0.071 
   (0.044)  (0.059) 
Constant 0.186*** 0.164*** 0.165*** 0.230*** 0.232*** 
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.027) (0.023) (0.043) 
      
Observations 265 265 265 265 265 
R-squared 0.053 0.085 0.085 0.267 0.278 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Reference for Size is Large, and that for Industry is banking 
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At the organisational level, HPR has a significantly positive and direct relationship with 
ROCE (Table 4.41). The results are like those found in table 4.40 across all 
specifications. 
 
Table 4.41: Regression: Least Squares (Organisational Level) HPR on ROCE 
ROCE (1) (2) (3) (4) 
HPR 0.050*** 0.045** 0.048*** 0.036* 
 (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.021) 
GSE  0.084 0.077 0.089 
  (0.084) (0.105) (0.121) 
Size     
Big   -0.039 -0.018 
   (0.078) (0.104) 
Medium   -0.013 -0.029 
   (0.075) (0.100) 
Small   -0.001 -0.037 
   (0.082) (0.116) 
Industry     
FMCG    -0.146** 
    (0.070) 
ICT    0.118 
    (0.077) 
Service    -0.156* 
    (0.093) 
Agric.    -0.280* 
    (0.152) 
Energy    -0.141 
    (0.133) 
Metals    -0.054 
    (0.086) 
Mining    -0.040 
    (0.121) 
Constant 0.183*** 0.169*** 0.187*** 0.230** 
 (0.028) (0.029) (0.063) (0.103) 
Observations 65 65 65 65 
R-squared 0.107 0.124 0.130 0.258 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Reference for Size is Large, and that for Industry is banking 
 
4.3.2. Dependent Variable Computed As The Sum Of Responses On A Likert 
Scale. 
 
R software was also used to run the regression based on the data set. HPR was 
computed as the sum of Likert scores for each respondent from B1 to B6. Previous 
studies have applied a similar method of coding (Gray, Grove & Suntherland, 2016; 
Grove & Cipher, 2017, Waltz et al., 2010). Some researchers argue that if social 
sciences rigidly adhere to the rules developed by Stevens (1946), then few if any 
measures will meet the criteria to be considered interval level data. Such researchers 
(often referred to as pragmatist) further argue that violating Stevens’ criteria does not 
lead to a serious consequence for the outcomes of data analysis (Gray et al., 2016). 
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Pragmatist treat summed ordinal level data from multi-item scales as intervals on a 
continuum and proceed to use parametric statistical methods to analyse them. They 
argue that with many ordinal measures such as scaling procedures, an underlying 
interval continuum is present that justifies the use of parametric statistics (Knapp, 
1990; Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994). Table 4.42 shows each variables component(s). 
 
Table 4.42: Computation Of Variables In SPSS And R 
Variable Computation 
HPR Sum of scores from B1-B6 for each respondent 
PERF Sum of scores from B7-B11for each respondent 
INNOVATE Sum of scores from B12-B15 for each respondent  
ENV Sum of scores from B16-B20 for each respondent  
POLITICS Sum of scores from B21-B24 for each respondent  
MCS Sum of scores from B25-B30 for each respondent  
INC Sum of scores from B31-B36 for each respondent  





Employee_ Satisfaction C10 
 
4.3.2.1. HPR On Employee Perception Of Firm Performance. 
 
The various measures of employee perception, which are the dependent variables in 
equation 4 to equation 7 are not continuums, and hence a binary logistic regression 
was performed (Al-Ghamdi, 2001). Logistic Regression differs from the ordinary linear 
regression in that it does not require rigorous assumptions to be met. In a logistic 
regression with dependent variable and independent variables, for instance, the model 
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Thus, the log of the odds of success of the dependent variable is regressed on the 
explanatory variables 
 
log[Employee_Perception_L3Y] =a +bHPR+DUMMY SIZE+DUMMY LISTED+DUMMY INDUSTRY + e…(4) 
log[Employee_Perception_INDUSTRY]=a +bHPR+DUMMY SIZE+DUMMY LISTED+DUMMY INDUSTRY+e (5) 
log[Employee_Perception_TARGET]=a+bHPR+DUMMY SIZE+DUMMY LISTED+DUMMY INDUSTRY+e (6) 







To perform the logistic regression, the case (Prempeh, 2009) with scores of between 
1-3 (Outperformed, marginally above and at par) were considered as positive and 
code as 1, whereas the non-case with scores of 4 & 5 (Marginally below and 
significantly below) were considered as negative and coded as 0. Similarly, for HPR, 
scores of 1-3 on the Likert scale (agree, somewhat agree and strongly agree) were 
coded as representing HPR and coded as 1. Considering that HPR was computed as 
the sum of the scores for each respondent, and the fact that six questions (B1-B6) 
were used to measure HPR, this translated to a score of eighteen (18) representing 
HPR. Scores above eighteen (18) represented dishonest MPR (strongly disagree, 
somewhat disagree, disagree and neutral) and was coded as 0. Results of the logistic 
regression are presented below (Table 4.43-4.46) and confirm a statistically significant 
direct positive relationship of HPR on variants of employee perception about FP. 
 
Logistic regression quantifies the relationship between the dichotomous dependent 
variable and the predictors using odds ratio. Odds is the probability that an event will 
occur divided by the probability that it will not occur (Kleinbaum et al., 2008). In other 
words, it is the probability of the case divided by the probability of the non-case.  The 
odds ratio compares if the odds of a positive outcome (odds of the case) are equally 
likely to the odds of a negative outcome (odds of a non-case). The odds ratio has a 
minimum value of zero but with no upper limit. An odds ratio of less than one indicates 
that the case is unlikely to prevail, a value of one indicates that the odds of success 
(case) are equally likely as the odds of failure (non-case) and a value higher than one 
suggests a high likelihood for the case scenario to prevail. Therefore, odd values 
greater than one suggest a stronger relationship.  
 
As an example, to assess the relationship between Best Competitor Perception (Table 
4.43) and HPR controlling for firm size, industry type and stock listing status of the 
firm, a binary logistic regression is used due to the nature of the response variable 
(BC). Unlike in linear regressions, the R-squared for logistic regression is only used to 
compare competing models that used the same data set. In such a case a value of 
one indicates a perfect fit and a value of 0 indicates there is no relationship. The 
receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve is often used as a measure of goodness-
of-fit to evaluate the fit of a logistic regression model. It calculates sensitivity and 
specificity pairs for each possible cut-off point and plot sensitivity on the y-axis by (1-
specificity) on the x axis. The area under the ROC curve ranges from 0.5 and 1.0 with 
larger values indicative of better fit. 
 
In the case of logistic regression, the likelihood ratio test is used to test the overall 
significance of the model. The likelihood ratio test (table 4.43) produced a chi-square 
value183.2 with a p-value significant at any level of significance. (d.f = 12, p-value < 
0.001). The pseudo coefficient of determination used in this case is the Nagelkerke 
which was 0.6735. The Nagelkerke shows that about 67% of the variability in the 
Employee Perception is explained by the explanatory variables. The model further 
shows that a positive HPR increases the logarithm of odds of positive BC by 4.049 
controlling for all the other factors in the model and this is statistically significant. ( Z = 
8.364, p < 0.001). This shows that there is strong evidence to suggest a positive 
relationship between HPR and BC. To validate the model, the Hosmer Lemeshow test 
is used. The Hosmer-Lemeshow test, tests the hypothesis that the data fits the logistic 
regression model. The H-L test produced a chi-square value of 6.41 with a p-value of 
0.6011 implying that the data indeed fit the logistic regression model used. 
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Table 4.43: Logistic Regression Results: HPR on Employee Perception Of FP 
Against BEST COMPETITOR 
Coefficients: 
               Estimate  Std. Error z value   Pr(>|z|)     
(Intercept)          -0.84618     0.98091             -0.863     0.3883     
HPRCAT          4.04925     0.48415    8.364     <2e-16 *** 
MEDIUM          0.39103     0.82333    0.475     0.6348     
BIG                    -0.45344     0.84228             -0.538     0.5903     
LARGE              -0.97696     0.80375             -1.215     0.2242     
GSE             0.74036     0.55360    1.337     0.1811     
MINING          1.54204     0.92537    1.666     0.0956 .   
FMCG                -0.57752     1.05213             -0.549     0.5831     
ICT                    18.08651          979.67217    0.018     0.9853     
BANK                 -0.27697     0.73774             -0.375     0.7073     
SERVICE         0.02882     0.86321    0.033     0.9734     
AGRIC           0.63031     0.87278    0.722     0.4702     
ENERGY          -15.74293        1769.25779             -0.009     0.9929     
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘   ’ 1 
 
Cox.Snell 2R   
0.4987562  
 
Nagelkerke 2R     
0.6735338   
 
Hosmer and Lemeshow goodness of fit (GOF) test 
Chi- squared = 6.4124, df = 8, p-value = 0.6011 
 
 
Model               Likelihood Ratio Test                                     
 Obs         265    LR chi2     183.02     
  0            107    d.f.              12         
  1            158    Pr(> chi2) <0.0001     
                                             
 
Tables 4.44 to 4.46 present the rest of the logistic regression results of the influence 
of HPR on employee perception of FP while Fig. 4.6 shows the ROC curve with 
interpretation for BC. The remaining ROC curves are included in the appendix and 
generally confirm the same pattern of a positive influence of HPR on employee 
perception of FP (see fig 10.3-10.5).  
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Table 4.44: Logistic Regression Results: HPR on Employee Perception Of FP 
Against INDUSTRY 
Coefficients: 
               Estimate  Std. Error  z value   Pr(>|z|)     
(Intercept)          -2.1792      1.0530                -2.069     0.0385 *   
HPRCAT          4.2921      0.5173     8.297     <2e-16 *** 
MEDIUM          1.0385      0.8849     1.174     0.2406     
BIG             0.3457      0.8876     0.390     0.6969     
LARGE           0.2281      0.8438     0.270     0.7869     
GSE             1.3374      0.5953      2.247     0.0247 *   
MINING          2.2418      0.9706     2.310     0.0209 *   
FMCG            0.6739      1.0364     0.650     0.5156     
ICT                    19.4294          1598.6630     0.012     0.9903     
BANK            0.2572      0.7764     0.331     0.7405     
SERVICE           -0.4198      0.9483     -0.443     0.6580     
AGRIC           0.1597      0.9589     0.167     0.8677     
ENERGY          -16.6149          2917.0128          -0.006       0.9955     
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘  ’ 1 
Cox.Snell 2R   
0.4987562  
 
Nagelkerke 2R     
0.6735338   
 
Hosmer and Lemeshow goodness of fit (GOF) test 
Chi- squared = 6.4124, df = 8, p-value = 0.6011 
 
 
Model               Likelihood Ratio Test                                     
 Obs         265    LR chi2     183.02     
  0            107    d.f.            12         




Table 4.45: Logistic Regression Results: HPR on Employee Perception Of FP 
Against LAST THREE YEARS 
Coefficients: 
               Estimate  Std. Error  z value   Pr(>|z|)     
(Intercept)    -1.48390     0.87966   -1.687      0.0916 .   
HPRCAT              3.05071     0.38646     7.894    2.92e-15 *** 
MEDIUM           0.21264     0.76055     0.280      0.7798     
BIG              0.19359     0.74298     0.261      0.7944     
LARGE          -0.37034     0.71024   -0.521      0.6021     
GSE              0.43870     0.49582     0.885      0.3763     
MINING           0.97355     0.88022     1.106      0.2687     
FMCG           -1.99279     0.89806   -2.219      0.0265 *   
ICT              1.02951     0.93501     1.101      0.2709     
BANK             0.63696     0.63920     0.996      0.3190     
SERVICE          0.02989     0.78025     0.038      0.9694     
AGRIC          -0.13130     0.79945   -0.164      0.8695     
ENERGY          -14.71183       1073.10923   -0.014      0.9891     
 
 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
Cox.Snell 2R   
0.3904609 
Nagelkerke 2R     
0.5211724   
 
Hosmer and Lemeshow goodness of fit (GOF) test 
Chi- squared = 1.7035, df = 6, p-value = 0.9449 
 
 
Model               Likelihood Ratio Test                                     
 Obs         265    LR chi2     131.19     
  0            125    d.f.            12         




Table 4.46: Logistic Regression Results: HPR on Employee Perception Of FP 
Against TARGET 
Coefficients: 
               Estimate  Std. Error  z value   Pr(>|z|)     
(Intercept)          -2.2104  1.7352             -3.4090  0.0634*   
HPRCAT         4.4311  0.3418  5.4821  <2e-16 *** 
MEDIUM          0.2109  0.8431  1.1185  0.2292     
BIG             0.1783  0.8469  0.3721  0.6649 
LARGE           0.2214  0.8048  0.2575  0.7505     
GSE             0.5296  0.6336  2.3916  0.0263 *   
MINING          2.4277  0.9922  2.3614  0.0214 *   
FMCG            0.7453  1.7600  1.1038  0.8756     
ICT                    21.9424           1805.4342  0.0136  1.1184     
BANK            0.2257  0.9776  0.4168  0.9324     
SERVICE          -0.0487  0.9438              -0.4410  0.6549     
AGRIC                0.7446  0.9195  0.1601  0.8320     
ENERGY         -17.6449         3097.8476              -0.0060  1.0572     
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
         
Cox.Snell 2R   
0.4213642 
Nagelkerke 2R     
0.5618429   
 
Hosmer and Lemeshow goodness of fit (GOF) test 
Chi- squared = 10.507, df = 8, p-value = 0.2312 
 
 
Model    Likelihood Ratio Test                                     
 Obs         265    LR chi2     144.97     
  0            134    d.f.            12         
  1            131    Pr(> chi2) <0.0001     
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FIG 4.6: ROC For BC 
 
Area Under The Curve 
Test Result Variable(s):   Predicted probability   
Area Std. Errora Asymptotic Sig.b 
Asymptotic 95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
.905 .018 .000 .869 .940 
The test result variable(s): Predicted probability has at least one tie between the positive 
actual state group and the negative actual state group.  
a. Under the nonparametric assumption 




The area under the curve is .905 with 95% confidence interval (.869, .940). Also, the 
area under the curve is significantly different from 0.5 since p-value is .000 meaning 
that the logistic regression classifies the group significantly better than by chance. 
Similar results were obtained for TARGET, IND and L3Y as per their ROCs presented 
in the appendix (Figure 10.3 – 10.5). 
 
4.3.2.2. HPR And Employee Satisfaction. 
A binary logistic regression equation was also used for equation 3.  Employee 
satisfaction scores of between 1-3 on the Likert scale (strongly satisfied, somewhat 
satisfied and satisfied) were considered positive and coded as one (1) while scores 
between 4-7 (strongly dissatisfied, somewhat dissatisfied, dissatisfied, and neutral) 
were considered negative and coded as zero (0). HPR scores above 18 were 
considered as positive and coded as 1 and scores above 18 were considered negative 
and coded as 0. The results of the binary logistic regression (table 4.47) confirms a 
significant positive direct relationship between HPR and Employee satisfaction when 
controlled for firm size, industry type and listing on the Ghana Stock Exchange. 
 
Employee Satisfaction =a +b HPR + DUMMY SIZE + DUMMY LISTED + DUMMY INDUSTRY + e    (3) 
 
Table 4.47:  Logistic Regression Results: HPR on Employee Satisfaction 
Coefficients: 
               Estimate  Std. Error  z value   Pr(>|z|)     
(Intercept)    -1.6344      1.0835    -1.508     0.1315     
HPRCAT           4.4274      0.4884      9.066    <2e-16 *** 
MEDIUM         -0.6084      0.9527    -0.639     0.5231     
BIG            -0.5282      0.9093    -0.581     0.5614     
LARGE          -1.6302      0.8907    -1.830     0.0672 .   
GSE              0.5023      0.5470     0.918     0.3585     
MINING           0.8229      1.2938     0.636     0.5248     
FMCG             0.8208      1.1319     0.725     0.4683     
ICT            -0.6283      1.2249     -0.513     0.6080     
BANK             0.1318      0.8242     0.160     0.8729     
SERVICE        -0.9048      1.0684    -0.847     0.3971     
AGRIC            1.5310      0.9604    1.594     0.1109     
ENERGY          -13.3015          1072.1094               -0.012     0.9901     
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
Cox.Snell 2R   
0.5325656 
Nagelkerke 2R     
0.7104960   
Hosmer and Lemeshow goodness of fit (GOF) test 
Chi- squared = 10.153, df = 8, p-value = 0.2544 
 
Model               Likelihood Ratio Test                                     
 Obs         265    LR chi2     201.53     
  0            138    d.f.            12         




FIG 4.7: ROC For Employee Satisfaction 
 
Area Under The Curve 
Test Result Variable(s):   Predicted probability   
Area Std. Errora Asymptotic Sig.b 
Asymptotic 95% Confidence 
Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
.935 .016 .000 .904 .966 
The test result variable(s): Predicted probability has at least one tie between the positive 
actual state group and the negative actual state group.  
a. Under the nonparametric assumption 
b. Null hypothesis: true area = 0.5 
 
In figure 4.7 above, the area under the curve is .935 with 95% confidence interval 
(.904, .966). Also, the area under the curve is significantly different from 0.5 since p-
value is .000 meaning that the logistic regression classifies the group (HPR on 






4.3.2.3. HPR On ROA & ROCE. 
Considering that the dependent variable ROA and ROCE are continuums (Field 2013, 
Pallant, 2013 and Rose, Spinks & Canhoto, 2015), equation 1 and equation 2 were 
modelled using ordinary least square regression. 
 
ROA =a +b HPR + DUMMY SIZE + DUMMY LISTED + DUMMY INDUSTRY + e…………….(1) 
ROCE =a +b HPR + DUMMY SIZE + DUMMY LISTED + DUMMY INDUSTRY + e…………..(2) 
 
HPR, scores of 1-3 on the Likert scale (agree, somewhat agree and strongly agree) 
were categorised as representing honest managerial performance reporting and 
coded as 1. Considering that HPR was computed as the sum of the scores for each 
respondent, and the fact that six questions (B1-B6) were used to measure HPR, this 
translated to a score of eighteen (18) representing honest reporting of managerial 
performance. Scores above eighteen (18) represented dishonest reporting of 
managerial performance (strongly disagree, somewhat disagree, disagree and 
neutral) and was coded as 0. 
 
The number of employees within an organisation was used as a proxy for 
organisational size (Rosen, 1982, Kremer, 1993). A linear regression model was 
conducted to assess the extent of the relationship between ROA and HPR controlling 
other factors. In the first place, the overall significance of the model is tested using 
analysis of variance (ANOVA). The ANOVA test for the overall significance of the 
regression model gave an F-statistic of 14.36 with a significance probability less than 
0.1% implying that the overall model is significant in predicting ROA. The model 
subsequently gave an adjusted coefficient of determination (R-Squared) to be 0.3778 
showing that, approximately 38% of the variabilities in ROA is explained by the 
regression model. Since the overall model is significant, the study proceeds to look at 
the significance of the individual explanatory variables. The model further shows that 
controlling for industry type, firm size and stock listing status of the firm, a positive 
HPR increases the ROA of a firm by 0.084 and this was statistically significant (t 
=4.607, p<0.001). Similar significant positive relationship of HPR was confirmed on 
ROCE. Tables 4.48 and 4.49 present the results of HPR on ROA and HPR on ROCE 




Table 4.48: Linear Regression Results Of HPR On ROA 
 
Coefficients: 
               Estimate    Std. Error    t value    Pr(>|t|)     
(Intercept)  -0.028332    0.046470      -0.610     0.542621     
HPRCAT         0.083872    0.018207        4.607     6.50e-06 *** 
MEDIUM         0.171334    0.041897        4.089     5.82e-05 *** 
BIG            0.154006    0.039715        3.878     0.000135 *** 
LARGE          0.171114    0.039043        4.383     1.72e-05 *** 
GSE            0.045599    0.023289        1.958     0.051336 .   
MINING       -0.025041    0.047560      -0.527     0.598998     
FMCG         -0.052035    0.042789     -1.216     0.225093     
ICT            0.007222    0.050772       0.142     0.886994     
BANK           0.047441    0.032075       1.479    0.140367     
SERVICE      -0.159850    0.038952     -4.104     5.49e-05 *** 
AGRIC        -0.162317    0.041087     -3.951     0.000101 *** 
ENERGY       -0.262783    0.068435     -3.840     0.000156 *** 
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
Residual standard error: 0.1345 on 252 degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-squared:  0.406, Adjusted R-squared:  0.3777  
F-statistic: 14.36 on 12 and 252 DF,  p-value: < 0.001 
 
 
To conduct, a justifiable ordinary least square regression, some assumptions must be 
met, or at least not violated. These assumptions include; linearity of the relationship, 
normality, independence and homogeneity of the variance of the random errors, 
symmetricity of the random errors about zero and absence of outliers. Non-violation 
of these assumptions validates the model. To check whether any of these assumptions 
are violated, graphical plots are used. The normal quantile - quantile plot (Q-Q plot) of 
the residuals is used to assess the normality of random error terms while the residuals 
are plotted against the fitted values to assess the other assumptions. The graphical 




FIG 4.8: Normal Q-Q Plot For HPR On ROA 
 
 
From the Q-Q plot, it is noticed that the residuals do not heavily deviate from the 
normal distribution function line. The shows that, the normality assumption is not 
violated. 
 
FIG 4.9: Residual Versus Fitted Plot For HPR On ROA 
 
From the residual vs fitted plot, it is observed that there are not influential outliers. 
Also, there is no pattern of distribution of points plotted. This shows that the model is 
indeed linear, the residuals are independent and have constant variance and 
symmetric about zero. Due to non-violation of the assumptions, there is strong 
evidence that the use of linear regression, in this case, is justified. Table 4.49 with Fig. 




Table 4.49: Linear Regression Results Of HPR On ROCE 
Coefficients: 
               Estimate    Std. Error  t value     Pr(>|t|)     
(Intercept)  -0.086810    0.068048      -1.276      0.203232     
HPRCAT         0.052786    0.026661     1.980     0.048804 *   
MEDIUM         0.164805    0.061353     2.686     0.007707 **  
BIG            0.223470    0.058156     3.843     0.000154 *** 
LARGE          0.214040    0.057173        3.744     0.000225 *** 
GSE            0.095234    0.034103        2.793     0.005631 **  
MINING         0.005918    0.069645        0.085     0.932354     
FMCG         -0.067237    0.062658      -1.073     0.284266     
ICT            0.186941    0.074348        2.514     0.012548 *   
BANK           0.111710    0.046969        2.378     0.018135 *   
SERVICE      -0.109074    0.057039      -1.912     0.056977 .   
AGRIC        -0.231722    0.060166      -3.851     0.000149 *** 
ENERGY       -0.126230    0.100214     -1.260     0.208978     
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
Residual standard error: 0.1969 on 252 degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-squared:  0.3205, Adjusted R-squared:  0.2881  
F-statistic: 9.905 on 12 and 252 DF,  p-value: 7.883e-16 
 










FIG 4.11: Residual Versus Fitted Plot For HPR On ROCE 
 
4.3.3. Discussion Of Results Of Predictors Of HPR. 
Considering that evidence exists in the literature of a positive effect of employee 
satistifaction and perception on FP (this was confirmed in this study and presented in 
the appendix- see table 10.2 – 10.4), then the results presented above confirms that 
HPR has a direct relationship with ROA and ROCE and an indirect relationship through 
HPR’s effect on employee satisfaction as well as employee perception of FP. 
Indirectly, the implication of a transparent and fair compensation system as well as a 
high innovation culture, coupled with a harmonious internal environment encourages 
team work and improves motivation and hence improves employee satisfaction (C10) 
which affects FP (Babakus et al., 2004)  
 
Yee et al. (2008) for instance confirm that employee satisfaction leads to improved 
service quality, which leads to higher customer satisfaction and hence improved firm 
profitability (Bowen & Schneider, 1985; Hartline & Ferrell, 1996). 
 
Section 4.2 tests a model that essentially confirms that HPR is positively related to 
ENV, POLITICS, INC, IND, INNOVATE and PERF. Evidence exists in the literature of 
the effect of ENV (Lumpkin & Dess, 2001; Načinović et al., 2012), POLICTICS (Grover, 
2005), INC (Baiman & Lewis, 1989; Evans et al., 2001), IND (Bass & Avolio, 1993), 
INNOVATE (Yang, 2009), MCS (Sonrensen, 2002) and PERF (Yang, 2009) on FP, 
and hence the significant relationship between HPR and FP is not surprising.  
 
As an example, Metcalfe (1998) and Gunday et al. (2011) find evidence that innovation 
improves product performance, which improves market performance and hence firm 
performance. Also, Yoon & Suh (2003) find evidence to suggest that satisfied 
employees work harder and deliver better quality service, which improves customer 
satisfaction. Anderson et al. (2004) propose that customer satisfaction has a lasting 




Also, MCS affect FP through a notion of ‘fit to the context of the organisation’ (Sim & 
Killough, 1998; Govindarajan, 1988; Govindarajan & Fisher 1990; Perera, Harrison & 
Poole, 1997; Henri, 2006) and firms with a greater capacity for innovation gain a 
competitive advantage through constant corporate renewal and customer orientation 
and hence achieve high FP (Danneels, 2002; Hurley & Hult, 1998). 
 
In this model, HPR has a significantly positive direct relationship with various 
measures of employee perception of FP, employee satisfaction, ROA and ROCE. In 
any case, an indirect relationship can also be inferred through HPRs effect on 
employee satisfaction and employee perception. 
 
The relationship between HPR and employee perception can be explained by 
McGregor’s (1960) assertion that HPR could suggest the non-existence of 
performance gaps and hence could influence employees’ perception that the 
organisation is performing well or has reasonable ability to overcome any identified 
performance gaps.  This favourable perception could increase employee confidence, 
satisfaction and performance.  
 
4.3.4. Summary & Conclusion Of Predictors Of HPR 
 
This section provides evidence of a significantly positive relationship between HPR 
and selected measures of firm performance. Probable explanations for the identified 
relationships are discussed based on existing literature. 
 
I summarise, below, the iterative process used in this analysis to arrive at this 
conclusion. After confirming the variables that influence HPR, I realised that empirical 
evidence confirms that most of the variables that influence HPR also have 
relationships with FP. As an example, the effects of harmonious organisational culture 
(POLITICS) and a high innovation culture (IINOVATE), MSC, etc. on various 
measures of FP has been suggested by studies such as Yang, (2009) and Shields & 
Young (1994). I, therefore, proceeded to explore this relationship with interesting 
results. However, since this, is the first study of this relationship, further studies will be 
required to confirm this relationship.  
 
HPR was regressed on various measures of FP including ROA, ROCE, an employee 
satisfaction index and various measures of employee’s perception of FP. Employee 
satisfaction scores and perception of FP were obtained on a Likert scale through a 
questionnaire. The theoretical basis for these hypotheses are explained in sections 
3.3.3.1. and section 4.3. Chun (2005) applies a similar method. Dummy variables were 
introduced to control for organisational size, industry type and listing on the Ghana 
Stock Exchange (Waddock & Graves, 1997). The results of the regression are 
presented in tables 4.32 – 4.49 and largely confirm the significant directional influence 
of HPR on FP.  
 
In exploring the relationship between HPR and ROA & ROCE, I perform a Halo Test 
to isolate the effects of prior financial performance on current, actual or perceived 
financial performance (Bharadwaj, 2000). This is usually referred to as ‘Halo Effects’, 
and I initially test a ‘control’ using an equation of the form FP1=a+B1FP0 (see chapter 
three) and find no statistically significant relationship between prior, current and 
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immediately past financial performance. Therefore, no further analysis was performed 
to eliminate Halo.  
 
Typically, higher ROA and ROCE percentages suggest relatively better FP. However, 
in the questionnaire, HPR as a latent variable was computed in two ways. It was 
computed either by using PCA or summing up the relevant set of Likert responses for 
each respondent from a seven-point Likert Scale. There are no significant differences 
in findings based on the two approaches. Since HPR was derived from observable 
variables on a Likert Scale from strongly disagree (7) to strongly agree (1) making 
higher values computed for HPR relatively adverse compared to lower values, to align 
the direction (sign of the coefficient), the sign direction of HPR was reversed and used 
in the regression equations for ROA and ROCE. 
 
One of the roles of accounting is to produce information on business performance 
(Gaspareto, 2004). This is usually done using financial accounting information. 
According to Orlitzky, Schimdt, & Rynes (2003), FP is often measured in three forms: 
- market, accounting and survey instruments. Market measures explain the degree of 
satisfaction of shareholders; accounting measures examine the relative level of 
internal efficiency in the application of resources within the company while survey 
instruments provide a subjective estimation of firm performance (FP). 
 
Even though, ROA is the variable widely used in empirical studies of FP (Boaventura, 
Silva, & Bandeiraode-Mello, 2012), the measurement of FP by non-monetary 
indicators is more recent and has increased in acceptance particularly as a function of 
the contemporary concern regarding the social action of organisations (Oliveira, De 
Luca, Pone & Pontes Junior, 2009). Figure 4.11a depicts the hypothesised relationship 














The findings suggest that HPR has a significantly positive and direct influence on ROA 









of Firm Performance  
Employee Satisfaction  
 277 
 
of firm performance. Additionally, employee perception is also a significant predictor 
of ROA, ROCE and Employee Satisfaction (see appendix Table 10.2-10.4; this is not 
discussed further because it is not the focus of the study).  
 
Table 4.49a summarises the results of the various hypotheses of the relationship 
between HPR and FP when HPR is computed as a sum of responses on a Likert scale.  
In Table 4.49a RW represents standardised regression weights. In table 4.49b the 
summary shows the results at both the respondent and the organisational level when 
PCA is used. ORGHPR (organisational level HPR) was computed as the mean of 
individual HPR scores per organisation. The intention was to ensure one HPR score 





TABLE 4.49a: Results Of Hypothesis Of HPRs Relationship With FP. 
HPR Estimated As Summation Of Likert Responses Per Respondent 
No. Hypothesis Relationship Regression Method 
Applied 
Regression at the Respondent Level -
HPR 






H19 HPR has a directly significant and 
positive influence on ROCE. 
HPR -> ROCE Linear Regression 0.053  P<0.01 Supported  
H18 HPR has a directly significant and 
positive influence on ROA. 
HPR -> ROA Linear Regression 0.084  P<0.01 Supported 
H17 HPR has a directly significant and 
positive influence on Employee 
perception of FP 
HPR -> C5 
HPR -> C6 
HPR -> C7 
HPR -> C8 
Logistic Binary 
Regression 








H16 HPR has a directly significant and 
positive influence on Employee 
Satisfaction (C10). 
HPR -> C10 Logistic Binary 
Regression 
 









TABLE 4.49b: Results Of Hypothesis Of HPR Relationship With FP 








Regression at the Respondent Level -HPR Regression at the 




Supported/ Rejected RW P Value Supported
/ Rejected 
H19 HPR has a directly 
significant and positive 







.012 0.121 Partially Supported 
Significant for all 
specifications except 
Industry Dummies.  
.036 P<0.01 Supported 
H18 HPR has a directly 
significant and positive 







0.024 P<0.01 Supported 
Significant for all 
specifications 
.052 P<0.01 Supported 
H17 HPR has a directly 
significant and positive 
influence on Employee 
perception of FP  
HPR -> C5 
HPR -> C6 
HPR -> C7 






See Table 4.35 – 
4.37  
P<0.01 Supported 
(See 4.35 – 4.37) 
however, a significant 
positive relationship 
confirmed for a 












H16 HPR has a directly 
significant and positive 















4.4. MANAGERIAL PERFORMANCE REPORTING BEHAVIOUR IN GHANA. 
 
As discussed in chapter three, the MPR behaviour in GC100 companies was 
measured with vignettes through a questionnaire (Section D of the questionnaire). The 
scenarios were developed based on the operationalisation of HPR in this study and 
sought to measure company practices and respondent’s opinion of company practices 
in MPR. An additional 15 interviews were conducted based on the vignettes to 
enhance the descriptive quality of responses.  
 
HPR was computed as an index measure based on the responses of each participant. 
An overall HPR score was calculated as the sum of the responses of each respondent 
to questions B1 to B6. HPR is conceptualised as a sum less than 18 (i.e. Neutral/Not 
Sure on the Likert Scale) to 6 (i.e. Strongly Agree on the Likert Scale).  Misreporting 
is conceptualised as a score of 18 or higher (up to 42). Mean total is the average 
across all scenarios and is computed to provide an estimate of overall MPR behaviour. 
Based on the mean total, 47% of respondents suggested that their organisations 
misreport managerial performance. Yang (2009) finds similar results in a study of HPR 
among government bureaucracies in Taipei.  
 
Interviewees were also asked to rank, on a scale of one to seven (similar to the Likert 
scale), questions B1-B6 and provide reasons for their answers. The responses 
provided were used in computing a score. The sum of responses and the researchers’ 
overall assessment of MPR (based on the mean calculated and the thresholds stated 
earlier) were disclosed to the interviewee for his agreement. As an example, the 
researcher will state that ‘Based on the responses you provided to these questions, 
will it be appropriate to say that, overall leaders of the organisation mostly misreport 
managerial performance?’. All respondents agreed with the overall assessments 
(emanating from the computed means) except three respondents who reviewed their 
answers from HPR (2.33; 3.83; and 3.17) to misreported MPR (4.17; 4.67; 4.17 






Questionnaire Interviews Total 
N= HPR 
N =  
Misreported 
MPR N= HPR 
N =  
Misreported 
MPR N= HPR 
N =  
Misreported 
MPR 
n % N % n % n % n % n % 
HPR =(B1-B6) 161 61% 104 39% 8 53% 7 47% 169 60% 111 40% 
SCENARIO 1: 
Responsible 
Reporting 157 59% 108 41% 8 53% 7 47% 165 59% 115 41% 
SCENARIO 2: 
Truthful Reporting 165 62% 100 38% 10 67% 5 33% 175 63% 105 38% 
SCENARIO 3: 
Assigning Wrong 
Reasons 101 38% 164 62% 5 33% 10 67% 106 38% 174 62% 
SCENARIO 4: 




Jargons 163 62% 102 38% 9 60% 6 40% 172 61% 108 39% 
Mean Total 
    
142  53% 
    
124  47% 
      
7  49%     8  51% 
   
149  53%    131  47% 
 
In total (questionnaires and interviews) 47% of respondents suggested that their 
organisations mostly misreport managerial performance.  Overall organisations 
misreported to the media most, followed by customers, regulators, employees and 
shareholders (see table 4.51). 
 
TABLE 4.51: Ranking Of Misreporting To Stakeholders 
 Stakeholders 
Questionnaire Interview Total 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
B1: Employee   3.4792    1.8342    3.8000    1.7809    3.4964    1.8297  
B2: Bosses   3.2528    1.6561    3.6000    1.3522    3.2714    1.6411  
B3: Customers   3.5396    1.7165    4.7333    1.5337    3.6036    1.7258  
B4: Regulators   3.5019    1.8609    4.0667    1.6242    3.5321    1.8508  
B5: Shareholder   3.4000    1.8170    3.8000    2.1112    3.4214    1.8319  
B6: Media   3.7434    1.9154    4.6667    1.8772    3.7929    1.9214  
 
Regarding the scenario about Responsible Reporting, 47% of interviewees and 41% 
of questionnaire respondents suggested that their colleagues within the organisations 
will report ‘illustration B’ suggesting that some organisations do not ‘report MPR 
responsibly’ and often flout headquarters policy especially in situations where the non-
conformity did not affect the substance of an activity. Approximately 67% of 
respondents admitted that scenarios of this nature have occurred within their 
organisation.  Most respondents (51%) did not consider reporting ‘illustration B’ as 
misreporting. One respondent suggested that in reporting ‘illustration B’ ‘despite 




Regarding the scenario about reporting truthfully, 38% of all respondents suggested 
that their organisations do not report MPR truthfully. The relatively lower percentage 
may confirm existing empirical evidence that most organisations do not engage in 
direct lying (Bohte & Meier, 2000) as a form of misreporting because direct lying is 
considered extremely risky.  62% of respondents suggested that their organisations 
assign wrong reasons to performance gaps especially if performance reviewers 
already believed or will find it easy to believe the wrong explanation. 62% of 
respondents suggested that their organisation, under the stated circumstances 
(scenario 4) will conceal the profitability report (MPR) to hide the performance gap.  
Four (4) interviewees, however, indicated that whereas the finance department will 
have wished that the report is included, very often the decisions on this matter are 
beyond the CFO. 39% of respondents suggested that their organisations will use 
complex technical jargons to conceal performance gaps. 
 
The method mostly used to misreport MP is (see table 5.50)  ‘hiding information’ 
(62%), ‘assigning wrong reasons’ (62%), ‘not reporting responsibly’ 41% (i.e. ignoring 
company policy), followed by use of technical jargons (39%), and not reporting 
truthfully (38%). 
 
It will seem from comparing the responses in the interview to the responses in the 
questionnaire that, the interviews aside complimenting the responses in the 
questionnaire provided a relatively stronger suggestion of misreporting in MPR. The 
reason for this is beyond the scope of this study, but a possible explanation could be 
the extra clarity that can be gained from a two-way interaction process as in a face-to-




51% of interview respondents suggested that leaders of their organisation mostly 
misreported managerial performance.  I used qualitative measures to capture and 
understand the perceptions of respondents about MPR practices within GC100 
companies. 15 interviews were conducted and used for data analysis. The age of 
interview participants was between 26-55 years old (mean-39.2, Median =37). Eight 
participants were male, and seven participants were female. Hill et al. (2005) 
recommend developing interview protocols that consist of between 8 – 10 questions 
with probes to fit within one hour. She also recommends at least two pilot interviews 
to test the questions. The interview protocols in this interview consisted of ten 
questions, and four pilot interviews were conducted among colleague PhD students. 
Interviews varied in length but were approximately 30 minutes per interview. 
 
To help participants feel comfortable, the interview began with background questions, 
which also help gather pertinent background data (Hill et al. 1997). After the 
participants signed the consent form and filled out the demographic form, 
conversations regarding participants’ work, home life, and interest in the study were 
discussed (Jalma, 2008).  
 
Face-to-Face interviews were preferred over phone interviews because face-to-face 
interviews allowed for a naturalistic setting (Heppner, Kivlighan & Wampold, 1999). All 
interviews were audio taped and took place outside the work premises of participants. 
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In most case, interviews were held at the nearest hotel lobby to the participants work 
environment.  
 
Data collected from interviews were initially transcribed, coded and fitted into five 
domain themes. The transcripts revealed themes and patterns that emerged from the 
data. The researcher, his assistant and a colleague PhD student independently 
transcribed all interviews. The colleague PhD student served as a tiebreaker if the 
researcher and his assistant could not reach a consensus. Also, five of the transcribed 
responses were reviewed by a relative to assure that it appropriately reflected the 
contents of the recorded interview and were found to be accurate. The transcripts were 
examined to look for themes about strategies for MPR, reasons, and reflections. These 
data were coded, and I reduced extraneous data to aid analysis. While reading the 
transcripts, I made notes and highlighted statements, and then categorised the 
responses based on identified themes. I used the qualitative data to generate 
categories, identified themes, and recurring patterns. Nvivo was applied in a limited 
manner to help identify key words to support the formulation of themes.  
 
Strauss & Corbin (1990) suggest the identification of domains based on context, 
intervening conditions, actions/interactions strategies and consequence. I follow a 
similar approach and identify the following domain themes: - 
a) The extent of honesty in MPR 
b) Strategies for Dishonest MPR 
c) Participants estimation of reasons for MPR behaviour 
d) Participants Perception of MPR behaviour 
e) Experience related to participation in study and interview 
f) Other 
 
The names of the domains were an appropriate reflection of the data.  After the 
determination of the domain themes, core ideas were applied to the data, and 
subsequently, each core idea was examined for categories, nuggets or threads of 
common or unique experiences across the interview data. The analysis of the 
interview data-set for the vignettes resulted in five domains, five core ideas and 
eighteen categories. Core ideas attempt to categorise smaller nuances of information 
within the domain. Categories highlight unique components of participants experience 
within each domain. Direct interview quotes, which have been edited for grammatical 
clarity, are used to highlight the data. 
 
Hill et al. (2005) recommend presenting the cross analysis of qualitative results 
through the frequency of occurrence. In this interview of 15 participants, categories 
that occurred for just one participant are labelled Rare  (Jalma, 2008), categories that 
occurred for between two to seven participants are labelled Variant, categories that 
occurred for 8 – 13 participants are labelled Typical, and categories that occurred for 






4.4.1.1. The Extent Of HPR Within GC100 Organisations. 
 
All interviewees (N=15) indicated familiarity with the issues discussed within the 
scenarios and suggested that the vignettes appropriately captured the reality of MPR 
practices within GC100 companies. One respondent, for instance, indicated that ‘We 
have similar issues like the scenario illustrates’. Another respondent indicated that ‘I 
am wondering how you designed these scenarios. In this case, too, situations like this 
occur often within the company’. A third respondent identified with the vignettes and 
stated that ‘This is the problem we are always having’ while a fourth respondent stated 
that ‘….. due to the exact issue, you indicated in your question…..This is a real issue’. 
 
Most respondents expressed personal experiences with MPR practices within their 
organisations (n=13) in their responses to the scenarios. Some suggested active 
participation in generating the MPRs (n=6). One respondent, for instance, stated that 
‘I put the information together, so I know what I am saying’.  Other respondents 
indicated that they were mere witnesses or passive observers (n=8). For instance, one 
Table 4.52: Domains, Core Ideas And Categories 
Domain Core Idea Category N Frequency 
The extent of 
Honesty in MPR 
 
Nature of MPR HPR 8 Typical 
Partial HPR 6 Variant 







Hiding information & 
Delaying MPR 
11 Typical 




Deliberate Misleading by 
Assigning Wrong Reasons 
10 Typical 
Untruthful Reporting 5 Variant 
Participants 
estimation of 
reasons for MPR 
behaviour 
 
Reasons for MPR 
behaviour. 
Selfish Economic Reasons 15 General 
General Sustenance of the 
organisation 
5 Variant 
External Pressure 1 Rare 










Positive Perception 8 Typical 
Neutral & Indifferent 1 Rare 








General Interest in 
Research Topic 
6 Variant 
Learning about Self 








respondent indicated that ‘I have attended such meetings several times and I know 
what goes on. ….. I was right there in my boss’s office when this happened’. Other 
respondents, based on their responses, were both passive observers and active 
participators in different circumstances (n=6). 
 
Based on responses to questions B1-B6 of the questionnaire, eight respondents 
suggested that their organisations are mostly honest in reporting MPR, while six 
respondents suggested that their organisations were mostly partially honest in 
reporting MPR. One respondent suggested that his organisation was mostly dishonest 
in reporting MPR and confirmed it with an example of a recent MPR by stating that : -  
‘My company has been lobbying government for a concession, and all the information 
we are presenting to support the concession is false. Completely false! I put the 
information together, so I know what I am saying.  
 
As explained earlier, HPR scores were computed as an index measure based on the 
responses of each participant on a seven-point Likert Scale (similar to the 
questionnaire construct). An overall HPR score was calculated as the sum of the 
responses of each respondent to questions B1 to B6. For purposes of analysing the 
interview responses only, HPR is conceptualised as a sum from 6 (i.e. Strongly Agree 
on the Likert Scale) but less than 18 (that is any score below ‘somewhat agree’). Due 
to the ability for better clarity in an interview process, a score was computed for a 
Partial HPR construct. Partial MPR is computed as a score greater than 18 but less 
than 36 (i.e. is covers somewhat agree, neutral and somewhat disagree). Misreporting 
is conceptualised as a score of 36 or higher (up to 42).  
 
Through seeking further elaboration, respondents indicated that misreporting MPR 
occurred mostly to customers and the media. While admitting the power of the media, 
one respondent highlighted the general scepticism of his organisation in interacting 
with the media by suggesting that 
 
‘Telling the media the truth will kill our business and make our customers turn against 
us. ….. I do not think my company is the only one that does not tell the media the 
whole story because it is a bad strategy to be honest with the media. It is easy to lie 
to them because they do not understand our industry’. 
 
All respondents acknowledged the role of powerful stakeholders (especially external 
ones) on the MPR practices within organisations. A respondent discusses how making 
external stakeholders dissatisfied can have consequences on managerial tenure and 
comments that ‘One of our CEOs was transferred out of this country because of 
problems with regulators’. 
 
Even though external stakeholders were deemed influential, misreporting MPR was 
mostly to external stakeholders than to internal stakeholders. The conduciveness of 
partially honest MPR (often) to external stakeholders was attributed to lack of capacity 
of such external stakeholders to detect any misreporting. One respondent indicated 
that ‘worse of all, it seems to be working for them because they get away with it’. One 
respondent highlighted the lack of technical capacity of the media ‘….. because they 
do not understand our industry’ another highlighted the lack of capacity of regulators 
‘If the regulators do not stop being aggressive, we will keep lying to them because they 
do not have the calibre of staff to monitor our activities. They must tone down and work 
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with us’. In the same vein, another respondent indicated that ‘Anytime we want a 
reprieve from a government agency, we use complexity to scare them or excite them. 
Unfortunately, they are often not in a position to figure it out’. 
 
Even where internal stakeholders are deliberately misled in MPR, a recurring 
conduciveness of the action was attributable to lack of knowledge or awareness. One 
respondent, for instance, highlighted that managers misreported to the CEO, ‘Because 
he does not understand Ghana some of the directors have taken advantage and 
feeding him with wrong information’. Another respondent indicated that ‘Headquarters 
has never been able to track our CAPEX spend well due to the exact issue you 
indicated in your question ….. and often we report whatever figure we want depending 
on what we want to achieve’. The perception of lack of rigour extended to external 
auditors as well. One respondent remarked that ‘Our auditors asked once about this 
and never asked again. We just told the auditors that they are old Purchase Orders 
that we failed to input into the system.  
 
Most respondents assumed that their organisations MPR misreporting practices were 
conventional, institutional, common practice and widespread (n=7). While some 
respondents acknowledged personal involvement in the MPR process and suggested 
collective responsibility (n=3) stating that ‘We all do this. We do it to our bosses, and I 
suspect they do it to their bosses too’. Other respondents suggested a widespread 
practice without acknowledging their role in the process (n=4). For instance, a 
respondent stated that ‘Most companies in Ghana do not tell the truth at all especially 
when telling you the truth will entitle you to some form of benefit or right against them. 
…..Very few companies in this country tell the truth, especially to employees, 
customers and the government’. Most respondents who shared this opinion of a 
widespread conventional misreporting practice were convinced that misreporting to 
the media and regulators (n=5) was common practice among GC100 companies. One 
respondent, for instance, indicated that ‘I do not think my company is the only one that 
does not tell the media the whole story because it is a bad strategy to be honest with 
the media’. Another respondent indicated that ‘Most management is sceptical of 
regulators’. A respondent was quite adamant that the creeping in of misreporting MPR 
into organisational processes is here to stay and cannot be controlled. He provides a 
compelling analogy using the metaphor of how several lies must be told into the 
foreseeable future to protect one lie. He contends that organisations are sceptical 
about full disclosure to have a clean slate for MPR because shareholders and markets 
are unforgiving in their reaction when managers voluntarily disclose misreporting. He 
states that ‘The process of covering up or cleaning the mess creates more mess and 
lies. It is a vicious cycle.’ 
 
A respondent highlights the unforgiving nature of the market in the comment that ‘All 
they care about is higher profit even when it is not realistic and if you tell them the 
truth, they will sack you because they will say you are not achieving results’ 
 
One respondent even suggested it was a global trend, remarking and asking the 
researcher ‘Even in Europe this happens. Have you tried watching Bloomberg or 
business news on CNN before?’. 
 
A respondent justified the trend of misreporting suggesting that ‘Politicians in the 




An obviously passionate respondent went further to highlight his view about a 
disturbing corporate trend of misreporting all forms of performance. He stated that 
‘Look! Let’s call a spade a spade. The whole corporate system is a charade, and we 
all know it and pretend. Your boss is trying to keep his job; your bosses boss is trying 
to look good and get promoted and so on ..… that is why our stock market is not doing 
well. I do not believe any accounting report that any company in the world provides. 
 
Evidently, even though a significant number of respondents suggested some form of 
misreporting of MPR, the evidence of a wide spread problem was not established in 
this study. Indeed, quite a sizable number of respondents (49% of interviewees) still 
indicated HPR practices within their organisation. 
 
Six respondents were of the view that the action or inaction of Headquarters created 
the impression that they subtly condoned such practices and were in support of it. 
They attributed their reasons to the lack of sanctions when these actions become 
evident, the lack of rigour that could easily lead to a detection of these practices and 
even the subtly suggestions of these actions by superiors from headquarters. One 
respondent puts it clearly by suggesting that ‘headquarters treat us with kid gloves’. 
Another suggested that ‘management sides with them against us’. In terms of 
conscious expression by headquarters superiors, one respondent narrated a scenario 
of explicit collaboration to obsfucate the MPR where ‘Before the meeting starts, your 
boss’s boss will discuss with him what to include and what not to include, then at the 
meeting both of them will pretend ..… my boss insisted but had to give in because his 
boss (from headquarters) suggested it be discussed in another forum and not the 
quarterly performance meeting’. Another respondent was even more blunt and 
suggested that ‘I think headquarters is in on this because you just have to check the 
number of Purchase Orders in the last day of the year and the reversals at the 
beginning of the year, and even you can call the supposed suppliers to cross check’. 
Quite interestingly, most respondents suggested a critical role of the finance 
department and CFO in the MPR process. Some respondents even suggested that 
the finance department is not able to play its control and accountability role effectively 
because it does not receive adequate management support (‘management sides with 
them against us’) and often has the arduous task of defending MPRs that it has no 
influence on. The lack of top management support for the accountability function of 
the CFO is highlighted in this statement by a respondent ‘I can tell you that the CFO 
fights and argues with the other directors all the time, but the CEO always defends the 
other directors, so he is left isolated and gives in’. One respondent suggested that ‘we 
[the finance department] are given the arduous task of defending their incompetence. 
It happens all the time’. Another suggested that ‘the CFO has to cover for them and 
make up explanations which will be difficult.  I do not understand why everyone at 
Group [headquarters] expects the CFO to have all the answers concerning the 
business. It puts pressure on him, and he uses such creative ways to protect his job.’ 
 
Some respondent suggested that an explicit and equal role for all managers in the 
MPR preparation, presentation and defence process may be helpful in curbing the 






4.4.1.2. MPR Practices. 
 
Hiding Information and deliberate assigning of wrong reason are ‘typical’ schemes for 
misreporting MPR among GC100 companies.  Respondents acknowledged that the 
widespread use of these schemes was because they were (1) subtle and less 
aggressive (n=7) ‘it is not really lying, it is just stretching the facts a little bit…lying is 
wrong’’ (2) difficult to detect (n=8); ‘managers reputation is intact, and they are not 
criminally liable… it will never be detected’ (3) conventional business norms (n=11) ‘I 
have seen it in all the companies I have worked in’ and (4) hence allows for  positive 
self concept maintenance (n=5); ‘That way, managers can massage the facts and still 
feel good about themselves.’ 
 
A respondent summarises the widespread perceptual convenience of these two 
schemes in the following words: - 
‘If you decide to make a manager liable for hiding information the question becomes 
how do you determine that he did and intended to do so? It is very ambiguous. It is 
the same with using jargons. How do you prove that it was intended for a deceptive 
purpose? In all reports, reasons assigned are based on perspectives. How do you say 
my perspective is wrong and was intended for a deception? It is so difficult to prove’. 
 
All other schemes are ‘Variant’. Interestingly, however, direct lying is the least use and 
confirms existing empirical studies that confirm that managers will avoid direct lying 
because they consider it as risky.  
 
Discussions around the deliberate use of complexity and technical jargons to conceal 
performance gaps were quite compelling (n=6). One respondent narrated a scenario 
in his organisation that captures clearly the case of abuse of technical jargons  ‘Last 
two years, we hired a global consulting firm to come and help us fashion out a strategy 
to improve our revenues ….. look, everything they said in the report is the same thing 
we have been telling the company over and over again, but in simple language so they 
ignored us and went to pay big bucks for the same information. Let me give you an 
example; we suggested that the company round up minutes per call and they ignored 
us when the consultants called it ‘invisible price levers’ they liked it’.  
 
Even more profound was the justification provided by respondents for this action. 
Some suggested that it was standard industry practice (n=4) ‘We all do this’, while 
others argued that the action was global ‘Even in Europe this happens’. The comments 
of a respondent perhaps accurately capture the thought processes behind such action. 
She suggests that : - 
 
‘Every simple thing has to look complex to look important. If you use simple language, 
the problem looks simple, and the next question they will ask is, so why have you not 




4.4.1.3. Participant’s Estimation Of Reasons For MPR Behaviour. 
 
Most participants (n=10) indicated that they could relate to and accept the reasons for 
such reporting behaviour and attributed it to noble reasons with wider group benefits. 
One respondent expresses his support for managerial action by stating that 
‘Personally I understand the reason my bosses are not completely honest with 
shareholders’. Another indicated a collective benefit by suggesting that ‘Telling the 
media the truth will kill our business and make our customers turn against us’.  Some 
respondents (n=5) were however sceptical. One respondent suggested that MPR 
action was purely based on selfish economic motives of top management with no 
direct benefits to lower level employees ‘if you see their salaries and compensation 
packages, that is why they will tell lies to protect their jobs’.  
 
As another example, in discussing the scenarios, a respondent expressed full support 
for the actions of the CFO and attributed probable noble motives to his choice. She 
stated that ‘I will do the same thing the CFO did. I will reduce my revenue to the target 
number so that I can reduce the huge management fees (please note that 
management fees are a percentage of revenue) and use the excess credit in the 
revenue account as he did. He is an African, so he cares more about our bonuses, 
and I support him 100%’. 
 
Another respondent was however quick to highlight that misreporting rather occurs 
during periods of impressive performance and not during periods of performance gaps 
‘when performance is bad, then [management] they quickly open up to employees so 
that employees become sympathetic to them. When performance is good, then they 
make up all sorts of excuses especially by telling us that they want to invest more so 
that the business can grow more’.  
 
A respondent suggested that competition (i.e. external influences) drives the general 
trend for misreporting MPR within his company. He stated that ‘The market is tough, 
and competition is very high’. 
 
Five respondents attributed the determined MPR practices to a logical need for 
organisational survival and managerial sustenance. Related to this, MPR is used to 
avoid sanctions and keep stakeholders satisfied to ensure a continuous supply of 
critical resources that the organisation needs. One respondent discussed MPR to 
regulators and indicated that ‘anytime you tell the regulator you have a problem, 
instead of them helping you solve it, they punish you and the next moment you hear it 
splashed all over the media. I do not understand how these regulators work. Rather 
than seeing us as a team, they think that the best way to show the public that they are 
on top of their job is to impose fines for every least mistake. One of our CEOs was 
transferred out of this country because of problems with regulators’.  
 
All responded (n=15) alluded to selfish economic interest as a driver of MPR practices. 
One responded alluded to this by stating that ‘if you see the salaries and compensation 
packages of these people [senior management], that is why they will tell lies to keep 
their jobs. Their packages are huge, and they have gotten used to big lifestyles. Others 
identified the selfish desire for job security as well as other economic considerations 
of managers as the main driver for reporting behaviour. All respondents alluded to and 
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explicitly used the words performance ‘bonuses’ in the discussion of the reasons for 
MPR practices. Ten respondents used words that alluded to job security and 
promotions. Therefore, MPR practices were used by managers to ‘keep their jobs’, 
‘avoid transfers’, ‘get promoted’ ‘look good’ etc. 
 
Other respondents (n=10) suggested that the MPR practice is institutionalised and has 
become a routinised accepted norm.  Respondents alluded to this assertion by their 
suggestion of the widespread nature of this phenomenon. This has been discussed in 
an earlier paragraph. 
 
Two respondents alluded to cultural specificities (‘He is an African, so he cares more 
about our bonuses, and I support him 100%’) as well as peculiar and contextual 
operational issues (‘because unlike Europe and South Africa, everything has to be 
imported into Ghana’). 
 
Some respondent (n=9) justified the MPR practices through inter departmental rivalry 
highlighting the competitiveness and lack of harmony in the working relationship 
between managers and departments. In discussing a scenario about ‘truthful 
reporting,’ a respondent justified the hypothetical managerial action with an example 
of a similar event within her organisation. She stated that: -  
 
‘There are very few times that we [finance department] get to spend on CAPEX. The 
technical departments and the sales and marketing departments are always misusing 
company money on cars and other things that do not benefit the company much. When 
we get the opportunity, we also seek the mandate of our boss to defend the 
department so that we do not lose out. We are all part of the company, so we also 
deserve to spend on CAPEX. Last year, we used operational expenses to replace all 
the PCs of our managers with Laptops’. 
 
The lack of harmony as a driving factor for misreporting MPR was quite revealing from 
comments by respondents. In another discussion regarding a scenario about 
deliberate use of technical jargons, another respondent remarked that ‘‘You should be 
asking the sales director that because he and his team are the worse culprits. Every 
time there is a decline in sales, they blame everyone except themselves. Worse of all 
it seems to be working for them because they get away with it. Now we have a new 
technical director who is from the group head-office and very connected to the Group 
CEO. Let’s see if they can blame the technical department for sales challenges again’.  
 
Another respondent remarked ‘This is the problem we are always having. When we in 
the finance department point out that the other departments are the problem, 
management sides with them against us. Then we are given the arduous task of 
defending their incompetence. It happens all the time’. Another respondent reveals 
how such inter-departmental and inter managerial contentions leads to the breakdown 
of trust and a healthy working relationship. His analogy and subsequent explanations 
provide some clarity on how a breakdown of trust affects MPR through shirking and 
hiding of information ‘The reason why we will not include such reports is that the sales 
director will not attend the performance review meeting claiming he has to be on the 





4.4.1.4. Participants Perception Of MPR Behaviour. 
 
Participants conceptualisation of what constituted HPR was either narrowly defined 
(n=9) or erroneously conceptualised (n=6). Most respondents (n=9) considered HPR 
from the strict adherence to the letters (rather than the spirit) of rules and regulations. 
This is particularly evident in the scenario about responsible reporting. One 
respondent evaluated the managerial action in scenario one as meeting the 
requirements of HPR because ‘There is no breach of standards or laws or principles’. 
 
Seven interviewees suggested that their colleagues within the organisations will flout 
headquarters policy especially in situations where the non-conformity did not affect the 
substance of an activity. Most of these respondents (n=5) suggested that reporting 
‘illustration B’ does not violate HPR because ‘despite violating standard rules, the 
accuracy of the report is still intact’.  
 
Others (n=6) erroneously conceded MPR practices as acceptable and hence HPR if it 
results in outcomes that meet the expectations of a higher authority, ‘because it tells 
the story the business expects to see’ or in higher rewards for self and other colleagues 
‘ ….. and to be fair to employees as a means of rewarding performance’. One 
respondent suggested that reporting practices are acceptable if it is ‘in the best interest 
of the company and its employees targeted bonuses would be achieved’. Quite 
remarkably, three respondents equated misreporting MPR to creative accounting 
practices and suggested that creative accounting was legal. One respondent 
remarked that ‘Well you call it misreporting, but I call it financial engineering. Another 
respondent remarked that ‘The business expects targets to be achieved and employs 
creative ways to achieve the desired results. You call it misreporting, but I call it 
creative accounting which is allowed’.  
 
Perceptions of the effect of misreported MPR varied. Some considered it of serious 
consequence; ‘It is very serious than I can explain’; others considered any adverse 
effect to be mild. Eight respondents attributed an overall positive effect to misreporting 
MPR. Of these eight, three identified some negative effects but conceded that the 
positive effects outweighed the negative effects. One respondent was indifferent 
whereas seven respondents attributed an overall negative effect to misreporting MPR. 
Of these seven, two identified minor positive effects.  
 
The main positive effect that was identified was the financial benefit of misreporting 
MPR regarding bonus pay-outs to employees and management. One respondent 
questioned ‘Why must my boss stir up controversy especially if just keeping quiet will 
guarantee everyone’s end of year bonus? My boss is too smart to make such a 
mistake.’ Respondents also suggested that such reporting practices provided the 
impetus for the organisation's survival because it kept stakeholders satisfied and at 
bay while providing critical resources for the running of the organisation. A respondent, 
for instance, admitted that without obfuscating an MPR, it would have been impossible 
for his organisation to obtain the needed CAPEX resources. He states that ‘our 
industry is CAPEX driven and requires heavy investments to stay ahead of 
competition’. Another respondent admitted that it would have been impossible to 
obtain the needed software that was functionally critical for his job.  He states that ‘we 




Negative consequences identified included possible litigation, adverse effect on brand 
image and reputation if discovered, and well as negative effects on the wider national 
economy. The discussions of the wider effects on the national economy seem to be 
premised on the assumption that reporting practices affect the payment of legitimately 
due sums to the government.  
 
4.4.1.5. Experience Related To Participation In Study And Interview.  
 
The final core idea emanated from statements participants made regarding their 
experience of being interviewed and participating in this study. Most of this content 
was unsolicited by the interviewer. All categories under this section were Variant. Six 
participants expressed a general interest in the topic.  
 
In response to a question from the interviewer that asked that ‘Is there anything I have 
not asked about that you think would be important to know?’, One respondent 
indicated that ‘I think it is a very interesting topic and one that I will consider if I ever 
pursue a PhD. I have always wondered if people care about what goes on in 
organisations such as mine. Are people aware of the consequences of what we do on 
their daily lives? In my opinion, this topic should receive more attention from 
government and regulators because it has yet to be discovered consequence. I am 
glad someone is paying attention, and I hope you get the support you need’. The words 
of this participant underscore the relevance of this exploratory study. 
 
Five participants suggested that the interview process has led to an increased self-
awareness of HPR and resulted in self-considered thoughts about its implications as 
well as their role in the entire MPR process. In response to the same question from 
the interviewer, one respondent indicated that ‘I must admit that your questions have 
put things into a better perspective for me. I realise that some of the routinised 
behaviours that I take for granted contribute to this unhealthy practice. My action is to 
be a force for change, at least within my unit, and hope that it does not cost me my 
job’. 
 
Some participants (n=4) commented on how the interview process impacted them. 
The following quote highlights the issues that were raised by a participant as she 
discussed MPR practices within her organisation.  
 
‘My mind is curious about what will be different if all organisations adhere to the highest 
standard of HPR. All of a sudden, I am asking myself where my career will be if 
everything was done the right way and rewards and promotions were based on true 
performance. I am wondering if I can adhere to the right standards of HPR if I become 






4.5. EMPLOYEE PERCEPTION ABOUT THE EFFECT OF HPR. 
This was measured using interviews (n=30; That is an additional 15 interviews were 
conducted in addition to the interviews in section 4.5.1. The extra interviews were with 
civil society groups, regulators, the media etc.) and the questionnaire (n=265). The 
questionnaire approached this from two perspectives.  
 
Firstly, respondents were asked (with questions B41-B47) to show their agreement or 
otherwise with certain statements on a seven-point Likert scale from strongly agree 
(1) to strongly disagree (7). The statements were based on a scan of existing literature 
about the possible consequences of misreporting managerial performance. All 
statements began with the phrase; ‘When an organisation does not report honestly to 
its stakeholders…..” To ensure that, other consequences of misreporting are 
highlighted by respondents, two open ended questions were also included and sought 
to elicit respondents’ opinion on (a) the possible adverse effects of misreporting and 
(b) the possible positive effects of misreporting. 
  
63% of respondents stated that misreporting had a positive effect on the organisation. 
Reasons provided varied but included (1) opportunity to earn higher bonuses (2) 
opportunity to gain approval for critical resources needed to beat the competition and 
(3) job security for top executives. All respondents identified adverse effects of 
misreporting MPR, but in all cases, the identified adverse effects were like the ones 
provided in the closed ended question.  
 
Table 4.53 reports the descriptive statistics of the variables included in the 
questionnaire study. All variables were mean centered (Aiken & West, 1991) and were 
reported as such in table 4.53. 
 
Analysing the mean statistics in table 4.53, employees believe misreporting MPR 
mostly has a relatively more profound adverse effect on the organisation’s reputation 
(mean 3.0792), national economic development (3.0981) and FP (3.1132). This 
confirms earlier findings of effects of HPR of FP in this study (See the earlier section 




TABLE 4.53: Univariate Analysis Of Employees Perception Of The Effect Of Misreporting MPR 
  
N Range Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic 
Std. 





B41 265 6.00 1.00 7.00 3.1245 .10806 1.75906 .730 .150 -.568 .298 
B42 265 6.00 1.00 7.00 3.1283 .10691 1.74038 .640 .150 -.563 .298 
B43 265 6.00 1.00 7.00 3.1132 .09717 1.58186 .773 .150 .032 .298 
B44 265 6.00 1.00 7.00 3.2000 .10133 1.64961 .687 .150 -.344 .298 
B45 265 6.00 1.00 7.00 3.1962 .10679 1.73838 .663 .150 -.599 .298 
B46 265 6.00 1.00 7.00 3.0792 .10098 1.64379 .738 .150 -.368 .298 
B47 265 6.00 1.00 7.00 3.0981 .09985 1.62538 .678 .150 -.309 .298 
B41=adverse effect on organisation reputation, B42=Increased cost of operation, B43=Lower profits, B44=Internal conflicts, 
B45=Litigation and Penalties, B46= Lower moral and job satisfaction, B47=Adverse effect on national economic development 
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As stated in chapter three, interviewees on the effect of misreporting MPR included 
media, regulators and civil society groups (n=30: This means an additional 15 
interviews were conducted in addition to the interviews in section 4.5.1). Highlights of 
some of the responses from the interviews about the effects of misreporting MPR are 
similar to respondents in the vignette with interview. Peculiarly even though most 
respondents (n=102 questionnaire and interviews) identified potential adverse effects 
of misreporting HPR, they did not consider them critical.  In the interview process, for 
example, some respondent (n=10 in the interview) contested the practical relevance 
of brand equity. One respondent commented that ‘I have never really thought about 
this carefully, but if I am pushed to provide an answer immediately, I think the biggest 
risk of misreporting is to the organisation's reputation. I do not think that businesses 
collapse just because of executives cooking up the numbers. Maybe, in the advance 
countries, a bad reputation can be costly, but in Ghana, and especially in my kind of 
industry I do not think so’. Some respondents in the interview also contested (n=18) 
any significant effect of misreported MPR and indicated that any adverse effects could 
only be the soft and not significant consequence. One respondent highlighted that 
‘Misreporting even if it occurs can only affect employee moral if the resulting increase 
in bonus is shared only by the top executives. However mostly, we all benefit, even 
though top management gets the biggest share’. 
 
Interview participants from civil society groups, regulators and the media were 
particularly interested in the effect of MPR on the national economy of Ghana. One 
respondent commented that ‘As a regulator, I just completed an audit of organisations 
that exposed that most of the companies have been under-declaring their revenues 
costing the government of Ghana more than USD10 million over five years. I am not 
sure that discussing whether it is deliberate or not is appropriate for your academic 
work, but I hope this answers’ your question. Can you imagine what this money can 
do for Ghana?’  
 
Similarly, another respondent stated that ‘Because I work in an advocacy organisation, 
perhaps I am biased towards effects on the national economy. I think the effect on the 
national economy is the most critical because even these organisations will not 
perform well if the economy is under stress. My organisation is currently involved in 
an issue where a company has gained significant concession as a manufacturing 
company when in fact it is importing finished products from China. When we 
investigated, less than 10% of their manufacturing takes place in Ghana, and even 
then, they only assemble the imported components rather than manufacture. Over 
90% of the finished products on the market are imported. This has a direct 
consequence on the economy unless you do not agree. 
 
Some respondents suggested a wider group benefit of misreporting MPR thereby 
allowing the organisation an effective opportunity to manage its global affairs and 
hence sustenance (n=11 in the interview). One respondent suggested that ‘Most of 
this creative accounting benefits the group as a whole but perhaps affects the specific 
in-country operation. So perhaps, lower profits will occur in Ghana, but it will show up 
as a gain somewhere in the group. However, I see the importance of your question 
because if the misreporting is not done with the support of the group head office then 
more investments will be made by the group into the in-country operation and it will 




Secondly, the evidence from the interview (discussed above) is also collaborated by 
questions C3 and C4 that asked respondents to rank the effects of misreporting 
(positive and negative) in order of likelihood of occurrence and highest adverse effect 
on organisational survival. The summary of the results is presented below in Fig. 4.12. 
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Likelihood Of Occurrence 
This grid is derived from computing the mean score rank for each variable within 
question C3 and C4.  That is to say; it is computed as the mean of the various ranks 
provided by respondents. The size of the bubble is the researchers own estimation of 
the extent of seriousness (bigger bubbles are more serious than smaller bubbles) that 
organisations must attach to these consequences based on respondents’ opinion. The 
grid is divided into four quadrants, and the highlighted quadrant represents what 
respondents consider as very likely to happen with the highest adverse effect on an 
organisations survival.  However, based on the evidence of a high correlation between 
FP and HPR discussed in an earlier chapter, as well as the widely documented 
evidence of a high correlation between employee satisfaction (moral) and FP, it is 
possible that most organisations underestimate the adverse effect of misreporting 





























4.6. A JOINT CONSIDERATION OF IMPRESSION MANAGEMENT THEORY, 
LEGITIMACY THEORY, INSTITUTIONAL THEORY AND STAKEHOLDER 
THEORY TO EXPLAIN MPR BEHAVIOUR IN GC100.  
 
Legitimacy theory and Stakeholder theory are often considered as overlapping 
perspectives that emanate from Political Economy Theory (Benson, 1975) and 
Institutional theory (IT hereafter). The institutional theory assumes that organisational 
behaviour is affected by external and internal pressure and organisations usually 
comply with such pressure to receive social validation, stability, legitimacy, resources 
and to enhance survival prospects (Moll et al., 2006; Oliver, 1991). Managers, 
therefore, spend their time attempting a critical balance between the desires for 
legitimacy against the desire for internal efficiency. 
 
Gray et al. (1996, page 47) define political economy as ‘the social, political and 
economic framework within which human life takes place’.   Therefore, society, politics 
and economics are interlinked, and economic activity take place within a political, 
social, and institutional context. Impliedly accounting reports (and disclosures) are 
social, political and economic documents (Guthrie & Parker, 1990) that can transmit 
such meaning to a pluralistic set of recipients. This is because firms are part of a 
broader social system.  
 
Legitimacy theory draws from political economy and institutional theory (LT hereafter) 
and emphasise that firms exist to the extent that society considers it (them) legitimate 
(Deegan, 2002). It highlights society and compliance with the expectations of society. 
 
Stakeholder theory (ST hereafter) on the other hand concurs with the argument of 
different interest groups that have different views and expectations of a firm. Often 
such different interest groups have different levels of power, attractiveness, status, 
familiarity with the organisations, and ability to affect an organisation (Deegan, 2002). 
 
Even though both theories are used interchangeably (Deegan, 2002) in substance ST 
emphasises economic motivations whereas LT highlights social motivations (Gray et 
al., 1995). Therefore, whereas LT emphasises the expectations of society in general 
(i.e. the average expectation of all stakeholder groups in society), ST recognises the 
different expectations of different interest groups. Recently discussions of LT have 
highlighted agents focus on a selective but powerful segment of stakeholders to derive 
legitimacy (rather than on society as a whole). Impliedly, a critical reason for 
stakeholder management is to derive legitimacy.  
 
The overlap between LT and ST makes it possible and necessary to join them to 
provide more useful insight into organisational self-reporting of MP.    
 
The sociological concept of Impression management (IM hereafter) has been applied 
to studies of organisational behaviour to explain the reaction of firms facing legitimacy 
threats and to account for changes in MPR behaviour (Aerts, 1994). Organisational 
impression management has been defined as ‘any action that is intentionally designed 
and carried out to influence an audience’s perception of the organisation (Bolino et al., 




Gardner & Martinko (1988) categorise the impression management process into four 
parts; (a) the motivation for managing impressions (b) the way impression is managed 
(c) the reaction of the audience and (d) the organisational context in which IM is 
performed. These four aspects underpin the research objectives of this study. In 
constructing my hypothesis, I take into consideration the organisational context as well 
as the motivations of the ‘actor’. I further explore the manner of in which impression 
management is constructed using various scenarios that tie to the conceptualisation 
of HPR.  
 
In this section (section 4.6.1), I use stakeholder theory (supported by LT and IT) as an 
overarching theory, supported by IM theory to explain the reactions of the audience 
as well as any other observed findings of this study. I am of the view that the existence 
of multiple stakeholders is conducive for IM because inherent to the Impression 
Management theory (IM) is the view of multiple stakeholders (audiences). Firms like 
people are viewed as social actors with self-presentation goals (Whetten et al., 2009) 
seeking to gain approval and status from relevant constituents (Highhouse et al., 
2009). Therefore, impression management is used to gain legitimacy, be viewed 
favourably, and enhance the reputation of the organisation and/or self (Rosenfeld et 
al., 1995).  
 
Schlenker (1980) proposes two main reasons for Impression Management (a) 
instrumental; where people want to influence others and gain a reward and (b) 
expressive; where people construct an image to enhance their identity. Therefore, 
individuals are likely to manage impressions if it is instrumental in achieving their 
goals.  
 
Since reputation relates to the shared stakeholder impression of a firm (Fombrum, 
1996, Highhouse et al., 2009), then the building of a firm’s reputation can prompt 
relevant actors to engage in IM to gain a favourable impression from shareholders. My 
view is that, if reputation (for organisation and self) is considered as a product of HPR, 
then enhance corporate and self-reputation could be a key link between observed 
HPR results in this study, and the competitive advantage that results in enhanced FP.  
 
This is because, MPR is part of the dialogue between the firm and its relevant 
stakeholders (Gray et al., 1995) and can be used as an instrument of IM (see chapter 
two) to contribute to the firm’s reputation (Hooghicmstra, 2000). The evidence from 
this study is consistent with the view that management in selecting their construct of 
impression management (see results from scenario application) consider the 
implications on the organisations as well as their reputation and consider the relative 
relevance of the varied stakeholders. Fombrum & Shanley (1990) sum it up by 
suggesting that a firm’s reputation is enhanced by the cues that signal Firm 
Performance integrity, conformity to rules and social norms and competitive leadership 
as well as distinctiveness.  
 
Therefore, HPR as part of the dialogue between firms and their stakeholders can be 
used as IM instrument (Arndt & Bigelow, 2000) to communicate socially responsible 
images to stakeholders to influence their assessment of reputation. In the accounting 
literature, legitimacy and reputation are sometimes used interchangeably (Chalmers 
& Godfrey, 2004) because both concepts are social constructions with stakeholders 
assessing firms and both create an improved ability to obtain resources (Deephouse 
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& Carter, 2005). Therefore, it is difficult to discuss firm legitimacy without discussing 
firm reputation. 
 
In this study, IM confirms that managers engage in HPR to improve organisations 
relationship with stakeholders and enhance reputation (and hence will be mostly 
partially honest than outrightly dishonest in MPR).  Pfeffer (1981, p. 26) concurs with 
this assertion and states that ‘every organisation has an interest in seeing its definition 
of reality accepted …... for such acceptance is an integral part of legitimation of the 
organisation and its development of assured resources’. Therefore, in addition to 
striving to achieve MP, managers attempt to influence stakeholder perception of 
performance by rationalising the company’s actions and projecting a favourable image 
(Ginzel et al., 1992). 
 
Stakeholder theory affirms the differential constructs of IM since some stakeholder 
groups can be more influential than others in demanding HPR (Neu et al., 1998). In 
this study, there was evidence of enhancement and entitlements (Tedeschi & Norman, 
1985), active concealing (Sutton & Callahan, 1987), excuses (Tedeschi & Riess, 
1981), self-serving attribution (Schlenker, 1980), blurring and boosting. Institutional 
theory, in this study, highlights managerial tendency for isomorphism to gain 
legitimacy.  Stakeholder theory, impression management theory, institutional theory, 
and legitimacy theory explain the reaction and effect of HPR especially in providing 
management with the needed legitimacy and resources to succeed. Figure 4.12a 


























































4.6.1. Discussing Findings With Theoretical Framework. 
CAT (Jensen & Meckling, 1976, Fama, 1980 and Fama & Jensen, 1983) contends 
that the principal (shareholder) and the agent (manager) have opposing interests that 
can result in conflicts and affect the smooth running of the company. In contrast, 
stewardship theory suggests that ethical and professional motives will override and 
prevent conflicts of interest between the principal and agent (Muth & Donaldson, 1998) 
because managers are honest, and good resource managers (Donaldson, 1990, 
Donaldson & Davis, 1991 and Donaldson & Davis, 1994, Donaldson & Preston, 1995) 
focused on achieving good business track records (Davis et al., 1997), to preserve 
their reputation.  
 
Assuming the resource dependency theory, and interest group theory are relied on, 
the perspective about HPR will be relative because agents will be driven by a desire 
to satisfy ‘interest groups’ they consider valuable in facilitating the maximisation of 
performance (Pfeffer, 1973 and Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Therefore, what one interest 
group will consider as misreporting, will be considered as HPR by another often more 
‘powerful’ group. 
 
Theoretically, institutional perspective (Scott, 2001), holds that all social participants 
seek legitimacy, sometimes over economic efficiency (Carver, 2010) and in so doing 
help develop legitimate rules within the institutional environment (Judge et al., 2010). 
Therefore, if HPR delivers the required critical balance of the interest groups, then to 
promote legitimacy it will be vigorously pursued by managers (Hess & Warren, 2008; 
Johanson & Östergren, 2010). 
 
All the above theories, working together explain various aspects of HPR (causes, 
effects etc.) and underlie and support the interrelationship between HPR and FP. 
However, stakeholder theory (with legitimacy theory) probably offers an integrative 
and holistic perspective on HPR. HPR improves FP to the mutual benefit of 
shareholders, employees, customers, suppliers, regulators and all other agents likely 
to be affected by the decisions taken by the company. Figure 4.12c depicts the 
conceptual and theoretical application of various strands of stakeholder theory vis-à-
vis the actual empirical work to guide analysis in this section. 
 
The findings of this study also suggest that MPR practices usually follow routinised 
practices and conventions (Institutional theory). It also confirms that the level of HPR 
is affected by several factors, internal and external (Stakeholder theory). Because 
HPR affects FP, managers voluntarily prefer HPR because it enhances managerail 
legitimacy with its attendant benefits. 
 
Additionally, because of the relative differences between interest groups and the 
desire for legitimacy and enhanced reputation, MPR, on a continuum, is mostly 
partially honest than outrightly dishonest. This is because managers engage in IM to 
influence perception and actions of varied stakeholders and will avoid the outright 
misrepresentation of facts (Schleicher & Walker, 2010; Schleicher, 2012). Figure 
4.12b presents a ‘complete model’ depicting the key findings of this study. In the 








































FIGURE 4.12b: Complete Model Of The Study. 
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The HPR-FP relations, with HPR based on a multi actor-principal agency construct, 
demonstrates that all interest groups derive benefits in some way or another. Indeed, 
the evidence from this study that HPR is influenced by a confluence of factors derived 
from various stakeholders underpins stakeholder theory and confirms that firms have 
multiple goals other than merely satisfying shareholder value maximisation. 
 
Also, the normative and instrumental approaches of this ST (see figure 4.12c) are also 
satisfied by the outcome of this work. The former because HPR undoubtedly 
generates actual and perceived benefits. The latter because this study confirms the 
relative importance given by the managers to the different stakeholders (See Table 
4.51) and applying varied methods to misreport MP (see sections 4.4). This reflects 
the priority assigned to each of the interest groups. Indeed, the descriptive, 
instrumental and normative aspects of the theory are evident in this research. Although 
quite different from each other, as pointed out by Donaldson (1999), they are 
complementary and able to explain the interplay between HPR and FP. The evidence 
from this study is that ethical behaviour such as HPR, a normative orientation- can 
result in a significant competitive advantage –an institutional orientation. This is 
because HPR allows for trust and corporative relationship among stakeholders, which 
leads to a reduction in opportunism as well as contracting cost. This provides a 
competitive edge. While some researchers disagree with such an integrative view, I 
believe it provides a comprehensive explanation of the findings of this study.  
 
The descriptive approach to ST provides a notion for the definition of a company; 
Donaldson & Preston (1995) describe it as a collection of cooperative and competitive 
interests with intrinsic value, Yang (2009); Pfeffer (1981); Cyert & March (1963) 
describe it as a loose network of cliques and coalitions with varied interest. From an 
instrumental point of view, ST provides the framework for analysing the relationship 
between HPR and the achievement of performance objectives (Surroca et al., 2010); 
it advocates that companies establish an order of priority amongst their interest groups 

































by companies depends largely on the relative importance of their interest groups (Choi 
et al., 2010). This contrasts with the normative aspect of this theory, which focuses on 
the legitimacy of the company's interest groups and the value of their interests, always 
worthy of attention regardless of category (Kaufman & Englander, 2011). 
Consequently, it becomes imperative to introduce good control systems as an 
important element of HPR. 
 
From a theoretical perspective, stakeholder theory (McGuire et al., 1988) sets the 
framework for the relationship between HPR and FP. Interest groups provide company 
resources, and in so doing implicitly require proper company behaviour, such as HPR.  
 
The term stakeholder has been defined in various ways such as from anyone who 
assumes risk, (Clarkson, 1995) to only those who are economically affected (Freeman, 
1984). The definition I prefer defines stakeholders as individuals or groups that may 
be affected by organisational actions or the process of achieving a given set of 
organisational objectives (Freeman, 1984). Stakeholder theory assumes that the 
interest of all stakeholders is considered in managerial decision making and actions 
and hence the agents’ main role is balancing the competing interest among 
stakeholders. Such groups usually have a legitimate authority or influence on the 
organisation and organisations serve the purpose of co-ordinating the varied interest 
of stakeholders (Evan & Freeman, 1993).  
 
Where companies misreport MP, the resultant misallocation of resources by 
stakeholders could be costly and affect FP. In contrast, if companies report MP 
honestly, decision making by stakeholders will be more efficient, encouraging more 
investments within the organisation and improvement in FP.  This is because, based 
on the social norm of reciprocity (Cuevas-Rodriguez et al., 2012) managing 
stakeholder relationships not simply as a discrete economic exchange, but as a valued 
relationship that exceeds the economic benefits of the exchange (i.e. exceed the 
stakeholder ‘reservation wage’ or opportunity cost), such as with HPR, can result in 
goodwill and social debt which can produce a social asset. This social asset can be 
drawn on should changing circumstances require a contribution from stakeholders that 
exceed the economic benefits of the exchange.  Cuevas-Rodriguez et al. (2012, page 
533) summarise the effect of HPR on FP and state that ‘by investing in stakeholder 
relations, agents may create social debt that based on social norms of obligation and 
reciprocity, may enhance firm vale and thus wealth of principals’. 
 
Little wonder therefore that, Mitchell, Agle & Wood (1997), Jones (1995) as well as 
Campbell (1997) propose that companies with relationships based on trust with the 
stakeholders are likely to develop a competitive advantage over other companies. 
Considering that stakeholders usually have legitimate authority over a company, 
indications of mistrust could result in tension and reduce organisational focus. 
Institutional theory posits that investors lean toward those companies with responsible 
behavior (e.g. HPR) when all other factors remain constant. In this regard, HPR can 
also improve the employment desirability at the firm and improve its purchase and 
investment intentions.  In line with expectations theory, (De Dreu, Giebels & Van de 
Vliert, 1998, Lant, 1992) Hendry (2002) points out that it is impossible for an 
organisation to function effectively without some measure of honesty and cooperation. 
Fehr & Falk (2002) confirm that the significant evidence of honest and partially honest 
MPR in this study is perhaps because 
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 ‘there are powerful non percuniary motives that shape human behaviours such as the 
desire to reciprocate, the desire to gain social approval and the intrinsic enjoyment 
arising from working on interesting tasks’ (page 719).  
 
That is to say; agents are rational social beings that recognise the value of stakeholder 
relations and will, therefore, enact protocols of justice and fairness in their dealings 
with stakeholders (Fukuyama, 1995). Therefore, in studies on MPR behaviour, 
broadening the perspective of agency theory to recognise that agents sit at the centre 
of a nexus of stakeholder relations and that these relations reside within a social 
context will improve literature (Cuevas-Rodriguez et al., 2012). 
 
Even though managers adopt varied MPR practices to manage impressions and 
sustain legitimacy and reputation, the findings of this study and other empirical works 
also recognised a patterned approach to MPR across various cultures, industries and 
countries. It will seem that the pattern of partially honest HPR is routinised and the 
reaction to various stimuli vis-à-vis MPR practices display isomorphism and 
standardisation. This is explained by institutional theory. Indeed, the practice of 
different MPR strategies to varied stakeholders based on the extent of their ‘influence’ 
is, in itself, a routinised MPR practice. 
 
4.7.  CHAPTER SUMMARY. 
 
This chapter has presented the key findings from the analysis of data collected for this 
study. It has highlighted that managers voluntarily prefer HPR, suggesting that existing 
contracts that are based on CAT and seek to align the monetary interest of managers 
with shareholders may be incomplete in dealing with MPR problems. It has also shown 
that HPR is affected by a variety of variables most of which are within the control of 
stakeholders and hence decision active stakeholders can consciously induce HPR.  
Additionally, it discusses employee perceptions about the consequences of HPR and 
confirms empirical hypothesis that the reputation loss that may result from misreported 
MPR may be very costly to organisations, perhaps more than regulatory sanctions and 
penalties.  It shows that HPR has a direct influence on FP and that MPR practices 
within Ghana mostly align with empirical literature but with some noticeable 
differences. The chapter concludes by explaining the findings from this study with a 




SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
This is the final chapter of the study, concludes by answering the primary and 
secondary research questions, its contributions to literature, practice and policy, the 
limitations of the study, and the directions for future research.  This study provides a 
framework to study the concept of honesty in Managerial Performance Reporting 
(MPR) among Ghana Club 100 companies (GC100). It aims to examine the nature of 
honesty of managers in relation to Managerial Performance Reporting (MPR), 
develops the concept of Honest Managerial Performance Reporting (HPR), it 
considers the factors that influence Honest Managerial Performance Reporting (HPR) 
and the nature of HPR’s relationship with Firm Performance (FP), contributing to our 
understanding and knowledge of these areas. Ghana offered a relevant and varied 
cultural environment to replicate prior research as well as test new relationships.   
 
5.2 ADDRESSING THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
The primary research question of this study was: - 
 
“Should stakeholders be concerned about managers’ honesty in managerial 
performance reporting (MPR) and if so what are the factors that influence this 
behaviour?”   
 
It is further developed by the formulation of five secondary research questions, which 
are: -  
 
1. In a self-reporting MPR environment do managers have a preference to be 
honest? 
2. Are there implications for HPR? 
3. Can we identify the factors that influence HPR? 
4. Is there a relationship between HPR and FP? 
5. Can we identify the main features of managerial behaviour in HPR? 
 
The subsequent sub sections discuss answers to each of the secondary research 
questions. 
5.2.1. In A Self-Reporting MPR Environment Do Managers Have A Preference 
For Being Honest?   
 
The general conclusion from this study is that, like previous studies (such as Evans et 
al., 2001), managers are partially honest rather than fully honest or dishonest.  This 
finding implies that other considerations temper individual's considerations for a 
maximum payoff from exploiting information asymmetry and hence the CAT alone 
does not provide a comprehensive explanation of the MPR behaviour within 
organisations. In the specific case of the experimental constructs, CAT will have 
implied that employees will seek maximum payoff (Evans et al., 2001) and hence HPR 
will be 0% for all scenarios especially scenario two (2). None of the scenarios had an 
HPR score of 0%.  This confirms the growing assertion that other influences, aside 
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from monetary gain, also affect MPR practices (Merkl Davis & Brennan, 2011). These 
influences may including the MCS, incentive structure, nnvironmental considerations, 
the ethical orientation of the manager, and nature of work place politics [Section 4.2 
of Chapter four explores possible ‘other variables’ for HPR]. 
 
The first secondary research question was addressed in an experimental study based 
on four experimental constructs and confirm that managers voluntarily prefer HPR 
within an organisational context.  The scenarios were; 
 
The experiments helped to test the following hypotheses with the following results 
(table 5.1). In summary, the results confirm that managers prefer to be honest in MPR 
within an organisational context but may be encouraged to misreport MPR if 
exogenously introduced variables introduce unfairness in the evaluation and 
compensation for performance (payoff). In other words, the desire for a maximum 
payoff from information asymmetry is mitigated by other influences, considerations 
and motives. Particularly managers are mindful of the fact that, from a normative 
perspective, HPR influences intrinsic stakeholder value, especially in their resource 
allocations decisions, even under situations where there is no direct economic benefit 
to the firm. This has implications on trust, confidence and relationship between 
managers and stakeholders.  
 
TABLE 5.1: Results Of Hypotheses Tested With Experiments 
No. Hypothesis Supported
/Rejected 
H1 For Business Managers, HPR will be higher with an 
organisational related construct than an ‘individual based’ 
construct 
Supported 
H2 For Business Managers, HPR of a scenario involving an 
immediate pay-off will be lower than HPR involving a deferred 
pay-off 
Supported 
H3 For Business Managers, HPR of a scenario with capped pay-off 
will be lower than HPR of a scenario with an uncapped pay-off 
Supported 
H4 The mean HPR for students will be significantly different from the 




The experiments performed found and confirmed the following; 
 
H1: Among managers (persons currently in employment and have been for at least 
three consecutive years), MPR behaviour is more honest within an 
organisational setting than involving private issues.  This confirms my earlier 
conviction (and hence hypothesis) that studies on HPR should focus on the 
organisational level applying organisational constructs rather than a mere study 
of the lying behaviour of individuals. My conviction has been supported by other 
researchers such as Quinn et al. (1997) and Cameron et al. (2004). This 
Experiment 1- Individual Scenario -Immediate Pay-off -Payoff uncapped 
Experiment 2- Organization Scenario -Immediate Pay-off -Payoff uncapped 
Experiment 3- Organizational Scenario -Immediate Pay-off -Payoff capped 
Experiment 4- Organization Scenario -Future Pay-off -Payoff uncapped 
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highlights the fact that inherent controls, reputation effects, and the possibility 
of sanctions for misreporting MP within an organisation can act as a mitigating 
factor on the extent of misreporting of MP. Studies, such as Widener (2007) 
have confirmed that effective MCS can improve HPR. Therefore a general 
study about why people lie (e.g. Gneezy, 2005) may not be appropriate in 
predicting MPR behaviour.  
 
H2: For business managers, HPR improves significantly, when performance related 
bonuses are uncapped and not paid immediately after MPR. This revelation 
provides credence to the growing debate about delaying the payment of 
performance related bonuses. It is likely that this behaviour is due to the high 
possibility of detection and the consequent sanctions and reputational damage 
that may result due to the time lapse. 
 
H3: Thirdly, HPR reduces when performance bonuses (pay-offs) are capped. 
Evans et al. (2001) explain this observation with a ‘distributional theory’ (see 
chapter two). Gino & Pierce (2009) and Maas & Rinsum (2013) also suggest 
that capped pay-offs lead to employee resistance and hence gaming behaviour 
because it distorts the relationship between effort and reward that gives a 
perception of unfairness.  
 
H4: This study also confirms that students as surrogates for actual employees 
(business managers in the specific case of this study) in ethical studies may be 
inappropriate. This is confirmed by the significant differences in mean HPR 
scores between students and managers. The group statistics confirm that 
business managers have a statistically significant higher mean HPR =0.61 
(±0.28) than students= 0.39 (± 0.27): - [See Tables 4.4., 4.11]. Various 
researchers (for example, Brownwell, 1995; Cole & Smith, 1995) have argued 
against the generalisation of findings from ethical studies about students to 
work place scenarios and argue that students cannot appreciate the inherent 
controls and effects of their ethical actions within the work place environment. 
Admittedly, this issue still divides opinions; however, despite the genuine 
challenges with using actual employees for organisational level studies [these 
challenges are discussed in Chapter Three], the relative relevance of the results 
from such studies on organisational improvement should justify and encourage 
the effort. 
 
This study is the first attempt at studying HPR in Ghana including the adoption of an 
experimental approach. Ghana provides a varied context from other countries where 
similar studies have taken place. Most studies on this phenomenon have been in 
developed countries with relatively less corruption and high level of liberal behaviour. 
Ghana like most developing countries is a relatively more conservative society 
(Hofstede, 1991), but with a high level of corruption and hence offers an opportunity 
to study this phenomenon within a different geographical, social and cultural context. 
This curiosity was the basis of my interest in this research.  That is to ask, how does 
Ghana differ from Western Europe regarding MPR? The understanding of how MPR 
practices vary across cultural and national lines could be critical to MNOs, in the 
continuous challenge to balance the desires of standard global practices with an 
appropriate consideration of specific norms of various cultural contexts (Bartlett & 
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Ghoshal, 1998) as well as inculcating core values throughout the organisation (Desai 
& Rittenburg, 1997).  
 
More importantly, the increased internationalisation of the corporate world has led to 
a rise in multinational business interest in Africa. Therefore, the resulting 
compensation contracts may have wider implications for the international capital 
market especially if they are costly (Jensen, 2009), ineffective and based on a false 
premise. The evidence from this study demonstrates that the preference for honesty 
among managers does not significantly differ among nations and cultures and answers 
the call for more cross-cultural studies of this phenomenon (Evans et al., 2001). I arrive 
at this conclusion because the results from this experimental study are similar to prior 
studies about this phenomenon (this is discussed earlier). This is in line with the 
contention of Hopper et al. (2009) that Africa does not face peculiar management 
accounting issues from the rest of the world. Therefore, compared to other similar 
studies in Western Europe, the experiments performed do not suggest a difference in 
MPR behaviour between Ghana and Western Europe. Rather it confirms a significant 
difference in ethical behaviour among employees (i.e. business managers as 
respondents) and students (control group).  
 
The results of this study confirm that agents will not necessarily use private information 
for their gain. In fact, the study reveals that compensation contracts have the 
unintended consequence of encouraging misreporting of MP if capped at some 
arbitrary threshold and perhaps principals may benefit more from paying agents a 
higher fixed salary rather than the current over focus on performance related bonuses. 
However, where performance related bonuses are used, this study confirms that HPR 
will be improved if the actual payment of the performance related bonus is delayed to 
some future date. Understanding the efficacy of the conventional agency model vis-à-
vis the theoretical prediction of agents’ MPR behaviour is critical to improving the 
credibility of the performance accountability process, and its attendant effects on 
resource allocation and hegemony (Solomon et al., 2013) and the result of these 
experiments shed more light on this. 
 
Moreover, considering that CAT as a theory underpinning HPR divides opinions, this 
replicated experimental study contributes to the resolving the debate and achieving 
the critical mass required for theorisation, generalisation and prediction (Chenhall, 
2003). Also, the evidence from these experiments contribute to the accounting 
literature by demonstrating that even where individuals are dishonest in private life, 
the dynamics of the organisational context mitigates the preference for dishonesty and 
therefore current compensation contracts that seek to align agents’ and principals’ 
interests may not only be costly but ineffective. The findings indicate that although 
previous research suggests agency conflicts arising out of information asymmetry are 
the principal cause of opportunism, opportunism alone does not comprehensively 
explain agents (managers) MPR behaviour. Instead, stakeholder theory and its 
relevant sub theories are fundamental, yet little examined, theory to explain MPR 
behaviour. Evidence from this study points to the need to examine HPR within a 
context of complex stakeholder relationships and institutional fields. Based on 
Stakeholder theory, managers attempt to moderate varied motives and influences in 
their MPR behaviour and will focus on the key and/or influential stakeholders who 
control resources and can influence other stakeholders. Therefore, stakeholder 
dynamics affect MPR techniques, and different MPR behaviours will be adopted for 
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different stakeholders. In this sense, the approach of goal alignment between agents 
and stakeholders through the purposeful distribution of equity to top managers (Dalton 
et al., 2008) may, in some cases, only be a costly process with little empirical evidence 
on improving HPR. Indeed, O’Connor et al. (2006) suggest that depending on 
stakeholder dynamics, this goal alignment strategy can be counter-productive and 





5.2.2. Are There Implications For HPR?  
 
Purposefully misreported MPR has direct positive and negative implications for 
organisations. It is perceived to have a positive effect on organisations due to its effect 
on employee bonuses and the ability to obtain critical resources.  However, 
misreporting MP hurts organisational reputation and national economic development 
(see chapter four; section 4.6).  This underlies the need for HPR in the organisation 
so that managers can gain legitimacy of managerial tenure as well as organisational 
survival. The clear influence of MPR on FP is confirmed in this perception index. HPR 
is highly likely to increase the cost of doing business which has implications on FP.  
 
The grid of employee perception of the effect of misreporting MP is reproduced below 
(earlier shown in chapter four; figure 4.12). The size of the bubble is my estimation of 
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5.2.3. Can We Identify The Factors That Influence HPR? 
 
The level of HPR within the MPR process of an organisation is affected by the 
simultaneous interaction and hence confluence of organisational factors (POLITICS, 
MCS, PERF, INC & INNOVATE), environmental and situational factors (ENV) as well 
as Individual factors (INC, IDV). The strength of the proposed relationship is significant 
at p=0.00 implying that the proposed interrelationships between variables explain HPR 
robustly. However, within the interaction mix, factors that can be described as 
‘controllable’ by ‘decision active stakeholders’ have more bearing on HPR than oher 
factors. Exploring the interaction of various variables on HPR was important because 
it revealed the relative significance (measured by regression weights and P values) of 
each variable within the mix. For instance, while I found evidence of a significant effect 
of each variable (in isolation) on HPR, the relative level of significance changed for 
some variables within the mix. Within the mix Management Control Systems (MCS) 
has the highest effect on HPR (p=0.0, RW 0.307) followed by Economic Incentives 
(INC, p=0.02, RW, 180).  
 
The conclusion is that HPR is effectively within the control of stakeholders (at least to 
a significant extent) and hence the quality of MPR processes is more a reflection of 
the priority that ‘decision-active’ stakeholders place on this process than it is of 
‘uncontrollable factors’. This is because decisions about MCS and INC are within the 
control and influence of ‘decision-active’ stakeholders. This confirms my earlier view 
(within the experimental study) that effective MCS predominantly drives MPR and 
hence organisational factors can temper individual ethical orientation. External 
environmental factors (ENV) has a positive but mild effect on the mix. Indeed, it has 
the least effect on the mix with a p value of 0.903 further confirming that controllable 
factors predominatly drive HPR. 
 
A second conclusion is that a pragmatic evaluation should preceed stakeholder 
participation (PERF) within the MPR process. The net negative effect of the cross 
interaction between PERF and INNOVATE is the reason for this caution. Indeed even 
though PERF has a positive direct effect on HPR, it also has a negative indirect effect 
on HPR through its interaction with INNOVATE.  While innovation requires new ideas 
and perspective and hence encourages stakeholder participation including relying on 
feedback from stakeholders (about challenges that need improvement), excessive 
stakeholder participation can stifle innovation because of the divergence in the interest 
of stakeholders resulting in conflicts. The point is, ‘decision-active’ stakeholders while 
persuing MPR must continually make a pragmatic determination of their extent of 
involvement so as not to blur the focus on a shared organisational vision ( Lumpkin & 
Dess, 2001).   
 
Following the evidence that CAT cannot completely account for MPR behaviour, this 
study explored the possible variables that influence HPR using hypotheses developed 
from theoretical modelling. Positive accounting theory has resulted in more research 
focus on the various techniques used by managers to manage impressions about 
performance to the neglect of studies about the causes and effects of HPR (Ndofor, 
Wesley & Priem, 2015).  Even where such studies have occurred, they have not been 
comprehensive and have rather focused on selected variables. To help improve MPR 
as a communication and accountability tool, relevant stakeholders need a deeper 
understanding of the critical factors that influence HPR. 
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A test of various hypotheses, based on data collected with a questionnaire instrument, 
precedes the structural model.  The summary of the results of the hypotheses are as 
follows (table 5.2): - 
 
TABLE 5.2: Results Of Hypotheses Tested About Factors That Influence HPR 




H5 A fair economic incentive (INC) is positively associated with HPR Supported 
H6 Stakeholder participation in performance measurement (PERF) 
is positively associated with HPR 
Supported 
H7 A high innovative performance culture (INNOVATE) is positively 
associated with HPR 
Supported 
H8 A well communicated belief and boundary system (MCS) is 
positively associated with HPR 
Supported 
H9 Non-Hostile internal politics (POLITICS) is positively associated 
with HPR 
Supported 
H10 A favourable external environment (ENV) is positively associated 
with HPR 
Supported 
H11 A predominant set of collectivists (IND) within an organisation is 
positively associated with HPR 
Supported 
H12 Stakeholder participation in performance measurement (PERF) 
is positively associated with a stronger innovation and 
performance culture (INNOVATE) 
Supported 
H13 Supportive external environment (ENV) is positively associated 
with a stronger innovation and performance culture (INNOVATE) 
Supported 
H14 Supportive external environment (ENV) is positively associated 
with stakeholder participation in performance measurement 
(PERF) 
Supported 
H15 Harmonious internal politics (POLITICS) is positively associated 
with a stronger innovation and performance culture (INNOVATE) 
Supported 
 
H5 – H15: These hypotheses confirm that MCS, INC, IND, POLITICS, ENV, 
INNOVATE & PERF collectively and individually have a positive and direct 
association with HPR. This preceded a SEM of the structure of interaction 
between the variables with Adjusted Goodness of Fit indices of 0.975: The 
model fit indices imply that the model robustly fits the data.   
 
This is the first tested structured model about the factors that influence HPR within 
profit oriented private companies (using data set from GC100 companies). Bollen & 
Pearl (2013) argue that models should not be evaluated based on an ‘accept’ or ‘reject’ 
criteria, but rather models should be compared to other models to determine relative 




5.2.4. Is There A Relationship Between HPR And FP? 
 
HPR has a direct and indirect influence on FP. Directly, HPR has a direct and positive 
influence on ROA and ROCE. This result is not surprising considering that the factors 
that affect HPR have been confirmed to influence FP as well. HPR aside conferring 
legitimacy on managerial tenure, based on institutional and stakeholder theory, also 
influences the ability to attract critical resources from key stakeholders for 
organisational operations and survival. Legitimacy reduces conflicts while critical 
resources can provide competitive leverage. Both of these are critical for FP. 
 
Indirectly, HPR affects FP because it has a positive and direct influence on (1) 
employee perceptions about FP and (2) employee satisfaction. Evidence of the direct 
influence of employee perceptions and employee satisfaction on FP abound (see, for 
example, Fombrum & Stanley, 1990). HPR underscores employee’s expectation of 
fairness and hence guides subsequent perception and behaviour. 
 
The stepwise regression estimates using PCA also reveal an interesting finding (even 
though this was not the focus of the study) that supports my conclusion. This finding 
provides further strength to the theoretical argument to explore the relationship 
between HPR and FP.  Stepwise regression of HPR on ROA and ROCE with GSE 
(Listing on the Ghana Stock Exchange) as one of the specifications shows a positive 
influence of GSE listing on ROA and ROCE. This is not surprising and has been 
confirmed by previous prior studies. However, one of the critical requirements and 
processes for GSE listing is a credible MPR process and hence HPR. If this linkage is 
expanded, then it can be presumed that listed firms generally ensure HPR. This 
provides a theoretical basis to explore a linkage between HPR and objective measures 
of FP which is confirmed by this study.  
 
The conclusion from these findings is that, in modelling variables to ensure FP, 
‘decision-active’ stakeholders must include HPR and put in place effective 
mechanisms to ensure HPR. Considering that section 5.2.2 confirms that HPR is 
predominantly driven by ‘controllable factors’ within the purview of key stakeholders, 
this is achievable. My conclusion of a robust influence of HPR on ROA and ROCE is 
not tempered by considerations of independent variables such as organisational size, 
listing on the GSE and type of industry (at the organisational level). This implies that 
the positive and direct influence of HPR on ROA and ROCE remains significant for all 
specifications. My study provides other evidence that supports my conclusion that 
HPR robustly influences FP. For instance, even though organisation size, industry type 
and listing on the GSE has no statistically significant bearing on employee satisfaction, 
HPR does. This is in line with the theory because employee satisfaction is usually 
based on internal organisational factors vis-à-vis employee’s expectations of fairness 
and transparency. This aligns with social expectation theory, which emanates from 
institutional theory. 
 
I also conclude, based on evidence from this study, that even though a robust direct 
relationship exists between HPR and employee perception of FP, this relationship is 
more likely depending on the organisation's size or industry type. As an example, the 
positive effect of HPR on employee perceptions is more likely for bigger organisations. 
Compared to the banking sector, the energy industry is likely to show a relatively 
stronger effect of HPR on all specifications of employee perception. My opinion is that 
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the volatility of the energy sector, mostly driven by externalities, can affect the financial 
fortunes of such organisations irrespective of employee efforts. In such a case, the 
relationship between economic compensation and employee efforts can be distorted. 
This creates a greater expectation of fairness and transparency by employees from 
managers and HPR enhances the perception of employee value and appreciation. 
Based on this, actual or perceived HPR could have a relatively higher implication on 
employee perception about FP. 
 
Also, even though this may not be the focus of the study, I find evidence of other 
factors that affect ROA and conclude that medium sized firms seem to have relatively 
higher ROA and ROCE than larger firms. For ROA this result is statistically significant 
at the respondent level. The evidence ties in with literature which abounds with 
empirical findings that large organisations can have challenges with efficiency in asset 
utilisation due to bureaucracy and other attendant limitations. It will seem that, medium 
size firms comparatively have more agility and focus required to drive efficiency in 
asset utilisation and hence the relatively higher ROA. This may be an opportunity for 
further empirical study in future research. Again, the study provides evidence that, 
within GC100 companies, the banking industry outperforms other industry types 
regarding ROA. This evidence, within the Ghanaian context, is not surprising. In recent 
times, the banking sector has experienced phenomenal growth which has led to the 
proliferation of intermediary financial institutions. Little wonder that financial institutions 
dominate the GC100. 
 
The conclusions above are based on a statistical analysis of questionnaire data vis-à-
vis the following hypotheses (table 5.3). 
 
TABLE 5.3: Results Of Hypotheses About The Influence Of HPR On FP 
No. HYPOTHESIS Supported/ 
Rejected 
H16 HPR has a directly significant and positive influence on 
Employee Satisfaction (C10) 
Supported 
H17 HPR has a directly significant and positive influence on 
Employee perception of FP. 
Supported 
H18 HPR has a directly significant and positive influence on ROA. Supported 




H16: This study confirms that HPR has a direct and positive influence on employee 
satisfaction. This is in line with existing literature (Koh & Boo, 2004) that 
confirms that ethical culture constructs, such as top management support for 
ethical behaviour (e.g. HPR), improves employee satisfaction. HPR enhances 
the perception of fairness and equity. Till (2011) confirms that individual, 
distributive and procedural equity are critical to employee satisfaction. HPR 
enhances the opportunity for equity and fairness and hence reduces conflicts 
and dissonance in the working environment.  Inherent in consideration of 
multiple stakeholders is the likelihood of information leakage and hence 
enforces transparency, a critical requirement for fairness. The results imply that 
organisational leaders can use HPR as a means to generate favourable 
organisational outcomes especially as empirical studies establish a significant 




H17: HPR also has a direct and positive influence on employee perception of FP. 
When organisations are honest in MPR, it reinforces employees believe that 
managers have nothing to hide vis-à-vis the prospects of the organisation. In 
that way, market mechanisms may enhance reputation and legitimacy of the 
organisations (with its managers) to good effects. An example of such market 
mechanisms will be the attraction and employment of new talents, as well as 
critical resources. These reinforce the believe about improved FP. Employee 
perceptions can be as powerful as reality in reinforcing desirable behaviours, 
and hence stakeholders can benefit immensely from positively influenced 
employee perceptions. 
H18 & 
H19: HPR also has a direct and positive influence on ‘objective’ and financial 
measures of FP such as ROA and ROCE respectively. Considering that HPR, 
based on an institutional theory and stakeholder theory, bestows legitimacy, 
reduces distractive conflicts between managers and stakeholders, enhances 
organisational reputation and hence helps secure critical organisational 
resources required for organisational survival and operations, then it is no 
surprise that HPR influences ROA and ROCE. The implication is that 
stakeholders in designing strategies to improve FP must consider HPR has a 
relevant variable. This requires relatively little effort because the variables that 
affect HPR also have a direct effect on FP and are ‘controllable factors’ from 
the perspective of stakeholders. 
 
This is the first empirical test of the relationship between HPR and FP, and hence the 
findings and conclusions thereon are useful to organisations and stakeholders in their 
quest to improve FP, organisational legitimacy and reputation. Additionally, it 
repositions studies about MPR and HPR as relevant variables of interest as it affects 
the ‘bottom line’. I am hopeful that the conclusions of this study will generate more 






5.2.5. Can We Identify The Main Features Of Managerial Behaviour In 
HPR? 
 
MPR among GC100 companies espouses HPR and partial HPR. However, 
there are misconceptions among managerial groups about what constitutes 
HPR, and a fairly high level of purposeful misreporting of MPR exists, 
particularly to the media. The distrust of the media in the MPR process cuts 
across all GC100 companies. This confirms my earlier preposition that GC100 
organisations do not apply a ‘one size fits all’ MPR. Instead, there are 
differential MPR practices to different stakeholders and hence different levels 
of HPR to different stakeholders even though the average HPR (across various 
stakeholders) is usually honest and partially honest. Based on the evidence 
from this study, I conclude that MPR practices within GC100 are substantially 
similar to MPR practices in Western Europe but differ in the extent of 
misconception about what constitutes HPR.  
 
To a large extent, MPR practices follow institutional conventions where 
managers attempt to manage impression with deceptive language, syntax, etc. 
(partially HPR) and will avoid outright lies in MPR. Even though MPR practices 
are mainly routinised and common industry practices, the perception of 
widespread misreporting of MP (by respondents) is misplaced and not backed 
by the evidence from the study. The choice of method for misreporting MP is 
based on considerations of  
 
(a) The ability of the information recipient to identify the error 
(b) The perception of the relative power of the stakeholder on managerial 
tenure 
(c) Conventional practices and 
(d) The consequence on self and organisation for HPR 
 
The above implies that misreported MPR is higher for external stakeholders 
than for internal stakeholders. 
 
Misreporting MP, where it occurs, usually occurs in organisations 
 
(1) With a high level of departmental rivalry and competition,  
(2) That are highly technical and sophisticated making it difficult for the 
ordinary mind to understand and evaluate the mode of business or 
operations,  
(3) That lack transparency in reward systems and the ability to relate reward 
to effort. 
(4) Where the CFO bears full responsibility for the MPR process without 
proportional responsibility on other managers. 
 
Point four is revealing and a new finding and highlights that an MPR process 
must be a shared responsibility. When CFOs are ultimately responsible for the 
entire process, the ensuing pressure could result in misreported MP, deepening 
interdepartmental tensions with its attendant effects on HPR. In this study (with 
results from the 15 interviews) HPR was higher where the CFO did not bear full 
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responsibility for the MPR process (Mean HPR 61%) compared with when they 
did (mean HPR 42%).  
  
The conclusions are relevant for MNCs in their desire to inculcate standardised 
values across their subsidiaries. Even though some respondents alluded to 
cultural differences for their perspectives, the cultural difference was not 
evident in the perceptions about HPR. However, the level of mistrust of MNC 
headquarters (HQ) in promoting HPR was quite revealing. MNCs must address 
the perception that they tacitly approved misreported MP through actions, 
omissions in actions or inactions. Standardised practices about HPR are 
possible but should be proceeded with education about HPR. There were clear 
misconceptions about what constitutes HPR, and this needs to be addressed 
before any attempt at standardised practices and values.   
 
5.3. GENERAL SIGNIFICANCE AND CONTRIBUTION OF THE STUDY 
 
Theoretically, this study makes contributions that are useful. I provide a 
conceptual definition of Honesty (from an organisational and stakeholder 
perspective), and the concept of HPR is developed and applied in the study. 
My definition of Honesty vis-à-vis the MPR process differs from other definitions 
in several ways. For instance, my conceptualisation of Honesty links with the 
operational definition of HPR and is based on varying ranges on a continuum. 
As such it is possible to compare HPR within and across organisations, 
because it is possible to have more, or less, honesty compared to another 
rather than a mere dichotomy between true or false. This is a critical distinction 
(especially from an institutional and stakeholder perspective) and allows for the 
appropriate contextualisation of the often used ‘partial HPR’. Till date, even 
though most studies have adopted and applied the word ‘partial HPR’ or ‘partial 
honesty’ there is no clear definition of same. Also, the appropriate 
conceptualisation of Honesty also allows for the development and 
contextualisation of HPR. If for nothing at all, my conceptualisation of MPR and 
HPR allows for standardisation of empirical methods, contributes to the debate 
about what constitutes HPR and allows for a more robust comparison between 
studies. Most studies (notable exceptions being Evans et al., 2001 and Yang, 
2009) lack clarity because they proceed with empirical discussions without 
conceptualising MPR and HPR. 
 
In the same light, my conceptualisation of Honesty, MPR, HPR and FP are 
useful contributions because it departs from CAT (and shareholder theory) and 
emanates from Stakeholder theory. As explained earlier, CAT has remained 
the predominant theory for discussions about MPR even though there is 
growing evidence of CATs inability to comprehensively explain partial HPR. 
Interesting despite this evidence, conceptual developments of FP, HPR, MPR 
and Honesty are still dominated by CAT. My conviction is that theoretical 
frameworks should guide perspectives about operational definitions. Therefore, 
my study demonstrates how stakeholder theory can be applied in the 
operationalisation of concepts in ethical studies, MPR inclusive. I demonstrate 
that where stakeholder and institutional theory provide theoretical bedrock, 
multiple considerations must be infused into concepts practically to highlight 




My study is the first to test the confluence of factors that influence HPR in ‘profit-
oriented businesses’ as well as the direct influence of HPR on FP. Specifically, 
the study offers, for the first time, the direct evidence of the relationship between 
HPR and FP among GC100 organisations. The credibility of these findings are 
enhanced because- (1) the analysis is preceded by a halo test to eliminate the 
confounding effect of prior FP on current FP (2) the proxies for FP tested in this 
study are numerous and include financial and non-financial measures (3) the 
theoretical basis for these hypotheses are extensively discussed. This 
enhances the potential for generalisation and further replication. Secondly, the 
study offers, for the first time, a preposition of how various variables interact to 
influence HPR. It establishes that INOVATE and PERF are mediating variables 
in the relationship and compliment the direct effects of MCS, INC,  IND,  ENV 
on HPR. This is the first evidence of how variables interact with each other and 
directly on HPR within GC100 companies and hence offers managers a view 
on how to influence the level of HPR.  
 
The findings from the above advance literature. Firstly, aside from 
demonstrating that HPR should be studied from an organisational relevant 
perspective, it provides a new perspective by espousing a theoretical basis for 
exploring the influence of HPR on FP. Hopefully, the theoretical arguments 
made to define the nature of the relationship and hence hypotheses (H16 – H19) 
will encourage more tests of this relationship to enhance our understanding of 
the phenomenon. Secondly, my study about the factors that affect HPR departs 
from conventionally accepted thinking that the alignment of interest of 
managers to shareholders through the purposeful distribution of economic 
surplus is the single most important factor to enhance HPR. Rather, my study 
confirms that other factors have a mitigating influence on economic incentive 
(INC). I also confirm that MCS has more bearing on the level of HPR than INC 
even though INC plays a significant role. The practical implication of this on the 
design and content of existing and future employment contracts is phenomenal. 
Thirdly, my study confirms that FP is affected by HPR and HPR is mainly 
affected by ‘controllable factors’. Even though this is a new perspective, it is not 
surprising. However, it is a useful perspective because it provides further 
credence of the link between ‘controllable factors’ and FP. By extension, it 
shows one of the ways that ‘decision active’ stakeholders can influence FP. 
 
The process to arrive at findings and emanating conclusions from my study also 
make significant theoretical contributions. In explaining my findings, I 
demonstrate how Institutional Theory and Stakeholder Theory can be 
combined in a meaningful way to explain MPR. My approach is new in that I 
propose a linkage between the two theories through Impression management 
and Legitimacy theories. Therefore, aside from espousing an alternative 
theoretical basis for studies about MPR, I demonstrate how these theories can 
be linked to explain observed behaviour. This is useful, especially with the 
recent call for exploring multiple theoretical dispositions to explain managerial 
and organisational behaviour.  Using this theoretical framework, I conclude that 
MPR is driven by a desire to impress stakeholders to gain legitimacy. These 
considerations reduce outright lies in the MPR process because managers are 
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aware of the implications of purposefully misreported MPR on FP with its 
attendant consequences on the legitimacy of their tenure.   
 
The study makes methodological contributions. It adopted a mixed method 
approach (experiments, interviews, surveys, mathematical modelling) and 
applied new methodologies to the study of MPR based on a sound synthesis of 
the literature. This mixed method approach provided complimentary findings 
that enhance credible understanding of MPR and HPR. Very few studies on 
HPR have applied such an extensive set of methods. As an example, unlike 
previous studies that were based on CAT (Ndofor et al., 2015), this study in the 
design of its methodology (survey instruments and experimental constructs), 
adopted a multi-actor principal-agent model with interesting findings. 
Essentially, I measured HPR from the perspective of varied agents and 
principals rather than solely from the perspective of shareholders. This was 
based on my earlier stated conviction that, in reality, managers’ report on their 
performance to multiple persons of interest. Also, the experimental constructs 
correct for limitations in previous experimental constructs, uses actual 
employees, and introduces new experimental constructs to measure previously 
unmeasured variables. The use of employees as respondents is a 
methodological improvement especially with the growing body of knowledge 
(and confirmed in this study) that the assumption of subject homogeneity 
between students and employees in ethical studies is inappropriate. In using 
employees as respondents, this study demonstrates how to achieve a 
pragmatic balance between realism and artificiality in order not to confound 
experimental settings and constructs. This approach implies that 
recommendations and other deductions made from this study will have practical 
relevance. This is useful because, if empirical studies provide such relevance 
to practitioners and businesses, including stakeholders, then perhaps MPR will 
begin to receive the attention it deserves with its attendant benefits.  
 
Another contribution is that this study provides a practical demonstration of how 
new methods and models about MPR can be tested in new geographical and 
cultural settings. Specifically, I demonstrate that in MPR studies, the adoption 
of the ‘company as a person’ metaphor remains useful irrespective of 
geographical considerations. I arrive at this conclusion because the application 
of this approach minimises SDB to acceptable levels. I also demonstrate that 
ensuring anonymity in pay-off mechanism during MPR studies reduces 
irrelevant exogenous considerations. This provides a useful guide to the future 
application of participant observation to MPR studies.  
 
Furthermore, the application of CFA (Confirmatory Factor Analysis) to 
analysing the causes of HPR as well as the effect of HPR on firm profit improves 
upon linear regression and introduces robustness into the findings reported. 
CFA can handle more complex data; such as data that is not normally 
distributed, incomplete data, collinearity problems and measurement error 
problems (Kline, 1998). Therefore, if a proposed model fits the data, based on 
CFA, then the proposed model acquires validity which can be enhanced after 




The study, therefore, offers a significant contribution to academia. This study 
extends current research on HPR (Ndofor et al., 2015; Zhang et al., 2008) by 
building theory regarding the effects and causes of HPR from an 
organisationally relevant perspective. It also answers the numerous calls for 
replication studies of the HPR phenomenon. That way, academia can build on 
the findings of this study to make a valuable contribution to business. This is 
important because misreporting of MP is a qualitatively different and potentially 
more egregious form of opportunism compared to simple shirking or the 
manipulation of strategic actions because HPR is fundamental to robust and 
efficient equity markets (Ndofor et al., 2015). 
 
Also, the synthesis of literature coupled with the findings of this study resulted 
in a holistic conceptual framework within which to position and critically assess 
the various normative arguments on HPR. For instance, by better 
understanding, from a holistic perspective, the causes and effects of HPR, as 
well as how HPR can be conceptualised, researchers and practitioners are 
better positioned to critique and expand on empirical findings in literature as 
well as advance a theory for predicting MPR behaviour (Lee & Nowell, 2015). 
 
The evidence from this study also has important implications for practice as it 
(1) provides a starting point for stakeholders to predict the likelihood of 
misreporting MPR within an organisation of interest to them, (2) can facilitate 
benchmarking and comparison among different companies even though this 
must be done within a context and with caution, (3) can guide decision about 
how to improve HPR within an organisation from a stakeholder perspective. 
 
This study also makes contributions to practice for managers and decision 
makers. Specifically, even though further studies are required, empirical 
findings from this study confirm the influence of HPR on FP directly and 
indirectly. Improved FP benefits all stakeholders (Lee & Nowell, 2015). 
Therefore, stakeholders in modelling FP must consider HPR as a relevant 
variable and make efforts to improve on situational, organisational and 
individual factors that affect HPR.  
 
Additionally, empirical evidence from this study suggests that stakeholders 
must consider a strategy of delaying performance related bonuses (pay-offs) to 
improve HPR (Ndofor et al., 2015) and avoid capping performance related pay 
off with an arbitrary threshold. The setting of arbitrary thresholds reduces the 
established relationship between effort and reward and introduces gaming into 
the MPR process. 
 
Educational institutions should also consider more specific courses on HPR for 
accounting students to deal with the numerous misconceptions about HPR. 
This suggestion emanates from the revelation of significant differences 
between students and employees in dealing with an ethical dilemma in the 
experimental constructs. This was reinforced by the perceptions among 
employees about the effect of HPR on organisations (See Fig. 4.12). 
 
Petre & Rugg (2010) suggest that making a significant contribution implies 
adding to knowledge or contributing to the discourse through providing 
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evidence to substantiate a conclusion that’s worth making. They provide seven 
categories for demonstrating contribution, and I provide a summary of the 




 TABLE 5.4: Summary Of Contributions Of This Study Based On Petre & Rugg (2010) 
Main Category Sub Category The contribution of this study 
Re-contextualisation of 
an existing technique, 
theory or model. 
 
 
Applying a technique in a new context. I Studied MPR & HPR with a mixed approach. Applied vignettes 
to the study of MPR. Even though Vignettes have been applied 
to ethical studies, no evidence was sighted by this researcher of 
its application to MPR studies. Developed real task based and 
organisational relevant experimental constructs for testing 
previously unexplored relationships. 
Testing theory in a new setting. This study is the first known application of experiments to the 
study of MPR in Ghana among GC100 companies. 
Showing the applicability of a model to 
a new situation. 
This study showed that models on HPR do not vary across 
cultures. The study demonstrated that the ‘company as a 
metaphor’ concept is useful across cultures in survey studies. 
The study borrows from social theory and applies multiple 
theories to explain behaviour. The propose linkages between the 
main theories are new and can be a useful guide to future 
studies. 
Confirmation and 
expansion of an 
existing model 
 
Evaluating the effects of a change in 
condition. 
This study confirmed the inadequacy of CAT and proceeded to 
evaluate the application stakeholder and institutional theory to 
MPR behaviour with robust conclusions. This provides an 
alternative theoretical framework for studying MPR and has 
potential to improve the robustness of empirical studies. 
Considering that the proposed theoretical framework 
substantially explains the observed MPR phenomena it 
enhances our perception and understanding of this phenomenon 
from both a theoretical and practical perspective. 
Providing an experimental 
assessment of a specific aspect of a 
model. 
This study tests the implication of delayed payoff and finds 
confirmation that delayed pay-offs improve HPR. This 
experimental construct is new and offers practical considerations 
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for MNC and practitioners on how to improve organisational 
HPR. 
Contradicting an existing model or a specific aspect of a model 
 
The assumption of the subject to population homogeneity 
between students and employees, in MPR studies, is confirmed 
in this study to be flawed. Also, studies about individual lying 
behaviour cannot be extended to organisational context because 
it does not consider mitigating influences within organisations. 
CAT is not helpful and does not fully explain observed MPR 
phenomenon. Cultural considerations have minimal bearing on 
MPR. HPR predominantly driven by ‘controllable factors’ and 
hence stakeholders can improve HPR. 
Combining two or more ideas and showing that the arrangement 
reveals something new and useful 
 
This study combines multiple theories and establishes linkages 
between them to explain MPR and HPR within organisations.  
Demonstrating a concept – proving that something is feasible 
and useful, or that something is infeasible and explaining why it 
fails 
 
Provides three theoretical bases to explore the relationship 
between HPR and FP and confirm that HPR has a direct and 
indirect effect on FP. 
Implementing a theoretical principle – showing how it can be 
applied in practice; making ideas tangible; how something works 
in practice; and what its limitations are 
 
I adopt a multi-actor principal agent model and demonstrate its 
application.   
Providing a new solution to a known problem and demonstrating 
the solution’s efficacy 
I confirm that HPR should be studied within an organisational 
context, suing employees as respondents. I also confirm that 
HPR is a relevant variable in determining FP. Also, Institutional 
Theory and Stakeholder Theory provide a more robust 




5.4. THE LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
 
Studies have limitations, and this study is no exception. There are limitations 
with conceptualisation, findings and methodology. Most of these potential 
limitations have already been discussed in detail in chapter three. 
 
Conceptually, I operationalised the concepts of Honesty, FP, MPR and HPR 
based on Institutional and Stakeholder Theory. The inherent limitation of these 
theories is that it introduces the perspective of relativity rather than an absolute 
dichotomy. While I find this a critical and relevant distinction and hence with 
practical usefulness, other researchers may be of the view that it limits the 
ability to have a ‘one size fits’ all definition. Therefore, the limitation in my 
conceptualisation is that it may not apply to other studies underpinned by other 
theoretical frameworks. This can affect the desire for standardisation and 
comparability between empirical studies. The effect of this limitation is however 
restricted because, in any case, it is not meaningful to compare studies 
underpinned by different theories and hence methodologies especially when 
the findings differ (Callan & Thomas, 2009).  
 
HPR indices computed from the survey responses are perceptual measures 
and based on information obtained from employees rather than managers (who 
are the subject of enquiry). In exploring the relationship between HPR and FP 
the perceptual measure of HPR was proxied with actual HPR (with empirical 
support as discussed in chapter three and four) to test the various regression 
equations. An alternative approach could have been the construction of HPR 
indices based on actual observations and analysis of the researcher. Also, the 
credibility of using employees to measure managerial action could have been 
enhanced using a control group of managers as respondents. This will have 
allowed for comparison. There are currently no rigorously developed theoretical 
basis on which to construct HPR indices from research observation and hence 
my approach, aside from being in line with empirical practices (discussed in 
detail in chapter three), avoids the necessity of making subjective and arbitrary 
value judgements (Owusu-Ansah, 1998) and hence minimises biases.  
 
My findings regarding the factors that influence HPR and the influence of HPR 
on FP must be generalised within context. Firstly, it is based on cross sectional 
data. That is, the empirical data used in this study covered between one to three 
calendar years. The lack of longitudinal data reduced the ability to observe the 
phenomenon over several years. Data was collected at one point in time rather 
than longitudinally, and hence this research cannot account for time lag effects 
on behaviour. That is to say, in studying the relationship between HPR and FP, 
for instance, I assume a synchronous relationship even though it is possible 
that a certain period must elapse before the full effect of HPR can reflect in FP 
(Salama, 2005; Callan & Thomas, 2009). Also, the data sample may not be 
representative of all businesses in Ghana and may be relatively small (256 
questionnaire respondents and 15 interviews). However, the 65 sampled firms 
resulting in 265 responses were larger compared with the samples of similar 
prior studies in Africa (e.g., Firer & Meth, 1986; Ho & Williams, 2003; Mangena 
& Chamisa, 2008) and even some european studies (such as Yang, 2009). The 
65 sampled firms represented all the qualifying firms that met the criteria within 
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the GC100 population. Admittedly, however, more questionnaires (than the 
current average of four questionnaires per an organisation) could have been 
administered per organisation. However, the context of Ghana and the 
objectives of this study make data collection difficult. Also, much manual work 
is required to collect and analyse the data. As a result, practical limitations of 
time, effort and finance meant that the sample had to be reduced to a number 
that is statistically large enough to make a significant contribution, while at the 
same time ensuring that the study is completed within the scheduled time-frame 
of a PhD. 
 
Even though the targeted population for the study was GC100 companies, 
some firms were excluded because they did not meet a pre determined criteria. 
The main reason for the exclusion was when firms were owner-managed or 
had significant government managerial control. The determination of owner 
managed was based on guidance from GIPC rather than direct contact with the 
organisations. This approach was adopted because of the general difficulty in 
unveiling real ownership of firms in Ghana. GIPC had previosly commisoned 
an exercise in that regard, and hence the researcher relied on their guidance 
as well as his knowledge of the Ghanaian business environment. This could 
introduce omission or inclusion bias and affect the ability to generalise findings 
to all GC100 companies. Rather than exclude firms, it could have been possible 
to attach weights based on the extent of compliance with the set criteria or even 
create an un-weighted mixed of the entire population of GC100 companies. 
Attaching weights could have introduced sujectivity and further complicated the 
findings and hence was avoided.  Also, to the limitation, the organisations that 
formed the subject of this study are members of GC100 (relatively larger 
companies), and this introduces a bias into the ability to generalise the findings 
of this study to other companies. However, the diverse spread of industries 
within the sample mitigates this risk. 
 
There may be validity and reliability problems with the Halo Index. The halo 
index constructed was un-weighted and based on a binary rather than an 
ordinal coding scheme. Binary coding can be less informative (Barako et al., 
2006; Hassan & Marston, 2008). Un-weighted indices treat all variables as of 
equal importance, a view which is inconsistent with both theory and practice 
(Barako et al., 2006). My approach is because of the lack of rigorously 
developed theoretical basis on which weights could be accurately assigned to 
the various variables in a Halo index and hence the use of un-weighted index 
avoids the necessity of making subjective and arbitrary value judgements 
(Owusu-Ansah, 1998) and hence minimises biases. In any case, there is 
evidence that weighted and un-weighted indices tend to give the same results, 
especially where the number of variables is relatively large (e.g., Robbins & 
Austin, 1986; Chow & Wong-Boren, 1987; Beattie et al., 2004). Moreover, the 
use of an un-weighted index made it easier for direct comparisons with other 
studies. Another limitation is that the Halo Index was not coded by a different 
person to ascertain inter-coder consistency. This risk is however mitigated by 
the experience of the researcher from similar coding practices. 
 
Methodologically, as explained in Chapter Four and the appendix (Table 11.1), 
discriminant validity issues (albeit very marginal) initially existed in the data for 
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MCS and ENV (particularly MCS). Using modification indices, this was 
corrected by covariance between selected error terms that improved the AVE. 
However, more measurement work is needed on the discriminate validity 
issues for MCS and ENV. As a first test model, however, the results of this study 
remain valid especially as the discriminant validity issue was solved (Ping, 
2009). 
 
ROA and ROCE information were mainly collected from annual reports 
received from the organisations (even though there was a minimal attempt to 
cross validate). It could have been cross-checked with other sources, such as 
questionnaire survey and face-to-face interviews, returns submitted to the 
Registrar Generals Department, GIPC, etc. Considering the legal and 
regulatory obligations to prepare and submit financial reports my opinion was 
that the mandatory nature of annual reports make them regular and reliable and 
is consistent with other empirical approaches (e.g., Lang & Lundholm, 1993; 
Botosan, 1997). Evidence also suggests that organisations hardly contradict 
their annual report (Lang & Lundholm, 1993, Botosan, 1997). Further, and for 
practical reasons, considering that there was the need for ROA and ROCE to 
comply with IFRS, only company annual reports were consistently available 
with appropriate information to allow for the computation. 
 
The study may also suffer from potential omitted variables bias. In the case of 
the FP proxies, they may fail to capture informal personal interactions among 
directors, management, and employees that may potentially impact on a firm’s 
FP (Ntim, 2009). About the HPR variables, they may not be able to capture the 
true intentions for which managers instituted them. For example, even though 
managers may know that MCS may be practically ineffective in monitoring their 
actions, they may still implement them just to signal their intentions of protecting 
company assets. 
 
However, the limitations discussed above do not negate the result and findings 
of the study but only suggest that any generalisation must be done with caution. 
The research findings must, therefore, be interpreted in light of the above 
limitations. Also, these limitations potentially represent avenues for future 
research. Therefore, the next section points out potential avenues for future 






5.5. AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH STUDY 
 
There are various opportunities emanating from this work and existing literature 
for further studies. The ones discussed herein are based on the identified 
limitations of this study. 
 
First, to improve the dearth of MPR studies in Africa, replication studies in other 
African countries will enhance our current understanding of the drivers of MPR 
behaviour and HPR among organisations. The basis of this suggestion 
emanates from the fact that HPR influences employee satisfaction and 
perception. Considering that job satisfaction and perception can be affected by 
cultural values (Kuada, 1990), then, perhaps cultural difference can result in 
differences in the interaction between HPR and FP. Such studies can extend 
this study by exploring if and how MPR practices are different between private 
and public organisations, or between listed and non listed organisations or also 
between large, small and medium sized organisations. Even though this study 
confirmed that industry type, and organisational size did not affect MPR and 
HPR practices, this conclusion needs to be confirmed in other studies applying 
varied geographical considerations. Such replication studies can also explore 
the feasibility of other theoretical frameworks in explaining MPR and HPR. 
Particularly the appropriatness of other social theories such as Sympolic 
Interaction Theory, Conflict Theory, Functionalist Theory, Labelling Theory and 
Rational Choice Theory can be explored. Considering that these theories 
explain social action, reaction and social order they may perhaps offer an 
alternative perspective for MPR and HPR behaivour. Cognitive Dissonance 
Theory and Justice Thoery can also be used to explore MPR and HPR 
practices. 
 
Second, the study has mainly examined the influence of HPR on FP. Future 
studies can investigate how purposefully misreported MPR affects FP. In doing 
this such studies can begin by enhancing the distinction between HPR and 
misreported MPR through clear conceptualisation. Even the relationship 
between HPR and FP can be explored further by a focus on how the specific 
interaction between PERF and INOVATE affect FP. This will have practical 
relevance to managers and stakeholders in decisions about the optimal level of 
PERF that delivers HPR without negatively affecting INOVATE. Assuming a 
mathematical or statistical approach is applied in this analysis, then the 
conceptualisation and formulation of the Halo Index can be based on a 
weighted ordinal method. Also, extensive effort should be made to avoid 
discriminant validity issues so that there will be no need to mitigate its effect on 
the actual results of the study. Similarly, the conceptualisation of FP can be 
extended to include other proxies and variables. I am particularly curious about 
extending FP conceptualisation, based on a stakeholder methodology, to 
consider FP based on contribution to employment and national taxes. It will be 
of interest to know if the robustness of the influence of HPR on FP is maintained 
if such a conceptualisation of FP is adopted. A fuller appreciation of the 
interaction of HPR on a broader set of financial indices will be of immense 
interest.  




This study analysed the nature of managerial incentive structure on HPR. It 
focused on the processes, perceptions and mechanisms rather than the 
absolute amount of managerial pay. It also did not explore directors pay. 
Considering the wide spread discussions about gender pay equality, as well as 
implicit deduction of the influence of directors pay on the global financial crisis, 
future research can also analyse if gender pay differences influence HPR and 
the relationship between the director (i.e., CEO, executive, and non-executive) 
pay and FP. In doing this, a distinction can be made between multiple (i.e. ‘busy 
directors’) and ‘non-busy directors’. Related to this, future research can explore 
the relationship between MPR, HPR on the structure and cost of capital or risk. 
This is because if HPR positively influences FP, then a sound theoretical 
preposition is that HPR will result in lower cost of equity capital or risk. In the 
same light, future studies can explore the relationship between HPR and share 
price for listed companies. 
 
Regarding improvement to the current study, future research can re-examine 
the factors that affect HPR as well as the influence of HPR on FP by expanding 
the sample size and considering a longer period applying a longitudinal 
approach and perhaps a participant observation methodology. If a longitudinal 
approach is used, then such a study can estimate both balanced and un-
balanced panels to avoid survivorship bias. Such a study can also identify 
cleaner specifications of the firm to ascertain whether the current findings are 
sensitive or robust to different sample specifications. 
 
Future research can also improve the construction of the Halo or HPR index to 
enhance validity and reliability. This can be done by examining the sensitivity 
or robustness of the results to weighted and un-weighted indices and to re-
examine the implications of binary and ordinal coding schemes on the study 
results. The reliability of the index can be improved if future research uses more 
than one coder so that inter-coder consistency can be measured. Future 
studies can also explore alternative sources of data collection, especially about 
FP and HPR. Even if data about MPR and HPR are collected from employees 
rather than managers, a control group of manager responses can provide 
useful insight and/or collaborative evidence. Related to this, future studies can 
explore the application of an alternative method that allows for primary data 
collection about HPR by the researcher and proceed to propose and test a 
method for coding or analysing such data to construct an HPR index. That way, 
the HPR construct will not be perceptual, and hence the will be no need to proxy 
actual HPR with perceptual HPR. The literature on corporate governance has 
gone through a similar evolution to great and consistent effect.  
 
Definitions of variables could be improved and made more precise. The 
construction of ENV can be measured by a broader base of variables than 
turbulence and complexity, IND can be defined to include variables beyond 
cognitive orientation, and even if the cognitive orientation is adopted, the 
variables can be broader than collectivism and individualism. IND, for instance, 
could consider cultural orientation. It could also consider self-control problems 
using the ‘planner-doer model’. The definition of managers could be broad base 
and extend to non-executive members of the board, and where non-executive 
members are considered, a distinction can be made between independent and 
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non-independent members. This enhances the stakeholder perspective and 
avoids the inherent assumption that the board is representative of stakeholders 
rather than shareholders. If this approach is adopted, then in substance the 
board has responsibilities to stakeholders for the MPR process rather than a 
simplified assumption that the board represents stakeholders to ensure a 
credible MPR process from managers. The logistic regression of HPR on FP 
can also be enhanced beyond the binary classification to include partial HPR 
or by applying an alternative HPR of high, low or medium HPR. 
 
The research design can consider alternatives such as event study 
methodology, participant observation, or even grounded approach. Event study 
methodology can isolate key events and explore their implication on MPR and 
HPR. Participant observation will provide insights into how MPR takes place 
and evolves within organisations and highlight how the various influences on 
HPR interplay in real scenarios. Understanding the evolution process for MPR 
is key to successful remedial action and other interventions. Admittedly 
behavioural change cannot be sudden, and this encompasses reaction to 
system changes. Therefore, understanding the evolution of MPR will help to 
anticipate the human reaction to changes and interventions.  
 
Even though a qualitative approach was adopted for some aspects of this study, 
this can be deepened in future studies. Particularly a qualitative approach can 
be used to explore wider variables about HPR and MPR among external 
stakeholders. In line the surge in behavioural economics studies, with the 
current trend to integrate economics with psychological analysis (Thaler, 2017), 
it will be helpful to be able to concisely examine and predict the decision-making 
processes of external stakeholders to key variations in MPR. Specifically, a 
qualitative approach can be used to explore how Mental Accounting (Thaler, 
2017) applies to MPR vis-à-vis stakeholders. An alternative experimental 
approach that adopts Thaler’s dictator games can be used to measure 
respondent’s attitude to fairness vis-à-vis the MPR process. The effects of 
managerial ‘nudging’ on HPR can also be explored through case studies or 
other qualitative methods. This may help enhance current understanding of 
how MPR evolves especially in a developing country setting. Studies about how 
MPR processes evolve will be very insightful and of peculiar interest, because 
it enhances our appreciation of the likely impact of changes to ‘controllable 
factors’ along with a time range. 
 
Also, in applying the survey method about different scenarios for misreporting, 
a difference was found between the questionnaire responses and interview 
responses. 47% questionnaire responses suggested misreporting MP within 
the organisation in Ghana whereas 51% interviewees suggested misreporting 
of MP.  Further research is required to understand if the choice of methodology 
affects findings. This is on a quest to ensure that methodological limitations do 







This study explores the concepts of honesty (H) in MPR of managers in their practice 
environment located in Ghana top companies. It seeks to explore, discover and review 
our understanding of these phenomena and then develop the concept of Honest 
Managerial Performance Reporting (HPR). 
 
In this exploration, the study assesses the managerial preference (i.e. voluntary 
propensity) for honesty in Managerial Performance Reporting (MPR), establishing the 
view that managers are mostly partially honest and therefore stakeholders may have 
some concerns.   As a result, this has implications for their advocacy of HPR in an 
organisational context.  The identification of relevant factors that influence HPR is 
clearly paramount in our understanding and how to improve the level of HPR.  The 
promotion of Honest Managerial Performance Reporting (HPR) is not just an idealised 
quest but has an impact on Firm Performance (FP). Finally, the main features of 
managerial behaviour in the top Ghanaian companies are considered in relation to 
HPR.  
 
The answer to the primary research question is that stakeholders must be concerned 
about HPR because it has implications on FP, employee satisfaction, employee 
perception and hence employee action. Also, multiple factors affect HPR. These 
include MCS, INC, IND, POLITICS, ENV, INNOVATE and PERF. However, the 
manner of interaction of these variables is such that ‘controllable factors’ have 
relatively more bearing on HPR. 
  
The study adopts a suitable and innovative theoretical framework in this endeavour.  
Initially, it considers Agency Theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), which now has 
matured into classic status. Hence Classic Agency Theory (CAT) is utilised to explore 
MPR practices.  It then utilises the multi-factor stakeholder model (Freeman, 1984, 
Yang, 2009) to explore the factors that influence Honest Managerial Performance 
Reporting (HPR) providing a more informed outcome of the relevant factors which are 
at work. The nature of the relationship between Honest Managerial Performance 
Reporting (HPR) and FP is explored using appropriate statistical and methodology 
approaches to develop our understanding further. This provides metrics and measures 
to calibrate and quantify resulting associations.  The use of mini case studies (in the 
form of vignettes) give insights into organisational and managerial practice about 
MPR. 
  
The outcomes of the study are profound, in that they provide an understanding of key 
concepts of honesty (H), Managerial Performance Reporting (MPR and Honest 
Managerial Performance Reporting (HPR) and how this relates to Firm Performance 
(FP).  It informs practice of the factors, relationships and features at work in Managerial 
Performance Reporting (MPR), the level of honesty (H) of managers and how 
stakeholders need to be vigilant in monitoring such behaviour.  This study is offered 
as a thesis that develops our understanding, contributes to our knowledge and has a 















































































































FIG 10.3: ROC For INDUSTRY 
 
Area Under the Curve 
Test Result Variable(s):   Predicted probability   
Area Std. Errora Asymptotic Sig.b 
Asymptotic 95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
.917 .018 .000 .882 .952 
The test result variable(s): Predicted probability has at least one tie between the positive actual state 
group and the negative actual state group.  
a. Under the nonparametric assumption 
b. Null hypothesis: true area = 0.5  
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FIG 10.4: ROC For TARGET 
 
Area Under the Curve 
Test Result Variable(s):   Predicted probability   
Area Std. Errora Asymptotic Sig.b 
Asymptotic 95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
.880 .021 .000 .839 .922 
The test result variable(s): Predicted probability has at least one tie between the positive actual 
state group and the negative actual state group. 
a. Under the nonparametric assumption 
b. Null hypothesis: true area = 0.5 
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Area Under the Curve 
Test Result Variable(s):   Predicted probability   
Area Std. Errora Asymptotic Sig.b 
Asymptotic 95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
.857 .024 .000 .811 .904 
The test result variable(s): Predicted probability has at least one tie between the positive actual 
state group and the negative actual state group.  
a. Under the nonparametric assumption 




Hair et al., (2010) argue that a Composite Reliability (CR) greater than 0.7 for all 
endogenous variables demonstrates reliability while an average variance extracted (AVE) 
greater than 0.5 demonstrates convergent reliability. Two methods are usually used in 
the literature to check for discriminate validity. A maximum shared variance (MSV) < AVE 
and squared root of AVE > than inter construct correlations.  Table 10.1 provides the initial 
results of a validity test of the model as presented below (Fig 10.6).  
 
Table 10.1: Validity Tests of SEM 
 CR AVE MSV MaxR(H) INC MCS ENV POLTCS IND 
INC 1.194 1.400 0.937 0.929 1.183         
MCS 0.949 0.809 0.897 0.965 0.941 0.899       
ENV 0.909 0.883 0.903 0.973 0.950         
POLTCS 1.028 1.027 0.935 0.978 0.926 0.931 0.948     
IND 1.135 1.344 0.937 0.981 0.968 0.947 0.921 0.967   
 
The initial test raised certain discriminate validity concerns (1) the square root of the 
AVE for MCSS is less than one the absolute value of the correlations with another 
factor, (2) the AVE for MCSS is less than the MSV, and (3) the AVE for ENVS is less 
than the MSV 
 
Ping (2009) argues that AVE and discriminant validity issues should not reduce the value 
of ‘First Time Studies’   as long as they are discussed as a limitation of the study.  This is 
because "interesting" theoretical model-testing studies usually involve a "first-time" 
model, and an initial model test, that together should be viewed as largely "exploratory." 
This "first test" usually uses new measures in a new model tested for the first time, etc., 
and insisting that the new measures be "perfect" may be inappropriate because new 
knowledge would go unpublished until a "perfect" study is attained. In such a case the 
diminished AVE is noted and discussed in the Limitations section of the research, any 
significant effects involving the low AVE LV's are held to a higher significance requirement 
(e.g., |t| >= 2.2 rather than |t| >= 2.0), and any discussion of interpretation, and especially 
implications, involving the low AVE LV's are clearly labelled as "very provisional" and in 
need of replication. 
 
This study proposes a new model to test HPR and hence contributes as a "first test,". 
Indeed, more measurement work is needed on the discriminate validity issues for MCS 
and ENV. Error terms were correlated to raise AVE and improve discriminant validity until 
discriminant validity was eliminated. The diagram below presents the detailed path 










FIGURE 10. 6 Full Path Diagrams For SEM  
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EMPLOYEE PERCEPTION ON ROA, ROCE AND EMPLOYEE SATISFACTION 
 
‘Perception’ was measured as a composite index of four variables: IND, BC, TARGET 
and L3Y. Only one factor was obtained using the Eigen value criteria, and this factor 
explains 57% of the total variations in the variables used. To increase this variation, the 
second factor (which explains about 20% of the total variations) was included. The 
proportions explained were used as weights to obtain a single indicator from the two 
factors. 
 
Employee perception of an organisations financial performance is a significant predictor 
(has a positive direct effect) of ROA, ROCE and employee satisfaction and the 
relationship is positive. The results would remain the same if the earlier factors generated 
were included individually. The equations were estimated with OLS with robust standard 
errors, and the results are presented below. 
 xxxi 
 
Table 10.2: Regression: Employee Perception And ROA 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
perception 0.064*** 0.060*** 0.061*** 0.055*** 0.055*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) 
GSE  0.080*** 0.098*** 0.045* 0.050* 
  (0.024) (0.025) (0.026) (0.027) 
Industry      
FMCG    -0.086*** -0.086*** 
    (0.026) (0.028) 
ICT    -0.108*** -0.103*** 
    (0.020) (0.023) 
Service    -0.197*** -0.195*** 
    (0.025) (0.026) 
Agric.    -0.197*** -0.195*** 
    (0.037) (0.042) 
Energy    -0.337*** -0.331*** 
    (0.015) (0.023) 
Metals    -0.046** -0.043* 
    (0.018) (0.025) 
Mining    -0.097*** -0.091*** 
    (0.023) (0.029) 
Size      
Big   0.007  0.004 
   (0.022)  (0.026) 
Medium   0.079***  0.021 
   (0.029)  (0.030) 
Small   0.069  -0.015 
   (0.044)  (0.048) 
Constant 0.163*** 0.146*** 0.125*** 0.215*** 0.209*** 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.018) (0.016) (0.023) 
      
Observations 265 265 265 265 265 
R-squared 0.091 0.127 0.154 0.354 0.356  
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Table 10.3: Regression: Employee Perception And ROCE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
perception 0.075*** 0.069*** 0.069*** 0.051*** 0.048*** 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) 
GSE  0.118*** 0.123*** 0.104** 0.089* 
  (0.039) (0.044) (0.041) (0.049) 
Industry      
FMCG    -0.169*** -0.165*** 
    (0.028) (0.031) 
ICT    0.040 0.024 
    (0.028) (0.037) 
Service    -0.189*** -0.205*** 
    (0.031) (0.037) 
Agric.    -0.294*** -0.325*** 
    (0.048) (0.058) 
Energy    -0.238*** -0.246*** 
    (0.021) (0.042) 
Metals    -0.077*** -0.105*** 
    (0.030) (0.038) 
Mining    -0.106*** -0.114*** 
    (0.021) (0.042) 
Size      
Big   0.002  0.025 
   (0.036)  (0.045) 
Medium   0.025  -0.030 
   (0.033)  (0.042) 
Small   0.006  -0.083 
   (0.043)  (0.056) 
Constant 0.186*** 0.162*** 0.156*** 0.237*** 0.245*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.027) (0.021) (0.042) 
      
Observations 265 265 265 265 265 











Table 10.4:  Regression: Employee Perception And Employee Satisfaction 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
perception 1.050*** 1.015*** 0.949*** 1.205*** 1.147*** 
 (0.141) (0.143) (0.143) (0.139) (0.142) 
GSE  0.649*** 0.886*** 0.298 0.429 
  (0.233) (0.236) (0.253) (0.281) 
Industry      
FMCG    -0.218 -0.025 
    (0.328) (0.353) 
ICT    -2.042*** -1.887*** 
    (0.538) (0.607) 
Service    -0.471 -0.396 
    (0.376) (0.391) 
Agric.    0.729* 0.560 
    (0.403) (0.441) 
Energy    -1.915*** -1.625*** 
    (0.280) (0.364) 
Metals    -0.097 -0.137 
    (0.386) (0.430) 
Mining    -1.531*** -1.236** 
    (0.437) (0.489) 
Size      
Big   0.833***  0.407 
   (0.230)  (0.297) 
Medium   0.733**  0.262 
   (0.334)  (0.379) 
Small   1.263***  0.734** 
   (0.270)  (0.340) 
Constant 3.113*** 2.979*** 2.450*** 3.270*** 2.982*** 
 (0.108) (0.125) (0.180) (0.169) (0.286) 
      
Observations 265 265 265 265 265 













Thank you for your participation in this experiment. Please read the instructions carefully 
before starting the experiment.  
You will participate in four (4) experiments and answer a short post experimental 
questionnaire.  
Participation is voluntary. Therefore, you can exercise your right not to participate at any 
time during the process. 
You will receive a monetary payment for your participation in these experiments. This will 
include a fixed fee for appearance and completed participation (US$5) and a variable 
amount, the calculation of which will vary per experiment. 
After each experiment, you will visit the next room (clearly designated) to collect your 
payment.  
Please do not discuss this experiment among yourselves or with the cashier as she does 
not know about what is going on here and what the experiment is about. 
For all experiments, please try to put yourself into the situation and try to behave as if you 
were involved in a real-world decision-making process. 
 
Thank you for your participation. 
 
 











Confidential Participation Number………………….. 
Experiment Number …………………………………… 
Reported Amount Q1……………………………………… 
Reported Amount Q2……………………………………… 
Reported Amount Q3……………………………………… 
Reported Amount Q4……………………………………… 
 
Experiment Two. 
With this experiment, your payoff will be based on your reported performance into the 
PMS. You have randomly selected a unique participation code and randomly selected 
your actual performance achievement which is private to you only. Neither the researcher 
nor anyone else has the information about your actual performance except you.  
Assume in this experiment that your annual salary is US$32. You are an employee of an 
organisation that distributes bonuses based on job performance. Annual bonuses are 
paid based on an accumulation of quarterly bonuses, and quarterly bonuses are 
computed as quarterly target achieved x (annual salary/4). For instance, an employee 
whose quarter one (Q1) target achievement rating is 50% will earn a bonus of 
50%X32/4=$4. All bonuses are accumulated and paid at the end of the year 
(Q1+Q2+Q3+Q4). You have agreed, with your boss, your percentage achieved targets 
for the last four quarters, and this has been duly imputed into the performance 
management system (PMS). Unfortunately, the PMS that records the agreed targets has 
been destroyed in a fire, and there is no back up anywhere.  Your boss, who agreed your 
performance rating with you has resigned and moved to another country and cannot be 
reached. No one else has this information. The organization has requested that you 
update the system with your agreed performance for the last three quarters. 




iv. These things happen 
v. Could have done better. 






































UNIQUE PARTICIPATION NUMBER……………………………………………….. 
 
POST EXPERIMENT QUESTIONNAIRE 
Please indicate the extent (circle as appropriate) to which you agree with each of the following 
statements about your company. In answering, use the following response scale and circle the 






B1 My participation in the experiment was anonymous 7  6  5  4  3   2    1 
B2 I have made the decision during the experiment as I would decide in 
a real-world situation 
 
B3 My variable pay-off was based on how much I reported and not on the 
actual numbers. 
 
B4 I have experience in performance measurement within my 
organization. 
 
B5 I am unaware of what these experiments are about or what they are 
meant to achieve. 
 
B6 When deciding on what to report, I considered how much monetary 
reward I will get. 
 
B7 No one will ever know whether I reported the accurate figure or not.  
B8 I was free to report any figure I wanted.  
B9 When deciding on what to report, in each scenario, I considered the 
likelihood that the accuracy of my report will be verified. 
 
 




































This survey is designed to explore the factors that cause as well as the effects of reporting 
behaviours within an organisation. The essence of this research is for academic purpose 
only; as part of a doctoral research study. 
To be useful for analysis, we are interested in your honest perception (i.e. what you alone 
firmly belief to be the case in each scenario and with each case). High standards of 
confidentiality will be maintained and is assured to all respondents and your response will 
not be shared with your organisation or any other person. There are no identifying marks 
on this questionnaire and your responses will be aggregated and summarised into one 
report and therefore cannot be uniquely identified. 
If you require any further clarification, please call the researcher on 0244621991. 
For the purpose of this study we define honest reporting to exist when an organisation or 
its leaders purposefully report performance results to stakeholders truthfully, responsibly 
and in a timely manner. Therefore, although truthfulness is central to the definition, being 
timely and responsible is equally relevant. As such, for this study, dishonest reporting (or 
misreporting) goes beyond direct lying and will encompass other techniques to 
purposefully hide information such as knowingly attributing managerial failures and other 
corporate failures to the wrong reasons such as “unforeseen or uncontrollable events”, 
deliberately delaying the submission of reports with the intention to shift stakeholder 
interest, as well as, the conscious use of technical jargons, sophisticated numbers etc., 
to confuse stakeholders. 
Business leaders are defined to mean executive management who report directly to the 
CEO and/or the BOD such as the CFO and other directors as well as all managers with 
a span of control (direct or indirect) over more than ten employees. 
Please provide your answers based on your objective perception of the organisation as 
a whole (not a specific individual or specific event in isolation) spanning the past 
three years (including this year). Do not return your completed questionnaire to anyone 
within the organisation, or share your responses with anyone. Please post the completed 
questionnaire to the researcher in the addressed envelope included or else the 
researcher (or his authorised agent) can be alerted to pick it up through the number 
provided above. 
 
Thank you for your participation. 
 




Please provide the following details. All information provided will be treated as extremely 


























Please tick one box to indicate your age range 
□ Below 18                   
□ 26 yrs- 35 yrs             





 Please mark as appropriate 
□ Male        
□ Female 
A3: HIGHEST ACADEMIC QUALIFICATION 
Please indicate your highest academic qualification (Mark/Tick One Box Only) 
□ SSCE/ O’ level/ A’ level                          
□ Professional qualification                                           
□  Other (please specify)…………… 
□ 18 yrs - 25 yrs 
□ 36yrs – 50 yrs 
□ HND    
□ Masters degree       
□ Bachelors Degree 
□ PhD or higher 
A4: TYPE OF INDUSTRY 
Please indicate the organizations main industrial sector (Mark/Tick One Box Only) 
□ Food, Beverage and Tobacco (FMCG) 
□ ICT and telecommunication                                           
□ Service industry 
□ Textile, Furniture and Paper 
□ Agriculture 
□ Other (please specify) 
□ Financial Services and Banking 
□ Government 
□ Construction 
□ Energy, Oil and gas 
□ Engineering and Electric 
□ Metal and Chemicals 
 
A5: NUMBER OF YEARS EXPERIENCE WITHIN THE ORGANIZATION 
Please indicate the years you have worked for the organization (Mark/Tick One Box Only) 
□ Less than 3 yrs 
□ More than 3 yrs but less than 5 years 
□ More than 10 years 
□ More than 5yrs but less than 10 yrs 
A6: NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES (FULL AND PART TIME; PERMANENT AND ON 
CONTRACT) IN THE ORGANIZATION 
Please indicate the average number of employees within the organization for this year  
(Please provide answer below) 
……………………………………………………………………………………. 
A7: YOUR MARITAL STATUS 
Please indicate your current marital status (Mark/Tick One Box Only) 
□ Single 




A8: OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 
Please indicate the ownership / controlling structure of the organization (Mark One Box Only) 
□ 100% private sector owned with no foreign ownership 
□ 100% private sector owned with foreign ownership 
□ Joint venture between local private and foreign private ownership 
□ Joint venture between local private ownership and government 






























SECTION B: YOUR PERCEPTIVE  
This section seeks your perspective on certain statements regarding the organization. Your 
perspective should be based on a frame of reference of the previous three years including this 
year in question. Please indicate the extent (circle as appropriate) to which you agree with each 
of the following statements about your company. In answering, use the following response scale 






B1 When there are performance gaps, leaders of this organization report 
honestly to Employees       
7  6  5  4  3   2    1 
B2 When there are performance gaps, leaders of this organization report 
honestly to their superiors and/or Bosses 
7  6  5  4  3   2    1 
B3 When there are performance gaps, leaders of this organization report 
honestly to Customers        






















A9: WHERE THERE IS GOVERNMENT SHAREHOLDING WHO IS IN CONTROL OF KEY 
MANAGEMENT DECISIONS (Mark One Box Only) 
□ Government 
□ The private shareholders 
□ Equally between the private shareholders and government 
A10: PLEASE TICK AS APPROPRIATE WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING BEST DESCRIBES 
YOUR ORGNAIZATION (Please mark more than one box if required) 
□ Registered as private limited liability  Company 
□ Registered as public limited liability  Company 
□ Registered as a Sole proprietorship 
□ Listed on Ghana Stock Exchange 
□ Equally between the private shareholders and government 
□ Owners/Shareholders directly manage the organizations 
□ Ownership and management are separated 
□ Registered as a partnership 
□ Listed on Ghana Club 100 
□ NGO □ Gov’t controlled 
□ Profit seeking 
A11: KNOWLEDGE ABOUT THIS ORGANIZATIONS PERFORMANCE REPORTING 
SYSTEM - Please indicate if you have an idea about the organizations performance reporting 
and management systems – (Please tick one) 
□ Yes I have an idea and actively involved in the organizations performance reporting 
□ No I have no idea and not involved in the organizations performance reporting 
□ I have a thorough idea about the organizations performance reporting system even 
though I am not actively involved. 
□ I used to be involved in the organizations performance system, but I am no more 
involved, however I still have a fair idea about it 
□ I am actively involved in the organizations performance reporting system but I do not 
understand it. 





B4 When there are performance gaps, leaders of this organization report 
honestly to Regulators          
7  6  5  4  3   2    1 
B5 When there are performance gaps, leaders of this organization report 
honestly to Shareholders        
7  6  5  4  3   2    1 
B6 When there are performance gaps, leaders of this organization report 
honestly to the Media       
7  6  5  4  3   2    1 
 
B7 Shareholders/BOD participate in designing organizational 
performance indicators for this organization 
7  6  5  4  3   2    1 
B8 Regulators influence key performance indicators for this organization 7  6  5  4  3   2    1 
B9 Employees participate in designing key performance indicators for this 
organization. 
7  6  5  4  3   2    1 
B10 Customers influence key performance indicators for this organization. 7  6  5  4  3   2    1 
B11 Employees are familiar with the results of performance measurement 
of leaders of this organization. 
7  6  5  4  3   2    1 
 
B12 Risk taking and creativity are actively encouraged in this organization. 7  6  5  4  3   2    1 
B13 Leaders of this organization encourage us to make suggestions for 
improvement in our work. 
7  6  5  4  3   2    1 
B14 People in this organization are encouraged to try new and better ways 
of doing the job. 
7  6  5  4  3   2    1 
B15 Innovative employees are the people who get rewarded in this 
organization. 
7  6  5  4  3   2    1 
 
B16 Most responsible officers have relatively limited decision making 
authority and often have to defer to other leaders on critical issues.  
7  6  5  4  3   2    1 
B17 Changes in the organizations products (i.e. new product, product 
improvements, new branding, price changes etc.) and processes (production, 
distribution, procurement, accounting and H.R processes etc.) do not occur 
frequently (less than five times a year). 
7  6  5  4  3   2    1 
B18 Critical decisions making is mostly centralized in the hands of a few 
top managers. 
7  6  5  4  3   2    1 
B19 This organization is not widely diversified and focuses on one or a few 
businesses, products, customers or suppliers to survive. 
7  6  5  4  3   2    1 
B20 There is homogeneity, similarity and alignment of interest and 
objectives among key stakeholders (e.g. regulators, media, 
employees, shareholders, customers etc.) of this organization. 
7  6  5  4  3   2    1 
 
B21 There are no cliques, infighting, power and territory struggles in this 
organization. 
7  6  5  4  3   2    1 
B22 In this organization, departmental units work together and there is no 
intense competition and rivalry among them. 
7  6  5  4  3   2    1 
B23 In this organization, telling others the truth is better than telling people 
what they want to hear. 
7  6  5  4  3   2    1 
B24 In this organization people listen to each other and credit is always 
given to the right person. 
7  6  5  4  3   2    1 
 
B25 This organizations, mission, vision and purposes of existence are 
widely communicated in clear language. 
7  6  5  4  3   2    1 
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B26 This organizations code of conduct is communicated widely and in 
clear language. 
7  6  5  4  3   2    1 
B27 This organization has standard operating procedures for critical 
activities and these are widely communicated in clear language. 
7  6  5  4  3   2    1 
B28 This organization has sanctions for disregarding the organizations 
rules and value systems and these sanctions are fairly applied in all 
situations. 
7  6  5  4  3   2    1 
B29 The code of conduct and other business rules are updated regularly.  7  6  5  4  3   2    1 
B30 Leaders of this organization adhere to the organizations values and 
rules. 
7  6  5  4  3   2    1 
 
B31 Performance evaluations on which pay raises are based are 
transparent and fair in this organization. 
7  6  5  4  3   2    1 
B32 Monetary rewards in this organization equitably reflect effort and 
outcome compared to others in the same organization. 
7  6  5  4  3   2    1 
B33 Salary raises within this organization are consistent with set policies 
on how raises should be determined. 
7  6  5  4  3   2    1 
B34 People in this organization are given the right type and amount of 
resources they need to do the work. 
7  6  5  4  3   2    1 
B35 People performances on which rewards are based are openly 
disclosed in this organization. 
7  6  5  4  3   2    1 
B36 Distribution of rewards is fair in this organization. 7  6  5  4  3   2    1 
 
B37 Leaders in this organization have high moral standards and uphold 
strong personal values. 
7  6  5  4  3   2    1 
B38 Leaders of this organization accept collective responsibility and do not 
shift blame. 
7  6  5  4  3   2    1 
B39 People of this organization will often sacrifice their personal interest 
for the collective interest of the group. 
7  6  5  4  3   2    1 
B40 People in this organization are likely to take time off to visit a sick 
employee. 
7  6  5  4  3   2    1 
 
B41 When an organization does not report honestly to its stakeholders, it 
adversely affects the reputation of the organization. 
7  6  5  4  3   2    1 
B42 When an organization does not report honestly to its stakeholders, 
shareholders invest in surveillance which increases cost of operation. 
7  6  5  4  3   2    1 
B43 When an organization does not report honestly to its stakeholders, it 
leads to lower profits. 
7  6  5  4  3   2    1 
B44 When an organization does not report honestly to its stakeholders, it 
increases internal conflicts among co-workers. 
7  6  5  4  3   2    1 
B45 When an organization does not report honestly to its stakeholders, it 
increases litigation and penalties charged against the organization. 
7  6  5  4  3   2    1 
B46 When an organization does not report honestly to its stakeholders, it 
reduces employee morale and job satisfaction. 
7  6  5  4  3   2    1 
B47 When an organization does not report honestly to its stakeholders, it 
adversely affects national economic development. 






1) In your view what are the negative effects of an organization misreporting its 








2) In your view what are the positive effects of an organization misreporting its performance 







3) Please rank the following (including your answer(s) to question C1 and C2) in order of 
likelihood of occurrence.  
Use 1 to represent highest likelihood, 2, next highest likelihood and so on .If you believe none has the likelihood 
of occurrence please state so here………………………………………………………. 
a. Negative effect on organization reputation and brand image         [   ] 
b. Increased cost of doing business                                                   [   ] 
c. Lower profits                                                   [   ]                 
d. Internal conflicts and low employee moral             [   ] 
e. Litigations and penalties                   [   ] 
f. Negative effects on national economic development            [   ] 
g. Answer(s) to C1 & C2…………………………              [   ] 
h. Answer(s) to C1 & C2…………………………            [   ] 
i. Answer(s) to C1&C2…………………………              [   ] 
j. Answer(s) to C1&C2…………………………              [   ] 
 
4) Please rank the following (including your answer(s) to question C1& C2) in order of 
highest adverse effect on organizational survival. 
Use 1 to represent highest adverse effect, 2 the next highest adverse effect and so on.  Please note that in this 
case, positive effects from dishonest reporting will appear after negative effects. If you believe none has the 
likelihood of occurrence please state so here………………………………………………………. 
a. Negative effect on organization reputation and brand image         [   ] 
b. Increased cost of doing business                                                   [   ] 
c. Lower profits                                                   [   ]                 
d. Internal conflicts and low employee moral             [   ] 
e. Litigations and penalties                   [   ] 
f. Negative effects on national economic development            [   ] 
g. Answer(s) to C1&C2…………………………              [   ] 
h. Answer(s) to C1&C2…………………………              [   ] 
i. Answer(s) to C1&C2…………………………              [   ] 
j. Answer(s) to C1&C2…………………………              [   ] 
5) What is your perception about the financial performance of the organization compared to 
its best competitor? 
a. Outperformed best competitor              [   ] 
b. Marginally above best competitor                                                    [   ] 
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c. At par with best competitor                                               [   ]                 
d. Marginally below best competitor                    [   ] 
e. Significantly below best competitor              [   ] 
6) What is your perception about the financial performance of the organization compared to 
the industry average? 
a. Outperformed industry average              [   ] 
b. Marginally above industry average                                                 [   ] 
c. At par with industry average                                              [   ]                 
d. Marginally below industry average                    [   ] 
e. Significantly below industry average              [   ] 
7) What is your perception about the financial performance of the organization compared to 
the organizations own targets? 
a. Outperformed target                [   ] 
b. Marginally above target                                                          [   ] 
c. At par with target                                               [   ]                 
d. Marginally below target                     [   ] 
e. Significantly below target               [   ] 
8) What is your perception about the financial performance of the organization compared to 
the average performance of the organization over the last three years? 
a. Outperformed 3 yr average               [   ] 
b. Marginally above 3 yr average                                                        [   ] 
c. At par with 3 yr average                                              [   ]                 
d. Marginally below 3 yr average                    [   ] 
e. Significantly below 3 yr average              [   ] 
9) Have you ever participated in a similar survey (based on the objective of the survey as 
stated earlier (Please mark one)?      Yes/ No 





Please answer the questions below and truthfully as possible based on your knowledge of the 




Key performance targets set by HQ for an organization on a new product recently launched are 
(a) Gross margin % (GM %) = at least 40% or better (b) Net Profit margin % (PM %) = at least 
15% or better. At the end of the year the actual performance figures for the new Product are 
presented as “Illustration A”. 
In the reported figures in ‘ILLUSTRATION A’, there is a cost item within cost of sales (COS) of 
GHS10 that most organizations often classify as operational expense (OPEX) and this is 
technically very accurate, but in order to ensure standardization, HQ has specifically clarified that 
such cost items should be classified within COS and not OPEX. HQ only sees a summary of 
performance as presented below and never goes into the details unless it is absolutely necessary. 
The entire organizations and its employee’s bonuses are based on achieving both the GM% and 































to OPEX), the organizations performance report will look like “Illustration B” and meet all the 
targets. 
 ILLUSTRATION A  ILLUSTRATION B 
GHS % GHS % 
Sales 100  100  
Cost of Sale (COS) (70)  (60)  
GM 30 30% 40 40% 
Operational Expense (OPEX) (15)  25  
Net Profit 15 15% 15 15% 
 
Please answer the following questions as honestly as possible. Please be aware that there 
is no right or wrong answer. 
1) Assuming you are responsible for providing this report, which illustration will you report 












3) How have your colleagues in this organization treated similar scenarios in the past and 






4) Do scenarios like this occur in your organization and how often? …………………………. 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 




SCENRIO TWO (2) 
In an organization, annual capital expenditures plans (CAPEX) must be pre-approved by HQ as 
part of the annual budgeting cycle. Even after approval of the annual budget, actual spends within 
the year can only be made with HQ approval. As a convention, CAPEX approvals for the next 
year are based on actual execution and spend of previously approved CAPEX. HQ defines spend 
to include committed funds (when a purchased order has been raised in the system) even if not 
actually spent. CAPEX budget for next year (2015 financial year) includes a significant spend for 
upgrading the finance office including a management accounting software but this may not be 
approved unless the organization shows that it has utilized (spent or committed) more than 80% 
of this year’s (2014 financial year) approved CAPEX.  The organizations 2014 approved CAPEX 
is GHS 1000, the actual amount spent so far is GHS600 and the pending POs (Purchase orders) 
in the system is GHS100 hence budget spend as defined by HQ is 70% of the approved budget. 
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HQ has no way of knowing actual POs generated in the system. HQs only sees an excel sheet 
that summarizes actual spend and committed POs.  
Assuming you are the management accountant of this organization and the decision is entirely 

















SCENARIO THREE (3) 
A departmental head is responsible for ensuring that departments’ overhead does not exceed 
GHS2000 per annum and the whole department’s end of year bonus is tied heavily to achieving 
this target. At the end of the year (2014) actual expenditure is GHS3000. The department carried 
out a redundancy exercise so HQ is expecting the department to exceed its overhead. The 
budgeted amount for the redundancies exercise was GHS1000 so the actual overheard of 
GHS3000 is within HQs expectation. However unknown to HQ, the department succeeded in 
negotiating the redundancy cost down to GHS600.The extra GHS400 cost in overhead is an 
accrual for a cost item that was missed in last year’s account (2013). GHS400 is 10% of the 
organizations 2013 total expenses and if it had been reported in last year’s accounts, the 
department will missed its performance targets hence earn no bonus. Last year the department 
was adjudged the best performing department within the group in terms of cost control.  
 
Assuming the organization you currently work in is confronted with a similar scenario, in the 
annual performance review with HQ will it highlight the error in last year accounts or will it allow 
HQ to continue believing that the excess overheads relate to redundancy cots assuming HQ has 






SCENARIO FOUR (4) 
Your organization produces a quarterly product profitability report covering all products, but 
management never takes a look at this report. Your organization has recently launched a product 
that has been generating remarkable sales volume and revenue. Last year, every member in the 
organizations bonuses went up by 50% due to the achievement of the sales target for this product, 
and this is likely to repeat this year. However, a critical review of the product profitability report 
shows that the huge sales for the new product (last year and this year) were driven by a relatively 
high cost making the product unprofitable. You have spoken to the sales manager who has 
promised to get this cost under control next quarter and you are confident that he can; based on 
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the plan of action he has shared with you. Often as part of the quarterly visits from senior 
executives from HQ, a meeting is held where the performance of the organization is discussed. 
Various reports are prepared in readiness for that meeting, including the product profitability 
report, CAPEX report, overall financial statements and Human resources reports; however the 
product profitability report is never discussed or reviewed. HQ will be very unhappy if they realize 
the profitability of the new product. HQ has requested that your organization limit the number of 
reports submitted for this quarter’s discussion to three due to time constraints. The CAPEX report 
and HR report do not contain any significant changes from last quarter’s submission. 
  
Based on your knowledge of your current organization, how do you perceive the department in 
which you currently work will act if confronted with a similar scenario? Which reports will they 







SCENARIO FIVE (5) 
Sales volumes have been significantly below target in the months of May, June and July. Last 
year (in 2014) the sales director attributed ‘unforeseen circumstances’ to the low sales volume in 
a similar period and explained it as due to heavy rains affecting product distribution and consumer 
consumption preferences. HQ always accepts this explanation. However this year’s budget 
(2015) took into consideration the rainfall patterns and significantly reduced forecasted sales 
volumes in MAY, JUNE and JULY. The real reason for the low sales volume is rather due to (for 
2015) a competitor introducing a superior distribution network and a relatively better quality 
product that is appropriately priced. HQ is unaware that the budget figures took into consideration 
rainfall patterns, and are also unaware of the competitor recent successes. The sales director has 
attributed ‘unforeseen circumstances’ (without any further explanation) again as the reason for 
low sales volume. Technically he is right because the recent competitor activities are unforeseen. 
However, without any further explanation HQ will think it ‘unforeseen circumstances’ implies yet 
again an unpredictable rainfall pattern and are likely to accept the explanation without any further 
questions. 
 
How will your organization handle such a situation in a real scenario? Will it offer further 
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